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This research focuses on the relationship between international investment and 
cultural rights, ultimately seeking to determine how to reconcile investor protection 
with the need to protect and promote the cultural rights of vulnerable stakeholders, 
such as indigenous peoples. Cultural rights, which are closely connected to the 
principles of human dignity and sustainable development, have attracted the attention 
of academics and policy-makers in recent decades, but are still far from receiving the 
attention and recognition that they deserve. Conversely, international investment law 
is much more developed and has been construed in a way that can compromise a 
host State's ability to regulate in order to promote and protect human rights in general, 
and cultural rights in particular. This research will contain two parts: the first one will 
be composed of three chapters, the first analysing the concept and scope of cultural 
rights; the second providing an overview of international investment law; and the third 
assessing its relationship with cultural rights. The second part of the study will deal 
with the hard and soft law mechanisms that can be used to influence the balance 
between investment and the respect for cultural rights, at the international level. This 
will include the analysis of voluntary corporate conduct codes (chapter 4), compliance 
requirements in the context of investment loans (chapter 5), as well as investor-State 
dispute settlement (chapter 6). Finally, conclusions will be drawn, so as to provide a 
deeper understanding of the most effective ways to protect and promote cultural 
rights in the context of foreign investment.
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In the past decades, the whole world has witnessed and praised the undeniably vast 
array of benefits brought about by foreign investment, particularly in terms of 
economic growth.1 Nevertheless, scholars, activists and the media have all 
highlighted the dangers of globalisation and the transformative effect that it has on 
societies all over the world, at every level.2 In fact, the benefits attributed to increasing 
investment flows are not always homogeneously distributed among all the groups that 
are impacted by foreign investment, and claims of insufficient consideration for certain 
non-economic interests have started to appear and spread all over the world.3 One 
such interest – the one which constitutes the object of this research – is the protection 
of the cultural rights of stakeholders that are affected by investment projects,4 both 
as a legitimate non-investment objective that States ought to be able to pursue and, 
more importantly, as an obligation that, in a perfect world, large and powerful 
multinational enterprises (hereinafter, MNEs)5 ought to have. 
On the one hand, the exercise of a given State’s sovereign powers seriously risks 
being constrained by the assumption of commitments at the international level which 
focus solely on economic issues. On the other hand, and perhaps more worryingly, 
host States often fail to control the activities of MNEs operating in their territories, 
sometimes even colluding with them in serious human rights violations.  
																																																								
1 Especially in the context of developed economies, but depending on absorptive capacities – see Laura 
Alfaro et al., ‘Does foreign direct investment promote growth? Exploring the role of financial markets on 
linkages’, 91 Journal of Development Economics 242 (2010). 
2 For an interesting perspective on the effects of globalisation on democracy, see Armin Von Bogdandy, 
‘Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law’, 15 
European Journal of International Law 885 (2004). See also Mohsen al Attar and Ciaron Murnane, ‘The 
Place of Capitalism in Pursuit of Human Rights in Globalized Relationships of States’ in Jeffery F. 
Addicott et al. (eds), Globalization, International Law, and Human Rights (Oxford 2011). 
3 In this regard, see, inter alia, Lorenzo Cotula, Human Rights, Natural Resources and Investment Law 
in a Globalised World - Shades of grey in the shadow of the law (Routledge 2012). 
4 Throughout this dissertation, and unless otherwise stated, I will refer to ‘stakeholders’ as not including 
the foreign investor, but rather as encompassing individuals and communities who are affected by an 
investment project in which they do not directly participate.  
5 There is no terminological consensus regarding MNEs; they are also called multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and transnational corporations (TCs). In this research, I will give preference to the term MNE. 
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Balancing cultural rights and investment protection raises questions that are likely to 
grow exponentially in the near future, both in terms of complexity and gravity. Year 
after year, an increasingly high number of International Investment Agreements6  
(IIAs) are being concluded,7 thus progressively heightening the potential for conflicts 
of interests between the protection of foreign investment and compliance with other 
obligations, arising either from domestic or international law.8 These conflicts of 
interests become particularly acute when they involve a non-economic policy 
objective of the host State, such as the protection of human rights and the 
environment, as the sovereign prerogative of a State to regulate must be weighed 
against the duty to protect foreign investors. 
IIAs entail the assumption of commitments by the contracting parties regarding each 
other’s investors and investments. They also provide for enforcement instruments,9 
which generally include the possibility of settling disputes through investor-State 
arbitration. This means that host States may see their regulatory space constricted 
(or harder to manage), since they are obliged to compensate foreign investors in case 
of direct or indirect expropriation and to treat them in a non-discriminatory manner, in 
accordance with objective and subjective standards of treatment. The violation of 
these obligations results in host State liability, which, in turn, may lead to a ‘race-to-
the-bottom’,10 where the will to attract foreign investment dissuades the State from 
enacting legitimate regulatory measures and eventually leads to a general lowering 
of standards regarding non-economic objectives.11 Whilst not all disputes between 
foreign investors and States end up being solved through arbitration, the mere 
existence of that possibility is regarded as a factor sufficiently strong to influence the 
																																																								
6 In this research, IIAs will be deemed to include international investment agreements and international 
trade agreements, as long as they contain investment-related provisions. 
7 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), by the end of 
2014, there were 2,926 Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter, BITs) and 345 other IIAs, including 
free trade agreements with investment chapters. The UNCTAD points out, nevertheless, that ‘the annual 
number of “other IIAs” has remained stable over the past few years, while the annual number of BITs 
continues to decline’ – UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance (UNCTAD/WIR/2015) (2015), p. 106. 
8 The number of investor-State dispute settlement cases has been rising exponentially, reaching 
unprecedented numbers in 2013 (59 known cases, whilst in 2014 there were 42) – UNCTAD (2015), p. 
112. 
9 Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’, 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal (2010). 
10 OHCHR, Human rights, trade and investment report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9) (2003), p. 11. 
11 See Kate M. Supnik, ‘Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing 
Interests in International Investment Law’, 59 Duke Law Journal (2009), at 373. See also Shannon 
Lindsey Blanton and Robert G. Blanton, ‘What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human 
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment’, 69 The Journal of Politics (2007), p. 144. 
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way in which States manage their domestic and international obligations, namely 
regarding human rights. The prominence of the subject has been acknowledged and 
addressed by both international institutions and legal scholars. Namely, it led several 
international organisations to emphasise and try to tackle the issue of consistency 
between IIAs and international human rights instruments. Based on the premise that 
States have a duty to protect, respect and fulfil human rights, the United Nations 
(hereinafter, UN) embarked on a mission to establish mechanisms designed to 
ensure said consistency. In 2003, the High Commissioner for Human Rights affirmed: 
(…) it will be important to avoid a situation where the threat of litigation on the 
basis of broadly interpreted expropriation provisions has a “chilling effect” on 
government regulatory capacity, conditioning State action to promote human 
rights and a healthy environment by the commercial concerns of foreign 
investors. While human rights should not provide a shield to protect 
unwarranted protectionism, administrative failures or unfair treatment, neither 
should they be made subject solely to an economic calculus.12  
Next to the mere existence of the possibility of arbitration, the legal uncertainty 
created by inconsistent awards is another relevant factor leading to the referred 
‘chilling effect’. In the absence of a comprehensive multilateral investment treaty and, 
consequently, of a centralised dispute settlement mechanism, inconsistent 
interpretation of similar treaty provisions and unpredictable application of other 
international law instruments render the parties less willing to take risks – there is ‘a 
patchwork of mechanisms to resolve the investment disputes’13 and no single entity 
capable of a higher level of judicial review or correction of legal errors made by arbitral 
tribunals. This results in a very accentuated threat to the rule of law and, therefore, to 
the legitimacy of the entire investment arbitration system.14 
Whilst some IIAs already contain limited exceptions addressing public policy issues,15 
such as ‘human, animal or plant life or health’ and the protection of ‘aboriginal people 
																																																								
12 OHCHR (2003), pp. 21-22. 
13 Susan D Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review (2005), p. 1523. 
14 Idem, pp. 1582 et seq., affirming that the ‘chilling effect’ on State exercise of regulatory power is but 
one of the many symptoms of the growing inability to ‘determine with certainty the respective rights and 
obligations of investors and Sovereigns in a given situation.’ 
15 For instance, the 2004 Canadian Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) contains broadly 
drafted general exceptions, which are very similar to those present in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). 
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or socially or economically disadvantaged individuals or groups’,16 these exceptions 
are generally qualified so as to be inapplicable to the agreements’ provisions on 
expropriation or to apply only to Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and National Treatment 
(NT) standards.17 This, coupled with the scarcity of customary international law rules 
dealing with public policy and public interest, renders the consideration of non-
economic objectives by international investment tribunals very difficult. In addition, 
such consideration is deemed a ‘dangerous task because it seems to draw tribunals 
beyond the applicable law and, thus, to expose their awards to a serious danger of 
annulment.’18 
Despite all the less optimistic views expressed in legal literature in this regard, some 
authors still affirm that arbitral tribunals seek coherence and, therefore, attempt to 
reach a consistent interpretation of similar treaty provisions.19 Furthermore, some 
commentators stress the fact that: 
(…) consistency should not be confused with uniformity in a world of differing 
State interests and differing treaty language. Given States' varying interests, 
it has been suggested by some that the system should be an “intelligent” one 
that provides different solutions for different users of the system, including 
developing countries who need policy space for their development. It has also 
been suggested that predictability might be a better term than consistency to 
capture the goal at issue.20 
In addition, according to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(hereinafter, VCLT), international treaties ‘shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’.21 The elements of context, object 																																																								
16 See, e.g., Article 24 of the Energy Charter Treaty, signed in Lisbon in December 1994 and in force 
since April 1998. 
17 See, inter alia, Article 7 of the UK Model Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(2005, with 2006 amendments), reproduced in Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment 
Claims (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
18 Charles H. Brower II, ‘Obstacles and Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment 
Treaty Disputes’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2008-2009 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
19 See, inter alia, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration’, 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 513 (2009), as 
well as David Gaukrodger and Kathryn Gordon, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for 
the Investment Policy Community’ OECD Working Paper No 2012/3 (2012), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf. 
20 David Gaukrodger and Kathryn Gordon (2012), p. 61 (emphasis added). 
21 Cf. Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol. 1155, p. 331 (emphasis added). 
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and purpose may facilitate an interpretation of IIAs that not only provides for more 
consistency, but also for more flexibility and the ability to take into account objectives 
that are not strictly related to investment.  
First, it is important to note that many IIAs contain references to these objectives both 
in the provisions concerning exceptions and in the preamble. For instance, the 
preamble of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which contains an 
important investment chapter, expressly refers to the objectives of respecting 
‘environmental protection and conservation’, preserving ‘flexibility to safeguard the 
public welfare’ and promoting sustainable development.22 Similarly, the preamble of 
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) mentions ‘the increasingly urgent need for 
measures to protect the environment’. IIAs more recently concluded by the European 
Union (EU) together with its Member States and third countries, such as the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the CARIFORUM States,23 contain more 
sophisticated references to non-investment objectives, by affirming the contracting 
parties’ commitment to ‘the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the 
rule of law’, ‘internationally agreed development objectives’, ‘sustainable 
development’ and ‘basic labour rights’.24 
Secondly, according to the same Article 31(1) of the VCLT, the assessment of 
‘context’ for the purpose of interpretation of treaty provisions must take into account 
‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’.25 This obligation may require investment arbitrators to take into account 
important international instruments such as, for example, the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)26 or the 1972 UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
																																																								
22 It should nevertheless be noted that Article 102 of the NAFTA establishes several objectives which 
are intended to guide interpretation and application of the agreement; the list does not include the non-
investment objectives mentioned in the preamble. 
23 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the 
European Community and its Member States, of the other part (2008), OJ L289/I/3, of 20/10/2008. 
Although this is primarily a trade agreement, it also contains important provisions on investment. 
24 Although the number of IIAs containing these provisions is low in absolute terms, it is important to note 
that language associated with non-investment goals is gaining popularity in more recent agreements. In 
this sense, see K. Gordon et al., ‘Investment Treaty Law, Sustainable Development and Responsible 
Business Conduct: A Fact Finding Survey’ OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2014/01 
(2014), p. 10; and Federico Ortino, ‘Investment treaties, sustainable development and reasonableness 
review: a case against strict proportionality balancing’, Leiden Journal of International Law 71 (2017), p. 
80. 
25 Cf. Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 




Cultural and Natural Heritage (hereinafter, the World Heritage Convention or the 
WHC). 
It is, therefore, possible to affirm, like Brower does, that ‘principles of treaty 
interpretation provide a starting point for more open and systematic consideration of 
the public interest pervading investment treaty disputes.’27 
A distinct problematic feature of International Investment Law (hereinafter, IIL)28 is 
that investors are widely protected in IIAs, but mostly left without any specific 
obligations, which leads to a significant imbalance of power between them and 
affected stakeholders. The seriousness of this lack of obligations is heightened by the 
fact that international Human Rights Law (HRL) has still not reached a point where it 
clearly imposes legally binding obligations on non-State entities, leaving it to States 
to adopt rules that translate their human rights obligations regarding the conduct of 
individuals and MNEs; often, this means allowing business to act with impunity. 
The above considerations reflect some of the key concerns expressed in recent calls 
for reform of IIL.29 Whilst radically restructuring this field of law and its enforcement 
mechanisms is probably a herculean task, unattainable in the nearest future, several 
ad hoc opportunities for change appear on the horizon. At a time when globalisation 
is becoming so overwhelming, cultural homogenisation rapidly takes place and civil 
society is fighting harder than ever to be heard, it becomes urgent to bring forth the 
debate about cultural rights and how they can be articulated with the protection of 
investors and investment, about corporate human rights responsibility and the 
suitability of international arbitration for the effective promotion and protection of such 
rights. 
Discussing these issues is not just a theoretical necessity; a brief look at newspapers 
and social media in 2016 will quickly demonstrate how relevant these matters are at 
present in practical terms, namely as evidenced by the situation in Standing Rock, 
North Dakota, United States (US), which has captured the world’s attention and 
																																																								
27 Charles H. Brower II (2009), p. 376. 
28 In this research, IIL will be understood as including not only investment treaties (bilateral and 
multilateral) and trade agreements with investment provisions, but also other instruments that have an 
impact on foreign investment, such as the relevant international customary law, general principles of law, 
judicial decisions and soft law instruments. 
29 Regarding calls for reform of IIL, in particular of investment arbitration and States’ ‘regulatory space’, 
see, inter alia, Susan D Franck (2005); Kate M. Supnik (2009); Charles N. Brower and Stephan W. Schill, 
‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boom to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law’, 9 Chi J Int'l L 471 
(2008); and UNCTAD (2015). 
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inspired passionate reactions from both sides involved. At stake is the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, destined to connect southern Illinois and the Bakken and Three Forks 
production areas in North Dakota, which is currently fiercely opposed by the Standing 
Rock Sioux tribe, who argue their sacred sites will be destroyed and the quality of 
their water (essential for drinking but also for their way of life) will be compromised.30 
Unfortunately, this situation is not an isolated event. In Canada, for instance, similar 
protests are taking place regarding a hydro-electric dam that is to be built on 
indigenous lands in the Peace River Valley, British Columbia. If actually built, this 
dam will flood over 80km of the Valley, destroying lands that are vital to indigenous 
hunting and fishing and destroying grave sites.31 
 
2. Research questions 
In this research, the focus will be placed mainly on the investor itself. Whilst the issue 
of extraterritorial regulation of the conduct of MNEs abroad by the home State is 
extremely interesting, it will not be discussed in this dissertation, for reasons of 
space.32 Furthermore, this research will not discuss the role of the host State (holder 
of the primary duty to protect human rights against abuse by third parties, including 
businesses). This duty imposes on host States a positive obligation to exercise due 
diligence (in the form of appropriate policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication) 
to ensure that the activities of private parties do not impinge on the enjoyment by 
individuals and groups, within their jurisdiction, of internationally-guaranteed cultural 
rights. The main reasons for excluding this topic from the scope of this research are 
matters of space (the full treatment of the host State duty to protect would constitute 
a thesis in itself) and also a question of realism: whereas many developed countries 
already possess robust mechanisms in this regard, there is still a significant number 
of States that do not. This is particularly acute in the case of indigenous peoples – as 
noted by the UN, 
																																																								
30 See, inter alia, ‘Dakota Access pipeline: the who, what and why of the Standing Rock protests’, The 
Guardian, 3 November 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/03/north-
dakota-access-oil-pipeline-protests-explainer. 
31 See, inter alia, ‘Canada’s $7 Billion Dam Tests the Limits of State Power’, The New York Times, 10 
December 2016, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/10/world/canada/canadas-7-billion-dam-
tests-the-limits-of-state-power.html?_r=0.  
32 For an interesting account of the matter, see, inter alia, Claire Methven O'Brien, ‘The Home State Duty 
to Regulate the Human Rights Impacts of TNCs Abroad: A Case of Extraterritorial Overreach?’ DIHR 
Matters of Concern Human Rights Research Papers No 2016/04 (2016). 
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[M]ining companies and other extractive corporations tend to have few 
requirements to consider the environmental or social impact of their activities 
on indigenous peoples. This is especially the case in southeast Asia and many 
African countries due to the non-recognition of customary land rights. Even 
where some legislation protecting indigenous peoples’ land rights exists, it is 
frequently not implemented or is overpowered by conflicting legislation that is 
designed to attract foreign investment. Whether it is gold mining in Guatemala, 
nickel extraction in Indonesia, the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, or the gas 
pipeline in Camisea in the Peruvian Amazon, the effects have been 
devastating on the indigenous peoples whose territories are destroyed by 
highly polluting technologies and disregard of local communities’ right to the 
environment.33 
Acknowledging the existing shortcomings of the protection afforded by host States, 
and recognising the need to find more holistic solutions, I therefore propose to focus 
mainly on the role of the investor, with one exception: when analysing if investment 
arbitration can be harnessed to protect cultural rights, I will refer to situations in which 
host States directly or indirectly engage with human rights and/or cultural rights 
arguments.  
The particular focus on indigenous peoples is intentional, due to the severe 
vulnerability that results from their particular culture, spirituality and minority status. 
Not only are there many situations in which the home State does not even 
acknowledge indigenous peoples as such, but the instances of historical abuse also 
justify particular care with the preservation of their culture. Indigenous peoples are 
amongst the most sustainable communities in the world, living in symbiosis with the 
environment. Ensuring that they are allowed to maintain and develop their traditional 
ways of life is crucial: there should be no further forced assimilation, and cultural 
diversity must be guaranteed both because of its intrinsic value, and because of its 
contribution to sustainable development. In fact, 
indigenous peoples tend to see globalization as a threat to their territories, 
their traditions and cultural expressions, their cultures and identities, 
																																																								
33 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Social Policy and Development, 
Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 




compelling them to fight harder on a variety of fronts to ensure their cultural 
survival, as well as to find a new way to assert their rights and autonomy.34 
The 1989 Convention (No. 169) on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (hereinafter, ILO Convention no. 169) states that self-identification is the 
primary criterion in the definition of which peoples should be considered indigenous. 
It further characterises tribal and indigenous peoples as those groups ‘whose social, 
cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national 
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or 
traditions or by special laws or regulations’. In addition, it refers to indigenous peoples 
as those groups having a particular status as a result of their ‘descent from the 
populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country 
belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions.’35 
The main question that this research intends to answer is: how can we harness both 
hard and soft law mechanisms to integrate international investment and cultural 
rights? That is, in order to integrate international investment and cultural rights, is it 
preferable to harness hard or soft law mechanisms, or a combination of both, and 
what can be improved? 
This may be broken down into several secondary questions, namely: is it possible to 
address cultural rights concerns in the context of investment projects from an ex ante 
perspective, i.e., before a dispute between the investor and the host State has a 
chance to occur? Is it realistically possible to influence the behaviour of MNEs so as 
to guarantee that they will do everything in their power to respect, protect and promote 
cultural rights? If this is indeed possible, what are the hard and soft law mechanisms 
that can be harnessed for that purpose? And, lastly, how adequately can investment 
arbitration deal with cultural rights issues that may arise? Are stakeholders able to 
participate in the dispute, express their concerns and defend what is sacred to them? 
What is more effective? 
 																																																								
34 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Social Policy and Development, 
Secretariat of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
(2009), ST/ESA/328, p. 71. See previous page for the arguments leading to this conclusion. 




The methodology applied to this research is not purely doctrinal, but rather analytical. 
It entails extensive literature review on the topic and related matters, but also a 
thorough examination of investment arbitration documents, a survey and analysis of 
the relevant international hard and soft law instruments, official figures and reports, 
as well as the media. This research intends to be inter-disciplinary, in the sense of 
drawing from different branches of international law, namely international investment 
law, international cultural heritage law and international human rights law, 
complemented by notions of anthropology and archaeology. 
This dissertation revolves, to a great extent, around the phenomenon of globalisation 
and its impacts on individuals and communities. It draws inspiration from Kant’s 
famous words: 
Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has 
developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout the 
world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated 
notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil and international 
law, indispensable for the maintenance of the public human rights and hence 
also of perpetual peace.36 
The approach undertaken is liberal, principled and human rights-based, recognising 
cultural diversity and pluralism without losing sight of the universal values and 
morality that form part of an ‘overlapping consensus’37 uniting the whole of humanity. 
It is cosmopolitan in the sense that it presupposes that ‘all kosmopolitês, all citizens 
of the world, share a membership in one single community, the cosmopolis, which is 
governed by a universal and egalitarian law.’38 Normatively speaking, this leads to 
the affirmation of the principle per which ‘every human being has a global stature as 
an ultimate unit of moral concern’.39 In addition, this research follows Buchanan’s 
																																																								
36 Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical sketch (1795)’ in Hans Reiss (ed), Kant's Political 
Writings (Cambridge University Press 1970), pp. 107-108. 
37 The expression is borrowed from John Rawls, ‘The idea of an overlapping consensus’, 7 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1987). 
38 Roland Pierik and Wouter Werner, Cosmopolitanism in context: perspectives from international law 
and political theory (Cambridge University Press 2010), p. 1. 
39 Thomas W Pogge, World poverty and human rights (Polity 2008), p. 175. 
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thesis that ‘[j]ustice ought to be a primary goal of the international legal system, where 
the main content of justice is supplied by a conception of basic human rights.’40 
In sum, the three main pillars grounding this research are as follows: first, every 
human being has equal moral value and everyone has an obligation to contribute to 
the preservation of such moral value; second, human rights are inherent to a vision 
of global justice as the ultimate goal of the international legal system; third, cultural 
rights are essential to sustainable development, to the preservation of the identity of 
communities and their self-determination, to human dignity and to the promotion of 
peace amongst and within nations. 
 
4. Main thesis and structure of the work 
This research takes it as a given that the integration of international investment and 
human rights is desirable, and that both human rights and investment are worthy of 
protection. It assesses if and how this integration may be achieved, through an 
analysis of the arguments behind the relevant rules and an appraisal of their 
consequences. 
The thesis acknowledges that neither international HRL nor IIL, as they stand today, 
offer the clarity and accountability necessary to guarantee the protection and 
promotion of the cultural rights of stakeholders that are affected by investment 
projects. For that reason, it will demonstrate the need to harness both hard and soft 
law mechanisms in order to enhance the integration of cultural rights and international 
investment. This dissertation will assume that prevention of impacts should be 
preferred, as opposed to remediation, which justifies the harnessing of soft law 
mechanisms imposing human rights responsibilities on companies and financial 
institutions (at least, as long as legally binding instruments are not available). Keeping 
in mind the cases where these impacts cannot be prevented from the point of view of 
corporate social responsibility, this research will also assess how different 
approaches to investment arbitration may contribute to the protection and promotion 
of cultural rights. 
																																																								
40 Allen E Buchanan, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: moral foundations for international law 
(Oxford University Press on Demand 2007), p. 69. 
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In light of the above, it is important to map the most relevant hard and soft law 
instruments, including intergovernmental, institutional and private initiatives, that are 
applicable to international investors, and to understand how they can be applied in 
this very specific context through an examination of their key features. I conclude that, 
if implemented and applied correctly and substantially by investors, existing soft law 
mechanisms have the potential to significantly affect corporate behaviour so as to 
bring it into compliance with human rights law. This constitutes a small yet positive 
step in the right direction, and whilst the international community struggles to adopt 
binding rules on corporate behaviour, these instruments should be harnessed and 
their ‘hardening’ should be promoted. 
To clarify, for the purposes of this dissertation, the ‘hardening’ of soft law instruments 
is deemed to occur in four different ways: first, States and regional institutions (such 
as the European Union) may adopt binding legislation inspired by, and in line with, 
the existing soft law instruments; second, international organisations can make, apply 
and enforce rules linked to sustainability in an increasingly ‘law-like’ manner; third, 
international courts and tribunals may apply human rights standards to corporate 
behaviour, even if indirectly (e.g., investor-State dispute settlement bodies may justify 
their decisions with reference to soft law instruments); and, finally, the success of 
these initiatives can inspire the transition of international human rights law to a binding 
framework that is more adjusted to a globalised world, in which MNEs hold massive 
power, through the formal expansion of human rights responsibilities to non-State 
actors. 
In short, the answer that I propose to the main research question (how can we 
harness both hard and soft law mechanisms to integrate international investment and 
cultural rights?) is as follows: since none of the individually assessed instruments 
sufficiently guarantee such integration when taken in isolation, it is essential to make 
an intelligent and effective use of both hard and soft law mechanisms in combination, 
which in turn has the potential to significantly alter corporate behaviour and to foster 
a more sustainable investment culture. Both sets of instruments should be pursued, 
but they also need to be improved. The answer, therefore, lies not in the strict choice 
between binding legislation and private orderings, but rather in their coexistence, 
mutual reinforcement and improvement.  
There will be two parts to this dissertation: the first, composed of three chapters, will 
focus on the conceptual framework, analysing the concept of cultural rights and the 
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main contours of investment protection, followed by a sketch of the interaction 
between the two. The reason for the inclusion of these chapters lies fundamentally in 
the broad range of intended readers (from human rights lawyers to investment 
lawyers, but also scholars who are interested in the cultural rights responsibilities of 
business more generally), who may not be familiar with the context of international 
investment law or cultural rights. The second part, also with three chapters, will 
analyse both ex ante and ex post mechanisms to protect cultural rights.41 
Chapter 1 will focus on the conceptual and historical framework of cultural rights, but 
also on the linkage with related concepts (such as cultural heritage and other related 
human rights) and the relevant sources of law. Chapter 2 will provide a brief overview 
of IIL and relevant instruments, whereas chapter 3 will address the relationship 
between investment and cultural rights, providing an examination of the clashes of 
interests that are manifest in their interaction. 
The second and main part of this research will deal with the legal mechanisms that 
can be harnessed to influence the balance between investor protection and the 
respect for cultural rights, at the international level. This will include the analysis of 
corporate social responsibility (chapter 4), the role that banks may play in corporate 
performance (chapter 5), as well as investor-State dispute settlement (chapter 6). 
Chapters 4 and 5 will thus attempt to determine if and how it is possible to influence 
the behaviour of investors ex ante, either through their own volition or through 
requirements imposed by banks financing investment projects. Chapter 6 will address 
the last safety net for stakeholders, which is the possibility of addressing cultural rights 
arguments in investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). Finally, some conclusions will 
be drawn and some suggestions will be put forward.  
																																																								
41 Ex ante mechanisms will refer to the tools that can be used mainly before the implementation of the 
investment project and/or before adverse impacts have a chance to occur, whereas ex post mechanisms 
relate to tools that can be used mainly after project implementation and/or after adverse impacts take 
place. 














Chapter 1 – The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
 
1. What is culture? 
Cultural rights have, to a large extent and until very recently, been neglected by 
academics, international organisations and human rights treaty bodies. This is 
particularly evident when taking into account the prevalence of the mature categories 
of civil, political, social and economic rights in legal literature, as well as in decisions 
of international and regional courts and the work of international organisations. In the 
late nineties, Symonides had already characterised cultural rights as an 
‘underdeveloped category’ of human rights and pointed out that ‘[they were] the least 
developed as far as their scope, legal content and enforceability are concerned’.42 
This is still a pertinent observation today.43 
According to Stamatopoulou, there are generally six reasons for this neglect, namely: 
(1) fear that discussing cultural rights will raise the issue of cultural relativism,44 which 
can weaken the claim for universality of human rights; (2) the ‘fluid and changing’ 
nature of the definition of ‘culture’, which is necessary to define cultural rights; (3) the 
pervasiveness of the view of cultural rights as a ‘luxury’; (4) ‘political difficulties’ arising 
from the fact that talking about cultural rights will lead to a discussion of ‘cultural 
wrongs’ – which many governments are still not willing to do; (5) the fear that cultural 
rights might legitimise cultural groups’ identity claims and compromise the idea of 
‘nation-state’; and, finally, (6) institutional shortcomings, such as the fact that ‘the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and UNESCO have 
																																																								
42 Janusz Symonides, ‘Cultural rights: a neglected category of human rights’, 50 International Social 
Science Journal 559 (1998). 
43 In this sense, see Athanasios Yupsanis, ‘The Concept and Categories of Cultural Rights in 
International Law: Their Broad Sense and the Relevant Clauses of the International Human Rights 
Treaties’, 37 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (2010); and Francesco Francioni, 
‘Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction’ in Francesco Francioni and Martin Scheinin (eds), 
Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
44 There is a very interesting account of cultural relativism and human rights in Richard A. Wilson, 
‘Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction’ in Richard A. Wilson (ed), Human Rights, Culture 
& Context - Anthropological Perspectives (Pluto Press 1997), pp. 4-10. 
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unfortunately not yet forged the substantive link they were expected to create by the 
drafters of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’.45 
Whilst a complete analysis of the history of cultural rights is outside the scope of this 
research,46 it is still important to consider in broad terms how the concept of culture 
evolved throughout time. For this purpose, it is necessary to understand the 
kaleidoscopic presentation of the concept of culture, as well as the evolution of 
international practice in terms of ‘cultural property’, which progressed to today’s 
notion of ‘cultural heritage’, in turn intimately connected to the idea of cultural rights. 
Attempting to define ‘culture’ is an extremely difficult task, which is not exempt from 
serious consequences. For a long time, it has been an object of study for a number 
of disciplines, namely archaeology and anthropology, but it is increasingly important 
to transport the discussion into the field of international law, as the term becomes 
more and more pervasive in the legal realm. The term ‘culture’ or ‘cultural’ may be so 
broadly interpreted as ‘an all-inclusive, totalizing concept’47 that it includes basically 
any form of human interaction with the surrounding environment. Conversely, it may 
be construed in such a restrictive way that it risks leaving out a number of important 
elements, such as those that are private to specific groups. Adding the (more recent) 
qualification of ‘heritage’ to the concept of ‘culture’ may appear to narrow down its 
scope dramatically, but this is not straightforward. In fact, although ‘heritage’ seems 
to hint towards the past and to something handed down from previous generations to 
the next, and therefore exclude all current affairs, the fast pace at which society 
develops, grows and changes cannot be ignored, and the ‘past’ may be anything that 
happened up to exactly now. 
There are, as summarised by Stamatopoulou, three levels of ‘culture’ which stem 
from literature and institutional practice: 
a) culture in its material sense, as product, as the accumulated material 
heritage of mankind, either as a whole or part of particular human groups, 
including but not limited to monuments and artifacts (sic); 
																																																								
45 Elsa Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law - Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and Beyond (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007), pp. 4-6. 
46 But very clearly explained in, inter alia, Elsa Stamatopoulou (2007); and Francesco Francioni and 
Martin Scheinin (eds.), Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
47 John G. Blair, ‘Blackface Minstrels in Cross-Cultural Perspective’, 28 American Studies International 
52 (1990), p. 53. 
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b) culture as process of artistic or scientific creation, i.e. the emphasis being 
placed on the process and on the creator(s) of culture; and 
c) culture in its anthropological sense, i.e. culture as a way of life or, in 
UNESCO’s words, the “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group”; it encompasses “in 
addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs”.48 
In the words of Eriksen, ‘culture is naturally not a solid object, even if the word 
unhappily is a noun. Culture is something which happens, not something that merely 
exists; it unfolds through social process and therefore also inherently changes.’49 It is 
this sense of culture as a way of life that is the most relevant to the current research; 
nevertheless, it was the last to permeate the legal realm. 
 
2. From ‘cultural property’ to ‘cultural heritage’ 
The first approaches to the protection of cultural goods to appear in international law 
refer to the laws of war and to a State-oriented view of tangible culture as property 
deserving special protection – that is, in the first sense of the concept of ‘culture’ 
mentioned above. In particular, legal instruments adopted in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries provided for the obligation to ‘spare, as far as possible, buildings 
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes [and] historic monuments’ 
in situations of siege and bombardment, as is the case of the 1907 Hague 
Convention.50 Later on, in 1923, another Hague conference produced rules in similar 
terms for the purpose of controlling air warfare.51 However, the protection of cultural 
																																																								
48 Elsa Stamatopoulou (2007), p. 109 (references omitted). 
49 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, ‘Multiculturalism, Individualism and Human Rights: Romanticism, the 
Enlightenment and lessons from Mauritius’ in Richard A. Wilson (ed), Human Rights, Culture & Context 
- Anthropological Perspectives (Pluto Press 1997), pp. 53-54. 
50 See Article 27 of the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907). The wording of this provision 
was very similar to the one found in the work of Francis Lieber, the author of the ‘Lieber Code’, 
proclaimed by President Lincoln in 1863, in the US, which demonstrates that this type of concern was 
well known to the realm of national regulation before it reached the international level – General Orders 
No. 100 on April 24: The Instructions for the Governance of Armies of the United States in the Field 
(1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp. 
51 See Article 25 of the Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air 
Warfare, drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague (1923), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/275; these rules were never adopted in legally binding form. 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 29 
property, in these and subsequent conventions, was merely ancillary to the regulation 
of other subjects. 
The first international instrument to focus specifically on the protection of cultural 
property was a treaty entered into by 21 American States, known as the Roerich 
Pact.52 The contracting parties agreed to create a distinctive flag (the ‘Banner of 
Peace’, displaying the ‘Pax Cultura’ emblem) with the purpose of identifying ‘historic 
monuments, museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions’. These 
monuments and institutions were to be ‘considered as neutral and as such respected 
and protected by belligerents’, both in time of peace and in war.53 Although of great 
historical relevance, the Roerich Pact, not unlike subsequent draft treaties, was 
quickly left behind, mostly due to ‘the events of World War II, (…) changes in the 
technology, tactics and strategy of warfare and the new concept of "total war," and 
(…) the offenses against cultural property deliberately and systematically committed 
by the Nazis’.54 
Until World War II, the protection of cultural property was seen as belonging to the 
jurisdiction of each individual State. If someone were to perpetrate acts against 
cultural property, he would be liable before his own government, even though his acts 
were against international law. This came to change radically. First of all, the 
Nuremberg trials reflected very clearly the notion that individuals committing offences 
to cultural property would incur international responsibility and could therefore be tried 
by the offended State.55 Secondly, with the creation of UNESCO and subsequent 
conclusion of a number of international treaties relating to cultural property, namely 
the 1954 Hague Convention,56 the principle of individual international responsibility 
was affirmed and incorporated. The idea that cultural property was only a part of the 
State was being overcome by the powerful notion that ‘damage to cultural property 
belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all 
mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world’.57 
																																																								
52 Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (Roerich Pact), 
Washington (1935), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/325?OpenDocument. 
53 See Article 1 of the Roerich Pact. 
54 John Henry Merryman, ‘Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property’, 80 The American Journal of 
International Law 831 (1986), p. 835. 
55 See the example of Rosenberg, referred in John Henry Merryman (1986). 
56 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, The Hague (1954), hereinafter referred to as the ‘1954 
Hague Convention’. 
57 Cf. Preamble of the 1945 Hague Convention. 
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The 1954 Hague Convention corresponded to a new vision of the world order and to 
the idea that the protection of cultural property contributed to international peace. That 
new vision led to the conclusion of various international instruments on cultural 
property. UNESCO adopted a number of Recommendations on specific issues, such 
as the 1956 Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to 
Archaeological Excavations, the 1960 Recommendation concerning the Most 
Effective Means of Rendering Museums Accessible to Everyone, the 1962 
Recommendation concerning the Safeguarding of Beauty and Character of 
Landscapes and Sites, the 1964 Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 
and the 1968 Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property 
Endangered by Public or Private works.58 
In the 1970s and 1980s, a significant number of UNESCO conventions were 
concluded, considerably contributing to a more precise notion of cultural property and, 
at the same time, to the evolution of the concept towards a more sophisticated and 
cosmopolitan construction – that of cultural heritage. The World Heritage Convention 
(WHC), adopted in 1972,59 is a landmark in this evolution, postulating a positive 
interaction between the national and international levels of protection of cultural 
heritage. This Convention is one of UNESCO’s biggest successes – in fact, 193 
States Parties have adhered to it, which means near universal acceptance of what it 
postulates. 
The Preamble of the WHC states that ‘it is incumbent on the international community 
as a whole to participate in the protection of the cultural and natural heritage of 
outstanding universal value, by the granting of collective assistance which, although 
not taking the place of action by the State concerned, will serve as an efficient 
complement thereto’. This interaction was patent in the functioning of the Convention: 
the World Heritage List enumerates the ‘properties forming part of the cultural 
heritage and natural heritage (…) which it considers as having outstanding universal 
value’.60 However, the inclusion of a site in the List depends on the initiative of the 
State in whose territory the cultural or natural property is located. After nomination, 
the World Heritage Committee has a final say as to the inscription on the List. Beyond 																																																								
58 All available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12026&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html. 
59 The text of the WHC is available at: http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/  
60 Cf. Article 11(2) of the WHC. 
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question, cultural nationalism was being replaced by a more dynamic perspective, in 
which pluralism would play an ever more relevant role. Cultural heritage, whilst still 
within the scope of the sovereign powers of each individual State, acquired a 
universal dimension, by being regarded as a value deserving protection through the 
cooperation of all members of the international community. 
In fact, ‘cultural heritage’ as a category expanded immensely during the past four 
decades. What started off as referring only to material manifestations of culture 
(normally associated with the concept of ‘cultural property’), progressively started to 
include other elements, such as natural areas and landscapes. Accordingly, the 
concept of cultural heritage enshrined in the WHC comprises monuments, groups of 
buildings and sites which, because of their particular features, ‘are of outstanding 
universal value’61 – however, it still reflects mostly the notion of tangible cultural 
heritage. The idea of ‘heritage’ as something that is transmitted from generation to 
generation because of its special value to the preservation of a given people’s identity 
is very present in the WHC. As Blake emphasises, ‘[t]his view of cultural heritage lies 
behind much of the rhetoric of the international law on the subject and reflects a 
powerful emotional impulse as well as an intellectual position’.62 
A further element of cultural heritage that is worth noting lies in the deep connection 
between nature and culture that has progressively become uncontested. As 
Lowenthal very expressively points out, ‘if [culture and nature] are twins, they are 
Siamese twins, separated only at high risk of the demise of both’.63 In line with this 
increasingly popular view, which derives from ‘science and sentiment alike’,64 the 
WHC establishes a link between the two elements, treating them both as an 
indispensable part of the world heritage. Nevertheless, at the time the WHC was 
adopted, in practice there was still a very striking dichotomy between nature and 
culture, which had consequences at the level of the inscriptions in the World Heritage 
List. When, in 1992, the Convention was celebrating its 20th anniversary, the World 
Heritage Committee requested a series of efforts in order to evaluate the performance 
and achievements of the Convention, identify its weaknesses and propose 
																																																								
61 The concept of ‘outstanding universal value’ is a controversial one, but its detailed study is outside the 
scope of this research. For a good account of the debate, see Craig Forrest (2010), pp. 232-238. 
62 Janet Blake, ‘On Defining the Cultural Heritage’, 49 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 61 
(2000). 
63 David Lowenthal, ‘Natural and cultural heritage’, 11 International Journal of Heritage Studies 81 
(2005). 
64 Idem, p. 85. 
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improvements. In the course of that assessment, it became obvious that the World 
Heritage List contained a number of serious discrepancies, both in terms of 
geographic location of the sites (more than half of the inscriptions were located in 
Europe and North America) and of the specific features of the cultural objects (a vast 
majority of the religious sites on the list were connected to Christianity; defunct 
civilisations were much more represented than living civilisations). More 
conspicuously, 78% of the inscriptions corresponded to cultural properties, whilst only 
22% referred to natural properties.65 
These findings, alongside intense criticism from countries which considered that the 
World Heritage List did not offer enough room to include their particular cultural 
features, led to the development of the concept of ‘cultural landscape’. According to 
the 2012 Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention, cultural landscapes are ‘cultural properties and represent the "combined 
works of nature and of man" designated in (…) the Convention. They are illustrative 
of the evolution of human society and settlement over time, under the influence of the 
physical constraints and/or opportunities presented by their natural environment and 
of successive social, economic and cultural forces, both external and internal.’ 66 This 
new classification admittedly benefited several countries, by allowing for the 
inscription of sites of universal value which otherwise would not be recognised. 
Currently, there are 88 sites on the World Heritage List under the classification of 
‘cultural landscape’.67 
The above notwithstanding, the system of the WHC still received harsh criticism both 
from commentators and representatives of local communities, who accused it of 
‘elitism’ and of neglecting the interests of those communities that constituted groups 
within a State. These communities generally witnessed a neglect of their particular 
cultural heritage by the State and the international community alike, as can be seen 
from numerous examples around the world, such as the difficulties encountered by 
																																																								
65 Data collected by UNESCO, published in S. Boukhari, ‘Beyond the monuments: a living heritage’, 80 
UNESCO sources (1996).  
66 Cf. Section II.A(47) of the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention (2012), UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, WHC 12/01. 
67 Data published on the WHC website: http://whc.unesco.org/en/culturallandscape. 
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Australian Aborigine.68 Commentators denounce the inability of the WHC, even after 
the creation of the ‘cultural landscapes’ category, to balance universalism, on the one 
hand, and cultural diversity, on the other. More generally, the insufficiencies of the 
concept of cultural heritage, regarding its suitability to encompass the interests of 
these groups that are constituted within a State, can be immediately verified at the 
level of interpretation. Two disparate views of the concept clash and reveal a 
significant gap.69 On the one hand, the theory of cultural internationalism points to an 
idea of protection of cultural heritage linked to its value to ‘mankind as a whole’,70 and 
minimises the importance of the protected objects to the preservation of the identity 
of the people that produced it. On the other hand, the theory of cultural nationalism 
focuses on the value of cultural heritage to the nation-State from which it originates,71 
and assumes, for instance, that all cultural productions of indigenous peoples belong 
to the State – which is tantamount to saying that the interests of communities existing 
within a State are assimilated with those of the majority and stripped of their 
specificity. 
As was pointed out even before the adoption of the WHC, in a meeting at the 
UNESCO headquarters, one could identify an apparent contradiction between the 
right to culture and the right of cultures. ‘In the first case, what is involved is the 
individual's right to culture, a right of which he may be deprived by poverty or by 
political oppression; in the second, it is the right of cultures to survival in the face of 
radical changes taking place in the world today. The first of these rights calls for 
modernization: the second has much to fear from it.’72 The evolution of international 
law seems to have included these apparently contradictory rights under the wings of 
cultural heritage, mostly through the intensive legislative activity of the UNESCO. 
																																																								
68 In this regard, see Athanasios Yupsanis, ‘Cultural property aspects in International Law: the case of 
the (still) inadequate safeguarding of indigenous peoples' (tangible) cultural heritage’, 58 Netherlands 
International Law Review 335 (2011); P. J. Fowler, ‘World Heritage Cultural Landscapes 1992-2002’, 6 
World Heritage Papers (2003); and Jean Musitelli, ‘World Heritage, between Universalism and 
Globalization’, 11 International Journal of Cultural Property 323 (2002). 
69 See Joe Watkins, ‘Cultural Nationalists, Internationalists, and “Intra-nationalists'': Who's Right and 
Whose Right?’, 12 International Journal of Cultural Property 78 (2005), and Athanasios Yupsanis (2011). 
70 This expression is used, inter alia, in the Preamble of the WHC. 
71 The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property reflects this view, at Article 4(a), stating that ‘[c]ultural 
property created by the individual or collective genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural 
property of importance to the State concerned created within the territory of that State by foreign 
nationals or stateless persons resident within such territory’ ‘forms part of the cultural heritage of each 
State’. 
72 Red Cross, ‘Cultural Rights as Human Rights, UNESCO Chronicle, Paris 1968, No. 12’, 9 International 
Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997) 166 (1969), p. 167. 
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The most significant expansion of the concept of cultural heritage to date is probably 
the recognition and protection of intangible cultural heritage, such as music, 
language, ceremonial and ritual traditions and performing arts. This development was 
controversial, since several States considered intangible cultural heritage to be 
somehow unimportant (mostly, developed countries),73 whereas for many other 
cultures there is no possible way of separating the tangible from the intangible. The 
notion of intangible cultural heritage is very closely linked to cultural identity, cultural 
diversity and sustainable development,74 thus to human dignity and human rights. 
It is important to note that the move to intangible cultural heritage took place in the 
context of heavy criticism of the WHC, especially from Asian, African and South 
American countries, who deemed it to be ‘Eurocentric in composition, but also 
dominated by monumentally grand and aesthetic sites and places’.75 Even the 
category of ‘cultural landscape’, added to the WHC system in 1992, was considered 
to be insufficient to tackle the problem, although it was meant to incorporate elements 
of intangible cultural heritage. This criticism triggered a serious debate about the 
nature of cultural heritage, its definition and protection. 
UNESCO had a leading role in this development, adopting a number of instruments 
which were directed at the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage. It is worth 
mentioning the 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture 
and Folklore,76 the 1993 Living Human Treasures programme and, more importantly, 
the Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity, 
implemented in 1998, which ‘served as a lever for the creation of the [2003 UNESCO 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage]’77 (hereinafter, 
the ICHC). 
																																																								
73 In the UK, for instance, intangible cultural heritage is neglected, to the point where ‘intangibility is 
marked out as “irrelevant”, “difficult” and incomprehensible’ and the ‘authorised heritage discourse’ 
emphasises ‘materiality and physicality’ – see Laurajane Smith and Emma Waterton, ‘'The envy of the 
world?' - Intangible Heritage in England’ in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds), Intangible 
Heritage (Routledge 2009). 
74 See Craig Forrest (2010), pp. 362-363. 
75 Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa, ‘Introduction’ in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa 
(eds), Intangible Heritage (Routledge 2009). 
76 Available at the UNESCO website: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13141&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
77 Noriko Aikawa-Faure, ‘From the Proclamation of Masterpieces to the Convention for the Safeguarding 
of Intangible Cultural Heritage’ in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds), Intangible Heritage 
(Routledge 2009). 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 35 
The ICHC,78 adopted in 2003 and in force since 2006, attracted a surprising level of 
support, counting today with 172 States parties. After lengthy discussions about the 
meaning of intangible cultural heritage,79 the final text of the ICHC contains the 
following definition: 
The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts 
and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in 
some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This 
intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is 
constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their 
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them 
with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural 
diversity and human creativity.80 
One of the most important innovations brought about by the ICHC was the strong 
focus on the participation of local communities. In the Preamble, it recognises ‘that 
communities, in particular indigenous communities, groups and, in some cases, 
individuals, play an important role in the production, safeguarding, maintenance and 
re-creation of the intangible cultural heritage, thus helping to enrich cultural diversity 
and human creativity’. In addition, Article 15 establishes the principle of ‘the widest 
possible participation of communities, groups and (…) individuals’. Communities are 
actually considered to be ‘the main difference between tangible and intangible 
heritage’.81 
Whilst a comprehensive analysis of the normative content of these Conventions is 
outside the scope of this research, it is worth mentioning that the ICHC also contains 
a list system, which has likewise been the target of some criticism, mainly due to the 
fact that lists depend on State proposals and they ‘[render] transferable the practices 
and expressions itemised and singled out for attention’.82 The Convention established 
																																																								
78 The text of the ICHC is available at: http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/en/convention. 
79 Regarding the debate over the definition of Intangible Cultural Heritage, see Noriko Aikawa-Faure 
(2009), also explaining the process that led to the adoption of the ICHC in detail. 
80 Cf. Article 2(1) of the ICHC (emphasis added). 
81 Affirmed by one delegation to the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage, as cited in Dawson Munjeri, ‘Following the length and breadth of the roots - Some 
dimensions of intangible heritage’ in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds), Intangible Heritage 
(Routledge 2009). 
82 Valdimar Tr. Hafstein, ‘Intangible heritage as a list - From masterpieces to representation’ in Laurajane 
Smith and Natsuko Akagawa (eds), Intangible Heritage (Routledge 2009). 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 36 
the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and the List of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding – a choice that was 
probably linked to the success of the WHC system – but it did not represent a perfect 
solution.83 
The risks of creating lists for the purpose of safeguarding cultural heritage are 
manifold: first, merely selecting what does or does not make it to the list risks 
contributing to the ‘deletion’ of certain places and traditions, as opposed to the 
visibility and celebration conferred to certain others.84 Second, and more gravely, 
governments have been known to use cultural heritage to fulfil their own political 
agendas, sometimes to the detriment of local communities.85 Third, whilst tourism, for 
example, is an appreciable benefit that comes with inscription on the lists, there is still 
a clear danger that the authenticity of intangible cultural heritage might be 
compromised.86 In addition, many communities (such as indigenous peoples) may 
not want their heritage recorded and archived and might resist inscription.87 
To fully understand the evolution of the legal treatment of cultural heritage at the 
international level, it is important to note that the concept developed according to 
necessity: the UNESCO Conventions mentioned above all appeared ‘as an ad hoc 
response to a particular crisis or the recognition of new values in cultural heritage’.88 
The move from ‘cultural property’ to ‘cultural heritage’ mirrors the shift in concerns of 
the international community, which became progressively more linked to a holistic 
vision of culture. UNESCO had a fundamental role in this evolution, even though it 
remained too detached from the human rights system to fully bridge the gap between 
the protection of cultural heritage and the human rights regime. 
																																																								
83 In this regard, see Craig Forrest (2010), pp. 377-381; and Valdimar Tr. Hafstein (2009). 
84 See, e.g., Denis Byrne, ‘A critique of unfeeling heritage’ in Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa 
(eds), Intangible Heritage (Routledge 2009). 
85 In this sense, see Janette Philp, ‘The political appropriation of Burma's cultural heritage and its 
implications for human rights’ in Michele Langfield et al. (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human 
Rights - Intersections in theory and practice (Routledge 2010). 
86 See Sally Ann Ness, ‘Tourism-terrorism: The Landscaping of Consumption and the Darker Side of 
Place’, 23(1) American Ethnologist 118 (2005); and William Logan, ‘Protecting the Tay Nguyen gongs - 
Conflicting rights in Vietnam's central plateau’ in Michele Langfield et al. (eds), Cultural Diversity, 
Heritage and Human Rights (Routledge 2010), pp 203-205. 
87 Larry J. Zimmerman, ‘Plains Indians and Resistance to "Public" Heritage Commemoration of Their 
Pasts’ in Helaine Silverman and D. Fairchild Ruggles (eds), Cutural Heritage and Human Rights 
(Springer 2007); and Federico Lenzerini, ‘Indigenous Peoples' Cultural Rights and the Controversy over 
Commercial Use of Their Traditional Knowledge’ in Francesco Francioni and Martin Scheinin (eds), 
Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
88 Craig Forrest (2010), p. 388. 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 37 
In light of the above, whilst there is still confusion regarding the use of the concepts 
of ‘cultural property’ and ‘cultural heritage’,89 it appears clear that reducing cultural 
heritage to property progressively became largely inadequate, as the most recent 
international instruments give preference to a broader concept, capable of 
encompassing numerous different elements. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects actually contains a unique choice not to 
use either of the terms, presenting the concept of ‘cultural objects’ as a more neutral 
alternative. Not only is ‘property’ a markedly Western concept, deeply associated with 
individual rights of exclusive and undisturbed enjoyment of ownership, but it also hints 
towards a static view of the cultural object, thus denying the collective, dynamic and 
ever-changing nature of cultural expression.90 The 2001 UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity meaningfully emphasises the inadequacy of 
property rights to deal with culture (broadly understood), as can be seen from Article 
8, which recognises ‘the specificity of cultural goods and services which, as vectors 
of identity, values and meaning, must not be treated as mere commodities or 
consumer goods’.91 
 
3. From ‘cultural heritage’ to cultural rights 
The progressive preference for the term ‘heritage’ over the term ‘property’ is 
undeniably connected to the fact that human rights instruments began to recognise 
cultural rights as fundamental rights, thus reflecting a perspective that detaches 
culture from merely individualistic or municipal interests and links it to the inherently 
human pursuit of a sense of identity and community, which is essential to an 
individual’s full realisation as a person with dignity.92 
In spite of the obviously very strong link between cultural heritage and cultural human 
rights, their legal treatment has historically not reflected the close relationship 
between the two concepts. In addition, as mentioned above, cultural rights have been 
very much neglected in the past – ‘treated as “poor relatives” of other human rights’93 																																																								
89 For an extended account of the relationship between ‘cultural property’ and ‘cultural heritage’, see, 
inter alia, Janet Blake (2000). 
90 In this regard, see Athanasios Yupsanis (2011), pp. 340-341; and Lucille A Roussin, ‘Cultural Heritage 
and Identity’, 11 Cardozo J Int'l & Comp L 707 (2003). 
91 Emphasis added. 
92 See Francesco Francioni, ‘Public and private in the international protection of global cultural goods’, 
23 European Journal of International Law 719 (2012), p. 722. 
93 Janusz Symonides (1998). 
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– and, even though institutional practice very often mentions the category of 
‘economic, social and cultural rights’ (ESC), cultural rights are rarely the focus of 
attention. 
One of the reasons that some authors have been pointing out for the lack of 
development of cultural rights is the fact that there are so little provisions in the 
international Bill of Rights referring to this category. However, there is a multiplicity of 
important legal sources, at the international level, referring to cultural rights. 
The first instrument that has to be mentioned in this regard is obviously the UDHR, 
which contains three particularly noteworthy provisions regarding cultural rights, and 
very significantly associates them with human dignity. The first of these provisions is 
Article 22, where the connection between cultural heritage and fundamental, intrinsic 
aspects of the human being is key: it states that everyone is entitled to the realisation 
of the cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality. Article 26 of the UDHR refers to the right to education, which is affirmed 
as essential to the maintenance of peace. More importantly, Article 2794 establishes 
that everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community. 
The second relevant international instrument is the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter, ICESCR), adopted in 1966 and in 
force since 1976, which recognises everyone’s right to take part in cultural life and 
imposes on the parties an obligation to take all steps necessary for the conservation, 
the development and the diffusion of science and culture.95 This Covenant represents 
yet another step towards the broadening of the scope of cultural rights, so as to cover 
the enjoyment of culture by individuals. 
The ICESCR contains several relevant provisions. First, the Preamble states that 
‘these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’ and it affirms that 
‘the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social 
and cultural rights’. Article 1 affirms that ‘[all] peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’ The right to self-
determination is intimately connected to cultural identity, especially when it comes to 																																																								
94 For an interesting account of the drafting history of this Article, see Elsa Stamatopoulou (2007), pp. 
11-18. 
95 Cf. Article 15 of the ICESCR, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm. 
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minorities and indigenous peoples – both self-determination and cultural rights can 
be exercised and enjoyed collectively, and ‘[both] are motivated toward ensuring the 
perpetuation of the group’.96 The right to self-determination also encompasses the 
right of a people to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. 
Article 13 of the ICESCR recognises the right to education in terms similar to the 
UDHR, highlighting the close relationship between education, the ‘full development 
of the human personality and the sense of its dignity’, and the ‘maintenance of peace’. 
In addition, Article 15 enumerates further cultural rights: the right to take part in 
cultural life, the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, 
the right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from scientific, literary or artistic production, and the freedom indispensable for 
scientific research and creative activity. 
Despite the lack of specific reference to cultural rights, the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, ICCPR) also contains a provision 
that has been crucial in the development of ‘pioneering jurisprudence of the Human 
Rights Committee regarding the cultural rights of persons belonging to minorities and 
indigenous peoples.’97 Article 27 of the ICCPR states that persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language. 
It is important to consider the work of the UN Human Rights Committee in this regard, 
namely General Comment No. 23,98 in which important statements are made. First, 
the General Comment confirms that Article 27 provides a right conferred on 
individuals belonging to a minority, distinct from the right to self-determination.99 
Second, it states that the enjoyment of the rights contained in Article 27 ‘does not 
prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party. At the same time, 
one or other aspect of the rights of individuals protected under that article - for 
example, to enjoy a particular culture - may consist in a way of life which is closely 
																																																								
96 See Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, ‘Self-determination and cultural rights’ in Francesco Francioni and Martin 
Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). 
97 See Elsa Stamatopoulou (2007), p. 38. 
98 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), UN doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (8 April 1994), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc0.html. 
99 Idem, paragraphs 1-3.1. 
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associated with territory and use of its resources. This may particularly be true of 
members of indigenous communities constituting a minority.’100 
Third, it clarifies the fact that, even though Article 27 is formulated in negative terms, 
‘a State party is under an obligation to ensure that the existence and the exercise of 
this right are protected against their denial or violation. Positive measures of 
protection are, therefore, required not only against the acts of the State party itself, 
whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also against 
the acts of other persons within the State party.’101 
Fourth, the Human Rights Committee states that, even though Article 27 provides for 
individual rights, ‘they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain 
its culture, language or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by States may also 
be necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its members to 
enjoy and develop their culture and language and to practise their religion, in 
community with the other members of the group.’102 
Finally, the Committee recognises that ‘culture manifests itself in many forms, 
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially 
in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as 
fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of 
those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to 
ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions 
which affect them.’103 
In an important case involving quarrying in indigenous territory in Finland, the Human 
Rights Committee considered that reindeer husbandry carried out by the Sami 
community was ‘an essential element of their culture’ and stated that the fact that they 
had adapted their methods with the help of modern technology did not prevent them 
from invoking Article 27.104 However, it stated that ‘measures that have a certain 
limited impact on the way of life of persons belonging to a minority will not necessarily 
amount to a denial of the right under article 27’, and that, in this particular case, the 
impact of the quarrying on Mount Riutusvaara was not so substantial that it effectively 																																																								
100 Idem, paragraph 3.2. 
101 Idem, paragraph 6.1. 
102 Idem, paragraph 6.2. 
103 Idem, paragraph 7. 
104 Länsman et al v Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, Human 
Rights Committee, 11 June 1992, paragraphs 9.1-9.3. 
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denied to the authors the right to enjoy their cultural rights, noting that the Sami had 
been consulted during the proceedings, that measures had been taken to minimise 
impact and that reindeer herding in the area did not appear to have been adversely 
affected.105 The Committee warned that, in the case of future extension of existing 
contracts and celebration of new ones, which might constitute a violation of article 27, 
the State would have to ensure that the Sami continued to benefit from reindeer 
husbandry.106 
Another case that should be mentioned with regard to the implementation of Article 
27 of the ICCPR is that of the Japanese Nibutani Dam Decision.107 This case refers 
to the expropriation of land for the construction of a dam in the Nibutani region, which 
has been traditionally occupied by the Ainu, an indigenous people that was not 
properly recognised as such in Japan until fairly recently. This decision was 
particularly important because it recognised the indigenousness of the Ainu,108 as well 
as their rights under both domestic and international law. The court acknowledged 
that the Ainu were indeed a minority for the purposes of Article 27, stating, however, 
that the rights conferred by this article were not unlimited.109 After assessing the public 
benefits that the construction of the dam would entail, as well as its costs for the Ainu 
people, the court affirmed that any restriction to the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution and the ICCPR should be recognised only to the ‘narrowest possible 
degree’.110 It then stated: 
Of course, it is conceivable that [the many ethnic, cultural, historical, and 
religious values of the Ainu people] may be compromised for the public 
interest. But in cases where such concessions are to be sought, there must 
also be the greatest degree of consideration that includes a sense of remorse 
concerning matters such as that described above of the historical background 
of the coerced deterioration of the Ainu people's unique ethnic culture caused 
by assimilationist policies.111 
																																																								
105 Idem, paragraphs 9.4-9.7. 
106 Idem, paragraph 9.8. 
107 Kayano et al v Hokkaido Expropriation Committee (The Nibutani Dam Decision), Sapporo District 
Court, Japan, 27 March 1997, 127 International Law Reports 173. 
108 Idem, pp. 209-213. 
109 Idem, pp. 206-207. 
110 Idem, p. 217. 
111 Idem, p. 218. 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 42 
Ultimately, the court considered that the necessary degree of consideration for the 
culture of the Ainu had been lacking,112 and affirmed that the project authorisation 
was illegal, and that this illegality succeeded to the expropriation rulings.113 Finally, 
the court did not grant the plaintiffs substantive relief, considering that it would be 
against the public interest to order the revocation of the expropriation rulings, as the 
construction of the dam was substantially completed during the pendency of the 
case.114 Nevertheless, this decision remains important, in that it considered the 
respect for the cultural rights of indigenous minorities in a way that is aligned with 
international law and constitutes an example of the emergence of a renewed respect 
for indigenous peoples. 
In this context, it is also imperative to consider the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,115 
which was ‘inspired by the provisions of article 27’ of the ICCPR.116 This Declaration 
sets relevant standards and provides guidance as to what measures States are 
required to adopt in order to secure the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
It is also important to mention other UN instruments, such as the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),117 the 
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW),118 the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),119 and the 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families.120 In general terms, these instruments refer to cultural 
identity, participation in cultural life, linguistic rights, right to education and non-
discrimination. 
Regional human rights instruments such as the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights121 (hereinafter, ECHR), adopted by the Council of Europe, and the 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)122 are silent regarding cultural 
																																																								
112 Idem, pp. 219-221. 
113 Idem, p. 222. 
114 Idem, pp. 222-225. 
115 Available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm. 
116 See Preamble. 
117 Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx. 
118 Available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm. 
119 Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx. 
120 Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm. 
121 Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
122 Available at: http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html. 
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rights, and it was only through subsequent protocols that the subject was introduced 
in each of the systems.123 
In contrast, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,124 contains 
several provisions on cultural rights, such as the right to education and the right to 
economic, social and cultural development, ‘with due regard to (…) freedom and 
identity and (…) the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.’ Article 
17(2) of this Charter is equivalent to Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, and states that 
every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his community.  In a 2010 
decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the first to 
address the rights of indigenous peoples and their claims to land and natural 
resources, there is a clear view of culture in a holistic sense, as a ‘complex whole 
which includes a spiritual and physical association with one’s ancestral land, 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by humankind as a member of society - the sum total of the material and 
spiritual activities and products of a given social group that distinguish it from other 
similar groups.’125 At stake in this case was the removal of the Endorois, a pastoralist 
community, from their ancestral lands, which were gazetted as a game reserve. The 
complainants considered this removal to have happened without proper prior 
consultations, adequate and effective compensation. 
In this decision, the African Commission explicitly recognised the indigenousness of 
the Endorois.126 Furthermore, whilst assessing the alleged violation of Article 17, it 
made several important statements. First, it affirmed that ‘protecting human rights 
goes beyond the duty not to destroy or deliberately weaken minority groups, but 
requires respect for, and protection of, their religious and cultural heritage essential 
to their group identity’, and that ‘Article 17 of the Charter is of a dual dimension in 
both its individual and collective nature, protecting, on the one hand, individuals’ 
participation in the cultural life of their community and, on the other hand, obliging the 
state to promote and protect traditional values recognised by a community’.127 It 
																																																								
123 See the 1952 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (First Protocol), available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; and 
the 1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-52.html. 
124 Available at: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/. 
125 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, Comm No 276/2003, 4 February 2010, paragraph 241. 
126 Idem, paragraph 162. 
127 Idem, paragraph 241. 
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further stated that, due to the many threats faced by minority or indigenous 
communities like the Endorois, such as displacement, poverty, forced assimilation 
and political marginalisation, the State had an especially high duty to take positive 
steps to protect their identity and culture.128 
The African Commission also held that the absence of a clawback clause in the 
relevant provision was ‘an indication that the drafters of the Charter envisaged few, if 
any, circumstances in which it would be appropriate to limit a people’s right to 
culture’.129 If a limitation were to be imposed, the Commission affirmed that it would 
have to be ‘proportionate to a legitimate aim that does not interfere adversely on the 
exercise of a community’s cultural rights’, and that, in this particular case, even if the 
game reserve was a legitimate aim, Kenya's failure to secure access for the Endorois 
was neither proportionate nor justified, as their cultural activities posed no harm to 
the reserve's ecosystem and the ‘restriction of cultural rights could not be justified, 
especially as no suitable alternative was given to the community’.130 The Commission 
concluded that, by restricting access to Lake Bogoria, Kenya had denied the Endorois 
‘access to an integrated system of beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions and 
artifacts’, and that by forcing them to live on semi-arid lands without access to vital 
resources for the health of their livestock, Kenya had ‘created a major threat to the 
Endorois pastoralist way of life’ and, in practice, rendered their right to culture 
‘illusory’.131 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, proclaimed in 2000 and adapted in 
2012 to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,132 states in the Preamble that the 
Union ‘(…) respect[s] the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of 
Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States’, whilst Article 22 
affirms the respect for ‘cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’ and Article 25 
guarantees the right of elderly people to participate in cultural life. It should be noted 
that the Council of Europe adopted another important instrument in 2005: the 
Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro 
Convention).133 This Convention, as Stamatopoulou points out, ‘presents a shift from 
the question of how to preserve cultural heritage, to the question why the value of 																																																								
128 Idem, paragraph 248. 
129 Idem, paragraph 249. 
130 Ibidem. 
131 Idem, paragraphs 250-251. 
132 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 
133 Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680083746. 
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cultural heritage should be enhanced and for whom. It is based on the idea that 
knowledge and the use of heritage form part of the citizen’s right to participate in 
cultural life as proclaimed in the [UDHR]’.134 One particularly interesting provision in 
this Convention is Article 8, which provides for the recourse to cultural heritage impact 
assessments and the adoption of mitigation strategies. 
As Francioni points out, even though there is a relative scarcity of binding provisions 
related to cultural rights within the realm of human rights instruments, it is easy to find 
references to this category in several other international instruments,135 of which 
UNESCO has been the most prolific originator. It is useful to refer to the most relevant 
of these instruments. The 1966 UNESCO Declaration on the Principles of 
International Cultural Cooperation136 is extremely important, as it affirms, in Article 1, 
that ‘[e]ach culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and preserved’, 
‘[e]very people has the right and the duty to develop its culture’ and ‘(…) all cultures 
form part of the common heritage belonging to all mankind.’ 
Furthermore, the 1976 Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in 
Cultural Life and their Contribution to It137 addresses, among others, the right to 
education, access to culture, participation in cultural life and linguistic rights. In 1989, 
UNESCO adopted the Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture 
and Folklore,138 which covers the identification, conservation, preservation, 
dissemination and protection of folklore, through international co-operation. It is also 
critical to refer the 1996 Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, adopted in 
Barcelona, which recognises both individual and collective rights, with the proposed 
aim of ‘correct[ing] linguistic imbalances with a view to ensuring the respect and full 
development of all languages and establishing the principles for a just and equitable 
linguistic peace throughout the world as a key factor in the maintenance of 
harmonious social relations.’139 In 2001, UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration 
on Cultural Diversity,140 which, among other important provisions, affirms that 																																																								
134 Elsa Stamatopoulou (2007), p. 45 (emphasis added).  
135 Francesco Francioni (2008), p. 2. 
136 Available at:  
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13147&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html  
137 Available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13097&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html  
138 Available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13141&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
139 See preamble of the Declaration, available at: 
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/linguistic.pdf. 
140 Available at: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
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‘[c]ultural rights are an integral part of human rights, which are universal, indivisible 
and interdependent. The flourishing of creative diversity requires the full 
implementation of cultural rights (…)’. 
The International Labour Organisation (hereinafter, ILO) also plays an important role 
in the area of cultural rights, particularly with regard to indigenous peoples’ rights. ILO 
Convention no. 169141 establishes, inter alia, that governments have the responsibility 
for developing co-ordinated and systematic action to promote the full realisation of 
the social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous peoples, with respect for their 
social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions. 
Finally, it is crucial to acknowledge the role played by the 2007 UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereinafter, UNDRIP),142 which was adopted by an 
overwhelming majority, after almost 25 years of negotiations. In addition to 
addressing cultural rights, it is the first international legal instrument that expressly 
recognises indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. Contrary to what occurs 
with Conventions, UN Declarations are not deemed legally binding, which means that, 
formally, they contain mere aspirational statements that do not impose obligations or 
responsibilities upon States. However, ‘while this principle is generally accurate, it 
cannot be applied to the [UNDRIP] when it is used as an interpretative standard for 
state obligations contained in human rights conventions, and where the obligation, or 
alleged violation, pertains to indigenous peoples. In these cases the provisions of the 
Declaration are binding on states.’143 This is in line with the considerations expressed 
by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James 
Anaya, who affirmed: 
(…) even though the Declaration itself is not legally binding in the same way 
that a treaty is, the Declaration reflects legal commitments that are related to 
the United Nations Charter, other treaty commitments and to customary 
international law. The Declaration builds upon the general human rights 
obligations of States under the Charter and is grounded in fundamental 
human rights principles such as non-discrimination, self-determination and 
																																																								
141 Available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID
:312314:NO  
142 Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
143 Mililani B. Trask, ‘Afterword: Implementing the Declaration’ in Elvira Pulitano, Indigenous Rights in 
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cultural integrity that are incorporated into widely-ratified human rights 
treaties, as evident in the work of United Nations treaty bodies. In addition, 
core principles of the Declaration can be seen to connect to a consistent 
pattern of international and state practice, and hence to that extent they reflect 
customary international law (…).144 
 
4. The normative content of cultural rights 
4.1. The right to participate in cultural life 
There are essentially five human rights recognised in international law as cultural 
rights: (1) the right to education; (2) the right to participate in cultural life; (3) the right 
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (4) the right to benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which one is the author; and (5) the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity – all affirmed in the ICESCR, 
Articles 13 and 15. 
Of all the cultural rights mentioned above, this research focuses mainly on the right 
to participate in cultural life, as established in Article 15(1) of the ICESCR and Article 
27 of the UDHR, since this is the aspect that appears to be more relevant to the 
interaction between cultural rights and investment. Whilst an in-depth analysis of the 
normative content of these rights is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is 
nonetheless crucial to provide a portrait of the main elements that compose the right 
to participate in cultural life. 
Before that, it is however necessary to point out other human rights intimately 
connected to cultural rights, which will be useful for this research. In fact, cultural 
rights are ‘one of the most eloquent demonstrations of the inter-complementarity of 
human rights’,145 as evidenced by the sheer number of rights that are interconnected 
with culture as a way of life, and therefore, with the right to participate in cultural life. 
This results, on the one hand, from the fact that culture is present in virtually every 																																																								
144 Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya, Human Rights Council, Expert Mechanism on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Agenda Item 4: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (15 July 2010), available at: http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/statements/statement-on-the-united-
nations-declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples-to-the-emrip. 
145 Elsa Stamatopoulou (2007), p. 143. 
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aspect of human life, therefore permeating the areas of civil, political, economic and 
social rights. On the other hand, it appears clear that the effective implementation of 
most human rights depends on the effective implementation of cultural rights, 
especially in respect of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples, and vice-versa. For 
example, it is impossible to think of cultural rights without freedom of peaceful 
assembly and freedom of association – how could anyone reasonably be able to 
exercise their right to participate in cultural life (a right which is, by definition, 
exercised collectively) without being able to assemble as a group? Conversely, the 
right to self-determination only makes sense if a community has an established sense 
of identity that is alive through cultural rights. In turn, cultural identity is intrinsically 
linked to human dignity, which is evident from the legal sources identified above. 
 
4.2. The normative content of the right to participate in cultural life 
So what constitutes a cultural right? What is the normative content of the right to 
participate in cultural life? The answer to these questions relies heavily on the work 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both in terms of the 
requirements for, (and assessment of) States parties’ reports and, perhaps more 
importantly, General Comments (in particular, General Comment no. 21 on the right 
of everyone to take part in cultural life).146 The introduction to General Comment no. 
21 starts off by making an important statement: 
Cultural rights are an integral part of human rights and, like other rights, are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent. The full promotion of and respect for 
cultural rights is essential for the maintenance of human dignity and positive 
social interaction between individuals and communities in a diverse and 
multicultural world.147 
This statement is particularly important when considering that several commentators 
and even governments questioned for decades the very nature of ESC rights as 
enforceable human rights. In fact, it has been argued that, instead of establishing 
positive obligations on States, cultural rights constitute norms of a programmatic 
nature, subject to progressive realisation, and non-enforceable for the rights 																																																								
146 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General comment No. 21: Right of everyone to 
take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights)’ (E/C.12/GC/21, 2009). 
147 Emphasis added. 
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holders.148 Hence the importance of these paragraphs, read in conjunction with 
paragraph 1 (cited above), which affirm that: 
The right to take part in cultural life can be characterized as a freedom. In 
order for this right to be ensured, it requires from the State party both 
abstention (i.e., non-interference with the exercise of cultural practices and 
with access to cultural goods and services) and positive action (ensuring 
preconditions for participation, facilitation and promotion of cultural life, and 
access to and preservation of cultural goods). 
(…) 
The strategies and policies adopted by States parties should provide for the 
establishment of effective mechanisms and institutions, where these do not 
exist, to investigate and examine alleged infringements of article 15, 
paragraph 1 (a), identify responsibilities, publicize the results and offer the 
necessary administrative, judicial or other remedies to compensate victims.149 
It appears therefore clear that international HRL, as it stands today and through the 
interpretation of treaty bodies, recognises cultural rights as true and enforceable 
human rights. 
The General Comment proceeds to qualify the right to participate in cultural life as a 
‘cultural choice’, i.e., individuals are free to choose whether or not to participate in a 
specific culture, individually or collectively.150 This aspect of cultural rights is 
connected to what can be described as (the absence of) internal restrictions to the 
enjoyment of one’s right to culture – adopting Kymlicka’s terminology.151 According to 
this author, internal restrictions (as opposed to external protections) involve ‘the claim 
of a group against its own members (…) [and are] intended to protect the group from 
the destabilizing impact of internal dissent (e.g. the decision of individual members 
not to follow traditional practices or customs)’.152 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights highlights the fact that the freedom implicated in cultural rights 
																																																								
148 See, inter alia, E.W. Vierdag, ‘The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 9 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 69 (1978), p. 83 
et seq.; and Yvonne Donders, ‘A Right to Cultural Identity in UNESCO’ in Francesco Francioni and Martin 
Scheinin (eds), Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008), p. 318. 
149 General comment No. 21, paragraphs 6 and 72 (emphasis added). 
150 Idem, paragraph 7 of General Comment No. 21. 
151 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press 1995), p.35 et seq. 
152 Idem, p. 35. 
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must be enjoyed as a choice, ‘recognized, respected and protected on the basis of 
equality’.153 
Regarding the clarification of some of the terms used in Article 15(1) of the ICESCR, 
paragraph 15 of the General Comment mentions the main components of the right to 
participate in cultural life and it establishes that the word ‘everyone’ is meant to be 
understood as either the individual or the collective. As to the term ‘culture’, the 
Committee adopted the maximalist, mostly anthropological sense of the word. 
General Comment No. 21 also clarifies the conditions for the ‘full realization of the 
right of everyone to take part in cultural life on the basis of equality and non-
discrimination.’ These conditions comprise of: (1) availability of cultural goods and 
services; (2) accessibility, including physical, financial and geographic factors; (3) 
acceptability, which is intimately connected with both community and individual 
participation; (4) adaptability, with due regard to cultural diversity; and, finally, (5) 
appropriateness or cultural adequacy, especially regarding ethnic minorities and 
indigenous peoples.154 
In respect of the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment, the Committee 
highlights the applicability of Articles 2(2) and 3 of the ICESCR to the right to take 
part in cultural life. This means that ‘no one shall be discriminated against because 
he or she chooses to belong, or not to belong, to a given cultural community or group, 
or to practise or not to practise a particular cultural activity. Likewise, no one shall be 
excluded from access to cultural practices, goods and services.’ Non-discrimination 
and equal treatment are mandatory, even in situations of ‘severe resource 
constraints’. It is further affirmed that positive discrimination is legitimate, as long as 
it is temporary and does not perpetuate inequalities.155 
General Comment no. 21 further emphasises the fact that internationally recognised 
human rights may not be limited or infringed upon on grounds of cultural diversity. 
Limitations to the right to take part in cultural life have to be undertaken with due 
respect for proportionality.156 In this regard, the Limburg Principles on the 
Implementation of the ICESCR, developed in 1986 by a group of experts in 
international law, establish the principle that Article 4 of the ICESCR (limitations to 																																																								
153 General comment No. 21, paragraph 7. 
154 Idem, paragraph 16. 
155 Idem, paragraphs 21-24. 
156 Idem, paragraphs 17-20. 
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ESC rights) ‘was primarily intended to be protective of the rights of individuals rather 
than permissive of the imposition of limitations by the State’. It further affirms that no 
limitations can be made unless provided by national law of general application, and 
that this law shall not be arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.157 The Limburg 
Principles were later supplemented by the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were prepared at another meeting of 
experts in international law, in 1997, and will be referred to again below, in Section 
4.4. 
It is interesting to note that the Committee dedicated an entire section of the General 
Comment to the issue of cultural diversity, affirming that ‘[t]he protection of cultural 
diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity. It 
implies a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and requires the 
full implementation of cultural rights, including the right to take part in cultural life.’ It 
goes on to comment on the phenomena of globalisation and mass migration, 
integration and assimilation, and to demand from States that the adverse effects of 
globalisation be mitigated so as to protect the right to take part in cultural life. In 
harmony with provisions from the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, as well as with the Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity, the Committee stresses that cultural goods, 
services and activities should not be treated as having solely commercial value, and 
should rather be seen holistically as vehicles for ‘identity, values and meanings.’158 
 
4.3. Legal obligations 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights devoted an entire section of 
General Comment no. 21 to the subject of States parties’ legal obligations regarding 
the right to participate in cultural life. These obligations are divided into four 
categories: (1) general legal obligations; (2) specific legal obligations; (3) core 
obligations; and (4) international obligations. 
Within the first category, the Committee states that the right to participate in cultural 
life entails an immediate obligation to guarantee that it ‘is exercised without 
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discrimination’, to ensure that cultural practices are recognised, and to ‘refrain from 
interfering in their enjoyment and development’. It further affirms that the progressive 
realisation of cultural rights entails an obligation to ‘take deliberate and concrete 
measures aimed at the full implementation of the right of everyone to take part in 
cultural life’, and that States should take the steps ‘necessary for the conservation, 
development and dissemination of science and culture, as well as steps to ensure 
respect for the freedom indispensable to scientific research and creative activity’. 
Finally, there is a prohibition of regressive measures. 
As to States’ specific legal obligations, the Committee refers to the obligations to: (1) 
respect, (2) protect, and (3) fulfil. Expanding on these obligations, the Committee 
affirms: 
The obligation to respect requires States parties to refrain from interfering, 
directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to take part in cultural life. 
The obligation to protect requires States parties to take steps to prevent third 
parties from interfering in the right to take part in cultural life. Lastly, the 
obligation to fulfil requires States parties to take appropriate legislative, 
administrative, judicial, budgetary, promotional and other measures aimed at 
the full realization of the right enshrined in article 15, paragraph 1 (a), of the 
Covenant.159 
Additionally, the General Comment includes a specification of what constitutes each 
of these obligations. The first one (obligation to respect) entails the duty to adopt 
specific measures aimed at realising the rights of everyone: (1) ‘to freely choose their 
own cultural identity, to belong or not to belong to a community, and have their choice 
respected’; (2) ‘to enjoy freedom of opinion, freedom of expression in the language 
or languages of their choice, and the right to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds and forms including art forms, regardless of frontiers of any kind’; 
(3) ‘to enjoy the freedom to create, individually, in association with others, or within a 
community or group, which implies that States parties must abolish censorship of 
cultural activities in the arts and other forms of expression’; (4) ‘to have access to 
their own cultural and linguistic heritage and to that of others’; and (5) ‘to take part 
freely in an active and informed way, and without discrimination, in any important 
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decision-making process that may have an impact on his or her way of life and on his 
or her rights’. 
The obligation to protect, which is intimately connected with the obligation to respect, 
obliges States parties to ‘take measures to prevent third parties from interfering in the 
exercise of [the] rights [stated above].’ Additionally, it entails the obligations: (1) to 
‘[r]espect and protect cultural heritage in all its forms, in times of war and peace, and 
natural disasters’; (2) to ‘[r]espect and protect cultural heritage of all groups and 
communities, in particular the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
groups, in economic development and environmental policies and programmes’; (3) 
to ‘[r]espect and protect the cultural productions of indigenous peoples, including their 
traditional knowledge, natural medicines, folklore, rituals and other forms of 
expression; and (4) to ‘[p]romulgate and enforce legislation to prohibit discrimination 
based on cultural identity, as well as advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.’ Here, the 
inseparability of the protection of cultural heritage and cultural rights is clearly 
demonstrated. 
The obligation to fulfil entails the obligations: (1) to ‘facilitate the right of everyone to 
take part in cultural life by taking a wide range of positive measures, including financial 
measures, that would contribute to the realization of this right’; (2) to promote the right 
to participate in cultural life through ‘appropriate education and public awareness’ 
measures; (3) to ‘provide all that is necessary for fulfilment of the right to take part in 
cultural life when individuals or communities are unable, for reasons outside their 
control, to realize this right for themselves with the means at their disposal.’160 
Within the third category (core obligations), the Committee points out ‘a minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
each of the rights set out in the Covenant’, which materialises in ‘at least the obligation 
to create and promote an environment within which a person individually, or in 
association with others, or within a community or group, can participate in the culture 
of their choice.’ This entails immediate obligations to: (1) take legislative and any other 
necessary steps to guarantee non-discrimination and gender equality in the 
enjoyment of the right of everyone to take part in cultural life’; (2) ‘respect the right of 
everyone to identify or not identify themselves with one or more communities, and the 
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right to change their choice’; (3) ‘respect and protect the right of everyone to engage 
in their own cultural practices, while respecting human rights’; (4) ‘eliminate any 
barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a person’s access to the person’s own 
culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and without consideration for 
frontiers of any kind’; and (5) ‘allow and encourage the participation of persons 
belonging to minority groups, indigenous peoples or to other communities in the 
design and implementation of laws and policies that affect them’ (free and informed 
prior consent).161 
Finally, the fourth category (international obligations) includes: (1) the obligation of 
States parties to take steps, individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation, especially through economic and technical cooperation, with a view to 
achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant’; (2) the 
obligation to celebrate appropriate international agreements for such cooperation; 
and (3) the obligation to refrain from negotiating and celebrating international 
agreements which negatively affect the right to take part in cultural life, especially for 
vulnerable groups. These obligations are very significant for the subject of this 
research, as they directly constrain States parties’ freedom to negotiate and celebrate 
international agreements, be it IIAs, loans from financial institutions or other 
instruments. 
 
4.4. Violations of the right to participate in cultural life 
Both the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and General Comment no. 21 refer amply to violations of the right to participate in 
cultural life. The first document affirms that violations of the obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil, undertaken either by commission or omission, disregarding an 
obligation of conduct or an obligation of result, entail State responsibility. In addition, 
paragraph 18 of the Maastricht Guidelines states: 
The obligation to protect includes the State's responsibility to ensure that 
private entities or individuals, including transnational corporations over which 
they exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive individuals of their economic, social 
and cultural rights. States are responsible for violations of economic, social 
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and cultural rights that result from their failure to exercise due diligence in 
controlling the behaviour of such non-state actors. 
With regard to State responsibility for acts by non-state entities, General Comment 
no. 21 confirms that ‘[v]iolations can occur through the direct action of a State party 
or of other entities or institutions that are insufficiently regulated by the State party, 
including, in particular, those in the private sector.’162 
In addition, the Committee highlights the fact that ‘when a State party fails to take 
steps to combat practices harmful to the well-being of a person or group of persons’, 
i.e. cultural wrongs, there is also a violation of the ICESCR. 
Finally, General Comment no. 21 asserts that retrogressive measures taken by 
States, in respect of the right to culture, ‘require the most careful consideration and 
need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the 
Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.’163,164 
 
5. A (collective) right to culture? 
The question of who holds cultural rights is of paramount importance, particularly 
when it comes to the distinction between individual and collective rights. As 
mentioned above, some of the reasons behind the underdevelopment of cultural 
rights are intimately connected to both the issue of cultural relativism and the 
difficulties regarding the recognition of collective rights at the level of local 
communities. Although several of the instruments mentioned above refer to a 
collective aspect of the enjoyment of cultural rights, the international community has 
hesitated very significantly when it comes to the association of the words ‘collective’ 
and ‘rights’. Several factors can be identified when considering this hesitation, one of 
which is obviously the fear that the universality of human rights becomes 
compromised. 
The first step to understanding the debate around collective human rights is to assess, 
first and foremost, what constitutes a human right and what its characteristics are. 																																																								
162 Idem, paragraph 62. 
163 General comment No. 21, paragraph 65. 
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Human rights, as established in the UDHR (and, later, in the ICCPR and ICESCR), 
are typically seen as a ‘trump’ against the State: international human rights are 
exercised against the State and impose on it a number of obligations. The State is, 
at the same time, the main protector and main violator of human rights. 
The liberal concept of human rights gravitates around the individual, not a group. 
Human rights are universal and inalienable fundamental rights that every human 
being is entitled to just because he is human, and which he or she cannot abdicate. 
All members of humankind, everywhere in the world, are entitled to human rights. 
They are traditionally seen as equal and non-discriminatory, in the sense that they 
are held and exercised equally by every human being, i.e. ‘without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be 
made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country 
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.’165 Human rights are also 
indivisible, in the sense that individuals are entitled to all internationally recognised 
human rights, whether civil, political, economic, social or cultural, as all of them are 
inherent to human dignity and thus cannot be ordered hierarchically. Additionally, 
human rights are all interrelated and interdependent, which means they are all 
functionally connected, i.e. denial of one right will result in others not being fully 
recognised and/or exercised. 
Whilst discussing the full spectrum of the debate on collective human rights is outside 
the scope of this research, it is nonetheless important to understand some of the 
arguments involved. For many commentators, there can be no such thing as 
collective human rights; groups can obviously be entitled to some rights, but these 
cannot be human rights. If human rights are held by human beings, and human beings 
are by definition individuals, there is no logical reason for group rights to exist.166 In 
contrast, other authors accept the existence of collective human rights, to different 
degrees. For instance, Donnelly affirms that ‘individual rights approaches usually are 
capable of accommodating the legitimate interests of even oppressed groups – and 
(…) where they are not, group human rights rarely will be more likely to provide an 																																																								
165 Article 2 of the UDHR. 
166 See Peter Jones, ‘Human rights, group rights, and peoples' rights’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly 80 
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effective remedy.’167 According to this author, since ‘for a group right to be a human 
right, it must be universal in the sense that all groups of the specified type have that 
right’, the only unambiguous collective human right in international law is the right of 
peoples to self-determination.168 He nevertheless accepts that both the rights of 
indigenous peoples and a right to cultural heritage are ‘strong candidate[s]’ to 
consideration as group human rights, since each of them is ‘irreducibly a group right, 
[which] applies to all [peoples in the same situation] and seems to be in the process 
of being widely recognized as a standard threat to human dignity that requires 
remedy’.169 Others, such as Jones, also consider that there may be other group rights 
besides the right of peoples to self-determination, but require a distinction between 
corporate rights (e.g., the rights of a ‘nation’ or a ‘state’ as a corporate entity) and 
collective rights (those borne by individuals ‘jointly, rather than severally’).170 
According to Vrdoljak, ‘[s]elf-determination and cultural rights sit uncomfortably within 
the classic human rights framework’, since both ‘can, and are, held and exercised 
collectively’, and both ‘are motivated toward ensuring the perpetuation of the 
group’.171 Whilst the right of peoples to self-determination has been recognised 
widely, namely by the International Court of Justice (hereinafter, ICJ), according to 
which this right is ‘a right erga omnes’,172 cultural rights remain a subject of debate. 
The development of cultural human rights in international law has traditionally been 
centred around the rights of indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities and other 
vulnerable groups, mainly those that were the victims of historical wrongs such as 
colonialism and forced assimilation, and who were deprived of their right to self-
determination. Vrdoljak significantly affirms that ‘[t]hese groups have tested the 
boundaries of international law and challenged established state practice on self-
determination and cultural rights.’173 By the same token, Donnelly states that 
‘[c]olonialism (…) is a well-recognized standard threat to human dignity’ and 
‘[d]ecolonization thus is a practical prerequisite to the enjoyment of internationally 
recognized human rights. And it is the subjected people as a group that have this 
right.’174 
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Kymlicka is against the use of the term ‘collective rights’, which he considers to be 
‘unhelpful’, ‘too broad’ and one which does not reflect the distinction between internal 
restrictions and external protections. According to this author, ‘a deeper problem is 
that it suggests a false dichotomy with individual rights’.175 More interestingly, 
Kymlicka believes that asking whether a right exercised by individuals belonging to a 
group is tantamount to a collective right is a ‘sterile’ debate, ‘because the question of 
whether the right is (or is not) collective is morally unimportant.’176 For him, the debate 
should focus instead on why some rights should be group-differentiated, i.e. why 
some groups are entitled to rights that other groups do not hold. Similarly to Vrdoljak, 
Kymlicka argues that ‘[j]ust as certain individual rights flow from each individual’s 
interest in personal liberty, so certain community rights flow from each community’s 
interest in self-preservation’.177 
Whilst some authors fear that group rights might pose a threat to individual rights – 
which have been affirmed in part to protect individuals from negative effects of certain 
groups’ powers – Kymlicka defends that ‘[group-differentiated rights] are not about 
the primacy of communities over individuals. Rather, they are based upon the idea 
that justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be 
accorded different rights.’178 This author concludes that limitations on group rights are 
as important as recognising them: ‘minority rights should not allow one group to 
dominate other groups; and they should not enable a group to oppress its own 
members. In other words, liberals should seek to ensure that there is equality between 
groups, and freedom and equality within groups.’179 Conversely, Donnelly defends 
that group-differentiated rights are not necessary; he states that ‘[i]f a particular 
[group] identity is valued sufficiently, it will survive, perhaps even thrive. If not, then it 
will not.’180 He appears to accept that consequence lightly, but his reasoning seems 
to be more connected to Kymlicka’s notion of internal restrictions than to his idea of 
external protections. 
In terms of international practice, it appears that some human rights – namely, the 
right to culture – are considered group rights, despite all the controversy in legal and 
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political theory. An example of this is present in General Comment no. 21, which 
affirms: 
(…) the term “everyone” in the first line of article 15 may denote the individual 
or the collective; in other words, cultural rights may be exercised by a person 
(a) as an individual, (b) in association with others, or (c) within a community 
or group, as such. 
Although the difference between a right being held by a group and an individual right 
being exercised in the context of a group can be of significant theoretical 
importance,181 this affirmation by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is highly relevant, as it denotes international acceptance of the exercise of 
cultural rights by communities or groups. Conversely, the Human Rights Committee, 
in General Comment no. 23, asserts the following: 
The Covenant draws a distinction between the right to self-determination and 
the rights protected under article 27. The former is expressed to be a right 
belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a separate part (Part I) of the 
Covenant. Self-determination is not a right cognizable under the Optional 
Protocol. Article 27, on the other hand, relates to rights conferred on 
individuals as such and is included, like the articles relating to other personal 
rights conferred on individuals, in Part III of the Covenant and is cognizable 
under the Optional Protocol.182 
Even though some international legal instruments refer to the rights of persons 
belonging to ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities, not the rights of minorities 
themselves, it is important to note that there are some elements that imply recognition 
of the importance of groups – such is the case of the above-mentioned Article 27 of 
the ICCPR, which refers to persons belonging to minorities, but also contains the 
qualifier ‘in community with the other members of their group’. 
Other international instruments refer to collective rights of minorities and indigenous 
peoples, such as the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, which affirms that: ‘[p]ersons 																																																								
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belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, including those set forth in the 
present Declaration, individually as well as in community with other members of their 
group, without any discrimination.’183 By the same token, the CRC establishes that a 
child who belongs to a minority or indigenous group shall not be denied the right to 
enjoy his or her culture in community with other members of his or her group.184 
ILO Convention No. 169, in turn, provides that ‘[i]ndigenous and tribal peoples shall 
enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance 
or discrimination’, therefore not using the classical expression ‘people belonging 
to…’. The UNDRIP specifically refers to collective rights at several instances; to start 
with, the Preamble recognises and affirms ‘that indigenous individuals are entitled 
without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that 
indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their 
existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.’ In addition, in Article 
7(2), the UNDRIP recognises that ‘[i]ndigenous peoples have the collective right to 
live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples (…)’; Article 40 states that 
indigenous peoples are entitled to ‘effective remedies for all infringements of their 
individual and collective rights’.  
In light of the above, it is possible to conclude that collective rights are indeed 
recognised in international law, even if their nature as human rights remains 
contested. Regardless, for the purposes of this research, cultural rights will be 
understood in the same sense as described in General Comment no. 21 of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, i.e. either as individual or 
collective rights, exercised ‘by a person (a) as an individual, (b) in association with 
others, or (c) within a community or group, as such.’ Individuals cannot enjoy their 
culture in isolation. Culture is inherently relational. Therefore, it would be unrealistic 
to deny the collective aspect of cultural rights. 
 
6. A brief note on cultural relativism 
There is a further issue that needs clarification in the context of the intersection of 
culture with human rights. As mentioned above, one of the reasons why cultural rights 
have been so underdeveloped is the fact that ‘culture’ is a difficult concept in terms 																																																								
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of the debate it creates between universalists and cultural relativists. In any event, 
not only does the idea of cultural relativism jeopardise the development of cultural 
rights, but it has also been used as a political tool to question the validity of all human 
rights – even though almost all States in the world have committed to international 
human rights instruments. The notion of cultural relativism is not a legal one; rather, 
it draws from anthropology and moral philosophy.185  
An illustration of extreme positions regarding each of the theories serves best to 
explain the clash: whilst radical universalists believe that ‘culture is irrelevant to the 
validity of moral rights and rules, which are universally valid’, radical cultural relativists 
‘hold that culture is the sole source of the validity of a moral right or rule’.186 The latter 
therefore believe that it is impossible to establish a universally valid set of rules 
determining what is right and what is wrong, since this judgment can only be made in 
light of the dominant culture for each specific community. This, in turn, would mean 
that human rights cannot be defined equally for all societies in the world, and should 
rather accommodate specific cultural views. The formulation of each theory can vary 
in different degrees of strength, depending on the level of acceptance of the 
interaction between the two perspectives, and most modern literature adopts a 
mitigated view of either universalism or relativism. Hence, some authors defend that 
the majority of moral rights or rules are determined by universal values, but an 
element of cultural relativism will necessarily imply the consideration of certain 
context-specific cultural values;187 other authors state that the majority of moral rights 
and rules are determined by culture, even though some universal values apply.188 
The main claim of cultural relativism, independently of degree, is that what constitutes 
a human rights violation in one society can very well not be considered as such in a 
different society with a different culture. 
Although an in-depth analysis of cultural relativism and universalism is outside the 
scope of this research,189 it is still important to note a few key points in the debate, 
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the first of which is that cultural pluralism (or relativity) is an undeniable fact: all over 
the world, different societies have different worldviews, different traditions, different 
sets of values. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that the fundamental 
aspects of human rights should not apply to every human being, despite geographic 
location, since all persons share in the same inherent dignity. Secondly, human rights 
are not universal in the sense of being respected and promoted everywhere, by 
everyone: it is also a fact that there are numerous human rights violations across the 
globe, ranging from torture and oppression to starvation and mutilation. This 
notwithstanding, and in harmony with Kantian theories, one could argue that ‘the fact 
of pluralism in ways of life cannot invalidate claims about moral truth’.190 
The theory of human rights (as universal, inalienable and non-discriminatory rights) 
stems from Western philosophy and the idea of ‘natural law’, the latter flowing from 
the work of legal and political theorists and philosophers such as John Locke.191 This 
in itself raises problems, with authors such as Bentham saying that natural rights are 
‘nonsense upon stilts’, and MacIntyre affirming: ‘the truth is plain: there are no such 
rights and belief in them is one with belief in witches and unicorns’.192 Most authors 
accept that contemporary human rights have their origin in a very specific context: 
European States in the post-war.193 Thus the UDHR can be seen as ‘universal only in 
pretension, not in practice, since it is a charter of an idealist European political 
philosophy.’194 This raises concerns that human rights rooted in such a specific 
context become reminiscent of colonialism, ‘a mask for western interests or a new 
form of imperialism, or both’,195 and this position becomes stronger when considering 
that the West often appears to have double standards, supporting regimes that 
systematically compromise human rights, mostly due to strong economic interests. 
Developing countries, in particular, argue that human rights are a tool for Western 
domination and for the undermining of their sovereignty. In this regard, the US has 
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been especially criticised for confusing their foreign policy with human rights, and 
‘American interests with universal values’.196 
Another critique that frequently arises in this regard affirms that Western human rights 
are excessively individualistic, and therefore unable to grasp the realities of 
communities that place the emphasis on the collective aspects of their society, rather 
than on the individual ones. In the words of Falk, the UN operates with a ‘normative 
blindness towards indigenous peoples’.197 
Some of the concerns raised by cultural relativists are obviously pertinent; however, 
it is important to see that there are several limitations and problems inherent to that 
perspective, the worst of which is the ‘moral nihilism’ that it entails.198 I believe that 
the best option is to seek an ‘overlapping consensus’, as described by John Rawls: 
people who endorse different – and sometimes incompatible – comprehensive 
doctrines can nonetheless reach a level of agreement (an overlapping consensus) on 
what constitutes a political conception of justice.199 In essence, there would be ‘a 
special kind of agreement by which the same principles and ideals of the political 
conception are going to be affirmed for different reasons from the standpoint of each 
comprehensive doctrine’.200 
Donnelly provides a good balance between the more extreme views, with a theory of 
‘relative universality’, which embraces Rawls’s idea of overlapping consensus – at 
least at the conceptual level, given that ‘adherents of most leading comprehensive 
doctrines pretty much across the globe do in fact endorse internationally recognized 
human rights.’201 Very differently, at the level of enjoyment of human rights, the author 
defends a certain level of cultural relativism. As he explained in a previous paper, 
Human rights are (relatively) universal at the level of the concept, broad 
formulations such as the claims in Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal 
Declaration that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person” 
and “the right to social security.” Particular rights concepts, however, have 
multiple defensible conceptions. Any particular conception, in turn, will have 
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many defensible implementations. At this level – for example, the design of 
electoral systems to implement the right “to take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives” – relativity is not 
merely defensible but desirable.202 
In conclusion, this (very brief – and, necessarily, incomplete) account of the clash 
between universalism and cultural relativism demonstrates that there is considerable 
room for compromise. It is possible to mitigate universalism with some features of 
cultural relativism, therefore acknowledging and honouring multiculturalism, without 
losing sight of the universal recognition of human dignity and of the rights that are 
directly associated with it. Mitigating radical universalism is indeed necessary in order 
to avoid cultural imperialism and Westernisation, but it cannot go so far as to negate 
the function of human rights as instruments for social justice, fairness and respect for 
human dignity. 
 
7. Why cultural rights? 
The last question that needs answering in this first chapter relates to why I chose 
cultural rights for the subject of this research. Cultural rights are, as demonstrated 
above, an underdeveloped category of human rights. In assessing the relationship 
between IIL and culture, most authors so far have focused on UNESCO’s work 
regarding cultural heritage, with little space devoted to the human rights dimension.203 
On the other hand, studies on the interaction between IIL and human rights often 
disregard (or pay very little attention to) cultural rights.204 
The importance of cultural rights must not be underestimated. Human Rights treaty 
bodies correctly emphasise the role culture plays in the maintenance of peace and, 
in times like this, that role is more crucial than ever: with globalisation, mass migration, 
refugee crises, economic crises, extreme poverty, religious extremism and the fight 
against terrorism, the world needs, more than ever, to learn how to live in harmony 
and respect for cultural diversity and cultural pluralism. The speed at which 
technology has been developed, especially in terms of global communication, allows 																																																								
202 Jack Donnelly, ‘The relative universality of human rights’ (2007), p. 299 (emphasis added, references 
omitted). 
203 For example, see Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press 2014). 
204 See, inter alia, Lorenzo Cotula (2012). 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 65 
for an increasingly fast and intense contact between cultures. On the other hand, the 
threat to the mere existence of certain minority cultures is very real, with indigenous 
peoples becoming ever more Westernised and minority cultures feeling pressure to 
assimilate into the majority culture. A very grave example of this phenomenon is the 
tendency for languages to disappear – and languages are vehicles for culture, they 
are the way people decode, encode and understand their reality, their society, their 
values and beliefs. It is estimated that, by 2100, half of the languages in the world 
may completely disappear, taking entire cultures with them.205 For some 
communities, such as indigenous peoples, language is of incommensurable value; 
the extreme richness of oral tradition, expressed through stories, songs and even 
words that only exist for that specific group, risk complete annihilation. 
In addition, the world is today, more than ever, concerned with economic interests, 
and places tremendous focus on foreign investment and trade. As Vadi eloquently 
puts it, ‘[a]n international economic culture has emerged that emphasizes productivity 
and economic development at the expense of the common weal.’206 The emphasis 
on economic interests very often threatens cultural rights. 
Imagine the following scenario: indigenous peoples are more attached to the land 
than most other ‘mainstream’ cultures. They see the land and everything that nature 
offers as sacred, as the physical embodiment of their spirituality, as the living and 
breathing element of the stories they pass on from generation to generation. Some 
of these stories can only be told in specific places, representing both history and myth. 
Without access to their ancestral lands, indigenous peoples lose access to these 
stories and traditions, to the paths they used to walk, to the spiritual richness of their 
culture. Some of these traditions are only known to the group, as outsiders can be 
completely unaware of what constitutes a sacred path or a sacred place. On the other 
hand, traditional ways of life, including hunting and fishing, are also crucial elements 
of these peoples’ culture. Indigenous peoples are often the most sustainable and 
environmentally conscious groups in the world, with their traditions imbued with 
respect for biodiversity and the conservation of fauna and flora. Now, imagine that 
one of these groups inhabits a land that is rich in natural resources, such as oil or 
diamonds. The territorial State is eager to exploit these natural resources and there 																																																								
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are several foreign investors interested in joining in, either oblivious of the significance 
of that piece of land for the indigenous community, or plainly disregarding that 
significance in face of the potential economic profit. If the State decides to protect the 
integrity of the indigenous peoples’ culture, and there is an IIA protecting those foreign 
investors, this may completely derail the mining project, risking liability under IIL; if 
the State ignores the threat to that culture (which can happen purposefully or not), it 
will honour its commitments to the foreign investors, but it will also potentially 
obliterate an entire culture. This type of conflict is not merely hypothetical; it is 
happening right now to the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, in the US, and to the 
indigenous peoples in Peace River Valley, in Canada. One can only imagine the 
number of similar situations happening in less developed countries, where there is 
less concern for the cultural rights of indigenous peoples and less media coverage. 
Studying this conflict from the point of view of cultural heritage (tangible and 
intangible) is an interesting but necessarily incomplete exercise. The human right to 
culture is capable of encompassing the elements of heritage, but it goes well beyond 
it: the deep link with human dignity and cultural identity can only be fully grasped 
through the lens of HRL. Cultural rights also offer possibilities that the mere protection 
of cultural heritage does not; therefore, this research only makes sense if we look 
beyond representative lists and consider every culture precious, valuable and worthy 
of protection – regardless of official international recognition.  
 
8. Conclusions 
Establishing a conceptual framework for cultural rights is a difficult task, especially 
given the fact that definitions in this area have been considerably insufficient (either 
by fear of raising delicate issues or by the impossibility of reaching international 
consensus). This chapter has attempted to draw such a framework by explaining the 
concepts of culture and cultural rights, as well as the normative content and limitations 
of this category of human rights. In light of the above, it is possible to draw some 
conclusions.  
First of all, the concept of culture is difficult to grasp and has been the subject of 
heated debate by scholars across disciplines, from legal and political theory to 
anthropology. At the level of international HRL, culture has come to be understood in 
its anthropological sense, as a way of life, encompassing ‘the distinctive traits, 
The kaleidoscope of cultural rights 
	 67 
including the total spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional traits that characterise 
a society or social group, and that include, in addition to arts and literature, their value 
systems, and their traditions and beliefs’.207 
The protection of cultural goods evolved from a national perspective which focused 
on monuments to an international and more holistic regime, which developed in 
consonance with the historical problems that emerged at each given time. There are 
specific conventions dealing with the protection of cultural heritage in times of war, in 
times of peace, regarding the preservation of tangible, intangible and underwater 
cultural heritage, as well as the return, restitution and repatriation of movable cultural 
goods and the prevention of illicit traffic, the effectiveness of which is controversial. 
The interaction between cultural heritage law and HRL allowed for both the 
development of a more rounded conception of cultural goods (moving from ‘property’ 
to ‘heritage’), as well as for the development of cultural rights, even though they 
remain largely unfinished and underdeveloped bodies of laws. 
Cultural rights are true and enforceable human rights, intimately linked to human 
dignity and cultural identity. Their nature as human rights has been contested in the 
past, but literature, treaty language and international practice have become more and 
more open to the development of a right to culture. However, cultural rights are not 
absolute and their realisation depends on the state of economic development and 
available resources of each State, which influences the degree to which these rights 
are protected and promoted. Nevertheless, States have an immediate obligation to 
take positive measures to respect, protect and fulfil cultural rights, as well as to 
cooperate internationally with other States; violations of cultural rights by States and 
non-State entities entail State responsibility. 
It is important to note that cultural rights can be (and are) exercised within the context 
of a group or community; therefore, there is a strong collective element to the 
enjoyment of the right to culture, which is recognised by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
The debate between cultural relativists and universalists is old and, perhaps, ‘tired’ – 
but it is important to at least acknowledge the different perspectives. Cultural 
relativists consider that it is impossible to establish a universal set of values and 
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beliefs against which an action can be judged as morally right or wrong, whereas 
universalists disregard cultural differences and argue that such a universal standard 
does indeed exist. A mitigated view of universalism, which takes into account cultural 
relativity, is ideal for a balanced understanding of human rights. 
The importance of cultural rights in today’s world is incommensurate. Not only is the 
pervasiveness of culture recognised more than ever, but there is also a growing 
concern for cultural diversity, cultural pluralism and the preservation of endangered 
cultures. The challenges to cultural rights are growing in relevance and dimension, 
as globalisation, mass migration, refugee crises, economic crises, extreme poverty, 
religious extremism and the fight against terrorism take a more prominent place within 
the concerns of the international community. Faced with these conclusions, it appears 
to be more important than ever to integrate HRL and cultural heritage law, so as to 
strengthen the protection afforded to culture under international law.
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Chapter 2 – International Investment Law 
 
In order to evaluate the relationship between international investment law and 
arbitration and cultural rights, it is necessary, first of all, to understand what each of 
them mean. In the previous chapter, I have analysed the conceptual framework within 
which cultural rights can be understood; in this chapter, I will succinctly explore what 
IIL entails. 
Accordingly, this chapter will first seek to briefly introduce IIL in terms of goals, 
sources and main features (Section 1). Next, it will determine the typical content of 
IIAs, namely: investment promotion, admission and establishment of foreign 
investment, post-entry treatment of foreign investment (including relative and 
absolute standards of treatment, takings of foreign investors’ property and transfer of 
funds), performance requirements and, finally, dispute settlement (Section 2). Some 
conclusions will follow. 
 
1. Foreign investment and international investment law 
 
IIL is a significant part of public international law, with roots in the protection of foreign-
owned property that developed from the 17th century onwards.208 Modern IIL aims at 
protecting foreign investment and investors from harmful actions of the host State, 
with the objective of promoting international investment flows.209 It provides for a 
number of both procedural and substantial mechanisms that ensure the protection of 
foreign investors, chiefly through the possibility of investor-State arbitration – which 
means that IIL actually recognises the investor as an international actor with legal 
standing. The main channel for these developments was the gradual establishment 
of a large network of IIAs, most notably Bilateral Investment Treaties (hereinafter, 
‘BITs’), which started off as instruments regulating the relationship between Western 
countries and developing countries (the first ever BIT to appear in history was 
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concluded between Germany and Pakistan in 1959; the first BIT to include investor-
State arbitration was signed by France and Tunisia in 1969). Progressively, however, 
developing countries started to enter these agreements between them, and the same 
is true of Western countries amongst themselves. Throughout this process, a conflict 
of interests became apparent, with capital-exporting countries defending a protection 
regime that entailed significant constraints on national sovereignty, whereas host 
States emphasised national control of foreign investment with minimal constraints. 
The presence of conflicts such as this one is what stimulates the constant evolution 
and development of IIL.210 More recently, though, it is possible to affirm that most 
countries – developing or not – now accept the existence of treaty-based protection 
standards.211 Modern BITs have considerable differences, but the essence of the 
protection regime they establish is largely similar throughout the world, which, for 
some commentators, reflects the existence of global rules on foreign investment.212 
Even though there were several efforts towards the creation and implementation of a 
formal global investment regime – notably, from Western States – this development 
never did take place.213 The fragmentation of IIL into thousands of IIAs (some 
bilateral, some regional and some multilateral), prompted by economic globalisation 
and the expansion of MNEs, still raises concerns, namely contributing to ‘confusion, 
legal conflict, and uncertainty’ and creating an incentive for treaty shopping.214 
Under modern IIL, foreign direct investment (FDI) may be defined as a commitment 
of any asset bearing economic value, which serves to establish or maintain stable, 
lasting and direct links between the investor and the undertaking to which that asset 
is made available in order to carry out an economic activity. The investor must 
possess the ability of controlling or influencing the management of the undertaking. 
Portfolio investment, on the other hand, presents a purely financial character, where 
the investor does not possess managerial control of the investment. Concession 																																																								
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contracts are agreements concluded in writing between the investor and one or more 
State authorities, having as their object the execution of works or the provision of 
services, where the consideration consists either solely in the right to exploit the work 
or service or in this right together with payment, and the risk is transferred to the 
service provider or contractor. 
It is also important to mention the sources of IIL. These include, first and foremost, 
international investment treaties (including BITs, regional and multilateral treaties); 
international customary law; general principles of law; and judicial decisions (a 
subsidiary source, since, although there is no formal rule of precedent, tribunals are 
likely to draw inspiration from and comply with previous awards – leading some 
commentators to affirm that there is a de facto practice of precedent).215 It should also 
be noted that, although not constituting formal sources, IIL is also influenced by 
scholarly writings and soft law norms.216 
 
2. The scope of international investment agreements 
IIAs entail the assumption of commitments by the contracting parties regarding each 
other’s investors and investments. They also provide for enforcement instruments,217 
which generally include the possibility of settling disputes through arbitration. This is 
valid for BITs, as it is for investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), all 
of which invariably start off by defining their scope of application. The concepts of 
investor and investment are therefore vital to the determination of the coverage of 
IIAs. In substantive terms, most IIAs contain several common elements, namely: 
provisions on the conditions of admission and establishment of foreign investment; 
the conditions of operation and the protection accorded to covered investors and 
investments, including expropriation; repatriation of profits; and dispute settlement.218 
In addition, most IIAs contain obligations to promote investment among the 
contracting parties. 
 																																																								
215 For a more detailed discussion of the sources of IIL, see Moshe Hirsch, ‘Sources of international 
investment law’ International Law Association Study Group on the Role of Soft Law Instruments in 
International Investment Law (2011). 
216 Idem, p. 21-23. 
217 See Jeswald W. Salacuse (2010). 
218 Cf., inter alia, Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), pp. 65 and following; M. Sornarajah 
(2012) pp. 187 and following. 
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2.1. Investment promotion 
Investment promotion does not in principle entail any obligation of liberalisation.219 In 
fact, it should be pointed out that investment promotion and liberalisation constitute 
two distinct objectives of IIAs. It is understood that, by establishing a foreign 
investment regime which is characterised by stability, predictability and reliability, the 
contracting parties are implicitly encouraging investment. In the words of Salacuse 
and Sullivan, ‘[t]he basic working assumption upon which BITs rest is that clear and 
enforceable rules that protect foreign investors reduce risk, and a reduction in risk 
promotes investment.’220 It is not expected, however, that IIAs themselves contain 
legally binding clauses providing for the specific encouragement (or prioritisation) of 
investment from one contracting party to the other. In effect, most IIAs condition the 
investment promotion objective to national laws and connect it with inward 
investments, rather than outward.221 Nevertheless, the wording of these provisions 
provides valuable interpretative guidance for other clauses inserted in IIAs, such as 
those referring to standards of protection; furthermore, they may arguably give rise to 
specific constraints on State action.222 It is questionable, however, whether the same 
specific constraints would not flow from the IIA without the need for an investment 
promotion clause. The lack of arbitral awards on this matter renders its assessment 
less evident. 
Even though binding investment promotion provisions are absent from most IIAs, 
States have the possibility of adopting specific investment promotion measures, 
which are generally unilateral223 and may range from risk insurance and tax 
incentives/exemptions to technical support. 
 
2.2. Admission and establishment of foreign investment 
As to the conditions of admission/entry and establishment of foreign investment, it 
should be noted that the majority of IIAs does not provide a general right of entry to 
																																																								
219 Cf. Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), pp. 125-8. 
220 Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work: An evaluation of bilateral 
investment treaties and their grand bargain’, 46 Harv Int'l LJ 67 (2005), p 95. 
221 Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), pp. 125-6. The authors point out, at p. 127, that 
some BITs contain investment promotion provisions which are specifically directed to outward FDI. 
These cases, however, are not representative of the majority of IIAs. 
222 Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), at p. 127. 
223 M. Sornarajah (2012), p. 144. 
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foreign investors. Traditionally, the entry conditions for foreign investment have been 
considered an area of sovereign discretion of the States, since they correspond to 
the right recognised under customary international law to control the admission and 
establishment of foreigners in a State’s territory.224 Regardless, it is increasingly 
common to find provisions in IIAs that establish the right of free entry and 
establishment for foreign investors, constituting treaty-based limitations to the 
customary international law principle.225 The adoption of this type of clauses is 
intrinsically connected to the context of economic globalisation and to the generalised 
acknowledgement of the benefits that foreign investment brings to host economies. 
Entry and establishment are two different concepts that should be distinguished. The 
first concerns the permission for alien investors to cross the border into the host 
country (which may be temporary or permanent), whereas the latter is related to the 
‘type of presence’226 that they are allowed to adopt in that territory. 
Several IIAs provide for reciprocity, even if in varying degrees.227 The most relevant 
of these agreements is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which 
covers certain aspects of investment under mode 3 of supply of services (commercial 
presence) and mode 4 (temporary entry of natural persons).228 By providing for Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment229 and National Treatment (NT) in specific 
sectors,230 it concerns both entry and establishment conditions for foreign 
investors.231 
Another IIA worth mentioning in this regard is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 
signed in Lisbon in December 1994 and in force since April 1998,232 which comprises 
																																																								
224 Cf. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume I (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/10) 
(2004), pp. 143 and following; and Walid Ben Hamida, ‘Sovereign FDI and International Investment 
Agreements: Questions Relating to the Qualification of Sovereign Entities and the Admission of their 
Investments under Investment Agreements’, 9 Law & Prac Int'l Cts & Tribunals 17 (2010), p. 31. 
225 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume I (2004), p. 146. An example of 
a more modern market access provision can be found in Article 8.4 of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and Its Member States, 
available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10973-2016-INIT/en/pdf. 
226 Ibidem. 
227 See Angelos Dimopoulos, EU foreign investment law (Oxford University Press 2011), p. 51. 
228 See Article I(2)(c) and (d), and XXVIII(d) GATS. 
229 See Article II GATS. 
230 See Articles XVI and XVII GATS. 
231 For an analysis of the investment rules in the context of the WTO, see Thomas L Brewer and Stephen 
Young, ‘Investment issues at the WTO: The architecture of rules and the settlement of disputes’, 1 
Journal of International Economic Law 457 (1998). 
232 And recently updated, through The International Energy Charter, a further political declaration 
adopted and signed in The Hague on 20 May 2015 (available at: 
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/IEC_EN.pdf). 
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a multilateral framework for investments in the energy sector. According to the Energy 
Charter Secretariat, one of the main objectives of the ECT ‘is to ensure the creation 
of a “level playing field” for energy sector investments throughout the Charter’s 
constituency, with the aim of reducing to a minimum the non-commercial risks 
associated with energy-sector investments.’233 
The ECT’s relevance comes both from its unprecedented coverage in geographical 
terms and from its originality. In fact, not only is it the only legally binding multilateral 
instrument on energy issues and investment protection, but it also involves a large 
number of countries around the world, either through membership or through the 
status of observers.234 The ECT contains several provisions relevant to the 
liberalisation of investment in the energy sector, namely those guaranteeing freedom 
of capital transfers, subject only to very limited restrictions, and those providing for 
non-discrimination of foreign investors, granting them NT or MFN treatment, 
whichever is more favourable.235 
The provisions on admission and establishment are not, however, as strong and 
precise as the ones relating to post-entry protection. As Konoplyanik and Wälde point 
out, as the ECT stands now, it contains ‘softer’ rules for pre-entry conditions and 
‘harder’, legally binding obligations for the post-entry phase.236 The ECT members 
were nevertheless discussing the possibility of adopting a Supplementary Treaty 
covering the ‘Making of Investments’ phase. The negotiation process was initiated in 
1996, but subsequently put on hold, in 2002, while the discussions for a multilateral 
investment agreement were taking place at the WTO level. It was never resumed 
since,237 although the Energy Charter Conference, in 2004, reaffirmed the will to 
engage in the matter.238 
Finally, it is important to mention the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital 
Movements and of Current Invisible Operations (the ‘OECD Codes’). These Codes 																																																								
233 See Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘An Introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty: Why an Energy 
Charter?’ (D/2004/7850/5) (2004), p. 14. 
234 At the time of writing, 52 countries are members of the ECT (4 of which still have not ratified it), as 
well as the EU and Euratom (which adds up to 54 signatories) and 24 countries are observers; there are 
also several international organisations with observer status, including the WTO and the OECD. The 
International Energy Charter (a political declaration) already has over 70 signatories. 
235 Cf. Articles 10 and 14 ECT. 
236 See Andrei Konoplyanik and Thomas Wälde, ‘Energy Charter Treaty and its role in international 
energy’, 24 J Energy Nat Resources L 523 (2006), p. 533. 
237 Cf. Energy Charter Secretariat (2004), p. 14. 
238 In particular, see paragraph 14 of the Conclusions of the Review conducted under Article 34(7) of the 
Energy Charter Treaty (15th Meeting, on 14th December 2004), available at: 
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/CCDEC200408.pdf. 
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aim at the progressive abolition of restrictions on movements of capital, as well as on 
current invisible transactions and transfers, to the extent necessary for effective 
economic co-operation.239 There are no sanctions for non-compliance with the OECD 
Codes and their enforcement relies basically on ‘peer pressure’; however, the OECD 
reports that the ‘peer review process has proved to be quite a powerful tool for driving 
liberalisation forward, even though it does not involve direct negotiations and 
sanctions.’ 240 
 
2.3. Post-entry treatment of foreign investment 
After the investor enters the host country, there are still many aspects of his activity 
that may be regulated in a manner that conditions its exercise, e.g., ‘measures related 
to non-discrimination, nationalization or expropriation, capital transfer, dispute 
settlement, performance requirements, corporate tax rates and other measures 
affecting the operating conditions for [MNEs]’.241 The most relevant features of the 
post-entry treatment of foreign investment under IIL will be briefly analysed below. 
 
 a) Relative and absolute standards of treatment  
Most IIAs provide for the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investors and 
investments after they are established in the host country, generally with regard to 
nationality. Non-discrimination can be required both in relation to national investors 
and to other foreign investors: it corresponds to the obligations of NT and MFN 
treatment. 
NT and MFN treatment obligations do not set objective standards regarding how 
foreign investors should be allowed to conduct their activities in the host country. On 
the contrary, they set a relative standard which triggers a comparison between the 
treatment accorded to the foreign investor, on the one hand, and similarly situated 
host state nationals or foreign investors, on the other. The host country may not treat 
the foreign investor in a manner less beneficial than it would one of the comparable 																																																								
239 Cf. Article 1(a) of each Code, both available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-
policy/codes.htm. 
240 Cf. ‘Forty Years’ Experience with the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements’ (OECD, 
2002), p. 58, available at: https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/2510947.pdf. 
241 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and 
Development (UNCTAD/WIR/2011) (2011), p. 95.  
International Investment Law 
	 76 
individuals or legal persons. As an example, BITs concluded by EU Member States 
do not contain entry rules; consequently, NT and MFN clauses typically address post-
entry issues,242 i.e., treatment of foreign investors and investments after they are 
already established in their territory.243 Accordingly, the UK Model BIT specifies that 
NT and MFN treatment apply to ‘investments or returns of nationals or companies’ 
and ‘their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investments’.244 
Post-entry provisions are, however, not limited to obligations of non-discrimination. 
Most BITs include absolute standards of treatment, namely Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET) and/or Full Protection and Security (FPS). Under Articles 2(2) and 
4(1) of the German Model BIT, foreign investments are accorded both FET and FPS; 
the UK Model BIT contains the same solution;245 the French Model BIT, on the other 
hand, only establishes an obligation of FET.246  
FET is not defined in the majority of IIAs. This notwithstanding, it is evident from 
international arbitral awards that this obligation is far-reaching and includes both 
substantive and procedural issues. According to Vandevelde, this standard of 
treatment is intrinsically connected with the rule of law; in the author’s words, ‘the 
concept of legality is the unifying theory behind the fair and equitable treatment 
standard’.247 This has consequences both on procedural (as an obligation of due 
process) and substantive matters (as requiring reasonableness, consistency, non-
discrimination and transparency from the host State’s part).248 
The obligation of FPS is very often interpreted together with FET and sometimes even 
diluted in it. Nevertheless, this standard should be given an autonomous meaning as 
imposing ‘a high degree of diligence expected from a well-administered 
government’.249 In international arbitral awards, consideration has been given to the 																																																								
242 See Article 3 of the Federal Republic of Germany Model Treaty concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments (2008), hereinafter ‘German Model BIT’; as well as Article 3 of the 
UK Model Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2005, with 2006 amendments), 
reproduced in Zachary Douglas (2009), appendix 10, hereinafter ‘UK Model BIT’; and Article 4 of the 
Republic of France Model Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (2006), 
hereinafter ‘French Model BIT’. 
243 Jan Ceyssens (2005), p. 264. 
244 Cf. Article 3 of the UK Model BIT. 
245 Article 2(2) of the UK Model BIT. 
246 Article 3 of the French Model BIT. 
247 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A unified theory of fair and equitable treatment’, 43 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics (JILP) 43 (2010), p. 49. 
248 Idem, pp. 49-53. 
249 Mahnaz Malik, The Full Protection and Security Standard Comes of Age: Yet another challenge for 
states in investment treaty arbitration? (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2011), p. 11. 
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specific conditions of the State granting FPS in a way that the standard was 
envisaged as an obligation of ‘diligentia quam in suis’ or ‘level of care that one applies 
in one's own affairs’.250 Traditionally, this standard of treatment has been associated 
with the physical protection of investors and investments, although some arbitral 
awards seem to confirm the view that FPS extends to regulatory interference with 
foreign investment, thus going beyond the traditional approach.251 
 
 b) Takings of foreign investors’ property 
The post-entry treatment of foreign investors also covers the matter of takings. This 
concept encompasses two kinds of interference with foreign investors’ property by 
the host country: direct (‘legislative or administrative acts that transfer title and 
physical possession’) and indirect takings (‘acts that effectuate the loss of 
management, use or control, or a significant depreciation in the value, of assets’).252 
In general, the concepts of expropriation and nationalisation fit into the first category, 
whereas the second refers to indirect/creeping expropriation and regulatory 
takings.253 The usage of these terms varies significantly both in the wording of treaty 
provisions, arbitral awards and literature, despite the fact that countless takings have 
been under scrutiny for decades. This lack of uniformity is attributed to several factors, 
namely the fact that the term usually stems from varying national legislation, which in 
turn experiences changes in interpretation and application throughout time, as 
policies and ideologies mutate, as well as the fact that international practice has been 
characterised by a succession of different phases regarding host State action and 
corresponding reaction in international arbitration fora.254 For the purpose of this 
research, the term ‘expropriation’ will be used generically to refer to all host country 
takings of foreign investors’ property.  																																																								
250 Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), p. 309. 
251 For a review of these awards, see Mahnaz Malik (2011), pp. 7-9. 
252 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume I (2004), p. 236. 
253 The definition of takings and the distinction between direct and indirect takings, as well as the 
determination of what constitutes a compensable interference with foreign investors’ property are very 
interesting and complex questions. However, they will not be explored in this research, as they go 
beyond its scope. In this regard, see, inter alia, George C Christie, ‘What Constitutes a Taking of Property 
Under International Law’, 38 Brit YB Int'l L 307 (1962); Maurizio Brunetti, ‘The Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, NAFTA Chapter 11, and the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation’, 2 Chi J Int'l L 203 (2001); Allen 
S Weiner, ‘Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of" Legitimate" Regulatory Purposes’ 
(2003) International Law FORUM du droit international, available at: ; Christoph H Schreuer, ‘The 
Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties’ in Clarisse Ribeiro 
(ed), Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty (Juris Publishing 2006). 
254 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume I (2004), p. 237. 
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It is commonly accepted that expropriation is not forbidden, which is not the same as 
saying that it is allowed to occur without fulfilling certain requirements. For example, 
the majority of the BITs concluded by EU Member States require, in line with the most 
common international practice,255 the fulfilment of four requirements in order to 
consider an expropriatory measure as lawful: it must (1) pursue the public interest; 
(2) be non-discriminatory; (3) be exercised with respect to due process; and (4) 
provide for prompt, adequate and effective compensation. It should be noted that 
early instruments, such as the 1959 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-
Shawcross Draft Convention), which is regarded as one of the most important non-
governmental attempts to establish a multilateral agreement on foreign investment, 
already referred to these requirements.256 The OECD Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Investment, arguably an influential model for BITs concluded by 
OECD countries, contained all four requirements mentioned above.257  
There is much debate as to the standard of compensation that should be applied to 
cases of expropriation of foreign investors’ property. The tendency among capital 
exporting countries has traditionally been to follow the Hull formula, named after the 
US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, which requires ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ 
compensation.258 Hull employed this expression in a communication regarding the 
Mexican expropriations which reflected the idea that expropriation was not illegal per 
se and that compensation could be viewed as a necessary ex post requirement, 
rather than an ex ante condition of lawfulness. Capital importing countries – 
traditionally, developing countries – showed reluctance to accept the Hull formula, 





255 These four requirements are explicitly enumerated, e.g., in Article 1110(1) NAFTA; the same occurs 
in Article 13(1) ECT. 
256 1959 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, in UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Instruments: A 
Compendium’, no. 137, vol. V – cf. Article III, expressly referring to due process, non-discrimination and 
prompt, just and effective compensation. 
257 Cf. Article 3 of the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Investment (1968), 7 ILM 117 
258 Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), p. 376; Kommerskollegium (Swedish National 
Board of Trade) (2011), p. 23. 
259 In this sense, UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume I (2004), p. 237; 
M. Sornarajah (2012), p. 414; Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), p. 376; 
Kommerskollegium (Swedish National Board of Trade) (2011), p. 23. 
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 c) Transfer of funds 
It is commonly accepted that a foreign investor can only fully enjoy the outcome of 
his enterprise if the host State allows for the free transfer of funds.260 In fact, the 
possibility for the investor to mobilise capital (both inwards and outwards) is a 
fundamental component of the foreign investment process. The high importance of 
free transfer of funds is reflected in the attention to these issues expressed at the IIL 
level since early stages. 
A good example of this concern is the inclusion of provisions establishing the free 
transfer of funds in instruments such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Articles of Agreement (the ‘IMF Articles’), adopted in 1944,261 and the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign 
Investments (the ‘ICC Code’), proposed in 1949,262 which never entered into force 
due to the fact that States did not wish to adopt such a far-reaching agreement on 
investment.263 Its influence on the evolution of international approaches to investment 
protection is nonetheless undeniable. 
The OECD Codes,264 mentioned above in 2.2, contain binding free transfer 
obligations, which provide for more comprehensive protection than the IMF Articles. 
The GATS also contains free transfer commitments, albeit restricted to the services 
sector.265 IIAs commonly liberalise inward transfers but not outward transfers. 
As to the ECT, Article 14(1) provides for free transfer of funds, both inward and 
outward, with the sole exception of measures adopted with a view to protecting ‘the 
rights of creditors’, ensuring ‘compliance with laws on the issuing, trading and dealing 
in securities’ and guaranteeing the ‘satisfaction of judgments (…) through the 
equitable, non-discriminatory, and good-faith application of its laws and 
regulations’.266  
																																																								
260 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Key Issues, Volume I (2004), p. 257. 
261 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (1944), republished in 2011, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf. 
262 ICC ‘International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investment’, Brochure 129 (1949, Lecraw 
Press); reprinted in UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (1996), vol. 3, pp. 
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263 Idem, pp. 20-21. 
264 See Section 2.2. above. 
265 Cf. Articles XI(1) and XVI GATS, fn. 8. 
266 Cf. Article 14(4) ECT. 
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2.4. Performance requirements 
One of the ways in which the host State exercises control over foreign investment in 
its territory is through the imposition of certain requirements on the performance of 
economic activities, such as local content obligations and rules relating to minimum 
export levels. Performance requirements may be underpinned by various policy 
goals, ranging from environmental protection to employment of nationals and 
protection of local businesses, and they have the potential to affect both the entry and 
the operation of foreign investment. Whilst there is huge debate over the economic 
admissibility or desirability of performance requirements,267 international instruments 
have consistently reflected the view that such provisions are detrimental to the 
efficiency of foreign investment. Accordingly, the 1992 World Bank (WB) Guidelines 
on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (the ‘WB Guidelines’) emphatically 
state that:  
In the formulation and application of (…) regulations [to govern the admission 
of private foreign investments], States will note that experience suggests that 
certain performance requirements introduced as conditions of admission are 
often counterproductive and that open admission, possibly subject to a 
restricted list of investments (which are either prohibited or require screening 
and licensing), is a more effective approach.268 
Within the WTO, a number of performance requirements are regulated under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (the ‘TRIMs Agreement’), which 
originated in the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.269 As 
highlighted in its preamble, the TRIMs Agreement aimed ‘to promote the expansion 
and progressive liberalisation of world trade and to facilitate investment across 
international frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading partners, 
particularly developing country Members, while ensuring free competition’. Its scope 
of application is limited, however, to trade in goods270 and to specific performance 
requirements, which it does not define. It does contain an ‘illustrative list’ of prohibited 
																																																								
267 Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluis Paradell (2009), pp. 416-418. 
268 World Bank, ‘Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign 
Direct Investment’ (1992), 31 ILM 1363, Guideline II(3). 
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Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 1, 33 ILM 9. 
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measures, including local content rules (e.g., the obligation for foreign investors to 
‘purchase or use (…) products of domestic origin or from any domestic source’),271 
foreign exchange restrictions (‘restricting [the foreign investor’s] access to foreign 
exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows attributable to 
[him]’)272 and trade balancing obligations (e.g., limitation of the purchase or use of 
imports by reference to exports of local products).273 
The TRIMs Agreement has been criticised in legal literature as unsuitable to achieve 
its own goals, as it arguably did not succeed in going beyond what already resulted 
from the GATT,274 as well as for excessively fettering the regulatory freedom of 
developing countries.275 Conversely, it has been praised for bringing investment 
matters onto the WTO agenda.276 The TRIMs Agreement should not be viewed as a 
code intended to liberalise admission of foreign investment, but rather as a 
clarification of which performance requirements are incompatible with the GATT’s 
rules on NT and prohibition of quantitative restrictions.277 
At the WTO level, there are further prohibitions of performance requirements. Under 
Article XVI(2) of the GATS, whenever a member undertakes market access 
commitments, it must abstain from adopting measures which limit the number of 
service suppliers, the value of service transactions or assets, the number of service 
operations or the quantity of service output, the number of employees, the level of 
participation of foreign capital and the legal form of the entity supplying the service. 
The ECT also contains a prohibition of certain performance requirements. Article 5(2) 
textually replicates the wording of the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement, thus 
prohibiting the same type of measures. Moreover, under Article 10(11), the 
application of performance requirements to existing investments constitutes a breach 
of an ECT obligation. It is interesting to note, however, that Article 5(3) excludes from 
the prohibition those measures requiring use or purchase of domestic products, or 
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restricting levels of imports in accordance with the investor’s levels of exports of local 
products, ‘as a condition of eligibility for export promotion, foreign aid, government 
procurement or preferential tariff or quota programmes’. 
Finally, it should be noted that NT provisions have the potential to indirectly apply as 
a prohibition of performance requirements, by preventing the imposition on foreign 
investors of measures that would not be imposed equally on the host State’s 
nationals. Nonetheless, as NT is not always granted in a comprehensive manner (and 
sometimes its application to this kind of measures is even expressly excluded), it 
cannot be regarded as a sufficiently efficient instrument of protection from host States’ 
interference with the conditions of admission and operation of FDI. 
 
2.5. Dispute settlement 
Vattel stated, in 1758, that ‘[w]hoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, 
which must protect that citizen.’278 This 18th century idea was rooted in the 
assumption that ‘the individual had no rights at international law’.279 In line with this 
principle, historically, the settlement of international investment disputes between 
private parties and States occurred in the context of diplomatic protection,280 whereby 
the State of the investor’s nationality would espouse his claim. The International Law 
Commission (ILC), in Article 1 of its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, drew 
inspiration from the customary international law concept, in defining diplomatic 
protection as ‘[t]he invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of 
peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an 
internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national 
of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.’281 
This definition was also endorsed by the ICJ, namely in the Diallo case.282 Moreover, 
in 1924, the right of a State to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals 
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was very expressively characterised by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ), in the Mavrommatis case, as ‘an elementary principle of international law.’283 
While this right is generally undisputed, the question of whether diplomatic protection 
also constitutes a duty imposed on the States remains the subject of intense 
debate.284 In addition, under customary international law, whenever a foreign investor 
wishes to bring a claim against the host State, he is required to resort, first and 
foremost, to the national judicial system of that State. Only when local remedies have 
effectively been exhausted may the foreign investor seek diplomatic protection from 
his State of origin. Diplomatic protection often came accompanied with threats or use 
of force (the so-called ‘gun-boat diplomacy’)285 and there was an early practice of 
setting up ad hoc claims commissions and arbitral tribunals, although generally not 
granting actual standing to the foreign investor. The intervention of private parties in 
investment dispute settlement mechanisms evolved progressively, and the first 
international instrument that expressly provided for direct investor-State arbitration 
was the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention. 
It is commonly accepted that there is a principle of ‘free choice of means’ applicable 
to the international settlement of disputes.286 This principle has been expressed in 
several international instruments, most notably the UN Charter.287 In line with this 
principle, States have traditionally resorted to a wide range of dispute settlement 
options, including both bilateral and third-party mechanisms. The latter, most notably 
arbitration, only became common for the settlement of investment disputes in the 
‘post-1945 Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties’ period.288 Historically, 
most inter-State disputes were settled by resorting to bilateral mechanisms, such as 
negotiations and consultations. 
The first and most obvious example of multilateral inter-State dispute settlement is 
the WTO, under which a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) constituted by 
representatives of all members is in charge of the proceedings. These comprise two 
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stages, the first corresponding to a panel and the second to the Appellate Body (AB), 
which decides on appeals from the panel’s report. Although the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism was born from a ‘diplomatic paradigm’, after the Uruguay 
Round it became a ‘system that is based on third and impartial bodies, which shifted 
the adjudicatory function partially away from and beyond the WTO members.’289 The 
popularity of the WTO dispute settlement system among its members is clear 
evidence of its effectiveness and importance. In fact, it is argued that, among other 
factors, ‘by creating a system of compulsory, binding and enforceable dispute 
settlement’ the WTO ‘significantly reshaped the world trading system’.290 
With regard to ISDS, it was only after the establishment of the ICSID, in 1966, that 
international investment arbitration fully presented itself as an option for non-State 
parties. Accordingly, it has been frequently noted in legal literature that ‘[i]t was only 
during the 1990s that investment arbitration clearly emerged as an international 
mechanism of adjudicative review.’291 This was connected both to the rapid 
proliferation of BITs and to the conclusion of important regional treaties covering 
investment matters and providing for arbitration, such as the NAFTA and the ECT. 
In fact, the ECT presents a complex and innovative solution, by providing both for 
inter-State and investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms. Pursuant to part V of 
the ECT, private investors are entitled to submit disputes to international arbitration, 
in accordance with the principles laid out in Article 26. Furthermore, under Article 27, 
States are invited to settle their disputes through diplomatic channels, but are also 
granted the right to resort to an ad hoc tribunal governed, in principle, by the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.292 It should be noted that the latter mechanism is not 
limited to investment matters, but rather covers all issues concerning the application 
or interpretation of the ECT.293 
Regarding inter-State arbitration, the UK, German and French Model BITs all contain 
very similar provisions. Disputes between the parties should firstly be settled through 
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diplomatic channels; in case this fails, it is possible to resort to international 
arbitration, each party being entitled to appoint one member of the tribunal and a third 
being appointed by the first two. If any of these appointments is not properly made 
within the timeframes set in the BITs, the parties may refer to an appointing authority: 
the President of the ICJ in the UK and German Model BITs and the Secretary-General 
of the UN in the French Model BIT.294 
As to ISDS, all three Model BITs provide for an ‘unconditional right [for the investor] 
to bring a suit before an international tribunal’.295 If, after a variable period of time (six 
months for the German and French Model BITs and three months for the UK Model 
BIT), the dispute could not be settled through amicable mechanisms, it may be 
submitted to international arbitration. The French Model BIT only allows for ICSID 
arbitration, whereas the German and UK models open up a wide range of possible 
fora for the investor to choose from, including both institutional and ad hoc arbitration. 
Finally, it should be noted that, as a rule, and contrary to diplomatic protection, ISDS 
is available to foreign investors independently of the exhaustion of national remedies. 
In fact, the basic idea behind ISDS is that national courts are not always adequate to 
deal with foreign investment issues.296 The ICSID Convention reflects precisely this, 
by confirming that the requirement of exhaustion of national remedies must be 
expressly stated and should not be assumed.297 Nevertheless, even when the 
exhaustion of local remedies is not required per se, there are some drafting 
techniques that preserve the roles of national courts – they are what Schreuer calls 
‘the members of the Calvo clan’, which include the requirement of a given period of 
time before international arbitration may be utilised.298 For example, the BIT 
concluded between France and China in 1984 (entered into force in 1985) states that, 
if a dispute persists for six months after an attempt to settle it amicably, the investor 
may choose to resort to the administrative bodies and the courts of the host State. 
He may only initiate arbitral proceedings after one year.299 
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This is not, however, the same as saying that foreign investors are denied access to 
the local courts and administrative bodies of the host State because there is no 
exhaustion of national remedies requirement. Some BITs actually allow this access 
expressly and establish that national courts and international arbitration may be used 
alternatively. That is the case, for instance, of the BIT between Portugal and Peru.300 
 
3. Conclusions 
IIAs represent the assumption of commitments by the contracting parties regarding 
the treatment of foreign investors and investments. Accordingly, they contain several 
elements, including enforcement mechanisms, which are instrumental to those 
commitments. Investment promotion is one of the main goals proclaimed in IIAs, but 
it does not entail an obligation of liberalisation. It is generally accepted that the stable 
and predictable framework provided by IIAs is in and of itself sufficient to promote 
investment amongst the contracting parties. 
The definition of admission and establishment conditions for foreign investment has 
traditionally been a sovereign prerogative of States. Nevertheless, it is increasingly 
common to find IIAs that include commitments at this level. After this phase, the 
establishment of relative and absolute standards of treatment in IIAs is extremely 
relevant to the protection of foreign investors and investments. 
Relative standards of treatment correspond to obligations of non-discrimination, 
which can be required both in relation to national investors and to other foreign 
investors (NT and MFN treatment). In addition, one of the most important features of 
IIAs is that they aim at protecting foreign investors from takings of property, which 
may be direct or indirect, by laying out the conditions for those acts to be deemed 
lawful and by setting standards of compensation. Furthermore, the transfer of funds 
is covered to a large extent by international instruments that impose or promote the 
liberalisation of capital movements. Moreover, several types of performance 
requirements are expressly prohibited by a number of international instruments, such 
as the TRIMs Agreement and the ECT. Finally, international investment disputes may 
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be settled through bilateral or third-party mechanisms. ISDS (both institutional and ad 
hoc) is generally considered as one of the greatest advantages of IIL.
		 88 
 
Chapter 3 – The interaction between international investment law and 
cultural rights – an overview 
 
1. Introduction 
After briefly analysing the scope and meaning of both cultural rights and IIL, it is now 
time to understand how they interact. The first idea that should be conveyed in this 
regard is that IIL and human rights have significant points in common.301 As Cotula 
affirms, ‘[b]y setting minimum standards of protection and providing international 
mechanisms for the judicial review of adverse government action, these two bodies 
of law protect non-state actors against the arbitrary exercise of state sovereignty.’302 
In addition, investment tribunals have made use of concepts and standards used in 
HRL, such as the proportionality doctrine, and have referred to the case-law of human 
rights courts, as will be seen in more detail in Chapter 6. Finally, HRL represents an 
alternative route for foreign investors to seek the protection of their interests.303 
Nevertheless, there are also some notable differences between these two areas of 
law, beginning with the ‘different historical trajectories, (…) different philosophical 
underpinnings, (…) different language and concepts, and (…) different standards of 
legal protection.’304 Additionally, HRL protects every human being, whereas IIL (in 
principle) only protects a circumscribed category of people – that of foreign investors 
covered by relevant IIAs; and HRL requires exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
whereas IIL usually allows investors to directly access dispute settlement 
mechanisms against the host State.305 However, these differences have not 
precluded some cross-pollination between the two areas: first, it appears clear that 
the developments in HRL which occurred post-World War II have affected the 																																																								
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development of IIL; and, conversely, IIL demonstrably has the ability to shape the 
national policies of host States.306 
There is evidence that, in cases where there is a conflict of interests between local 
communities and foreign investors, the latter appear to be much more strongly 
protected. On the one hand, there is a very significant imbalance in negotiating power, 
which mirrors the asymmetries found in the legal protection of different rights 
holders.307 On the other hand, the enforcement mechanisms offered by IIL to foreign 
investors are much more accessible and effective than the mechanisms offered by 
international HRL (which rely heavily on the willingness of national courts to take 
matters seriously, and requires exhaustion of domestic remedies). Hence the need to 
explore alternative routes within investment law and practice that adequately take into 
account the interests of different rights holders, including local communities, 
especially those who are particularly vulnerable, such as ethnic minorities and 
indigenous peoples. 
Human rights and IIL can interact at different levels: first, the host State may harm 
the foreign investor’s rights, which may be protected under both areas of law – this is 
an interaction that falls outside the scope of this dissertation.308 Second, the 
investment-promotion and protection conduct of the host State can jeopardise the 
human rights of its citizens;309 in other words, there may be adverse human rights 
impacts brought about by a State’s compliance with IIL commitments, to the detriment 
of its autonomy to regulate in the public interest (as will be demonstrated in Section 
2 below). Third, the actions of a foreign investor can impair the human rights of local 
populations in the host State;310 this issue is made more critical by the fact that foreign 
investors are largely only given rights under IIL, rather than obligations, and that HRL, 
as it stands today, does not directly address corporate responsibility for human rights. 
However, the international community has been pushing for greater corporate 
accountability (as will be discussed in Section 3 further below). This brief chapter thus 
aims at highlighting the specific challenges to the protection of cultural rights in the 																																																								
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context of both the restrictions imposed by IIAs on States’ regulatory autonomy and 
obligations imposed on foreign investors. 
 
2. Protecting cultural rights – the State’s regulatory autonomy 
It has been widely noted that IIAs can bring about a significant restriction of States’ 
regulatory autonomy and their ability to define their own regulatory space, as all 
domestic regulations affecting protected investments have to be weighed against the 
applicable IIAs. As one commentator noted, ‘not only the actual but also the potential 
financial and political cost of investor-state arbitration or the threat thereof might 
suffice to cause a “chilling effect” on national regulation.’311 This has been identified 
with the possibility of a ‘race-to-the-bottom’,312 where the will to attract foreign 
investment dissuades the State from enacting legitimate regulatory measures and 
eventually leads to a general lowering of standards regarding non-economic 
objectives, namely human rights.313 
Cultural rights are a more circumscribed category than human rights, which poses 
particular challenges but also offers certain added possibilities. Vadi very 
expressively refers to ‘cultural sovereignty’ as ‘the freedom of any state to choose its 
cultural model and to set relevant cultural policies’, which is ‘an expression of state 
sovereignty’.314 As the author correctly points out, this notion has been endorsed by 
both the UN General Assembly and the ICJ; the first affirmed that ‘[e]ach State has 
the right to freely choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural 
systems’,315 whereas the second stated ‘each State is permitted, by the principle of 
State sovereignty, to decide freely [namely regarding its] political, economic, social 
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.’316 This ‘cultural 
sovereignty’, however, has become more and more restricted by the growth and 
development of international cultural law and international HRL, which impose 
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specific obligations on States.317 These bodies of law interact deeply and the 
boundaries between them are not as defined and straightforward as one could hope. 
In a ‘context of global legal pluralism’, a network of legal sources coexist and 
intermingle, from national law (of several different countries) to international law and 
transnational contracts, and create competing claims, each offering different levels of 
protection.318 
When States exercise their cultural sovereignty – which should always be done with 
respect for all human rights – there is a risk that cultural regulatory action clashes 
with IIL commitments. As Vadi points out, ‘[t]he cultural goal of a regulatory measure 
does not imply per se absence of discrimination or of any other breach of investment 
treaties’.319 To put it differently, it is worth asking, as Higgins did,320 who should bear 
the economic cost of regulations enacted in the public interest, but which negatively 
affect foreign investors. The question is hard to answer, and it largely depends on the 
specificities of each case; whereas States’ powers to regulate are unquestioned, and 
could entail takings of foreign investors’ property, the matter of compensation 
complicates the situation further.321 
If a State (that is, society as a whole) always had to bear the cost of regulating in the 
public interest, it might be dissuaded from doing so; if the cost systematically fell on 
the foreign investor’s shoulders (that is, if the State never compensated investors for 
the effects of regulation in the public interest), there could be much room for abuse 
of regulatory power.322 On the other hand, investment flows would likely decrease, as 
the State in question would be viewed as a high-risk country. As Vicuna points out, in 
the past, the answer to this question would entail a choice between pro-property and 
pro-State positions; presently, the answers are more nuanced, and involve ‘a 
determination of the extent of the rights eventually affected, the incidence of the 
measure taken, and the genuine need for a public purpose and non-discrimination.’323 
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One could ask why States should choose to subject themselves to IIL, if it risks 
constraining their regulatory space so much and putting vulnerable local communities 
at risk. The main justification for investment protection lies in the fact that ‘foreign 
investors tend to be more vulnerable than nationals to arbitrary treatment by the host 
state, because they lack political representation in that state and because they may 
fall victim of political manipulation by governments in search of scapegoats to defuse 
internal tensions’.324 Furthermore, foreign investors often tend to be more vulnerable 
to ‘discriminatory government action’.325 The vulnerability argument was endorsed by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in James and Others v. United 
Kingdom,326 but it is important to reflect on a very significant question: is it really 
possible to say that an international oil company is more vulnerable to arbitrary State 
interference than a local farmer – or, I might add, an indigenous community? 
States have an international human rights obligation to protect cultural rights from 
third-party interference, as results from General Comment no. 21.327 Human Rights 
Courts have consistently upheld this obligation; for instance, in Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) had to decide on a case involving the restitution of ancestral lands to an 
indigenous community. The owner of these lands was protected under a BIT between 
Paraguay and Germany, which led the government to resist restitution.328 However, 
the Court considered that 
[the BIT] allows for capital investments made by a contracting party to be 
condemned or nationalized for a “public purpose or interest”, which could 
justify land restitution to indigenous people. Moreover, the Court considers 
that the enforcement of bilateral commercial treaties negates vindication of 
non-compliance with state obligations under the American Convention; on the 
contrary, their enforcement should always be compatible with the American 
Convention, which is a multilateral treaty on human rights that stands in a 
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class of its own and that generates rights for individual human beings and 
does not depend entirely on reciprocity among States.329  
Another relevant case from the IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, also refers 
to the restitution of ancestral lands to an indigenous community, which had been 
removed for the construction of a dam. The Court affirmed that this tribe was 
protected by international HRL, ‘that secures the right to the communal territory they 
have traditionally used and occupied, derived from their longstanding use and 
occupation of the land and resources necessary for their physical and cultural 
survival’, and that the State had to ‘recognize, respect, protect and guarantee’ this 
right.330 It added that the right to property is not absolute, which means that the State 
has the ability to restrict it, under certain circumstances, to allow for the issuance of 
logging and mining concessions for the exploration and extraction of certain natural 
resources found within Saramaka territory.331 However, such restrictions can only 
take place if the State complies with a number of requirements, which include 
effective participation of the indigenous people; reasonable benefit to be received by 
the community; and a prior environmental and social impact assessment.332 
As Cotula rightly observes, when States decide to take action in order to protect local 
communities, they have to weigh the cost of compensating foreign investors for their 
losses. This is susceptible of entailing disincentives for States to effectively undertake 
such protection, or jeopardising compliance with international human rights 
standards.333 It is crucial to motivate host States to implement effective and 
comprehensive policies that promote and protect the cultural rights of their citizens. 
For this to happen, States need to trust that international investment tribunals will pay 
deference to their sovereign right to regulate internally (which remains uncertain), 
especially when there are international cultural rights obligations that are binding on 
these States. 
This is already happening to a certain extent – the most obvious example being the 
case of Glamis Gold v. USA,334 which will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 6. In 
this case, California introduced a mandatory backfilling requirement for a mining 																																																								
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project on sacred Native American sites. The investor’s claims were dismissed in their 
entirety, demonstrating that arbitral tribunals are capable of taking non-economic 
goals into account – in fact, the tribunal considered that ‘governments must 
compromise between the interests of competing parties’.335 However, this does not 
mean that IIL and cultural rights are fully integrated, or even that this integration was 
achieved in an ideal way in Glamis Gold. Even though the outcome of the award had 
the practical effect of protecting cultural rights, and the participation of the Quechan 
Indian Nation as amicus curiae was allowed, which in itself is of great significance, 
the tribunal ended up not addressing any of the human rights and cultural arguments 
raised by the amici (it did not even mention HRL at all), which begs the question of 
whether these arguments were simply ignored or avoided. Perhaps more tellingly, an 
in-depth analysis of arbitral practice demonstrates that there is no coherent response 
to arguments connected to human rights or cultural heritage, and that there is still a 
high level of uncertainty regarding how much these arguments may impact the final 
decision. This uncertainty is crucial when it comes to States’ incentives to regulate in 
the public interest, and this is a ponderous reason why a more effective integration of 
international investment and cultural rights is necessary. 
Moreover, in spite of the obvious potential overlap between IIL and human rights, 
‘investor-state arbitral tribunals remain reluctant to examine human rights arguments 
raised in amicus curiae submissions or on their own initiative (for example, as part of 
“contextual interpretation” proprio motu following the principle of jura novit curia) if 
human rights have not been argued by the parties.’336 In fact, strictly speaking, 
arbitrators do not have the power to adjudicate human rights violations per se. 
Nevertheless, they may be called upon to assess HRL in the context of an investment 
dispute, since ‘the law applicable to investment arbitrations typically encompasses 
international law (rather than simply the given investment protection treaty), and (…) 
this could include other non-economic forms of international law.’337 Amongst the 
bodies of international law that arbitrators should take into account when assessing 
an investment dispute, human rights – and, in particular, cultural rights – are key to 
the present research. According to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, treaties 
(including IIAs) should be interpreted in the light of ‘any relevant rules of international 																																																								
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law applicable in the relations between the parties’. This thus includes, inter alia, 
international human rights obligations and international cultural law. 
Contrary to what happens in other areas of economic law, ‘investment treaty dispute 
settlement is dispersed, ad-hoc and often opaque.’338 As a consequence of this 
dispersion and confidentiality, even if there are instances where investment 
arbitration might have human rights implications, the public may not be made aware 
of their existence. Therefore, the analysis of arbitral awards conducted in the course 
of this study should not be seen as exhaustive, as not all disputes are in the public 
domain. The potential restrictive impact of IIL on States’ regulatory autonomy, as 
seen through the lens of investment tribunals and the relevant case-law, will be 
analysed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
3. Protecting cultural rights – investor’s obligations 
The most delicate part of the interaction between IIL and cultural rights is perhaps the 
one that relates to violations perpetrated by the foreign investor, or by the State with 
the knowledge and contribution of the foreign investor. The size, cross-border 
character, nature and power of MNEs changed with the process of globalisation, 
making it ever more necessary to address their role in the protection of human rights. 
As Muchlinski rightly observed, ‘[t]he traditional notion that only states and state 
agents can be held accountable for violations of human rights is being challenged as 
the economic and social power of MNEs appears to rise in the wake of the increasing 
integration of the global economy that they have helped to bring about.’339 
As Weiler points out,  
While it may not be clear that transnational corporations (both large and small) 
wield the power alleged by some of their harshest critics, there is a 
considerable amount of evidence to suggest that foreign enterprises operating 
investments in the developing world have committed, or been complicit in, 
environmental, labor, and human rights abuses.340 
																																																								
338 Luke Eric Peterson and Kevin R Gray, ‘International human rights in bilateral investment treaties and 
in investment treaty arbitration’ International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) (2003), p. 15. 
339 Peter T Muchlinski, ‘Human rights and multinationals: is there a problem?’, 77 International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs) 31 (2001) 
340 Todd Weiler (2004), p. 433. 
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It should be recalled, at this point, that IIL is largely unbalanced, in the sense that 
agreements generally establish rights for the foreign investor without imposing on 
them any obligations, which means that States are virtually not able to sue foreign 
investors in an investment treaty tribunal.341 As one commentator put it, ‘arbitration is 
a mechanism for investors, not for states’.342 IIAs could, in theory, contain provisions 
imposing specific human rights obligations on the investor, but, in reality, very few 
do.343 Consequently, IIL does not provide a direct solution to these concerns. 
This means that it is crucial to understand what mechanisms can be used to ensure 
that foreign investors do not compromise local communities’ cultural rights. Such 
mechanisms comprise, without a doubt, (1) the establishment of voluntary corporate 
conduct codes (to be assessed in detail in Chapter 4); (2) performance standards in 
the context of investment loans (which will be analysed in Chapter 5), and (3) the 
effective use of international investment arbitration for the protection of cultural rights, 
which could occur through an adequate, culturally-sensitive interpretation of IIA 
provisions or through the introduction of specific human rights mechanisms within 
investment arbitration. 
As to the first two mechanisms, Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate that there are 
already several alternatives within the realm of soft law that have the potential to 
minimise an investment’s human rights impacts (in particular, cultural rights). Even 
though these instruments do not provide a complete solution, their contribution to the 
integration of international investment and cultural rights is not to be underestimated. 
In the majority of cases where investment tribunals referred to human rights in their 
decisions, international human rights instruments and practice have been taken into 
account most frequently to help clarify the protection of foreign investors under IIAs.344 
Nevertheless, several decisions have also referred to investor obligations, sometimes 
to the point where treaty protections are denied as a result of the investor’s unlawful 




341 The possibility of counterclaims will be assessed in Chapter 6. 
342 Dominic N. Dagbanja (2016), p. 74. 
343 Marc Jacob (2010), p. 9. 
344 Luke Eric Peterson (2009), p. 23 
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4. Conclusions 
This brief chapter aimed at introducing the relationship between IIL and cultural rights, 
which have several points in common, but also significant differences. 
Cultural sovereignty refers to the right of every State to freely choose its cultural 
model and to set relevant cultural policies. This sovereignty has become more and 
more constricted by the growth and development of international cultural law and 
international HRL, which impose specific obligations on States. When States exercise 
their cultural sovereignty, there is a risk that cultural regulatory action clashes with IIL 
commitments. 
Whenever there is a conflict of interests between local communities and foreign 
investors, the latter appear to be much more strongly protected. Even though States 
are under an international obligation to protect cultural rights, they may be dissuaded 
from doing so because of the economic impact of compensating affected foreign 
investors. In order for the cultural rights of local communities to be protected, States 
need to trust that international investment tribunals will pay deference to their 
sovereign right to regulate internally, especially when there are international cultural 
rights obligations that are binding on these States. It is important to note, in this 
regard, that arbitrators do not have the power to adjudicate human rights violations 
per se; however they may be called upon to integrate HRL in the context of an 
investment dispute. 
Finally, it became clear that foreign investors may be directly responsible for, or 
complicit with, human rights violations. With the globalisation process, MNEs have 
become much more powerful and capable of affecting the enjoyment of human rights 
directly. Neither IIL nor HRL, at this point, offer direct answers to this problem; 
therefore, it is necessary to assess the mechanisms that are available to ensure the 
protection and enforcement of cultural rights in the context of foreign investment, 
which necessarily includes voluntary conduct codes (analysed in Chapters 4 and 5) 
and the integration of HRL and international investment by investment tribunals 



















Chapter 4 – Operationalising Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
After establishing the conceptual framework for this research, it is now time to start 
analysing some of the soft and hard law mechanisms that can be resorted to, in order 
to ensure respect for cultural rights within the context of foreign investment. Starting 
with the soft law solutions, this chapter will focus on voluntary conduct codes – also 
known as Corporate Social Responsibility345 (hereinafter, CSR). 
The main goal of this chapter will be to understand how CSR may be operationalised 
so as to provide sufficient protection for the cultural rights of affected stakeholders, 
before an investment dispute has a chance to occur. It will also identify and assess 
some of the most relevant initiatives,346 and ascertain if it is realistically possible to 
influence the behaviour of MNEs in a positive way, thus minimising adverse impacts 
on the cultural rights of affected stakeholders.  
The first part of the chapter will analyse the concept, origins and scope of CSR 
(Section 1), followed by an attempt to briefly characterise the most noteworthy 
initiative taken at the UN level – the UN Global Compact (hereinafter, UNGC), which 
is the largest and most significant CSR initiative in the world – with particular focus 
on the cultural rights of indigenous peoples (Section 2). Finally, some conclusions will 
be drawn with respect to the appropriateness and effectiveness of CSR to protect 
cultural rights (Section 3). 
 
1. The concept, origins and scope of CSR 
Although a consensual and conclusive definition of CSR appears to be lacking, it has 
been described as ‘that strange mixture of altruism and corporate communications 
(…) [s]itting at the juncture of business and law, marketing and ethics, human rights 																																																								
345 Authors such as Logsdon and Wood suggest a different terminology, i.e., the use of the expression 
‘Global Business Citizenship’ or GBC – See Jeanne M Logsdon and Donna J Wood, ‘Global business 
citizenship and voluntary codes of ethical conduct’, 59 Journal of Business Ethics 55 (2005). In this 
thesis, I have opted for the more common term (CSR) to avoid confusion. 
346 Other relevant initiatives exist, some of which will be explored in the next chapter. However, for 
reasons of space, only the most significant will be assessed in this dissertation. 
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and international relations. (…) [It] is not only ameliorative347 and pragmatic but also 
directly linked with big goals like sustainability, social justice and world peace.’348 CSR 
is not a new concept – it had already been referred to and characterised in the 1970s 
as ‘encompass[ing] the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that 
society has of organizations at a given point in time.’349 CSR initiatives aim at self-
regulation and generally present three specific traits: (1) participation in these 
programmes is voluntary; (2) each programme focuses on one or more dimensions 
of CSR; and (3) these initiatives generate dialogue amongst stakeholders in order to 
advance the focus area.350 CSR is so relevant, complex and eminent in today’s 
society that it has become ‘one of the flavours and hopes of the new Millennium’351 
and ‘an industry in itself’, as noted by The Economist in 2004. The publication states: 
CSR, at any rate, is thriving. It is now an industry in itself, with full-time staff, 
websites, newsletters, professional associations and massed armies of 
consultants. This is to say nothing of those employed by the [Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs)] that started it all. Students approaching 
graduation attend seminars on “Careers in Corporate Social Responsibility”. 
The annual reports of almost every major company nowadays dwell on social 
goals advanced and good works undertaken. The FTSE and Dow Jones have 
both launched indices of socially responsible companies. Greed is out. 
Corporate virtue, or the appearance of it, is in.352 
																																																								
347 For a detailed analysis of the contrast between the earlier, ‘transformative’ form of CSR, and 
contemporary, ‘ameliorative’ CSR, see Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age’ in Peter Utting and José Carlos Marques (eds), Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Regulatory Governance - Towards Inclusive Development? (Palgrave Macmillan 
2013): ‘While the earlier idea of the socially responsible corporation had a genuinely transformative edge, 
(…) contemporary CSR is essentially ameliorative, seeking to temper without unsettling or displacing 
the idea of the corporation as a private, exclusively shareholder- and profit-oriented enterprise’, at pp. 
77-78. 
348 Jonathan A. Bush, ‘An Emerging History of CSR - The Economic Trials at Nuremberg (1945-49)’ in 
Charlotte Walker-Said and John D. Kelly (eds), Human Rights in the New Global Economy - Corporate 
Social Responsibility? (The University of Chicago Press 2015), p. 125. 
349 Archie B Carroll, ‘A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance’, 4 Academy of 
management review 497 (1979), p. 500. 
350 Ursula Wynhoven and Yousuf Aftab, ‘The Virtue of Voluntarism - Human Rights, Corporate 
Responsibility, and UN Global Compact’ in Charlotte Walker-Said and John D. Kelly (eds), Human Rights 
in the New Global Economy - Corporate Social Responsibility? (The University of Chicago Press 2015), 
p. 234. 
351 The expression is borrowed from Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay (2013), p. 77. 
352 See The Economist, ‘Corporate social responsibility - Two-faced capitalism’ (2004), available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/2369912. 
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The origins of contemporary CSR date back at least to the 1960s and 1970s,353 when 
public opinion started to focus on the activities of MNEs operating in developing 
countries, that often severely disregarded or even directly compromised human rights 
and environmental protection. Its most significant expansion occurred in the aftermath 
of the Cold War, at the same time as globalisation accelerated.354 At its roots, there 
were both external pressures (from NGOs and other critics) and internal corporate 
recognition that industry standards needed to be raised, although the latter appears 
to have been less of a motivation than the former.355 The expansion of CSR was 
concomitant with the expansion of FDI,356 as more and more companies had the 
possibility of operating in different (often less developed) countries. As neo-liberal 
policies led to the deregulation of labour, environment and rights of people affected 
by the investment, ‘much of the responsibility for monitoring international capital has 
shifted from the state to NGOs and social movements.’357 
In order to address the ‘governance gaps created by globalization’,358 a number of 
soft law standards have been developed. The most relevant of these soft law 
standards include the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,359 as well as the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.360 The latter, with 46 adhering members, has evolved into 
‘a hybrid model that increasingly blurs the boundary between self-regulation and 																																																								
353 Although some authors identify earlier roots, namely in the Nuremberg economic trials and the body 
of case-law around the Alien Tort Statute in the US. In this sense, see Jonathan A. Bush (2015) and 
Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay (2013). For an insightful analysis of the US enforcement of the 
Alien Tort Statute, see David Scheffer, ‘The Impact of the War Crimes Tribunals on Corporate Liability 
for Atrocity Crimes under US Law’ in Charlotte Walker-Said and John D. Kelly (eds), Human Rights in 
the New Global Economy - Corporate Social Responsibility? (The University of Chicago Press 2015). A 
good yet concise historical account of the origins of CSR is also present in Archie B Carroll (1979) and 
Rhys Jenkins, ‘Globalization, corporate social responsibility and poverty’, 81 International affairs 525 
(2005). 
354 Peter Rosenblum, ‘Two Cheers for CSR’ in Charlotte Walker-Said and John D. Kelly (eds), Human 
Rights in the New Global Economy - Corporate Social Responsibility? (The University of Chicago Press 
2015), p. 33. 
355 Stuart Kirsch, ‘Virtuous Language in Industry and the Academy’ in Charlotte Walker-Said and John 
D. Kelly (eds), Human Rights in the New Global Economy - Corporate Social Responsibility? (The 
University of Chicago Press 2015), p. 95. 
356 A significant expansion of CSR codes occurred since the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, a period 
which also corresponded to a tendency for literature on the subject to become much more prolific. In this 
sense, see Francesca Cuomo et al., ‘Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and Research Agenda’ 
Corporate Governance: An International Review (2015), p. 1. 
357 Stuart Kirsch (2015), p. 96. 
358 UN, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights (A/HRC/8/5) (7 
April 2008), paragraph 3. 
359 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (Governing 
Body of the ILO, 204th Sess. (1977), last amended 295th Sess. (2006)), available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm. 
360 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing, 2011), available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en. 
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accountability’,361 with the creation of ‘the implementation mechanism of National 
Contact Points (NCPs), agencies established by adhering governments to promote 
and implement the Guidelines’.362 
The main interlocutors of CSR discourse are (1) shareholders and investors, (2) 
consumers, (3) NGOs, and (4) workers. The first have been targeted by this discourse 
mostly as a reaction to what is referred to as ‘shareholder capitalism’, which led MNEs 
to feel the need to reassure both their shareholders and their potential investors that 
they were adopting voluntary corporate conduct codes in order to minimise risk. As 
Kaeb states, ‘[t]he legal dimension of CSR is determined largely by the fiduciary 
duties owed by corporate directors and officers to the corporation.’363 This is intimately 
related to the concept of ‘shareholder primacy’,364 prevalent in the US, ‘according to 
which management decisions need to be in the best interest of shareholders (in terms 
of profit maximization) in order to avoid a breach of fiduciary duties’.365 In Europe and 
Asia, fiduciary duties are usually understood widely, so as to encompass stakeholder 
interests, but in global terms, this approach lost popularity when faced with the Anglo-
American model. As Noyoo affirms, ‘(…) in Japan, firms have long been associated 
with the community and also regarded as a fundamental part of the society to which 
individual employees belonged. In contrast to an Anglo-American model of 
community, in Japan both individuals and companies are members of society and 
hence responsible to it.’366 However, by the end of the 20th century, ‘it was being 
claimed that the debate about corporate governance was over: the exclusively 
shareholder-oriented, Anglo-American model of the corporation had triumphed over 
its more stakeholder-friendly German, French and Japanese rivals.’367 In either case, 
any management decision that leads to profit reduction (such as would result from 
implementing CSR strategies that can lower the return of an investment) will see its 
legitimacy being assessed by corporate law, which can lead to an insufficient 
consideration of human rights objectives.368 In fact, corporate law mainly focuses on 																																																								
361 Caroline Kaeb (2015), p. 115. 
362 See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, p. 3. 
363 Caroline Kaeb (2015), p. 113. 
364 Which can be seen as a paradox, since the maximisation of ‘shareholder value’ was precisely what 
earlier, ‘transformative’ forms of CSR wanted to fight. See Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay (2013), 
p. 87 et seq. 
365 Caroline Kaeb (2015), p. 113. 
366 Ndangwa Noyoo, ‘Linking Corporate Responsibility and Social Policy in Zambia’ in Peter Utting and 
José Carlos Marques (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory Governance - Towards 
Inclusive Development? (Palgrave Macmillan 2013), p. 106 (emphasis added). 
367 Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay (2013), p. 86. 
368 Caroline Kaeb (2015), p. 113. 
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the protection of shareholder interests: ‘corporate managers are under a fiduciary 
duty to further shareholder – and not public – interests.’369 However, their activities 
aimed at profit maximisation cannot violate the law, which makes it clear that when 
legal norms exist and they impose certain public interest obligations on companies, 
these have to be respected. In the UK, for example, the Companies Act was amended 
in 2006 and Article 172(1) was expanded so as to include stakeholder interests.370 
Consumers became an important audience for CSR discourse as well, as their 
concern for sustainability grows and certification programmes become more and 
more important. However, certain industries – such as the mining industry – are 
‘largely immune to consumer politics’, since most metals are virtually ‘anonymous’, 
i.e., their sources are mostly impossible to identify, as is evident with the case of 
copper wires used in computer manufacturing.371 
The role of NGOs as interlocutors of CSR discourse is controversial, as increasingly 
high numbers of these organisations choose to cooperate with compliant MNEs, 
leaving some groups such as indigenous peoples in a position where they find it hard 
to trust NGOs and do not see them as allies, but rather as the enemy. 
Workers are the last interlocutors of CSR discourse, as MNEs tend to appear 
concerned with sustainability to attract labour and avoid confrontation with 
employees. It is evident that several communities close to investment projects, such 
as mining, are generally very environmentally conscious. These four categories of 
CSR discourse audience exemplify the variety of objectives pursued by MNEs and 
justify the characterisation of CSR as what anthropologists call ‘strategically 
deployable shifters’, i.e., the use of shared language for a multiplicity of different 
situations, contributing to communication ‘across social boundaries and political 
vantage points.’372 
There are essentially three types of corporate codes of conduct as to their source of 
origin and addressees: internal, external and third-party. The first refers to cases 
where the company adopts a code of conduct which does not extend to external 
stakeholders, thus focusing on employees and management. External codes of 
conduct are elaborated and adopted by companies, but reach outside groups and 																																																								
369 Caroline Kaeb, ‘Law, Morality, and Rational Choice - Incentives for CSR Compliance’ (2015), p. 196. 
370 UK Companies Act 2006, Article 172(1), available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf.  
371 Stuart Kirsch (2015), p. 101. 
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often address a wide range of stakeholders. Third-party codes of conduct are 
elaborated by an external group and adopted by companies, as they become 
members or signatories to that initiative.373 
Bondy et al. further identify three different ‘tones’ that corporate conduct codes may 
adopt: punitive, principles and commitment codes. Punitive codes are likely to include 
sanctions (or threat thereof) for noncompliance, thus assuming a ‘quasi-legal role 
within the company for control of employee or management behavior’; principles 
codes contain statements indicating the intention to participate in CSR, normally with 
defined stakeholders, nevertheless ‘the statements are broad with little or no 
indication of how or why they intend to engage in this way’; finally, commitment codes 
‘indicate the corporation’s intention to engage in CSR but statements are more 
specific, commitments are more formalized, and sometimes intended actions or 
behaviors are associated with the statements.’374 
The last categorisation to keep in mind is probably the most obvious one, relating to 
the level of hierarchy reflected in each corporate conduct code: there are international 
codes (those issued by transnational institutions, such as the OECD), national codes 
(individually or jointly issued by institutions within a country, such as the stock 
exchange), and individual codes (issued by individual companies, with the objectives 
of ‘establish[ing], and (…) communicat[ing] to investors and other stakeholders, the 
governance principles adopted by the firm’).375 Disclosure of compliance with national 
codes can be mandatory or voluntary (even though adoption is always voluntary) and 
can be required by a listing authority (as is the case in the UK) or by law (as happens 
in several other EU countries). It is interesting to note that, in 2014, the EU adopted 
a Directive which requires disclosure of non-financial information by companies with 
over 500 employees. This includes ‘policies, risks and outcomes as regards 
environmental matters, social and employee-related aspects, respect for human 
rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity on boards of directors.’376 
According to Cuomo et al., ‘[w]hen the disclosure of governance practices is 
mandatory, the effectiveness of governance codes increases, because the external 
																																																								
373 Krista Bondy et al., ‘The adoption of voluntary codes of conduct in MNCs: a three-country comparative 
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Operationalising Corporate Social Responsibility 
	 105 
(i.e., market) disciplinary mechanism can work well only with informative disclosure 
on adoption and/or explanation.’377 By contrast, in less developed countries, there is 
a tendency to make disclosure of compliance voluntary, which weakens the 
effectiveness of the codes.378 
 
1.1. Drivers, compliance and the effectiveness of CSR 
Corporate compliance with voluntary conduct codes raises several difficulties, namely 
at the level of incentives to comply. These incentives obviously include legal norms, 
but go far beyond it; in fact, one can expect morality to affect MNEs, ‘whether in the 
form of conventions, rational choice, psychological preferences, or an overarching 
“sense of justice”.’379 
Four reasons have been put forth as the main drivers for business adoption of CSR 
standards: moral obligation, sustainability, license to operate and reputation.380 The 
first driver, moral obligation, refers to either the fiduciary duties of a company to its 
shareholders or, more importantly, the ‘obligations a firm has as a result of its 
existence, its reasons for existence, scope and nature of operations, and its various 
interactions.’381 In other words, the moral obligation of MNEs to voluntarily adopt 
corporate conduct codes is a reflection of what they should do in order to take into 
account the impact business has on the main stakeholders (including shareholders, 
employees, suppliers, customers and, secondarily, the communities in which MNEs 
operate). 
Sustainability, on the other hand, refers to the need to take into account future 
generations and their ability to enjoy natural and human resources. In the words of 
Porter and Kramer, ‘[s]ustainability emphasises environmental and community 
stewardship’.382 This means that companies should strive to prioritise long-term 
performance over short-term benefits that might be detrimental to future generations. 
The idea of license to operate suggests that MNEs require some kind of consent 																																																								
377 Francesca Cuomo et al. (2015), p. 2. 
378 Idem, p. 3. 
379 Caroline Kaeb, ‘Law, Morality, and Rational Choice - Incentives for CSR Compliance’ (2015), p. 202. 
380 Michael E Porter and Mark R Kramer, ‘Strategy & Society: The Link between Competitive Advantage 
and Corporate Social Responsibility’ Harvard Business Review (2006), pp. 2-3. 
381 Patricia H Werhane, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility/Corporate Moral Responsibility: Is There a 
Difference and the Difference It Makes’ in Steven K. May et al. (eds), The Debate over Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 460. 
382 Michael E Porter and Mark R Kramer (2006), p. 3. 
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(explicit or tacit) from all of the affected stakeholders in order to conduct a business 
enterprise, including governments and communities. Finally, reputation is a very 
relevant driver for the adoption of CSR standards, since it has the potential to improve 
the public perception of a company, strengthen its brand and possibly raise the value 
of its stock.383 
It is possible to affirm, with Kaeb, that reputational risks are one of the most significant 
factors affecting corporate compliance, that is, ‘reputational costs and benefits have 
increasingly become part of corporations’ calculus in the form of their risk 
management as well as their branding and marketing efforts.’384 This author also 
emphasises the fact that fines, for example, could be less effective as an incentive to 
comply, since there is virtually no more uncertainty as to the consequences of non-
compliance (i.e., the firm knows exactly what the worst consequence is). Raising 
uncertainty levels arguably provides a stronger incentive to comply, and, in that 
scenario, the uncertainty about reputational costs leads to higher rates of compliance. 
In this context, Kaeb affirms that ‘[b]y imposing a monetary fine, the relationship 
between parties shifts from a nonmarket to a market orientation since the fine puts a 
price on wrongdoing, and thus commoditizes it. A social relationship thus becomes a 
market exchange.’385 This point is particularly important, since, as the author notes, if 
human rights are commoditised, firms will tend to treat them as simple costs and 
collateral damage, which can be offset by profits in other areas; if, conversely, respect 
for human rights is driven by a combination of internal and external incentives linked 
to morality and the willingness to ‘do good’ and ‘do better’, it is arguably more likely 
that compliance will ensue.386 
According to Porter and Kramer, the problem with the four drivers mentioned above 
(moral obligation, sustainability, license to operate and reputation) is that none of 
them sufficiently provides the means for a company to identify issues, establish 
priorities, and tackle social problems that either are the most relevant or are the ones 
that a specific business can impact the most. Wynhoven and Aftab, on the other hand, 
defend that CSR has ‘the unique potential to become corporate drivers’, motivating 
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companies to perform better than the law requires and above minimum standards. 
This can be achieved in four ways: (1) competition amongst MNEs can lead to better 
corporate citizenship; (2) voluntary corporate codes can fill in the gaps left by 
insufficient State regulatory activity; (3) high CSR standards have the potential to 
attract better and more qualified employees; (4) CSR allows companies to pay due 
regard to the demands of consumers and the public in general.387 
In sum, when asking why companies adopt corporate codes of conduct, there are 
mainly two perspectives reflected in legal literature: a normative one, which affirms 
that ‘codes are a formalization of corporate values or practices’, designed as ‘a way 
of formalizing, encouraging, and guiding employee behavior’;388 and an instrumental 
view, which emphasises elements such as reputational benefit, avoiding government 
interference, product differentiation, reduced insurance premiums, government 
failure to regulate, enhancement of relationships with customers, among others.389 
Regarding the effectiveness of CSR, several observations need to be made. First of 
all, it is crucial to note that a high number of critics have come forth in the past three 
decades, questioning whether voluntary codes of corporate conduct work at all – and 
whether they should even exist. As MNEs started to operate internationally, 
particularly within developing countries, it appeared clear for some that there was a 
business opportunity that should not be missed: companies had the chance to take 
advantage of more beneficial business environments present in such countries, with 
cheaper labour and weaker legal standards, thus improving the potential for profit. 
Even where strict regulation actually existed, a serious lack of enforcement opened a 
window of opportunity that MNEs were able to exploit. In fact, the governments of 
developing countries had an incentive to allow for this kind of opportunistic behaviour 
– if there were clear and enforceable rules, MNEs could move to other countries with 
more favourable conditions, hence lowering the levels of foreign investment coming 
into the country. In addition, several developing countries lack a democratic and 
representative government, thus increasing the danger of decision-makers not taking 
into account the interests of their citizens.390 Some commentators thus defended that 
introducing social concerns in the operations of MNEs was simply wrong in and of 
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itself. In fact, in 1962, Friedman stated that embedding social responsibility in 
corporate conduct was ‘fundamentally subversive’ and further affirmed that ‘[f]ew 
trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the 
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much 
money for their stockholders as possible.’391 
Even for those who disagreed with Friedman, there were still several downsides that 
could not be ignored. The most prominent one relates to the voluntary nature of CSR 
codes, which raised concerns as to the possibility of MNEs using them as public 
relations manoeuvres, rather than genuine commitment to socially responsible 
conduct. This led to several appeals to the adoption of binding, hard law mechanisms 
to ensure CSR, or to the legalisation of CSR codes. Such a change, however, 
appears to be unlikely from a political point of view (at least at this point in time) and 
might even be economically undesirable.392 Other criticism refers to the scarcity of 
courts considering CSR codes, the ease with which MNEs manage to circumvent 
these codes, or even the fact that the introduction of morality in corporate conduct 
might suppress innovation.393 As Murphy states, ‘[o]ver time, if the codes remain in 
nature as they presently are, while demands for social and environmental justice 
increase, the codes may lose much of their legitimacy’ and, furthermore, ‘as they 
wither away, the codes will be viewed as simply stepping stones in the crystallization 
of law.’394 
So, what are the solutions for this problem? It is hard for national legislation to present 
viable solutions, particularly when taking into account that the countries that need it 
the most (developing countries) might be reluctant to enact regulations that could 
diminish their competitive advantage in a free market. In fact, the reason why codes 
were suggested in the first place has everything to do with States’ difficulties 
regarding the regulation of cross-border non-State entities, coupled with the intention 
to allow for some flexibility and to foster the internalisation of socially responsible 
behaviour on the side of MNEs. Murphy thus suggests a ‘middle way’: 
Rather than view "command-and-control" laws as the next best step in 
addressing [MNE] conduct, policy-makers should consider a range of 																																																								
391 As cited in Archie B Carroll (1979), p. 497. 
392 Sean D Murphy (2004), p. 396.  
393 See Mark B Baker, ‘Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the Henhouse?’ The 
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 399 (1993), pp. 416-417. 
394 Sean D Murphy (2004), pp. 422-423. 
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governmental initiatives that reinforce the value and benefits of the voluntary 
codes to [MNEs] (in other words, creating "carrots"), while at the same time 
holding [MNEs] to the codes to which they have subscribed (creating "sticks"). 
If only carrots are created, more [MNEs] may be pulled into the adoption of 
corporate codes, but with spotty adherence. If only sticks are created, [MNE]s 
may view the adoption of codes as undesirable burdens.395 
According to this author, solutions might involve State intervention, aimed at: (1) 
convening the relevant stakeholders; (2) establishing a ‘code for codes’, which would 
serve as a template for quality control; (3) using CSR codes as justification for 
favourable treatment of a company, whether in terms of criminal or civil prosecution, 
thus encouraging compliance; (4) subjecting government procurement and financing 
to requirements linked with CSR codes; (5) promoting transparency and regulating 
false advertising by companies regarding their social conduct; and, lastly, (6) 
promoting effective monitoring.396 
In light of the above, it appears possible to conclude that, however flawed CSR codes 
may be at present, the solution for the problems pointed out by critics cannot be one 
of legalisation of corporate codes of conduct. There is more to gain from 
complementarity of strategies, which indicates that a balanced use of a combination 
of hard and soft law might be the answer in a world that is still not prepared (politically 
or economically) for a legal environment constituted only by binding norms regulating 
CSR. The next section will take the issue further, analysing the relationship between 
voluntary initiatives and legal measures. 
 
1.2. Voluntarism and the law 
Western liberal democratic theories had a very heavy influence on the way human 
rights were shaped under public international law. Positivist approaches to HRL 
meant that the focus has historically been placed on the relationship between State 
and individual human rights holders, leaving businesses largely unaccountable for 
activities that negatively impacted the human rights of stakeholders. The CSR 
discourse came to challenge this notion, by asking: 
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[I]s the protection of human rights the exclusive domain of states, leaving 
businesses free to seek their profits solely on the basis of the legal rules of 
states or do human rights constitute a normative order from which business 
cannot claim exemption on the basis of inadequate state protection of human 
rights?397 
It is crucial to establish from the beginning that voluntary initiatives and legal 
measures are not necessarily at opposite ends of the spectrum. In fact, back in 1979, 
Carroll had already defined CSR as including a legal dimension.398 As Former UN 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights John Ruggie points out in his 
report, States ‘should consider a smart mix of measures – national and international, 
mandatory and voluntary – to foster business respect for human rights.’399 Voluntary 
initiatives can complement legal measures, by using the power of the market to 
expand the toolkit available to businesses and society, in order to ‘embed [CSR] in 
business decisions’400 and achieve greater levels of sustainability. 
In fact, the main reason why voluntary conduct codes should be encouraged lies in 
the possibility of redefining corporate goals so as to include non-economic concerns 
in business strategy, to redefine and reconceptualise ‘profits’. As Wynhoven and 
Aftab point out, ‘[t]o many observers, responsible corporate behaviour is simply the 
result of business recognizing that [CSR] is necessary to protect and advance its 
financial bottom line. (…) But if [CSR] is only undertaken for profit maximization, there 
is little need for a theory; companies will happen across it in any event as they pursue 
profits.’401 This means that there is a possibility that CSR concerns become 
endogenous to business, much like profit, and therefore the need for legislative 
measures progressively lowers as MNEs integrate non-economic social concerns in 
their corporate goals. Following this line of reasoning, it is possible to infer that society 
will also incorporate CSR in their expectations towards business, and therefore 
demand a more sustainable conduct from MNEs. Indeed, voluntary conduct codes 
and their adoption by certain companies provide a standard against which society 
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can judge other companies’ conduct; hence the heightened possibility that society will 
exert pressure over MNEs to integrate CSR in their business strategies, mainly 
through public opinion and market behaviour. 
When MNEs view CSR as a cost or constraint, there is a danger that they will find it 
difficult to establish what should be done, even if the risks of social impact are 
identified and assessed. This leads to the establishment of corporate policies that are 
‘neither strategic nor operational but cosmetic: public relations and media campaigns, 
the centrepieces of which are often glossy CSR reports that showcase companies’ 
social and environmental good deeds.’402 
However, it is important to note that voluntary conduct codes do provide companies 
with guidance regarding the implementation of CSR objectives, and they do have the 
potential to redefine corporate behaviour through practice. According to Wynhoven 
and Aftab, this potential can be exemplified by the emergence of a productive 
dialogue amongst stakeholders; by the possibility of adopting flexible approaches to 
CSR and developing tailored strategies; by fostering cooperation with stakeholders 
and other businesses, which can lead to lower risks and costs in the adoption of CSR 
standards; and by providing space for dialogue and cooperation that regulation alone 
cannot achieve.403 
When comparing legal and voluntary mechanisms for the protection of human rights, 
one has to take into account the shortcomings of regulation. As Sen points out, ‘the 
entirely legal routes to understanding human rights are not only misleading, they may 
also be foundationally mistaken. The different legal routes that have been suggested 
(…) all suffer from being either misdirected or seriously incomplete.’404 This is in line 
with the thought of Ruggie, who affirmed that ‘any successful regime needs to 
motivate, activate, and benefit from all of the moral, social, and economic rationales 
that can affect the behavior of corporations.’405 
Voluntary corporate conduct codes have raised an important debate between 
‘voluntarists’ and ‘obligationists’ – the first arguing that voluntary initiatives are the 
most effective way of protecting and promoting human rights, whereas the second 
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believe that only binding rules can achieve that goal.406 Of course, not every 
commentator that has approached the subject can be labelled as simply one or the 
other, since many authors opt for nuanced versions of each theory. A full account of 
this debate is outside the scope of the present research, but it is still important to 
observe that even diametrically opposed theories can be reconciled. 
Additionally, it is crucial to take into account that CSR is increasingly within the legal 
realm: several governments, including the UK, have established legal provisions that 
require reporting on non-economic matters, namely on the impact businesses have 
on society and the environment.407,408 
In sum, voluntarism is a desirable complement to legislative activity, especially when 
considering the flexibility and opportunities that CSR offers. As Wynhoven and Aftab 
correctly state, ‘voluntarism will always be necessary to ensure that business is 
aspiring to adopt the spirit of the obligation in good faith even if law is passed.’409 
Legal norms need to be complemented by ‘a dialogue-based approach’ that pays 
deference to the fact that ‘most companies still have a lot to learn when it comes to 
managing social, environmental and governance issues.’410 To quote Vogel, 
If companies are serious about acting more responsibly, then they need to re-
examine their relationship to government as well as improve their own 
practices. And those who want corporations to be more virtuous should expect 
firms to act more responsibly on both dimensions. Civil and government 
regulation both have a legitimate role to play in improving public welfare. The 
former reflects the potential of the market for virtue; the latter recognizes its 
limits.411 
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1.3. Multi-stakeholder initiatives 
As mentioned above, according to Ruggie, there is a considerable governance gap 
‘between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of 
societies to manage their adverse consequences’,412 caused by globalisation. One of 
the solutions that have been put forth regarding the bridging of this gap is the creation 
of multi-stakeholder initiatives (hereinafter, MSIs), a mechanism that has now been 
largely adopted in mainstream CSR. MSIs ‘bring together stakeholders concerned 
about the negative impacts of an industry on particular communities (…) and (…) 
have now been embraced by most major global industries, setting standards and 
establishing frameworks to tackle a myriad of issues that formal domestic and 
international legal regimes have left unaddressed.’413 The UN has confirmed the 
importance of MSIs, as this kind of initiative was included in the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (hereinafter, the Guiding Principles).414 
MSIs are instruments through which several different stakeholders, such as 
governments, businesses and civil society, collaborate in order to tackle the 
externalities of transnational business enterprises. The conceptual and theoretical 
framework for MSIs is, however, underdeveloped.415 
According to Evans, first-generation MSIs began with conflicts between different 
stakeholders, which put significant pressure on businesses to adopt some sort of 
voluntary conduct code. Examples of this type of MSIs are the World Commission on 
Dams (formed in 1997 as a response to serious confrontation with NGOs and local 
communities negatively affected by the funding and building of dams); the Fair Labour 
Association (born out of strong campaigns against the use of sweatshop labour by 
apparel companies); the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(resulting from persistent lobbying by NGOs against oil companies); and the 
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Kimberley Process (developed after a fierce NGO campaign against blood 
diamonds).416 
More recent examples of MSIs are further away from the conflict-based origins, rather 
stemming from a consensus amongst stakeholders regarding an issue that ‘is not on 
the global agenda, but should be.’417 For example, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) was founded in the US in 1997, rooted in two environmental NGOs, with the 
involvement of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The GRI 
provides standards on sustainability reporting and disclosure, regarding matters such 
as climate change, human rights and corruption. It was developed with the purpose 
of creating an accountability mechanism to guarantee that companies were adopting 
a responsible environmental conduct. Rather than being born out of contestation and 
conflict, the GRI resulted from a generalised acknowledgment of its usefulness, as 
several companies chose to join the pilot programme and decided to adopt 
standardised reporting guidelines.418 The category of MSIs that were not born out of 
a specific conflict also includes the UN Global Compact, the world’s largest voluntary 
corporate conduct code, which will be analysed in detail in Section 2 below. 
Regardless of whether MSIs are born out of conflict or mere collective 
acknowledgment of a problem, truth is they facilitate the dialogue and build bridges 
between those who are interested in regulation and those who are to be regulated. 
On a different perspective, critics of MSIs defend that, beyond the facilitation of 
dialogue, there is little practical evidence that these initiatives promote effective 
change. It should be added that where external pressure to comply diminishes or 
disappears, businesses are less likely to promote structural change regarding human 
rights. Furthermore, companies are likely to form or join an MSI for less than 
honourable reasons, including the avoidance of stricter regulation or the minimisation 
of NGO confrontation.419 
The scope of MSIs is determined by the standards that they develop, rather than by 
a formalistic analysis of their stated mission. Whereas some MSIs base their 
standards on international law, thus imprinting them with added legitimacy, several 
others use weak language in their standards. It should be noted that, whilst joining an 																																																								
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MSI is voluntary, once a company has joined it is expected to comply with the relevant 
standards. As Evans explains, ‘[o]bligatoriness provides an indispensable form of 
credibility for MSIs’.420 
One of the most important critiques raised against MSIs refers to the range of 
stakeholders they generally include. Whilst most of them comprise high-profile global 
stakeholders, it is much less likely that they will include less powerful members, such 
as representatives of specific local communities and the vulnerable groups within 
them, local and national NGOs and stakeholders from the global South.421 
 
1.4. In focus: business responsibility for human rights 
In recent years, most of the CSR discourse has been geared towards environmental 
concerns, such as climate change.422 The discussion about business responsibilities 
over human rights has been a heated one, extending from whether human rights 
considerations should be a business concern at all to the idea that all companies 
should be subject to national and international HRL.423 
The UN attempted to regulate CSR within a HRL framework in 2004, with the 
presentation by the Sub-Commission of the (then) UN Commission on Human Rights 
of the ‘Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’. The fact that the Norms 
established binding obligations was fiercely opposed by businesses, and this project 
eventually failed. 
In 2008, however, John Ruggie presented the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework to the Human Rights Council (HRC). The Framework was unanimously 
welcomed in that same year, and operationalized in 2011 with the adoption of the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,424 which meant that, finally, the 
UN had an official position on the subject of CSR, based on three essential pillars: (1) 																																																								
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the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication; (2) the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, which means to act with due diligence to avoid 
infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts that occur; and (3) 
greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial.425,426 
It is important to highlight that the semantic distinction drawn in the Guiding Principles 
between the ‘duties’ of states and the ‘responsibilities’ of corporations is significant, 
both in legal and political terms. The choice of words is supposed to highlight the 
difference between legal and moral obligations, as a result of the current state of 
international law. As Ruggie explains, 
The term “responsibility” to respect, rather than “duty”, is meant to indicate 
that respecting rights is not an obligation that current international human 
rights law generally imposes directly on companies, although elements may 
be reflected in domestic laws. At the international level, the corporate 
responsibility to respect is a standard of expected conduct acknowledged in 
virtually every voluntary and soft-law instrument related to corporate 
responsibility, and now affirmed by the Council itself.427 
At both a philosophical and normative level, the establishment of such distinction has 
been criticised and named as ‘confusing’,428 with some commentators arguing that ‘it 
is counter-intuitive at best and misleading at worst to limit the scope of duty to the 
legal and that of responsibility to the non-legal realm at the outset.’429 
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The Guiding Principles are today seen as ‘the benchmark for business respect for 
human rights.’430 They establish corporate responsibility for human rights as 
complementary to, but independent from, States’ human rights obligations: 
The responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected 
conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists 
independently of States’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human 
rights obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists over 
and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights.431 
According to this paragraph, there are two essential points to corporate responsibility: 
first of all, business enterprises are responsible for respecting human rights (which is 
a considerable departure from the classic, State-centric conception of human rights); 
second, this responsibility does not depend on States’ compliance with human rights 
obligations – ‘at least morally, [it] transcends any national limitations in passage or 
enforcement of human rights law.’432 Finally, it should be noted that the Guiding 
Principles have officially been incorporated into the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, in 2011.433  
Even though the ‘CSR agenda’ progressively expanded over the years, thus 
encompassing more and more social issues, commentators affirm that ‘major blind 
spots remained’.434 In fact, ‘concrete measures and progress to address both labour 
rights and the broader category of human rights were limited.’435 Nevertheless, there 
is massive potential for the development of more comprehensive solutions, especially 
when taking into account that social pressure and expectations are important drivers 
for the emergence of soft law mechanisms,436 which, in turn, may lead to the adoption 
of domestic and international hard law standards,437 thus contributing to a more 
complete and thorough protection of human rights. 
																																																								
430 Ursula Wynhoven and Yousuf Aftab (2015), p. 232. 
431 Guiding Principles, commentary to Section II(A), Principle 11. 
432 Ursula Wynhoven and Yousuf Aftab (2015), p. 233. 
433 See section IV of the OECD Guidelines. 
434 Peter Utting and José Carlos Marques, ‘Introduction: The Intellectual Crisis of CSR’ in Peter Utting 
and José Carlos Marques (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility and Regulatory Governance - Towards 
Inclusive Development? (Palgrave Macmillan 2013), p. 2. 
435 Ibidem.  
436 For an interesting insight into social pressure and expectations, particularly in the extractive 
industries, see David Vogel (2005), chapter 6. 
437 For an assessment of the viability of hard law in this context, see Lee McConnell, ‘Assessing the 
feasibility of a business and human rights treaty’, 66 ICLQ 143 (2017). 
Operationalising Corporate Social Responsibility 
	 118 
2. The UN Global Compact 
The idea behind the UNGC came from a policy speech by Mr. Kofi Annan, then 
Secretary-General of the UN, in which he urged the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, to think about getting involved in a ‘creative partnership between the 
United Nations and the private sector.’438 The UNGC was born out of a situation of 
crisis affecting two major international players: the UN and corporations. Through this 
initiative, the UN expected to be able to reach out to non-State actors, and through 
that expansion of its influence, it hoped to ‘revive and reinvent its relevance on the 
global stage.’439 The creation of the UNGC thus appeared as an attempt at managing 
the governance gaps brought about by globalisation, whilst acknowledging that the 
UN would be unable to effectively fulfil its goals with only the support of States. The 
initiative, therefore, embodied the recognition of the growing power and influence of 
MNEs and the need to involve them in global sustainability efforts. On the other hand, 
corporations also needed the UN to help face the difficulties caused by growing public 
concerns with corporate governance, as well as the stark opposition to a number of 
practices by NGOs and civil society in general.440 
According to Ruggie, the UNGC came as an attempt to ‘embed the behaviour of 
business in the universal principles of the United Nations’ in cooperation with 
stakeholders, including labour, civil society, national governments and local 
authorities, so as to ‘weave a web of values around the global marketplace.’441 From 
inception, it was not meant to constitute a legally binding regulatory framework, but 
rather a ‘social learning network (…) intended to identify, disseminate and promote 
good practices based on universal principles.’442 
Today, the UNGC is the world’s largest and most significant MSI, counting with the 
participation of over 8,000 companies and close to 5,000 non-businesses (including 
NGOs and public organisations), based in over 160 countries. There are Global 
Compact Local Networks in over 85 countries, which serve the purpose of liaising 
with companies, so as to act on sustainability issues at the local level. 
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Since the formal launch of the programme in New York, on 26 July 2000, the UNGC 
has been both highly praised and heavily criticised. Whilst reports point to a high level 
of success (e.g., McKinsey concluded that 9 out of 10 corporate leaders were doing 
more in 2007 than they had 5 years before, to incorporate environmental, social, and 
political issues into their firms’ core strategies),443 the programme has also received 
harsh criticism from scholars, the press, NGOs, intergovernmental agencies and 
some developing countries (which will be analysed in Section 2.3 below). 
However, in order to identify the benefits and shortcomings of the programme and to 
assess its effectiveness, it is important to understand, first and foremost, what the 
programme aims to achieve and which values and principles it seeks to promote, as 
well as how it works in practice. 
 
2.1. The goals and mission of the UN Global Compact 
Throughout the documentation issued by the UNGC, the objectives of the programme 
are affirmed as the engagement of businesses on (1) implementing the ten principles 
of the UNGC into business operations; and (2) taking actions in support of UN goals 
and issues. As Rasche points out, the goals of the UNGC can be grouped into two 
distinct sets: at the macro level, it is meant to facilitate cooperation, long-term learning 
and collective problem solving amongst stakeholders; at the micro level, it promotes 
the internalisation of its principles into participants’ strategies and activities.444 Deva 
adds that, ‘[a]t a wider level, the vision of the Global Compact is "to promote 
responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the 
challenges of globalization," e.g., good corporate citizenship could contribute to 
establishing a "more sustainable and inclusive global economy”.’445 
The UNGC establishes ten principles446 inspired by four international agreements: the 
UDHR, the ILO Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,447 the Rio Declaration 
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on Environment and Development,448 and the UN Convention Against Corruption.449 
They cover human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. The first two 
principles establish that businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights and make sure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses. It should be noted that the UNGC relies to a great extent on 
the Guiding Principles, which, ‘[a]s a global standard applicable to all business 
enterprises, (…) provide further conceptual and operational clarity for the two human 
rights principles championed by the [UNGC]. They reinforce the [UNGC] and provide 
an authoritative framework for participants on the policies and processes they should 
implement in order to ensure that they meet their responsibility to respect human 
rights.’450 
These principles are the foundation for a programme that does not aim to bring about 
certification; the UNGC is not a regulatory instrument and it does not apply sanctions 
to its participants in case of noncompliance. Rather, it is a learning tool, directed to 
the construction of effective dialogue amongst stakeholders, thus implementing an 
idea of ‘principled pragmatism’.451 According to this idea, a balance should be sought 
between what ideally should be accomplished through regulation with what can 
realistically be attained in a specific political and social environment. Therefore, MNEs 
are encouraged to be transparent about their participation in the programme, 
reporting on their action and on the development of their governance policies. Once 
again, this kind of initiative does not preclude the need for regulation; it is rather a 
welcome complement to binding norms, acknowledging that most MNEs still need to 
undertake a serious learning process regarding sustainable governance issues.452 
 
2.2. How the programme works 
In order to understand how the UNGC works, it is necessary, first of all, to point out 
the actors involved in the programme, to describe what participation means to 
																																																								
448 Available at: 
http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163. 
449 Available at: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/. 
450 Cf. UN Global Compact, ‘The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Relationship to 
UN Global Compact Commitments’, July 2011 (Updated June 2014), available at: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Resources/GPs_GC%20note.pdf. 
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corporations and, finally, to assess the engagement mechanisms through which the 
initiative’s goals are sought. 
There are essentially four actors involved in the UNGC network: (1) the UN, with the 
relevant offices and agencies; (2) businesses; (3) governments; and (4) civil society 
and labour (including NGOs and international trade unions).  
The governance of the UNGC is shared amongst (1) the Triennial Global Compact 
Leaders Summit; (2) the Global Compact Board; (3) Local Networks; (4) Annual Local 
Networks Forum; (5) the Global Compact Headquarters (including the Global 
Compact Office and the Foundation for the Global Compact, integrated in the UN 
Secretary-General’s Executive Office); and (6) the Global Compact Government 
Group and the Friends of the Global Compact (the first is comprised of governments 
that contribute to the initiative and convene biannually to review budgets and 
progress; the second is a group of representatives from Missions to the UN in New 
York that convene around four times annually to receive briefings on the progress of 
the UNGC). 
The Global Compact Board is composed of twenty members from four constituent 
actors (three from the UN, eleven from business, four from civil society and two from 
labour) and is responsible for providing strategic and policy advice to the programme, 
including recommendations to the Global Compact Office, participants and other 
stakeholders. The UN is represented in the Board by the Secretary-General, the Head 
of the Compact Office and the Chair of the Global Compact Foundation. 
The role of the Inter-Agency Team should also be taken into consideration. It counts 
with the participation of seven UN agencies: the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), the ILO, the UNEP, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Entity for Women and Gender Empowerment.  
In order to take part in the programme, the Chief Executive Officer (hereinafter, CEO) 
of a given company has to write a letter to the UN Secretary-General expressing their 
interest in the initiative and their support for the values and principles that the UNGC 
embodies.453 
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According to the Global Compact Office, companies joining the initiative are expected 
to: (1) make the programme and its principles an integral part of their business 
strategy, day-to-day operations, and organisational culture; (2) incorporate the UNGC 
and its principles in the decision-making processes of the highest-level governance 
body; (3) take actions in support of UN goals and issues, including the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs);454 (4) report annually on progress made to implement 
the principles, ideally integrated into the annual report (the ‘Communication on 
Progress’ – or COP – policy); and (5) advance the initiative and the case for 
responsible business practices through advocacy and active outreach to all 
stakeholders and the public at large. Participating companies are also invited to make 
a financial contribution to the initiative every year.455 
The COP policy is arguably the most important part of the obligations that participants 
commit to upon signature to the UNGC.456 A COP is a public communication to all 
stakeholders (including consumers, employees, organised labour, civil society, 
investors, media and government) which reports on how each company has 
implemented the ten principles in their strategy and operations and how it has 
contributed to the advancement of UN goals through partnerships, if relevant. The 
COP policy is rooted upon the concepts of transparency, public accountability and 
continuous improvement.457 
Participating companies are expected to submit their first COP to the UNGC database 
within one year of signature. If a company fails to submit their report, it will be marked 
as ‘non-communicating’; if it still does not submit a COP within one year of being 
marked as ‘non-communicating’, it will be expelled from the programme. 
																																																								
454 There were eight Millennium Development Goals to be attained by 2015, ranging from halving 
extreme poverty rates to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education. A 
new post-2015 development agenda was developed by the UN, resulting in the approval of 17 SDGs, 
covering poverty, education, health, energy, climate change, peace and justice and others, all explained 
in the SDGs website: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/. The new sustainable development 
agenda was approved through the Draft outcome document of the UN summit for the adoption of the 
post-2015 development agenda, UN Doc. A/69/L.85, on 12 August 2015. Countries also adopted a 
global agreement on climate change, through Draft decision -/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, dated 12 December 2015. Both are available at the SDGs website 
(referred above). 
455 Global Compact Office, ‘After the Signature – A Guide to Engagement in the Global Compact’ (2008), 
available at: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/after_the_signature.pdf, p. 7 
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research. For a detailed analysis, see, inter alia, Surya Deva (2006), pp. 120-122. 
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In 2013, non-business participants in the UNGC (such as NGOs, business 
associations, public sector organisations, academics and others) were also invited to 
start reporting every two years, through a Communication on Engagement (COE), 
whereby they publicly disclose to stakeholders the activities undertaken to support 
the programme and the ten principles. There are three minimum requirements for the 
COE: (1) participants should present a declaration from their CEO stating their 
continued support for the programme and renewing their commitment; (2) the COE 
should contain a description of the activities taken in support of the programme and 
the ten principles; and, finally, (3) participants should present a measurement of 
outcomes. Similarly to what ensues should a business fail to submit a COP, non-
business participants who fail to submit a COE will be marked as ‘non-
communicating’; if they do not do so within one year of being marked as ‘non-
communicating’, they will be expelled from the programme. 
As far as how participants can engage with the initiative, companies have access to 
several ways to go beyond the implementation of the ten principles in their corporate 
strategy and operations. The first option is the creation of partnerships with 
stakeholders to advance development goals, such as the SDGs. According to the 
Global Compact Office: 
The basic concept of partnerships is simple and straightforward – to identify 
common ground between the private and the public sectors, and to combine 
their resources, skills and expertise to improve results. Partnerships focus on 
the many areas where private actors and public institutions can engage in win-
win relationships, such as poverty reduction, health, education and community 
development.458 
Partnerships can take the form of advocacy and policy dialogue, social investment 
and philanthropy, or core business (tackling sustainability challenges through the 
creation of employment, advancement of entrepreneurship, attainment of economic 
growth, generation of tax revenues, implementation of social, environmental or ethical 
standards, and provision of appropriate and affordable goods and services)459 and 
they can occur both at the local/regional level and at the global level. 
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At the local level, the most relevant structure is that of Local Networks. The Global 
Compact Office characterises these networks as ‘the most important vehicle for 
increasing and intensifying the impact of the initiative – by providing on-the-ground 
support and capacity-building tied to different cultural needs.’460 Local networks are 
expected to promote learning and dialogue, as well as to fundraise and produce an 
Annual Activities Report. As Rasche affirms, 
Local networks serve as a platform to create a close link between 
contextualised problems at the local level and the more abstract ideas and 
commitments that are developed at the global level. Networks are ‘translators’ 
of the created global solutions and, at the same time, ‘innovators’ looking for 
ways to implement the ten principles given the constraints and opportunities 
of a local context.461 
Besides these two main routes, UNGC participants should also engage in advocacy 
and raising awareness; collective action (with successful examples, such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)462 and the Global Business 
Initiative on Human Rights (GBI),463 or the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights)464; and the engagement of companies’ subsidiaries. 
Finally, the UNGC links its constituent actors through two very important learning and 
dialogue fora, which focus on identifying and discussing issues related to the ten 
principles and reinforcing the relationships between actors: policy dialogues 
(meetings at the global level, ‘for mutual understanding and problem-solving’465) and 
the Global Compact Leaders Summit (triennial meeting, chaired by the UN Secretary-
General, that gathers ‘top executives from participating businesses, heads of 
international labour, civil society and United Nations agencies, as well as high-ranking 
government officials to discuss both progress made and chart the future strategic 
course of the initiative’.466 
In sum, the engagement mechanisms available to participants in the UNGC can be 
grouped into four categories: (1) leadership (that is, promoting and disseminating the 																																																								
460 Idem, p. 24. 
461 Andreas Rasche (2011), p. 59. 
462 The website for the EITI provides abundant information on this collective action initiative: 
https://eiti.org. 
463 See http://www.global-business-initiative.org. 
464 See http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org. 
465 Global Compact Office, ‘Guide to Engagement’ (2008), p. 26. 
466 Ibidem. 
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values of the programme at all levels, through public commitment); (2) dialogues 
(communicating and discussing issues related to the Compact with all stakeholders); 
(3) learning (sharing experiences, examples and case-studies so as to promote the 
dissemination of best business practices); and (4) outreach/network (establishing 
platforms for action, including public-private partnership programmes).467 
 
2.3. The benefits and shortcomings of the initiative 
Although a full analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of the UNGC is outside the 
scope of this research, it is still worth pointing out the most common criticism made 
to the initiative. 
First, several authors argue that the UNGC contributes to a takeover of the UN by 
‘big business’, that is, that the interests of MNEs might be pursued through and within 
the UN, or that companies might be able to exert undue influence on UN bodies: 
On the one hand, [critics] maintain that the Global Compact aggravates the 
inequalities of development and widens the gulf between North and South. On 
the other hand, they contend that by giving greater power to the private sector, 
the Compact tramples on the democratic principles that should underpin the 
management of the international economic order.468 
Thérien and Pouliot state that this criticism has been heightened by several factors, 
namely ‘the widespread perception that it epitomizes a regrettable ideological shift on 
the part of the UN’, that the UNGC furthers a ‘pro-market spin’, and that a ‘privatization 
of the development process’ could render governments less willing to dedicate their 
efforts to social issues.469 Conversely, Rasche affirms that ‘the Global Compact is by 
no means the first, nor the only attempt to establish partnerships between the UN and 
business.’470 In this author’s view, these partnerships are actually desirable, since the 
UN no longer has the ability to pursue its goals in isolation; in addition, he believes 
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that there is ‘no basic inconsistency between the goals of business and the UN’, as 
both desire a stable and sustainable global market which is rooted in shared values.471 
Petersmann, on the other hand, rather than criticising this partnership, calls for a 
complementary UNGC involving UN specialised agencies, the WTO and other 
intergovernmental organisations, so as to build ‘a new human rights culture and a 
citizen-oriented national and international constitutional framework different from the 
power-oriented, state-centred conceptions of traditional international law.’472 
A second type of criticism raised against the UNGC lies in the claim that the ten 
principles are vague and therefore difficult to implement. Nolan argued that the 
vagueness of both the content and scope of the principles renders them unsuitable 
to provide a solid basis for enforceable standards. She adds that terms such as 
‘sphere of influence’, used to define the scope of companies’ human rights 
responsibilities, lacks definition and clarity, therefore leaving it open to interpretation 
and a wide margin of discretion which might compromise the effectiveness of the 
initiative. She adds that this vagueness turns business human rights responsibility 
into a ‘polite request to respect rights’.473 Deva similarly points to the dangers of the 
vagueness of the principles: 
The generality-cum-vagueness of the Compact principles is counter-
productive from the perspective of both sincere and insincere corporate 
citizens. The language of these principles is so general that insincere 
corporations can easily circumvent or comply with them without doing 
anything to promote human rights or labor standards. On the other hand, even 
a sincere corporate citizen (…) finds the language too general to be 
implemented (…).474 
Rasche once again attempts to counter such criticism, arguing that vagueness is the 
only option when faced with such variety in the features of participating businesses. 
In his opinion, it is necessary to ‘contextualise’ the ten principles within each business 
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environment, and the values of the programme need to be ‘translated into action, a 
task (…) that can be approached from different angles.’475  
The third type of criticism voiced against the UNGC is linked to lack of accountability 
and verification. A 2003 joint letter from Amnesty International, Oxfam International, 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch,476 criticised the 
general lack of accountability of the programme and demanded more rigorous 
monitoring of companies’ participation and reporting. In the same year, Prakash Sethi 
told The Financial Express that ‘[t]he Global Compact is another exercise in futility. It 
provides a venue for opportunistic companies to make grandiose statements of 
corporate citizenship without worrying about being called to account for their 
actions.’477 
The critique regarding lack of accountability of the UNGC is the most prevalent in 
academic literature and the media. Nolan affirms that ‘[a]ccountability, or rather the 
lack of it, is the crucial issue that faces the Global Compact.’478 Deva links the lack of 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism with the misuse of the programme as ‘a 
"marketing tool” to "bluewash" [the company’s] reputation or image, or to gain undue 
sympathy from consumers and prospective shareholders or employees.’479 In other 
words, there is a significant concern that the companies most eager to take part in 
the UNGC are actually the ones more desperate for an improved public image, 
leading to a process of adverse selection.480 The introduction of the COP policy in 
2003 was an attempt by the UN to counter this criticism, with the hope that enhancing 
reporting obligations would increase corporate accountability. According to Nolan, 
one of the biggest problems in regard to businesses’ accountability for human rights 
violations under the UNGC lies in the fact that there are no reliable and sufficiently 
developed indicators to be used in the assessment of corporate action, contrary to 
what happens within the realm of environmental protection, which is much more 
advanced.481 
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In defence of the initiative, Rasche points out that ‘one cannot and should not criticize 
the Compact for something it has never pretended or intended to be; a compliance-
based mechanism that verifies and measures corporate behaviour.’482 The author 
adds that the programme is ‘something in between’ full monitoring of corporate 
behaviour and no monitoring at all: it requires participants to report annually on 
progress. He also defends that verification might not actually be achievable due to: 
the difficulty in creating indicators that would be relevant across a wide variety of 
participants; the unlikeliness of obtaining support of the UN General Assembly to 
establish legally binding regulations; and the lack of logistical and financial resources 
to effectively monitor all participants, from MNEs and their supply chains and 
subsidiaries, to smaller enterprises all around the world.483 
In addition, Rasche affirms that any critique of the UNGC, although necessary for the 
advancement of the programme, needs to (1) pay deference to the core ideas of the 
initiative, namely to its intent to foster a ‘long-term learning experience and not 
regulation’; and (2) take into account the institutional constraints that inform the 
UNGC.484 In this sense, and according to Ruggie, the UNGC ‘engages the private 
sector to work with the UN, in partnership with international labor and NGOs, to 
identify, disseminate, and promote good corporate practices based on (…) universal 
principles.’485 In addition, ‘[t]he Compact is not itself a regulatory instrument; it is a 
social learning network.’486 
At this point, it is worth asking: why did the UN decide to adopt a voluntary 
programme, instead of a legally binding set of rules, much like the failed Norms? 
Ruggie presents three practical reasons: first, the very low probability of such a set 
of norms being adopted; second, the UN’s lack of logistical and financial capacity to 
monitor all relevant companies (from MNE’s and their supply chains to medium and 
small-sized businesses); third, binding rules would likely generate strong opposition 
from the business community, including those who are willing to participate in the 
Compact. In addition, Ruggie argues that the lack of consensus regarding a precise 
definition of the initiative’s principles is likely to impair the adoption of a ‘viable code 
of conduct’, and that these interpretational gaps can only be filled in through 																																																								
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‘accumulated experience’. In addition, the Special Representative states that ‘the 
extraordinary pace of change’ of the business world would not be accommodated by 
a rigid framework, and benefits more from the flexibility accorded by the UNGC. 
Ruggie also points out that ‘the open-network architecture’ of the programme has the 
potential to promote the creation of several complementary initiatives, or even the 
association of existing initiatives with the UNGC. Finally, there is a very strong 
argument based on the programme’s potential to motivate the business world to 
accept ‘an evolution toward harder legal forms.’487 
Ultimately, it is important to note that, regardless of the critique that has been made 
of the programme, the UNGC contributed to the growth and development of the UN 
itself, as it improved the engagement of private sector in the advancement of UN 
goals (such as the Millennium Development Goals and, more recently, the SDGs) 
and it opened the door to the imbuement of UN values into the business strategies of 
very powerful MNEs.488 
 
2.4. The UN Global Compact and indigenous peoples 
The Global Compact Office directly addresses issues regarding indigenous peoples 
through reference guides, case examples and good practice notes. Throughout these 
documents, the initiative demonstrates concern with the impact businesses may have 
in the lives of indigenous peoples, as companies tend to increasingly operate in 
remote areas. There is also recognition of the particularly vulnerable position of 
indigenous peoples, who might see their human rights (including the rights to self-
determination, property, health, development, and cultural life) compromised, due to 
their special relationship with the land, general lack of representation within the legal 
systems of host states, and pervasiveness of discrimination, abuse and 
marginalisation. 
The Global Compact Business Reference Guide to the UNDRIP states that every 
business (regardless of size, sector, operational context, ownership or structure) has 
a responsibility to respect indigenous peoples rights, and it identifies two essential 
elements: the right to self-determination and free, prior and informed consent 
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(FPIC).489 It also establishes six fundamental actions to be performed by businesses: 
(1) adopting and implementing a formal policy; (2) conducting human rights due 
diligence; (3) consulting in good faith; (4) committing to obtain and maintain the FPIC 
of indigenous peoples; (5) remediating adverse impacts; and (6) establishing effective 
and culturally appropriate grievance mechanisms.490 
UNGC participants are invited to act on two fronts: (1) corporate responsibility to 
protect; and (2) corporate responsibility to support. The first type of responsibility 
affirms that businesses should avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts, in addition to seeking to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts 
directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships 
and suppliers. The second refers to additional voluntary business actions that seek 
to promote and advance human rights.491 
 
a) Adopting and implementing a formal policy 
Businesses are expected to adopt a formal policy regarding the rights of indigenous 
peoples, which materialises in a public statement and may be incorporated into a 
broader human rights policy or into an overall code of conduct. The policy may also 
include a commitment to supporting, promoting and advancing the rights of 
indigenous peoples. For this purpose, companies should comply with the 
requirements of Guiding Principle no. 16.492 
Even though the Guiding Principles do not refer directly to the UNDRIP (nor do they 
approach the matter of FPIC), they require consideration of ‘additional standards’: 
‘[f]or instance, enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals belonging 
to specific groups or populations that require particular attention, where they may 
have adverse human rights impacts on them. In this connection, UN instruments have 
elaborated further on the rights of indigenous peoples (…)’.493 The policy should thus 
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refer to the relevant national, regional and international law on the rights of indigenous 
peoples, including the UNDRIP. 
In certain cases, such as when the company’s relationship with indigenous peoples 
requires specific provisions, the participation of indigenous representatives and 
human rights experts should be sought. When the policy is established, companies 
should require business partners to adhere to the policy and help implement it.494  
The policy should establish a minimum standard that the company commits to 
meeting, even if the relevant national law does not require it to do so. It should include 
an outline of the procedure the company will use in order to seek indigenous peoples’ 
consent. Finally, the policy should be flexible, so as to accommodate the traditional 
decision-making approach of the relevant indigenous peoples, but it should also 
ensure that marginalised groups (such as women and youth) are included in the 
process.495 
The effective implementation of the policy should entail, inter alia, its dissemination 
amongst all personnel, business partners and other relevant parties; its integration in 
the company’s training programmes; the establishment of mechanisms for 
accountability within the company and with contractors; regular data collection to 
enable monitoring; and on-going consultation with indigenous peoples. The policy 
should be widely available not only to the general public, but also to potentially 
affected indigenous groups, which means taking into account language and cultural 
differences, and translating it into indigenous or local languages. Widespread 
dissemination of the policy (through the internet, consultation and outreach meetings) 
is required. Finally, the policy cannot be static and should provide for mechanisms to 
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b) Conducting human rights due diligence 
It appears clear that regular due diligence efforts may not be adequate to identify 
specific issues that affect indigenous peoples. There are essentially two reasons for 
this inadequacy: first, what does not affect local communities in general may 
adversely affect indigenous peoples, due to their particular culture and relationship 
with the land and nature; second, companies should respect the particular decision-
making rights of indigenous peoples, and that requires respect for their ways of life, 
institutions, internal organisation, and the way in which each community uses, values 
and owns land. Therefore, the UNGC encourages businesses to take into account 
individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples when conducting impact 
assessments. According to Guiding Principle no. 17, human rights due diligence 
should be ongoing and it ‘should include assessing actual and potential human rights 
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and 
communicating how impacts are addressed.’497 
In addition, the Guiding Principles elaborate on the essential components of the due 
diligence: according to Guiding Principle no. 18, the due diligence process should 
include assessing actual and potential human rights impact; under Guiding Principle 
no. 19, companies are required to integrate the findings across relevant internal 
functions and processes, and to take appropriate action; Guiding Principle no. 20 
establishes an obligation to track responses; and Guiding Principle no. 21 refers to 
the duty to communicate externally how impacts are addressed. 
As to the timing of the due diligence process, the UNGC recommends that it is 
undertaken at several points in time, not just prior to commencing business 
operations. Due diligence efforts, adequate to assessing the impact of operations on 
indigenous peoples, should take place: (1) prior to initiating or investing in a business 
activity; (2) when there are mergers and acquisitions; (3) when entering a new 
country, region or location; (4) when entering into arrangements with new business 
partners; or (5) when the context or circumstances of the company’s engagement 
with or impact on indigenous peoples changes (including the actual or projected 
closure of a business or termination of a project). Furthermore, companies should 
make the results of the due diligence available both to the general public and to the 
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relevant indigenous communities, in their own language and in a format that is 
culturally sensitive, with due respect for confidentiality.498 
If a host State does not recognise a group as an indigenous people, or does not 
recognise indigenous peoples at all, businesses should nevertheless make an effort 
to identify the presence of indigenous peoples, regardless of the State’s position.499 
This issue is closely related to the requirement that companies pay heed to 
international law when undertaking due diligence efforts, and not just to domestic 
legislation, which may come short when it comes to protecting and promoting 
indigenous peoples’ rights.500 
 
c) Consultation 
The UNGC requires companies to foster consultation, participation and engagement 
with indigenous peoples to allow businesses to learn about their specific traits and 
culture and to promote a genuine dialogue, as well as trusting and sustainable 
relationships.501 Under ILO Convention No. 169, the duty to consult rests with States, 
as expressed in Articles 18 and 19; Although this Convention was not widely 
ratified,502 several experts claim that the obligation for States to conduct prior 
consultations with indigenous peoples is a general principle of international law.503 
The UNGC takes the duty to consult one step further: companies are also invited to 
engage in consultations. 
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ILO Constitution by the Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres (CEOSL)’ 
(2001), available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50012:0::NO:50012:P50012_COMPLAINT_PROCEDURE
_ID,P50012_LANG_CODE:2507223,en:NO, paragraph 38. 




503 In this sense, see Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Analysis of the duty of the State to protect 
indigenous peoples affected by transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
(E/C.19/2012/3) (2012), paragraphs 7-8. See also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Judgment 
in the case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador (2012), paragraphs 164-166; and 
James Anaya, ‘Indigenous peoples' participatory rights in relation to decisions about natural resource 
extraction: the more fundamental issue of what rights indigenous peoples have in lands and resources’, 
22 Ariz J Int'l & Comp L 7 (2005). 
Operationalising Corporate Social Responsibility 
	 134 
Before starting the actual consultation process, companies are advised to undertake 
a pre-engagement analysis, through which several complications may be avoided. 
The goal of pre-engagement is to create a deep understanding of the indigenous 
peoples that might be affected, their culture, their language, their traditional decision-
making process, governance and methods of communication. Companies should 
also investigate the relationships between and within indigenous groups, so as to 
identify the most adequate levels for consultation.504 
The main requirement for consultation is good faith. Businesses should also carefully 
identify barriers that indigenous peoples might have, that are likely to prevent or 
disturb the effective communication of their interests to the company’s 
representatives, such as gender or linguistic barriers. Companies are furthermore 
encouraged to take into account the conditions that should be fulfilled in order to 
guarantee the participation of women, such as the provision of childcare or eldercare. 
In addition, businesses should endeavour to identify the legitimate leaders of a 
specific indigenous group, as well as avoid the use of intermediaries as much as 
possible. However, consultation should be as wide as possible, in order to lower the 
risk that, if leadership changes, the negotiations are brought to a halt or agreements 
are cancelled. It should also be broad enough to include all affected groups, and the 
determination of the project impact area should be based not only on the direct 
physical impact area, but on the social, cultural and spiritual attachment to territories. 
If the indigenous peoples want to involve other parties in the consultation process, 
including NGOs and/or independent experts, businesses should support that choice 
and facilitate the conditions for that involvement to occur. In addition, an effort should 
be made to avoid interfering in the governance of indigenous peoples, namely by 
avoiding politicisation, pressure or perceptions of bribery. The UNGC also highlights 
the fact that engagement should not end with consent; it should rather continue 
throughout the duration of the project and it should always be easily accessible to 
indigenous peoples. Finally, the initiative recommends that companies are aware and 
respectful of voluntary isolation, which means making first contact only when invited, 
creating ‘buffer zones’ to protect these groups, including the use of airplanes and 
																																																								
504 UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2013), p. 21. 
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helicopters, and avoiding any potential land, air, water or noise pollution which may 
negatively affect their environment.505 
 
d) Free, prior and informed consent 
The mechanism of FPIC for the use of indigenous peoples’ lands, resources, 
traditional knowledge, or intellectual property, is put forth by the UNGC as the main 
solution to the dangers arising from the interaction between businesses and 
indigenous peoples. However, it is also acknowledged that ‘obtaining FPIC in a 
“check-the-box” manner is not sufficient to ensure that the company respects the 
rights of indigenous peoples. This is because FPIC is not an end in of itself, but rather 
a process that in turn protects a broad spectrum of internationally recognized human 
rights.’506 
Although the mechanism of FPIC is gaining popularity in international law, national 
regulation is clearly lagging behind. The relevance of FPIC in international law is not 
only reflected in the UNDRIP, but also in the practice of UN Treaty Bodies and 
regional human rights bodies. There are also several international standards that 
require FPIC, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance 
Standard 7,507 loan policies of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development508 and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB),509 the 2013 
Equator Principles,510 MSI codes of conduct such as the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil511 and Forest Stewardship Council,512 among others.513 Once again, as with 
																																																								
505 Idem, p. 23. 
506 Amy K. Lehr (2014), p. 3. 
507 See the IFC’s documentation on Performance Standard 7, available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1ee7038049a79139b845faa8c6a8312a/PS7_English_2012.pdf?M
OD=AJPERES. 
508 See the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Guidance Note on Indigenous Peoples, 
available at: http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/guides/guidance-note-on-indigenous-peoples.html. 
509 See the Inter-American Development Bank Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples and Strategy 
for Indigenous Development (OP-765), available at: 
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1442299. 
510 See Principle 5 of the 2013 Equator Principles (Stakeholder Engagement), referring to IFC 
Performance Standard 7, available at: 
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf. 
511 See the revised Free, Prior and Informed Consent Guide for RSPO Members (2015), endorsed by 
the RSPO Board of Governors at its meeting on 20 November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, available at: 
http://www.rspo.org/news-and-events/announcements/free-prior-and-informed-consent-guide-for-rspo-
members-2015-endorsed. 
512 See their guidelines for the implementation of the right to FPIC, Version 1 (30 October 2012), available 
at: https://ic.fsc.org/en/resources/guides-and-manuals. 
513 Some of these standards will be assessed in Chapter 5. 
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due diligence processes, companies should pay heed to international law, even if 
national law does not require FPIC. Not only does this mechanism help prevent 
serious human rights violations, it also mitigates legal and reputational risk for 
complying companies.514 
Accordingly, the importance of FPIC must not be underestimated. In fact, it is a well-
known fact that several companies have already temporarily or permanently lost 
access to their projects due to the opposition of indigenous peoples. Delays in 
operations caused by the resistance of indigenous peoples have cost millions of 
dollars and, in some cases, States have revoked concessions, and companies have 
given up on developing projects, due to the difficulties brought about by indigenous 
peoples’ protests. However, the opposite has also been confirmed in practice: 
companies that consult, negotiate and obtain consent from indigenous peoples have 
been able to establish mutually beneficial relationships, which facilitates operations 
and better protects indigenous peoples’ rights.515 
The concepts of consultation and FPIC are distinct but intimately related. James 
Anaya emphatically describes both these processes as fundamental in the protection 
of indigenous peoples’ rights, stating that ‘(…) neither consultation nor consent is an 
end in itself, nor are consultation and consent stand-alone rights. (…) [P]rinciples of 
consultation and consent together constitute a special standard that safeguards and 
functions as a means for the exercise of indigenous peoples’ substantive rights.’516 
According to the UNDRIP, FPIC is required in the following situations: (1) removal 
and relocation of indigenous peoples (Article 10); (2) taking of cultural, intellectual, 
religious and spiritual property (Article 11); (3) adoption and implementation of 
legislative or administrative measures that may affect indigenous peoples (Article 19); 
(4) confiscation, taking, occupation, use or damage of indigenous people’ lands or 
territories (Article 28); (5) storage or disposal of hazardous materials on indigenous 
peoples’ lands or territories (Article 29); and (6) projects affecting indigenous peoples’ 
lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilisation or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources (Article 
32). 
																																																								
514 Amy K. Lehr (2014), p. 5. 
515 Idem, p. 7. 
516 James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya 
(A/HRC/21/47) (2012), paragraph 49. 
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FPIC should be an on-going process, and requires regular and constant 
communication with indigenous peoples, especially whenever there are changes to 
the project.517 In order to obtain FPIC, companies have to follow a process that is 
negotiated with the relevant indigenous peoples. This negotiation should include the 
establishment of when consent will be obtained and it has to be formally documented 
– the latter being a requirement that also applies to the outcome of the negotiation 
process. In case the indigenous peoples are mostly illiterate, video recordings are 
strongly advised.518 In addition, the UNGC advises companies to adopt a number of 
measures destined to facilitate the FPIC process, such as ‘engaging an independent 
and culturally-sensitive facilitator, chosen by or acceptable to the indigenous peoples 
concerned, to assist with negotiations’; providing support (financial, logistical, etc.) to 
the indigenous peoples, thus promoting capacity-building and the improvement of 
their decision-making capabilities; and engaging with independent experts to monitor 
the FPIC process.519 
Similarly to what happens with consultation, FPIC should be carefully sought so as to 
avoid creating or exacerbating tensions between and within indigenous groups. This 
is particularly important when it comes to the identification of and engagement with 
the legitimate traditional leaders and decision-makers.520  
The notion of ‘free’ consent implies that indigenous peoples should have the ability to 
fully reject the implementation of a project. If a company fails to obtain consent, this 
is a solid indicator that it is lacking a ‘social license to operate’. In that case, persisting 
in the implementation of the project may not only lead to adverse media coverage but 
also to operational difficulties and shutdowns.521 
 
e) Remedies for adverse impacts and effective grievance mechanisms 
The duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse lies primarily with 
the State, who has the obligation to take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, 
administrative, legislative or other appropriate means, the conditions for effective 																																																								
517 UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2013), p. 26. 
518 Amy K. Lehr (2014), p. 18.  
519 UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2013), p. 28. 
520 In this sense, see Amy K. Lehr (2014), p. 10. 
521 Idem, p. 9. 
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remedy.522 However, non-State based mechanisms to remedy adverse impacts are 
also encouraged, and range from regional or international human rights bodies to 
‘those administered by a business enterprise alone or with stakeholders, by an 
industry association or a multi-stakeholder group. They are non-judicial, but may use 
adjudicative, dialogue-based or other culturally appropriate and rights-compatible 
processes. These mechanisms may offer particular benefits such as speed of access 
and remediation, reduced costs and/or transnational reach.’523 
According to Guiding Principle No. 22, ‘[w]here business enterprises identify that they 
have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate 
in their remediation through legitimate processes’. The Commentary to this Guiding 
Principle adds that ‘[w]here adverse impacts have occurred that the business 
enterprise has not caused or contributed to, but which are directly linked to its 
operations, products or services by a business relationship, the responsibility to 
respect human rights does not require that the enterprise itself provide for 
remediation, though it may take a role in doing so.’ Guiding Principle No. 24 adds that 
‘[w]here it is necessary to prioritize actions to address actual and potential adverse 
human rights impacts, business enterprises should first seek to prevent and mitigate 
those that are most severe or where delayed response would make them 
irremediable’. Finally, Guiding Principle No. 29 determines that ‘[t]o make it possible 
for grievances to be addressed early and remediated directly, business enterprises 
should establish or participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms 
for individuals and communities who may be adversely impacted’. 
The importance of establishing appropriate and effective grievance mechanisms must 
not be undervalued. When in place, effective grievance mechanisms allow for 
problems to be identified and addressed before they escalate, and they also 
contribute to the development of a positive and mutually beneficial relationship 
between indigenous peoples and business. Some companies have started to develop 
jointly-run grievance mechanisms, through which both the company and the 
indigenous peoples are able to nominate members for a panel that deals with 
grievances. This strategy is recommended by the UNGC, due to the benefits that this 
type of cooperation can bring: not only is it an excellent opportunity for joint problem-
																																																								
522 See Guiding Principles, III (A)(25). 
523 Idem, III (B)(28), Commentary. 
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solving, but it also renders the grievance mechanisms more credible for the parties 
involved and for the public in general.524 
A grievance mechanism is ‘any routinized, State-based or non-State-based, judicial 
or non-judicial process through which grievance concerning business-related human 
rights abuse can be raised and remedy can be sought’.525 It allows indigenous 
peoples to report perceived abuses committed by employees, third parties working 
on behalf of the business, or the business itself.526 
The Commentary to Guiding Principle No. 31 very significantly starts by affirming that 
‘[a] grievance mechanism can only serve its purpose if the people it is intended to 
serve know about it, trust it and are able to use it.’527 This Guiding Principle 
establishes several effectiveness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms – 
accordingly, in order to be deemed effective, grievance mechanisms should be: (1) 
legitimate; (2) accessible; (3) predictable; (4) equitable; (5) transparent; (6) rights-
compatible; and (7) a source of continuous learning. In addition, operational-level 
grievance mechanisms should be based on engagement and dialogue. 
The legitimacy requirement is complex and encompasses, first and foremost, the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ status as having the right to full enjoyment of their 
individual and collective rights. Second, grievance mechanisms should acknowledge 
and respect the role of the customary laws, traditions and practices of indigenous 
peoples and the authority of their governance institutions. This includes recognising 
that indigenous peoples may have internal grievance mechanisms that address 
violations within their traditional jurisdiction. However, these traditional mechanisms 
should always be rights-compatible, both in process and in outcome. Also very 
importantly, the accessibility requirement includes physical, linguistic, cultural and 
gender accessibility (therefore, including both men and women, elders, youth and 
other potentially vulnerable groups).528  
Regarding the content of remedies, the UN Working Group on Business and Human 
Rights notes the lack of elaboration within the Guiding Principles, and points to 
																																																								
524 Amy K. Lehr (2014), p. 19. 
525 UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2013), p. 30. 
526 Idem, p. 32. 
527 Guiding Principles, III (B)(31), Commentary (emphasis added). 
528 UN, Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises (A/68/279) (7 August 2013), paragraphs 51-52. 
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Articles 11 and 28 of the UNDRIP.529 The first establishes indigenous peoples’ right 
to effective redress (which may include restitution) with respect to their cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their FPIC or in violation of 
their laws, traditions and customs. Article 28 provides an example of what would 
constitute a rights-compatible outcome, namely restitution or, if that is not possible, 
just fair and equitable compensation. 
Whatever form grievance mechanisms ultimately take, they should entail both the 
consent and the participation of indigenous peoples.530 Lastly, the UNGC encourages 
companies to formalise and document grievance mechanisms, as well as to monitor 
(either internally or externally) and assign accountability for them.531 
 
2.5. The UN Global Compact and the cultural rights of indigenous 
peoples 
The UNGC addresses the specific issue of indigenous peoples’ cultural rights, again 
through its business reference guide to the UNDRIP.532 The most relevant provisions 
of the UNDRIP for this research are those that relate to culture, namely Articles 8, 11, 
12, 13 and 15. Article 8 refers to the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation 
or destruction of their culture. Article 11 contains the right of indigenous peoples to 
practise and revitalise their cultural traditions and customs. Article 12 states that 
indigenous peoples are entitled to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual 
and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies, including access, use and control 
of religious and cultural sites and objects, as well as the repatriation of human 
remains. Article 13 sets out indigenous peoples’ right to revitalise, use, develop and 
transmit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, 
writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for 
communities, places and persons. Finally, Article 15 refers to indigenous peoples’ 
right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations, 
appropriately reflected in education and public information. Whilst the UNDRIP 																																																								
529 Idem, paragraph 53. 
530 Human Rights Council, Comment on the Human Rights Council’s Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights as related to Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision-Making 
with a Focus on Extractive Industries (A/HRC/EMRIP/2012/CRP.1) (4 July 2012), paragraph 56. 
531 See UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2013), p. 33. 
532 UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2013), pp. 46-49. 
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establishes obligations regarding these rights that are only imposed on States, the 
UNGC encourages companies to acknowledge, respect and support them. The 
programme thus suggests that companies adopt a number of practical actions, 
destined both to respect and support the rights mentioned above. 
As to how business can respect (and foster respect) for the cultural rights of 
indigenous peoples, the Compact starts by inviting companies to use due diligence 
processes so as to ensure that their projects and their business partners do not 
cause, contribute to or encourage the forced assimilation of indigenous peoples. In 
this regard, particular attention should be paid whenever projects are to be developed 
in areas that constitute traditional lands, where there used to be indigenous presence 
that no longer exists, as well as when projects require indigenous peoples to relocate. 
Very importantly, the UNGC also incentivises the recourse to cultural impact 
assessments. Moreover, businesses should establish partnerships with indigenous 
peoples so as to avoid harming sacred places and the observation of religious and 
spiritual practices, as well as to ensure that these communities are not depicted or 
described by the company in a derogatory or discriminatory manner, which infringes 
upon their right to dignity, their culture, tradition, history and aspirations. For these 
purposes, the UNGC suggests that companies use the Akwé: Kon Voluntary 
Guidelines,533 established under the Convention on Biological Diversity, which are 
‘[v]oluntary guidelines for the conduct of cultural, environmental and social impact 
assessments regarding developments proposed to take place on, or which are likely 
to impact on, sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by 
indigenous and local communities’. 
Businesses are also invited to communicate with indigenous peoples using a 
language and medium accessible to them. Furthermore, companies should not 
appropriate, commercialise or use without consent any form of cultural or religious 
symbols, including the names of current or deceased members of the community. 
This also applies to the use of photographs and video footage, both of the indigenous 
peoples affected by the project and their deceased ancestors. In addition, items that 
the indigenous peoples consider offensive should not be used by companies or their 
business partners. All indigenous peoples that are involved in the project, including 
employees, should also be given appropriate time and venues for them to practice 
their religious customs and traditions, both in private and public ceremonies. In 																																																								
533 Available at: https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-brochure-en.pdf. 
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addition, particular care should be taken whenever an indigenous person passes 
away on site, so as to honour their dignity and culture. Companies should also prevent 
the influx of outside population from disrupting the culture, language and spirituality 
of indigenous peoples, as well as from compromising their influence in the 
community. If needed, companies should establish road-less operations. Finally, in 
case a company caused or contributed to cultural or environmental damage, it should 
consult with the indigenous peoples affected, in order to remediate the adverse 
impacts. 
Actions regarding business support for the cultural rights of indigenous peoples 
include conducting cultural awareness training for employees, organising respectful 
events that celebrate indigenous culture, supporting initiatives aimed at the 
preservation of indigenous cultural heritage, enabling employees to practice their 
religion, incorporating indigenous knowledge and learning styles to strengthen 
business practice, providing financial or other support to indigenous organisations 
involved in the preservation of traditional knowledge and cultural heritage, and, where 
appropriate, encouraging displays of indigenous flags and/or other cultural identifiers 
in the workplace. 
In practice, several companies have reported their efforts towards respecting and 
supporting the rights of indigenous peoples, although none of them have covered all 
the points mentioned above. For instance, from the twenty-two companies listed in 
the case examples provided by the UN Global Compact Office, only twelve have 
focused on culture, language and spirituality, and only eleven reported action on 
cultural heritage and traditional knowledge, whilst in the category of identity and group 
membership even less (only five companies) have reported action. 
Google, for example, partnered with the Surui tribe, in Brazil, in order to develop a 
programme documenting traditions and cultural heritage and creating a cultural map 
of the area, using Google Earth. In addition, Google taught the indigenous peoples 
how to map the Surui territory, which is extremely important, since it enables 
monitoring of the destruction of the rainforest, both by legal and illegal logging. Google 
also provided technology that allows the Surui to monitor their land’s carbon stock, 
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which they trade on the carbon credit marketplace, thus promoting sustainable 
development.534 
Microsoft, on the other hand, implemented a programme that contributes to the 
preservation of indigenous languages, namely through the Local Language Program, 
which aims at providing individuals with access to computers in their mother tongue. 
Within this programme, Microsoft created a Language Interface Pack for Windows in 
the Cherokee language.535 
MMG Limited, a mining company, put a cultural heritage management plan in place 
at each of its sites, in order to ensure the protection of culturally relevant sites and 
items, as well as the respect for traditional knowledge. The company also supported 
an intangible cultural heritage survey, in partnership with academics and government 
representatives, at its site in Sepon, Laos, capturing oral history, songs, music and 
religious expressions of twenty-one indigenous communities.536 
 
3. Conclusions 
It is clear, at this point, that CSR and foreign investment are closely related, but 
maintain a relationship that is hard to grasp and balance. Some commentators point 
out the emergence of a ‘new constitutionalism’, whereby States transfer sovereign 
powers to international organisations and grant inviolable rights to investors, 
‘removing important aspects of policy from State control and diminishing its ability not 
only to intervene in the market but to regulate corporations.’537 In this relationship, 
foreign investors arguably enjoy a much stronger level of protection than other 
stakeholders do under CSR initiatives – one can quickly arrive at the conclusion that 
‘[t]he ‘soft’ law of CSR is no match for the ‘hard(er)’ laws protecting shareholder 
interest’.538 
																																																								
534 UN Global Compact, ‘Practical Supplement - Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on 
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Release.aspx. 
537 Paddy Ireland and Renginee G. Pillay (2013), p. 78. 
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It is thus no wonder that so many commentators show scepticism and reluctance 
towards CSR. Some argue that the promise of CSR is still far from being fulfilled: 
where companies were supposed to bridge the gaps left by State regulation, ‘major 
blind spots remained’.539 Others ask if CSR is merely a contemporary version of the 
old French aristocratic idea of ‘noblesse oblige’ for multinational corporate elites – a 
concept that expressed the obligation of aristocracies to fulfil certain social roles as a 
result of the privileged position they had in society.540 It is also common to find 
expressions of discontent regarding the shape that CSR has taken in many cases, 
with authors claiming that ‘the managerialization and commodification of CSR’541 is a 
mostly negative tendency. 
Nevertheless, there is much to be gained from the cooperation between 
governments, businesses, NGOs and stakeholders in general. Empirical and 
conceptual studies alike have demonstrated that corporate conduct codes are not a 
panacea, but have the potential to improve the behaviour of companies, whatever 
their nature and size. It appears clear that the voluntary nature of CSR cannot 
guarantee that all companies will improve their governance practices as a result of 
the adoption of corporate conduct codes – as opposed to what happens under hard 
law requirements. It is also evident from empirical studies that companies tend to 
comply with voluntary conduct codes more in form than in substance, thus limiting the 
reach of CSR. As Cuomo et al. affirm, ‘codes can help avoid, or significantly reduce, 
the use of bad governance practices, but they are unable to promote the universal 
adoption of best governance practices’.542 It is, therefore, important to consider 
whether CSR is, or is not, worth pursuing, but it appears that there is still no 
consensus on this point – it is considered to be ‘too early’ to judge both the hard law 
and soft law approaches in this regard, even though the tendency is to consider these 
two variants as complementary, rather than alternatives.543 
In this regard, it is important to note the increasingly relevant role of NGOs. As Jacob 
rightly observes, 
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International organisations and NGOs are critical catalysts in pushing for 
further developments. They fill a vital gap in what is otherwise a largely self-
serving clientele by pointing to concerns that do not traditionally interest the 
principal actors (i.e. investors and states), such as transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy, and non-investment obligations.544 
Not only do NGOs offer a more unbiased perspective over issues that might not be 
in the States’ and investors’ interests, they also provide valuable information, 
documentation and – more importantly within the context of the present study – they 
can represent local interests in investment arbitration, as amicus curiae, a mechanism 
that will be clarified in Chapter 6. They also monitor the activities of MNEs, publicise 
them through increasingly fast and effective communications around the globe and 
take action, usually through different forms of activism (protests, petitions, boycotts, 
etc.).545 NGOs are thus more and more important at the international and national 
levels, contributing to a growing global awareness of human rights (and, particularly, 
cultural rights) issues. 
Initiatives such as the UNGC constitute positive developments, even though their 
effectiveness is questioned. However, it is worth noting that many of the actions that 
businesses are invited to undertake under the UNGC, as analysed above, may 
provide an important basis for the development of hard law standards in this regard. 
The initiative already provides detailed guidelines on how to ensure the protection 
and promotion of cultural rights, namely regarding indigenous peoples – it is up to the 
international community to build on this work in order to achieve more effective 
results. 
To end this chapter, it is imperative that I answer a fundamental question: is CSR 
enough to ensure respect for culture? The answer is necessarily negative, but must 
be nuanced. It appears clear that CSR is not enough to guarantee that companies 
will behave in a way that is compatible with cultural rights – especially given the fact 
that the CSR agenda has focused less on human rights than on other issues such as 
climate change, and that cultural rights are a problematic category of human rights, 
as explained in the first chapter of this research. It is also clear that socially 
responsible corporate conduct is not a panacea, and that hard law mechanisms (such 																																																								
544 Marc Jacob (2010), p. 43. 
545 In this sense, see David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights 
responsibilities for corporations at international law’, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 931 (2004), 
p. 934. 
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as national legislation and, perhaps in the future, international law) must accompany 
the developments achieved by CSR in complementarity. Nonetheless, there are 
serious benefits to a CSR approach that should not be ignored, and there is evidence 
of at least partial success to several initiatives, such as the UNGC. In conclusion, no 




Chapter 5 – Financial institutions and cultural rights 
 
The goal of this research is to identify and assess hard and soft law mechanisms that 
can provide balanced solutions for the protection of cultural rights in the context of 
foreign investment. Investment usually involves a number of actors that are capable 
of influencing the outcomes of projects and their impacts on stakeholders: I refer 
specifically to MNEs (whose role vis-à-vis human rights was explored in the last 
chapter), home and host countries (who have the primary duty to protect and promote 
human rights, but whose role is outside the scope of this research), and financial 
institutions (who might have the power to influence the conduct of foreign investors). 
This chapter will attempt to establish when and how banks have the possibility (or 
even obligation) of demanding that the investors they finance respect human rights 
and, more specifically, cultural rights. At stake here, much like in the previous chapter, 
is the issue of influencing the behaviour of MNEs so as to guarantee that they will do 
everything in their power to respect, protect and promote cultural rights. In addition, 
this chapter will endeavour to detect the main weaknesses of current mechanisms, 
thus identifying the areas in which there is room for improvement. In short, I intend to 
assess how banks can make a difference in the way culture is respected within the 
context of foreign investment. 
The first section of this chapter will focus on the general human rights responsibilities 
of financial institutions, briefly characterising the hard and soft law instruments 
applicable to banking and human rights. The second section will refer to Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs), with particular emphasis on the IFC, the private sector 
arm of the World Bank Group, which provides financial services to private investors 
in developing countries, aimed at development goals. The third section will explore 
the relationship between commercial banks and human rights, starting from the idea 
that loan requirements constitute a powerful instrument for the development of a more 
socially responsible investment climate, with significant consequences for cultural 
rights in general, and for the cultural rights of indigenous peoples in particular. Finally, 
some conclusions will be drawn. 
Financial institutions and cultural rights 
	 148 
1. Introduction: Financial Institutions and Human Rights 
Financial institutions have grown in both size and complexity over the last few 
decades, to the point where some large multinational banks have balance sheets that 
are bigger than some countries’ Gross Domestic Product.546 They can have a 
powerful effect on the human rights of stakeholders in the context of foreign 
investment: banks provide funding for projects that may have very positive outcomes, 
such as economic growth, eradication of poverty and development, but they also have 
the potential to cause devastating effects on the lives of local communities, namely 
through environmental damage and the violation of human rights. In fact, banks are 
uniquely positioned to influence investment projects, with the possibility of 
incorporating specific human rights requirements into loan agreements. By interacting 
with their clients, banks thus have the ability to shape foreign investment, mitigating 
social and environmental impacts – or aggravating them.  
Much like other businesses, banks have increasingly become the target of social 
expectations regarding human rights, largely driven by mounting pressure from NGOs 
and civil society organisations.547 Traditionally, banks had to assess and deal with 
risks that they themselves incurred – whether legal, reputational or other – as a 
consequence of their operations; more recently, though, the focus shifted amidst the 
international community so as to emphasise the risk to other stakeholders. The 
societal expectations over the conduct of banks have become impossible to ignore, 
but there is still significant uncertainty regarding their role in the protection and 
promotion of human rights. 
There are essentially two types of financial institutions for the purposes of this 
chapter: those in the public sector, i.e. MDBs; and those in the private sector, i.e., 
commercial banks. Whilst the first are international organisations, the second are 
private corporations; both have been the subject of much debate, with different 
implications. As international organisations, MDBs are subject to international law and 
controlled by States. Commercial banks, on the other hand, are subject to both 
domestic and international law and fall within the category of ‘businesses’. 
																																																								
546 Mary Dowell-Jones, ‘Financial Institutions and Human Rights’, 13 Human Rights Law Review 423 
(2013), p. 431. 
547 Malcolm Forster et al., ‘The Equator Principles - Towards Sustainable Banking’, 6 Journal of 
International Banking and Finance Law 216 (2005) 
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There are several soft law instruments dedicated to the protection of human rights 
that have (or should have) a strong influence over financial institutions, and this 
section will place particular emphasis on inter-governmental initiatives. The first one 
that needs to be mentioned is, of course, the UN Guiding Principles, already referred 
in the previous Chapter. In addition, it is also important to mention the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, as well as other initiatives originating from 
the OECD and the UN. Standards established by MDBs will be covered in Section 2, 
whereas private sector initiatives, namely the Equator Principles (EP) and the Thun 
Group of Banks, will be assessed in Section 3. 
 
1.1. The UN Guiding Principles 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Guiding Principles are based on three 
essential pillars: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third 
parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication; 
(2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means to act with due 
diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts 
that occur; and (3) greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and 
non-judicial.548 This research focuses on the second and third pillars. 
It is crucial to understand how the Guiding Principles apply to the financial sector, 
with its particularities. The complexity and vast diversity of today’s financial services 
constitute the biggest obstacle to an effective engagement with human rights, coupled 
with a surprising lack of interaction between human rights NGOs and activists, on the 
one hand, and banks, on the other.549	
Therefore, this Section will attempt to clarify if and how the Guiding Principles affect 
the activities of banks. First of all, the Guiding Principles apply to all businesses, 
‘regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure’550, 
which includes banks. Because the Guiding Principles are meant to apply universally, 
and not just to the financial sector, they only provide general guidance, rather than 
establishing detailed instructions as to how each bank should proceed. This 
reinforces the importance of initiatives that contextualise and develop the 																																																								
548 UN, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights (7 April 2008), 
paragraph 9. 
549 Mary Dowell-Jones (2013), p. 428. 
550 Guiding Principles, Principle 14. 
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methodologies that are relevant to certain types of banks, within the framework of the 
Guiding Principles. 
Banks (like other companies) are required to respect human rights (as opposed to 
States, who not only have the responsibility to respect, but also to protect and fulfil), 
which means they should ‘avoid infringing on the human rights of others and (…) 
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.’551 This 
obligation includes prevention, mitigation and remediation of adverse human rights 
impacts caused by businesses.552 Principle 13 further states that the responsibility to 
protect entails an obligation to ‘[a]void causing or contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts through their own activities, and address such impacts when they 
occur; [and] [s]eek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are 
directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, 
even if they have not contributed to those impacts.’553 This applies both to companies’ 
actions and omissions.554 
Banks (like all other businesses) consequently have the obligation, under the Guiding 
Principles, to respond adequately to situations where (1) their activity causes an 
adverse impact on human rights; (2) their activity contributes to adverse impacts; or 
(3) their operations, products or services are directly linked to adverse human rights 
impacts through business relationships. The nature of a bank’s involvement with 
human rights impacts can thus manifest in several different forms, and banks should 
identify which modality of involvement each specific situation represents so as to 
define an appropriate course of action. 
The most common human rights impacts included in the first category relate to the 
bank’s relationship with its employees (e.g., unequal pay for men and women, 
discrimination of certain employees based on race or ethnicity), and thus fall outside 
the scope of this research. The second category refers to situations where the bank 
contributes, or is perceived as contributing, to human rights violations. The notion of 
‘contribution’ used in the Guiding Principles is close to that of ‘complicity’, which has 
legal and non-legal meanings and implications, as the commentary to Principle 17 
elucidates. The legal standard of complicity is related to both criminal and civil liability 
at the domestic level, and is understood in international criminal law as ‘aiding and 																																																								
551 Idem, Principle 11. 
552 Idem, Commentary to Principle 11. 
553 Idem, Principle 13 (emphasis added). 
554 Idem, Commentary to Principle 13. 
Financial institutions and cultural rights 
	 151 
abetting’, i.e. ‘knowingly providing practical assistance or encouragement that has a 
substantial effect on the commission of a crime.’555 The third category consists of 
situations where there are adverse human rights impacts, which are directly linked to 
the bank’s operations, services or products, and where the bank is connected to the 
entity causing those impacts through its business relationships. In the case of banks, 
‘business relationships’ include ‘relationships with borrowers, project partners, retail 
and commercial banking clients, and other entities, potentially including some more 
distant in the value chain’.556 Direct linkage should be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis in order to establish the degree of proximity, which can range from ‘clear 
association’ to ‘extremely remote’.557 
The most usual contentions raised against banks, based on human rights impacts, 
result from this third type of involvement, i.e., from situations where the bank is not 
directly causing or contributing to human rights violations, but rather from situations 
where the bank’s operations, products or services are directly linked to a human rights 
impact through its business relationships.558 
In addition, according to Guiding Principle 15, in order to comply with their 
responsibility to protect human rights, banks (and all businesses) should have a 
number of strategies in place: (1) developing a policy commitment to meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights; (2) conducting human rights due diligence, so 
as to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on 
human rights; and, finally, (3) creating processes to enable the remediation of any 
adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.559 Companies 
																																																								
555 Idem, Commentary to Principle 17. See also OHCHR, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights - An Interpretive Guide’ (2012), available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf, pp. 79-80. The matter of corporate 
complicity is extremely interesting but, for reasons of space, will not be developed in this research. For 
further information on the subject, see Anita Ramasastry, ‘Secrets and Lies - Swiss Banks and 
International Human Rights’, 31 Vand J Transnat'l L 325 (1998); Anita Ramasastry, ‘Corporate 
Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon - An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on 
the Liability of Multinational Corporations’, 20 Berkeley J Int'l L 91 (2002); Florian Wettstein, ‘The Duty 
to Protect: Corporate Complicity, Political Responsibility, and Human Rights Advocacy’, 96 Journal of 
Business Ethics 33 (2010); and Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, ‘Categories of corporate complicity in 
human rights abuses’, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 339 (2000). 
556 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP, ‘Banks and Human Rights - A Legal Analysis’ 
(December 2015), available at: http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/BanksandHumanRights.pdf, 
p.10. 
557 Idem, p. 15. 
558 Idem, p. 13. 
559 Guiding Principles, Principle 15. 
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are thus expected to ‘know and show’ that they respect human rights in the course of 
their activities.560 
The requirement of due diligence is perhaps the most significant, placed at the heart 
of the Guiding Principles. Some authors even affirm that they ‘provide[] a stronger 
legal mandate than has existed in the past in terms of considering of social issues, 
now under the guise of human rights’, thus turning stakeholders into ‘rights-holders 
with legitimate interests that need to be respected.’561 
Whereas most banks already have in place risk management mechanisms, such as 
non-discrimination and environmental impact assessment processes, designed to 
prevent risks for the banks themselves, the Guiding Principles require them to set in 
place a specific human rights impact assessment. This requirement means that banks 
‘should put risks to rights-holders first, rather than risks to the business itself’.562 The 
approach taken by the Guiding Principles regarding due diligence processes has 
been analysed in considerable detail in the previous Chapter; therefore, at this point, 
I will endeavour to focus only on the specificities of the requirements as they relate to 
the financial sector. 
According to BankTrack, an NGO focused on private sector commercial banks, a 
large percentage of banks still does not commit to properly implementing due 
diligence processes: only 16 out of 45 banks assessed in 2016 fully committed to 
carrying out human rights due diligence processes, whilst 17 did not even mention 
such process at all. Furthermore, none of the assessed banks demonstrated how 
they guarantee meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups.563 Finally, it 
was discovered that only 9 out of the 45 banks specifically allocated responsibility564 
for addressing human rights within the company to clearly identified levels and 
functions.565 
																																																								
560 Commentary to Principle 15; see also OHCHR, ‘Letter from OHCHR to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development ('OECD')’ (27 November 2013), available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/LetterOECD.pdf , paragraph 7. 
561 Deanna Kemp and Frank Vanclay, ‘Human rights and impact assessment: clarifying the connections 
in practice’, 31 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 86 (2013), p. 90. 
562 BankTrack, ‘Banking with Principles? Benchmarking Banks against the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights’ (June 2016), available at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/ems_files/download/5412388/banking_with_principles_june2016update.pdf, 
p. 8 (emphasis in the original). 
563 See Guiding Principle 18. 
564 See Guiding Principle 19. 
565 BankTrack (June 2016), pp. 8-9. 
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It appears clear that, for banks, who engage with multiple kinds of frontline businesses 
through multiple different activities and operations, it can be extremely difficult – if not 
impossible – to assess the risks involved in each of those business relationships. In 
that regard, the commentary to Principle 17 meaningfully suggests that ‘business 
enterprises should identify general areas where the risk of adverse human rights 
impacts is most significant’ and ‘prioritize these for human rights due diligence.’ 
Therefore, in order to conduct an initial scoping, banks should identify entities in their 
value chain that belong to high-risk sectors; they should pinpoint their clients’ 
products or services that present the highest risk in terms of human rights impacts; 
and, finally, they should determine which contexts are high-risk (such as, for example, 
countries where there is a high level of corruption or locations where indigenous 
peoples inhabit or use the land for their livelihood and cultural expression). This 
scoping exercise should be undertaken with recourse to ‘widely available and credible 
sources focused on thematic or country-related human rights challenges and, in some 
cases, those relevant to business and even particular sectors.’566 
Once scoping is concluded, banks still need to prioritise action to address the risks 
that were identified. In order to do so, they need to take into account the severity of 
their risk of human rights impacts, which ‘will be judged by their scale, scope and 
irremediable character’.567 Scale refers to the gravity of the human rights impact whilst 
scope refers to the number of individuals potentially or actually affected. An impact 
will be deemed irremediable if there are limits to how the position of those affected 
can be restored to what it was before the impact, at least in an equivalent manner. 
Classifying a situation as ‘severe’ does not, however, require the satisfaction of all 
three requirements mentioned above, although it appears clear that, the greater the 
scale and/or scope of an impact, the less it is likely to be remediable.568 A company’s 
response to the risk of a potential or actual human rights impact should be 
proportionate to severity, and priority should be given to those risks that are more 
severe. 
As soon as the risks of human rights impacts are identified and prioritised, banks 
should react accordingly. If the impacts fall into the first category (i.e., the bank is 
directly causing a human rights impact), banks are supposed to either cease or 																																																								
566 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 12. 
567 Commentary to Guiding Principle 14. 
568 In this sense, see OHCHR, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights - An Interpretive 
Guide’ (2012), questions 12 and 13, p. 19. 
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prevent the activities that cause or are likely to cause human rights impacts. Similarly, 
if they fall into the second category (i.e., the bank contributes to a human rights 
impact), the bank should ‘take the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution 
and use its leverage to mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest extent 
possible’.569 If the impacts fall into the third category (i.e., the bank is directly related 
through its business relationships to adverse human rights impacts, but does not 
directly cause or contribute to the human rights impact), there is still a responsibility 
to prevent or mitigate that impact. These situations are understandably much more 
convoluted than the first two, and it is crucial to understand how different levels of 
leverage can affect the bank’s duties. Accordingly, the Guiding Principles suggest 
that appropriate action will depend on ‘the enterprise’s leverage over the entity 
concerned, how crucial the relationship is to the enterprise, the severity of the abuse, 
and whether terminating the relationship with the entity itself would have adverse 
human rights consequences.’570 
Companies are considered to have leverage when they are able to affect the activities 
of the entity that is causing the human rights impact. If such leverage exists, 
companies should exercise it in order to prevent or mitigate the adverse impact. If, 
however, leverage is lacking, companies should make an effort to increase it, so as 
to be able to influence the actions of the entity that is causing (or likely to cause) the 
adverse impact. If increasing leverage is impossible, companies should consider 
ending the business relationship.571 
The amount of leverage that each individual bank possesses can vary considerably 
depending on which types of product, service or operation are at stake.572 One typical 
example of this variation is project finance, which is: 
(…) a method of financing in which the lender looks primarily to the revenues 
generated by a single Project, both as the source of repayment and as security 
for the exposure. (…) In such transactions, the lender is usually paid solely or 
almost exclusively out of the money generated by the contracts for the 
Project’s output, such as the electricity sold by a power plant. The client is 
																																																								
569 Commentary to Guiding Principle 19 (emphasis added). 
570 Idem. 
571 Idem. 
572 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 17. 
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usually a Special Purpose Entity that is not permitted to perform any function 
other than developing, owning, and operating the installation.573 
In project finance,574 lenders typically have more influence over the construction and 
operation of the project, but this leverage is particularly strong before the project 
starts575 and dissolves as soon as the loan is repaid.576 Very differently, general 
corporate loans that are not specific to a project entail much less leverage, even 
though banks have the possibility of increasing it through contractual language and 
other alternatives, such as threatening to withdraw funding.577 
Finally, Principle 22 establishes an obligation for businesses to provide for or 
cooperate in the remediation of human rights impacts that they have caused or 
contributed to.578 This principle applies to banks in the same manner as it applies to 
other businesses, and will not therefore be explored further in this chapter. 
 
1.2. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter, the ‘Guidelines’) 
were first adopted in 1976 and revised five times, the latest revision having taken 
place in 2011. At the time of writing, they count with the adherence of 46 countries, 
including several non-OECD countries; the EU has the status of observer.579 The 
Guidelines are a soft law instrument dedicated to the relationship between companies 
and their adverse impacts on individuals, communities and the environment, including 
human rights. The 2011 review was undertaken with a view to reflecting crucial 
structural changes in international business, with the participation of companies, 
labour, NGOs, non-adhering countries and international organisations. By 
recommending due diligence efforts in global supply chains, the Guidelines ‘became 
the first international corporate responsibility instrument to incorporate risk-based due 																																																								
573 Equator Principles, ‘The Equator Principles III’ (June 2013), available at: 
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles_III.pdf , p. 18. 
574 For a very interesting and detailed analysis of the relationship between project finance, human rights 
and development, see Sheldon Leader and David Ong, Global project finance, human rights and 
sustainable development (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
575 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 17. 
576 Kendyl Salcito et al., ‘Assessing corporate project impacts in changeable contexts: a human rights 
perspective’, 47 Environmental Impact Assessment Review 36 (2014), p. 37. 
577 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 17. 
578 See also Commentary to Guiding Principle 22. 
579 Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, ‘Responsible Business Conduct: the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (June 2015), available at: http://biac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/FIN-15-06-GUIDELINES-BROCHURE.pdf, p. 7. 
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diligence into major areas of business responsibility, including human rights, 
environmental and labour issues and anti-corruption.’580 
The Guidelines are government-backed recommendations directly addressed to 
MNEs operating in and from adhering countries, and ‘have received widespread 
support from all stakeholders, including the business sector.’581 Not only are they one 
of the oldest standards addressing CSR, but they are also ‘the only multilaterally 
agreed and comprehensive code of responsible business conduct that governments 
have committed to promoting.’582 According to the Preface,  
The Guidelines aim to ensure that the operations of (…) enterprises are in 
harmony with government policies, to strengthen the basis of mutual 
confidence between enterprises and the societies in which they operate, to 
help improve the foreign investment climate and to enhance the contribution 
to sustainable development made by multinational enterprises.583 
The Guidelines cover a wide range of issues, but, for the purposes of this research, I 
will focus on the human rights chapter, which was added in the 2011 revision and 
constitutes a very welcome development, as the previous versions only briefly 
referred to the UDHR in the preamble. In fact, since 2011, the Guiding Principles have 
been incorporated into the Guidelines, and terminological convergence between the 
two initiatives was intentionally achieved.584 The General Policies of the Guidelines 
start by stating that companies should ‘[r]espect the internationally recognised human 
rights of those affected by their activities.’585 Chapter IV of the Guidelines is dedicated 
to human rights and it affirms that enterprises should: (1) respect human rights; (2) 
avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts; (3) find ways of 
preventing or mitigating adverse impacts that are directly linked to their operations, 
products or services, even if they did not contribute to those impacts; (4) have a policy 
																																																								
580 Adrian Blundell-Wignall, ‘The MNE Guidelines at 40: Implementation still matters’ (2016), available 
at: https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/mne-guidelines-at-40-implementation-still-matters.htm. 
581 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 42. 
582 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing, 2011), available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en, ‘Foreword’, p. 3. 
583 Idem, ‘Preface’, p. 13. 
584 See OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct, ‘Note by the Chair of the Negotiations 
on the 2011 Revision of the Guidelines, Regarding the Terminology on 'Directly Linked'’ in Expert letters 
and statements on the application of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and UN Guiding 
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commitment to respect human rights; (5) carry out human rights due diligence; and 
(6) provide for or co-operate in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts.586 
Similarly to what happens with the Guiding Principles, the Guidelines establish a 
responsibility to respect human rights that is independent from States’ compliance 
with internationally recognised HRL.587 Businesses should pay heed, at a minimum, 
to the International Bill of Rights.588 In addition, whenever necessary, they should 
consider and apply other specific standards, depending on whether their activities 
interfere with groups that require particular attention, such as: indigenous peoples; 
ethnic or national, religious and linguistic minorities; women; children; persons with 
disabilities; and migrant workers and their families. In situations where companies 
operate in conflict zones, they are expected to consider and apply principles of 
international humanitarian law, ‘which can help enterprises avoid the risks of causing 
or contributing to adverse impacts when operating in such difficult environments’.589 
The first paragraph of Chapter IV emphasises companies’ responsibility to respect 
human rights and address actual or potential human rights impacts, which means that 
they should ‘tak[e] adequate measures for their identification, prevention, where 
possible, and mitigation of potential human rights impacts, remediation of actual 
impacts, and accounting for how the adverse human rights impacts are addressed’.590 
In line with the Guiding Principles, the Guidelines establish three different kinds of 
situations of human rights impacts: (1) when a company causes (through actions or 
omissions) an adverse impact, it should endeavour to stop or prevent it; (2) when a 
company substantially contributes to an adverse impact, it should stop or prevent its 
contribution and, if possible, use its leverage to reduce human rights impacts caused 
by others; and (3) when a human rights impact is directly linked to a company’s 
operations, products or services, through its business relationships with other entities 
(including ‘business partners, entities in the supply chain and any other non-State or 
State entities directly linked to its business operations, products or services’),591 it 
should use its leverage, alone or in cooperation with other entities, to influence the 
																																																								
586 Idem, Chapter IV, p. 31. 
587 Idem, paragraph 38, p. 32. 
588 Idem, paragraph 29, p. 32. The International Bill of Rights comprises the UDHR, the ICCPR and the 
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589 Idem, paragraph 40, p. 32. 
590 Idem, paragraph 41, p. 33. 
591 Idem, paragraph 14 of the Commentary to Chapter II – General Policies, p. 23. 
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harmful behaviour and prevent or mitigate the adverse impact.592 In addition, 
companies should encourage their business partners to apply standards of corporate 
conduct that are aligned with the Guidelines.593 
The third modality referred above (impacts that are directly linked to a company’s 
operations, products and services, through its business relationships) constitutes a 
significant expansion of the scope of the Guidelines, aligned with the Guiding 
Principles. In fact, before the 2011 revision, an ‘investment nexus’ was required, in 
order for a human rights impact in a company’s value chain to be considered a 
responsibility of that company. What ‘investment nexus’ meant was defined by the 
OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in basic 
terms, stating that companies needed to have an ‘investment like relationship’ 
through which it could influence the entity causing the human rights impact.594 The 
elimination of this requirement constituted a very welcome development. 
Paragraph 4 focuses on policy commitments, and the commentary elaborates on the 
subject, stating that companies should adopt a policy that ‘(i) is approved at the most 
senior level of the enterprise; (ii) is informed by relevant internal and/or external 
expertise; (iii) stipulates the enterprise’s human rights expectations of personnel, 
business partners and other parties directly linked to its operations, products or 
services; (iv) is publicly available and communicated internally and externally to all 
personnel, business partners and other relevant parties; (v) is reflected in operational 
policies and procedures necessary to embed it throughout the enterprise.’595 
As to the responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence, paragraph 5 of Chapter 
IV states that the process ‘entails assessing actual and potential human rights 
impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses as well as 
communicating how impacts are addressed.’596 Human rights due diligence 
processes are expected to be on-going, so as to take into account changes in 
circumstances (either in terms of the company’s operations or in terms of context) 
and they are expected to adequately ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how 
they address their actual and potential adverse impacts as an integral part of business 
																																																								
592 Idem, paragraphs 42-43, p. 33.  
593 Idem, paragraph A.14 of Chapter II – General Policies, p. 19. See also Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee to the OECD (June 2015), p. 8. 
594 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), pp. 42-43. 
595 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), paragraph 44, pp. 33-34. 
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decision-making and risk management systems.’597 The Guidelines further 
differentiate between actual and potential human rights impacts, establishing an 
obligation to remediate the first and prevent or mitigate the second. Moreover, the 
size of the company, the context of its operations and the severity of its adverse 
impacts are factors that contribute to the definition of the extent and nature of the due 
diligence process.598 In cases where a company has a large number of suppliers, the 
due diligence efforts should be prioritised in accordance with the level of risk of human 
rights impacts.599 
When companies conduct due diligence and identify human rights impacts that they 
caused or contributed to, they should have processes in place to ensure remediation. 
This includes cooperating with judicial or State-based non-judicial mechanisms, but 
also the establishment of operational-level grievance mechanisms that fulfil the 
requirements of ‘legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, equitability, compatibility with 
the Guidelines and transparency, and are based on dialogue and engagement with a 
view to seeking agreed solutions.’600 In addition, operational-level grievance 
mechanisms ‘should not be used to undermine the role of trade unions in addressing 
labour-related disputes, nor should such mechanisms preclude access to judicial or 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms, including the National Contact Points under the 
Guidelines.’601 
Even though the Guidelines are non-binding and do not come with formal 
enforcement mechanisms, they are still ‘accompanied by a globally active grievance 
mechanism that aims to resolve issues arising under the Guidelines, including those 
linked to investments in companies which may be behaving irresponsibly.’602 This 
grievance mechanism consists of National Contact Points (NCPs), which, together 
with the Investment Committee, are in charge of effectively implementing the 
Guidelines.603 
																																																								
597 Idem, paragraph 14 of the Commentary to Chapter II – General Policies, p. 23. 
598 Idem, paragraph 15 of the Commentary to Chapter II – General Policies, p. 24. 
599 Idem, paragraph 16 of the Commentary to Chapter II – General Policies, p. 24. 
600 Idem, paragraph 46, p. 34. 
601 Ibidem.  
602 Roel Nieuwenkamp, ‘The Force of Finance for Responsible Business: How the financial sector could 
and should contribute to responsible business conduct’ (6 June 2016), available at: 
http://oecdinsights.org/2016/06/06/finance-for-responsible-business-conduct/. 
603 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 43; and Evaristus Oshionebo, 
‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as Mechanisms for Sustainable Development of 
Natural Resources: Real Solutions or Window Dressing’, 17 Lewis & Clark L Rev 545 (2013), p. 553. 
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The establishment of NCPs is one of the obligations incumbent on adhering countries, 
in addition to the duty to promote the Guidelines amongst MNEs operating in or from 
their territories.604 Although establishing the NCPs is mandatory for adhering 
countries, they enjoy considerable freedom as to their constitution and organisation, 
and they do not need to be similar across countries.605 NCPs have a triple mission: 
to promote the Guidelines in the country where they are based; to handle enquiries 
related to the Guidelines; and to play a conciliatory role, by contributing to the 
resolution of issues related to the implementation of the Guidelines,606 ‘in specific 
instances in a manner that is impartial, predictable, equitable and compatible with the 
principles and standards of the Guidelines.’607 This non-judicial mechanism is open 
to ‘all interested parties’, which includes the business community, worker 
organisations, NGOs and individuals.608 
As a rule, interested parties should raise an issue with the NCP of the country in which 
that issue arose. Issues are initially dealt with at the national level and, if appropriate, 
they are subsequently dealt with bilaterally. ‘The NCP of the host country should 
consult with the NCP of the home country in its efforts to assist the parties in resolving 
the issues [and] [t]he NCP of the home country should strive to provide appropriate 
assistance in a timely manner when requested by the NCP of the host country.’609 
Whenever multiple NCPs are involved in an issue, they should consult in order to 
determine which NCP takes the lead; the lead NCP should still consult with the other 
NCPs involved and they should all cooperate in the resolution of the issue.610 
There have been several issues raised with NCPs related to the financial sector, 
which can shed significant light on the specificity of the application of the Guidelines 
to banks. One such case was a complaint brought in 2012 by a consortium of NGOs 
to the Norwegian, Netherlands, and Korean NCPs, arguing that Pohang Iron and 
Steel Enterprise (POSCO), and its joint venture POSCO India Private Limited had 
breached the human rights provisions of the Guidelines. The complaint was also 
directed at two of POSCO's investors, the Dutch Pension Fund ABP, and its pension 
administrator APG, and the Norwegian Bank Investment Management (NBIM). The 																																																								
604 See Roel Nieuwenkamp (6 June 2016). 
605 Evaristus Oshionebo (2013), p. 554. 
606 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), Amendment of the Decision of the Council on 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, paragraph I.1, p. 68. 
607 Idem, Procedural Guidance, section C, p. 72. 
608 Ibidem. 
609 Idem, Coordination between NCPs in Specific Instances, paragraph 23, p. 82. 
610 Idem, Coordination between NCPs in Specific Instances, paragraph 24, p. 82. 
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NGOs argued that POSCO failed to: (1) seek to prevent or mitigate human rights 
impacts; (2) conduct comprehensive human rights due diligence; and (3) carry out 
environmental due diligence in its project to set up a steel plant in the Jagastinghpur 
District in Odisha, India. The three NCPs decided that each of them should handle 
the complaints raised against companies registered in their country; therefore, the 
Norwegian NCP assessed the complaint against NBIM, the Dutch NCP assessed the 
complaint against ABP and APG, and the Korean NCP assessed the complaint 
against POSCO. For the purposes of this research, we will focus on the 2013 final 
statement issued by the Norwegian NCP.611 
The first issue addressed by the Norwegian NCP regarding the financial sector dealt 
with NBIM’s submission that the Guidelines did not apply to minority shareholding. 
The NCP reiterated that the Guidelines apply to all businesses, including those in the 
financial sector, and stated that the question was not if the Guidelines applied to the 
financial sector and minority shareholding, but rather how they applied.612 The NCP 
thus affirmed that ‘the impacts of a company in which an enterprise has invested are 
directly linked by a business relationship to the investor, and thus encompassed 
within the due diligence framework.’613 Referring to a letter from the OHCHR,614 which 
addressed questions related to the financial sector, the NCP indicated: 
The UN Guiding Principles cover minority shareholdings of institutional 
investors, which constitute a “business relationship” (…) The OECD Chapter 
on Human Rights builds upon and converges with the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights. The OECD Chapter on Human Rights is thus 
applicable to minority shareholders of institutional investors. There is little 
basis to argue that the OECD Guidelines as such are not applicable to 
investors.615 
																																																								
611 The Norwegian National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ‘Final 
Statement: Complaint from Lok Shakti Abhiyan, Korean Transnational Corporations Watch, Fair Green 
and Global Alliance and Forum for Environment and Development vs. POSCO (South Korea), ABP/APG 
(Netherlands) and NBIM (Norway)’ (27 May 2013), available at: 
http://www.responsiblebusiness.no/files/2013/12/nbim_final.pdf, (hereinafter, ‘Norway NCP, NBIM 
Specific Instance’). 
612 Idem, p. 22. 
613 Ibidem. 
614 OHCHR, ‘Letter dated 26 April 2013 (interpretive guidance) from Craig Mokhiber, Chief of 
Development and Economic and Social Issues Branch, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)’ (2013), available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/LetterSOMO.pdf. 
615 Norway NCP, NBIM Specific Instance, p. 22. 
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Furthermore, all three NCPs agreed that the Guidelines applied to minority 
shareholding, and consequently to NBIM.616 The second question assessed by the 
Norwegian NCP referred to the relevance of the status of NBIM as a State-owned 
company to the application of the Guidelines. The NCP reached the conclusion that 
‘[t]he OECD Guidelines explicitly underscore that state owned enterprises are not 
exempt, and, on the contrary, suggests that public expectations are often even higher 
for state owned enterprises’.617 
A further question referred to the responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence, 
to which the Norwegian NCP replied: 
Given that NBIM manages one of the largest funds in the world with potentially 
severe human rights impacts from some sectors - such as industrials, 
extractives and companies operating in high risk environments - a robust 
system of human rights due diligence is appropriate. At the same time, the 
human rights due diligence system must take into account the fact that NBIM 
invests in 7,000 companies, so it is not possible to scrutinize and engage each 
company in detail or even individually. (…) 
It is not expected that each investor conduct due diligence on every company 
it considers for investment, especially not if the investment is based on a 
market weighted global benchmark index. However, the OECD Guidelines 
suggest that companies should use a risk-based approach that focuses due 
diligence on situations in which the severity and likelihood of adverse impacts 
are most significant.618 
The next issue referred to how NBIM should act after identifying the risks of human 
rights impacts. Firstly, in order to characterise the relationship between NBIM and the 
companies in which it invested, the NCP affirmed that ‘[i]nvestors are most likely to 
be directly linked to the impacts of their portfolio companies, in which case they should 
“[s]eek ways to prevent or mitigate those adverse human rights impacts ... even if 
they do not contribute to those impacts.”’619 In this regard, the NCP stated: 
The Guidelines recognise that companies that are directly linked to but do not 
cause or contribute to human rights impacts typically do not exercise control 																																																								
616 Idem, pp. 22-23. 
617 Idem, p. 23. 
618 Idem, pp. 29-30 (emphasis added). 
619 Idem, p. 34. 
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over the party responsible for the impacts, but this does not relieve them of a 
responsibility to take steps to influence the situation once they are in a 
business relationship. In such an instance, the Guidelines indicate that a 
company is to “use its leverage to influence the entity causing the adverse 
human rights impact to prevent or mitigate that impact,” acting alone or in 
cooperation with other actors.620 
It added that, in order to influence companies with which there is a business 
relationship, investors may use several tools, even if human rights impacts are only 
known after the investment is made, ‘including shareholder proposals, engagement 
with management, and the threat of divestment’.621 
Finally, the Norwegian NCP recalled that companies that do not cause or contribute 
to human rights impacts, but are rather directly linked to the impacts through a 
business relationship, do not have the obligation to provide remedies. Nevertheless, 
NBIM could still use its leverage over POSCO to encourage it to establish a remedial 
mechanism.622 
The Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct later confirmed these 
findings,623 referring to the Interpretive Guide on the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect Human Rights of the OHCHR, which states that ‘business relationships 
include indirect business relationships in its value chain, beyond the first tier, and 
minority as well as majority shareholding positions in joint ventures.’624  
 
1.3. Other initiatives 
There are several initiatives that aim at regulating corporate conduct and which have 
particular incidence over financial institutions. Firstly, it is important to mention the 
																																																								
620 Ibidem. 
621 Idem, p. 35. 
622 Idem, p. 40. 
623 OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct - Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, ‘Scope and Application of ‘Business Relationships’ in the Financial Sector Under the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2014), available at: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/global-
forum/gfrbc-2014-financial-sector-document-2.pdf, p. 5. 
624 OHCHR, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights - An Interpretive Guide’ (2012), p. 
5. 
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OECD Common Approaches,625 which constitute a recommendation by the OECD 
Council and are thus not legally binding. However, they should still be taken into 
account, considering that they convey ‘the common position or will of the whole OECD 
membership and therefore [are] considered to be an important political commitment 
for Member governments’.626 Specifically referring, among other instruments and 
standards, to the Guiding Principles and to the Guidelines, this Recommendation 
‘sets common approaches for undertaking environmental and social due diligence to 
identify, consider and address the potential environmental and social impacts and 
risks relating to applications for officially supported export credits as an integral part 
of Members’ decision-making and risk management systems.’627 The 
recommendation thus states that, in order to achieve the goals listed, Export Credit 
Agencies should, inter alia, ‘[e]ncourage protection and respect for human rights, 
particularly in situations where the potential impacts from projects or existing 
operations pose risks to human rights.’628 
Still at the OECD level, there are several projects related to the human rights 
responsibilities of the financial sector. One example is the Secretariat’s note entitled 
‘Due Diligence in the Financial Sector: Adverse Impacts Directly Linked to Financial 
Sector Operations, Products or Services by a Business Relationship’,629 which 
develops the Guidelines and reaffirms, with detailed examples: (1) the human rights 
responsibility of financial institutions; (2) the irrelevance of causality for the 
determination of direct linkage, the latter not being limited to first-tier or immediate 
business relationships; and (3) the level and rigor of due diligence that a financial 
enterprise is expected to exercise depends on the nature of its business relationships. 
Finally, it should be noted that the OECD is still undertaking work on the clarification 
of the human rights responsibilities of financial institutions, as demonstrated by the 
efforts made by the Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct, an 																																																								
625 OECD Council, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Common Approaches for Officially Supported 
Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence’ (7 April 2016), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/ECG%282016%293&doc
language=en; hereinafter, ‘Common Approaches’. 
626 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), 
p. 46. 
627 OECD, ‘Environmental and Social Due Diligence’ (2016), available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/environmentalandsocialduediligence.htm. 
628 OECD Council (7 April 2016), Common Approaches, p. 6. 
629 OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct, ‘Due diligence in the financial sector: 
adverse impacts directly linked to financial sector operations, products or services by a business 
relationship’ (2014), available at: http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/global-forum/GFRBC-2014-financial-
sector-document-1.pdf. 
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intergovernmental body established in 2013 and dedicated to ‘furthering the 
effectiveness of the Guidelines, fostering NCP functional equivalence, pursuing the 
proactive agenda, promoting engagement with non-adhering countries, partner 
organisations, and stakeholders, and serving as central point of information on the 
Guidelines.’630 The ‘proactive agenda’ employs a multi-stakeholder process and 
develops a number of projects intended to complement the specific instances 
procedure by clarifying several complex areas – namely, financial sector due 
diligence. 
At the UN level, there are also several initiatives that should be mentioned, starting 
with the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and its Human Rights Guidance Tool for 
the Financial Sector, originally launched in 2007, updated in 2011 and fully revised in 
2014, so as to adapt it to the evolving framework for business and human rights at 
the international level. This tool provides resources for financial institutions, and aims 
at helping them: (1) identify potential human rights risk in lending operations; (2) 
assess the materiality of the human rights risk; and (3) identify possible risk 
mitigants.631 In essence, it ‘makes the business case for financial institutions to take 
into account human rights; addresses human rights by sectors and by topic; and 
provides resources that financial institutions may want to consult to deepen their 
knowledge on the issue.’632 
Further examples of the engagement of the UN with the human rights responsibilities 
of businesses (comprising, or referring specifically to, financial institutions) include: 
(1) the UN Global Compact;633 (2) the collaborative work of the OHCHR and the 
Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises; and (3) the efforts made by several specialised UN 
bodies and agencies, such as UNICEF’s Children’s Rights and Business Principles634 
and the UN Global Compact Business Reference Guide to the UNDRIP,635 among 
others. 
																																																								
630 See https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/about/ (emphasis added). 
631 See UNEP FI, ‘UNEP FI Human Rights Guidance Tool for the Financial Sector’ (2014), available at: 
http://unepfi.org/humanrightstoolkit/. 
632 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 48. 
633 Addressed in detail in the previous Chapter. 
634 UNICEF with UN Global Compact and Save the Children, ‘Children’s Rights and Business Principles’ 
(2012), available at: 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/CRBP/Childrens_Rights_and_Busine
ss_Principles.pdf. 
635 UN Global Compact, ‘Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ (2013). 
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2. Multilateral Development Banks and Human Rights 
Similarly to what occurred in relation to the human rights responsibilities of MNEs, 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group have been subject 
to growing pressure from NGOs and civil society, who advocate the integration of 
human rights policies and standards into their activities. 
It should be noted that MDBs are  
(…) powerful development actors with considerable influence on the 
realization of large-scale investment projects such as infrastructure projects 
(e.g. building of roads, schools, hospitals, dams) or industrial projects for the 
exploitation of natural resources (e.g. pipelines, mining, oil drilling), [and thus] 
have a potentially huge impact on living conditions where the projects they 
finance are carried out.636 
The human rights accountability of MDBs can be seen from two complementary 
perspectives: a direct and an indirect approach. The indirect approach focuses on the 
fact that the member countries that compose MDBs have human rights 
responsibilities under a vast range of international human rights instruments, and their 
obligation to respect human rights applies both internally and when acting 
internationally.637 On several occasions, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights emphatically confirmed this perspective.638 In line with this approach, 
the Maastricht Guidelines639 state that the obligations of States to protect ESC rights 
extend also to their participation in international organizations, including international 
financial institutions, where they should ‘use their influence’ to ensure the 
compatibility of international organisations’ operations and policies with ESC rights.640 
When acting internationally, States should abide by standards that are not lower than 
the ones applied internally. However, it is very problematic to hold individual States 
																																																								
636 Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters, ‘A Responsible Lender? The European Investment Bank's 
Environmental, Social and Human Rights Accountability’ The European Investment Bank's 
Environmental, Social and Human Rights Accountability (September 7, 2011) Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies Working Paper (2011), p. 2. 
637 Sigrun Skogly, Human Rights Obligations of the World Bank and the IMF (Cavendish Publishing 
2001), p. 109. 
638 See UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Egypt’ (E/C.12/1/Add.44, 23 May 2000), paragraph 
28. 
639 See chapter 1, section 4.4, in relation to violations of cultural rights. 
640 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1997), paragraph 19 
(emphasis added). A reproduction of the Maastricht Guidelines is available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training12en.pdf, p. 117. 
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accountable for the actions of an MDB and the indirect approach is thus not sufficient 
to ensure respect for human rights at that level.641 
It is thus crucial to understand if and how MDBs can have direct human rights 
accountability. According to Fujita, the direct approach stands on three elements: (1) 
the international legal personality of MDBs; (2) their connection to international 
organisations that explicitly include human rights in their mandate (e.g., the UN or the 
EU); and (3) MDBs’ own mandates and commitments. In regard to the first element, 
commentators have relied on the fact that MDBs have international legal 
personality642 to consider that they are subject to international law – and this includes 
treaty law, customary international law, general principles of law and jus cogens. 
While some authors emphasise the fact that MDBs are not party to human rights 
treaties in order to restrict their accountability to an obligation to respect, others 
defend a wider interpretation of the matter and affirm that MDBs are also obliged to 
protect and fulfil human rights.643 
As to the second element, the links between MDBs and the international 
organisations that they are part of constitutes an explanation for the human rights 
accountability of the former. For instance, the WB is a part of the UN, which explicitly 
declares the promotion of human rights as one of its purposes,644 whilst the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) is a part of the EU, which is ‘(…) founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights’.645 The argument here is more political than legal, but it still attracts 
the support of several commentators.646 
Regarding the third element, the connection between MDBs and human rights 
responsibility is established through the institutions’ commitment to development,647 
which is intimately related to human rights. The relationship between development 																																																								
641 Sanae Fujita, The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Human Rights - Developing Standards 
of Transparency, Participation and Accountability (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013), pp. 6-7. 
642 See, for instance, Article 308 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which states that 
‘[t]he European Investment Bank shall have legal personality’. Equally, Article VI, section 2 of the IFC 
Articles of Agreement states that ‘[t]he Corporation shall possess full juridical personality (…)’. 
643 Sanae Fujita (2013), p. 8. 
644 Article 1(3) of the Charter of the UN states: ‘The Purposes of the United Nations are: (…) To achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’ (emphasis added). 
645 See Articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
646 Sanae Fujita (2013), pp. 9-12. 
647 See, for instance, Article 1 of the IFC Articles of Agreement; in relation to the EIB, see Article 309 
TFEU. 
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and human rights is evident from a number of UN documents, such as the Declaration 
on the Right to Development (DRD),648 which affirms that, ‘in order to promote 
development, equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the 
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights’.649 
It should also be noted that the 2003 Interagency Common Understanding of a 
Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Programming, which makes 
reference to the UN’s long history of engagement with and mainstreaming of human 
rights, highlights the relationship between development cooperation and international 
human rights instruments, by affirming that all development programmes ‘should 
further the realisation of human rights’.650 More recently, on 22 September 2016, on 
the occasion of the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the DRD, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights affirmed that ‘development is about rights, and is 
itself a human right’.651 Therefore, in the words of Fujita, ‘if [international financial 
institutions] are to fulfil their mandate to promote the “encouragement of 
development”, these Banks cannot ignore human rights considerations in their 
operations’.652 
The legal challenge for MDBs generally resides in their mandates, which in some 
cases explicitly prohibit interference with political matters – and this prohibition is 
deemed to cover the subject of human rights. According to a survey conducted in 
2011 by the EIB, the WB, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the IADB, the Islamic 
Development Bank (IsDB) and the IFC, all have political restrictions in their statutes 
that prohibit ‘interference in the political affairs of a member country or taking member 
																																																								
648 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986) A/RES/41/128. 
649 Emphasis added. See also Article 1 of the DRD, which affirms: ‘The right to development is an 
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650 UN Development Group, ‘The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards 
a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies’ (2003), available at: 
https://undg.org/main/undg_document/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-
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651 UN, ‘Statement by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at 
the High-level segment of the General Assembly - Commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the 
Declaration on the Right to Development’ (22 September 2016), available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20561&LangID=E. 
652 Sanae Fujita (2013), p. 13. 
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governments’ political character into account’.653 In the case of the IFC, such 
prohibition is stated in Article III, section 9: 
The Corporation and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of the member or members concerned. Only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations 
shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes stated in this 
Agreement. 
Despite the so-called ‘political prohibition’, MDBs have a number of policies in place 
that support human rights, even if specific reference to human rights is absent from 
such policies. For instance, the WB adopted policies regarding indigenous peoples, 
gender equality and involuntary resettlement, which are all obviously connected to 
human rights – even if not explicitly acknowledged. 
 
2.1. The International Finance Corporation 
The World Bank Group constitutes the world’s most powerful international financial 
institution. It comprises the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The IBRD and 
the IDA are specialised agencies of the UN; the first provides loans and other 
assistance to middle-income and credit-worthy poor countries, whereas the latter 
provides loans and grants to the poorest countries in the world. The IFC is the private 
sector lending arm of the World Bank Group, self-proclaimed ‘the largest global 
development institution focused exclusively on the private sector in developing 
countries’.654 MIGA promotes foreign investment through political risk insurance 
guarantees to private sector investors and lenders. Lastly, the ICSID provides 
arbitration and conciliation services for governments and private foreign investors. 
																																																								
653 World Bank and OECD, Integrating Human Rights into Development: Donor Approaches, 
Experiences, and Challenges (2nd edn, 2013), p. 149. 
654 This is stated in the ‘About’ section of the IFC’s website: http://www.ifc.org. 
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Because the IBRD and the IDA deal with States, rather than private investors, this 
chapter will focus on the IFC.655 
The IFC was launched in 1956, ‘with $100 million in capital, 12 staff and an ambitious 
goal: "Encouraging the growth of productive private enterprise" in three broad ways—
investing, advising, and mobilizing capital from others.’656 It is currently owned by 184 
member countries, and, in 2015, the IFC’s long-term investments in developing 
countries were calculated at $17.7 billion, of which over $7 million was mobilised from 
other investors.657 According to Article 1 of the IFC’s Articles of Agreement, ‘[t]he 
purpose of the Corporation is to further economic development by encouraging the 
growth of productive private enterprise in member countries, particularly in the less 
developed areas’. 
The IFC is independent from the other institutions in the World Bank Group, as per 
its Articles of Agreement,658 even though there are several situations in which they 
collaborate, mainly in three circumstances: firstly, the WB Environmental, Health and 
Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines) are applied by the IFC as ‘technical reference 
documents with general and industry-specific examples of good international industry 
practice’;659 secondly, the WB and the IFC often operate in the same country, and 
collaboration between both institutions usually means that their procedures may apply 
																																																								
655 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the World Bank (IBRD and IDA) and human rights, 
see, inter alia, Mac Darrow, Between light and shadow: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
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The World Bank's Engagement with Human Rights’, 34 Monash UL Rev 331 (2008); Suzanne Zhou, 
‘Reassessing the Prospects of a Human Rights Safeguard Policy at the World Bank’, 15 Journal of 
International Economic Law 823 (2012); and UN General Assembly, Promotion and protection of human 
rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment 
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cumulatively to the same project;660 finally, the WB and the IFC share the same 
President. 
The IFC (together with MIGA) has an inspection and accountability mechanism 
exercising ‘a centralized review and clearance function, independent from the line 
management of operations’:661 the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), a 
position created in 1999 by the World Bank Group,662 which is ‘an additional pillar in 
building a credible and responsive structure to ensure that projects are 
environmentally and socially sound and enhance IFC's and MIGA's contribution to 
sustainable development.’663 The Ombudsman is a recourse and accountability 
mechanism and independent office appointed by, and reporting to, the President of 
the WB/IFC.664 The mandate of the CAO is to (1) ‘[a]ddress complaints from people 
affected by IFC/MIGA projects (or projects in which those organizations play a role) 
in a manner that is fair, objective, and equitable; and (2) [e]nhance the environmental 
and social outcomes of IFC/MIGA projects (or projects in which those organizations 
play a role).’665 The CAO offers redress for environmental and/or social negative 
impacts of IFC/MIGA projects and it is available to affected communities and 
individuals, at any time in the life of a project, relating to any aspect of a project’s 
planning, implementation, or impact. 
The role of the CAO is threefold. First, it plays a dispute resolution role, whereby it 
receives complaints from affected individuals and/or groups and attempts to resolve 
the issues raised ‘using a flexible, collaborative, problem-solving approach’.666 
Second, it ‘oversees compliance investigations of the environmental and social 
performance of IFC and MIGA, particularly in relation to sensitive projects, to ensure 
compliance with policies, standards, guidelines, procedures, and conditions for 
IFC/MIGA involvement, with the goal of improving IFC/MIGA environmental and 
social performance’.667 Finally, it provides independent advice on environmental and 
social issues to the President and senior management. Complaints are to be 																																																								
660 Elisa Morgera, ‘Significant trends in corporate environmental accountability: the new performance 
standards of the international finance corporation’, 18 Colo J Int'l Envtl L & Pol'y 151 (2007), p. 154. 
661 Office of the CAO, ‘Terms of Reference’, available at: 
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/whoweare/documents/TOR_CAO.pdf, p. 1. 
662 CAO, ‘Operational Guidelines’ (2013), available at: 
http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/howwework/documents/CAOOperationalGuidelines2013_ENGLISH.pdf, p. 4. 
663 Office of the CAO, ‘Terms of Reference’, p. 1. 
664 Idem, p. 2. 
665 CAO (2013), ‘Operational Guidelines’, p. 4. 
666 Ibidem. 
667 Idem, p. 5. 
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submitted in writing, with no specific formal requirements and in any language; upon 
receiving a complaint, the CAO acknowledges its receipt and screens it against 
eligibility criteria. If a complaint is deemed eligible, the CAO will assess it to determine 
whether to trigger its dispute resolution or compliance role; the first is voluntary and 
requires agreement between the complainant and the client, whilst the second 
focuses on the performance of the IFC/MIGA and comprises the two stages of 
compliance appraisal and compliance investigation.668 
It appears clear that the IFC, much like other MDBs, is ‘acutely aware of the negative 
impacts which may be occasioned as a result of financing activities and [has] 
developed policies and guidelines to minimise the social and environmental impacts 
of these activities.’669 These policies and guidelines are essential and should be 
examined, not only because they apply to IFC activities, which are very significant, 
but also because they constitute fundamental benchmarks for the conduct of financial 
institutions, as evidenced by initiatives such as the Equator Principles,670 which will 
be assessed in the third Section of this Chapter. In fact, because the IFC has become 
‘the largest source of loan and equity financing to the private sector in developing 
countries’,671 it has progressively become extremely influential over its clients and a 
standard-setter for other financial institutions. 
The IFC’s Policy and Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability, together with the IFC’s Access to Information Policy, compose its 
Sustainability Framework, which ‘articulates the Corporation’s strategic commitment 
to sustainable development, and is an integral part of IFC’s approach to risk 
management’.672 
The IFC has in place eight Performance Standards (PSs), which address: (1) 
Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts; (2) 
Labour and Working Conditions; (3) Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention; 
(4) Community Health, Safety, and Security; (5) Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement; (6) Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living 																																																								
668 Idem, pp. 18 and 22. 
669 Adebola Adeyemi, ‘Changing the Face of Sustainable Development in Developing Countries: The 
Role of the International Finance Corporation’, 16 Environmental Law Review 91 (2014), p. 94. 
670 Steven Herz et al., ‘The International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards and the Equator 
Principles: Respecting Human Rights and Remedying Violations?’ Center for International 
Environmental Law, Oxfam Australia, World Resources Institute August (2008), p. 2. 
671 Adebola Adeyemi (2014), p. 95. 
672 IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability’ (2012), Overview of 
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability, paragraph 1, p. i. 
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Natural Resources; (7) Indigenous Peoples; and (8) Cultural Heritage. The PSs ‘are 
directed towards clients, providing guidance on how to identify risks and impacts, and 
are designed to help avoid, mitigate, and manage risks and impacts as a way of doing 
business in a sustainable way, including stakeholder engagement and disclosure 
obligations of the client in relation to project-level activities.’673 
These PSs should be considered together as a whole, as more than one can apply 
to the same project, and they should be cross-referenced, as they deal transversely 
with issues such as climate change, gender, water and human rights. The fact that 
the PSs refer explicitly to human rights constitutes a very welcome development. In 
addition to requiring clients to apply the PSs, the IFC also highlights the fact that they 
should comply with both national and international law,674 as well as the World Bank 
Group EHS Guidelines.675 The latter is most important since, if host State regulations 
establish standards that are different from the EHS Guidelines, the more stringent will 
apply.676 
It is important to note that, as a part of the review of environmental and social risks 
and impacts of a proposed investment, the IFC has a categorisation process in place, 
whereby projects are classified in accordance with the magnitude of environmental 
and social risks and impacts. The categories for classification of projects are as 
follows: (1) Category A refers to activities with potential significant adverse 
environmental or social risks and/or impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or 
unprecedented; (2) Category B corresponds to activities with potential limited adverse 
environmental or social risks and/or impacts that are few in number, generally site-
specific, largely reversible, and readily addressed through mitigation measures; (3) 
Category C refers to activities with minimal or no adverse environmental or social 
risks and/or impacts; (4) Category FI corresponds to activities involving investments 
in financial institutions or through delivery mechanisms involving financial 
intermediation; this category is further divided into three sub-categories: FI-1, FI-2 
and FI-3, depending on the magnitude of risks and impacts.677 If a project is 
categorised as category C, there is no further action required beyond screening. 
																																																								
673 Ibidem. 
674 Idem, Overview of PSs on Environmental and Social Sustainability, paragraph 5, p. ii. 
675 Idem, Overview of PSs on Environmental and Social Sustainability, paragraph 6, p. ii. 
676 Idem, Overview of PSs on Environmental and Social Sustainability, paragraph 7, p. ii. 
677 See IFC, ‘Environmental and Social Review Procedures Manual: Environment, Social and 
Governance Department’ (2015), available at: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/d0db8c41-cfb0-
45e9-b66a-522c88f270a5/ESRP_Oct2016.pdf?MOD=AJPERES, pp. 2-3 
Financial institutions and cultural rights 
	 174 
Project categorisation as A, B or FI will determine the level of scrutiny and disclosure 
of information by the IFC. 
Taking the above into account, it is now important to analyse the content of the most 
relevant PSs, which are those that can be related to cultural rights, namely PSs 1, 5, 
7 and 8. 
 
a) Performance Standard 1 
PS1 refers to Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and 
Impacts and it underscores the importance of having in place an Environmental and 
Social Management System (ESMS), ‘a dynamic and continuous process initiated 
and supported by management, [which] involves engagement between the client, its 
workers, local communities directly affected by the project (…) and, where 
appropriate, other stakeholders.’678 It applies to all business activities that may entail 
social and environmental impacts and risks and it implies a continued process of 
“plan, do, check, and act,” whereby environmental and social risks and impacts are 
managed in a way that is adequate to each project’s nature and scale. 
The ESMS should come as a result of adequate Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) and it should include a number of elements. First, a policy, 
specifying compliance with relevant laws and regulations and the principles of the 
PSs, in addition to identifying who is responsible for the execution of the policy.679 
Second, the identification of risks and impacts through due diligence processes that 
address all relevant risks and impacts – including those contained in PSs 2 to 8 – 
covering risks or impacts caused by third parties and the primary supply chain, and 
taking into account the position of disadvantaged and vulnerable individuals or 
groups.680 
Third, clients are required to establish management programs, defining mitigation and 
performance improvement measures and actions, favouring avoidance over 
minimisation, and establishing flexible environmental and social Action Plans to 
address the risks and impacts identified in the course of the due diligence process.681 
																																																								
678 Idem, Performance Standard 1, paragraph1, p. 1. 
679 Idem, PS1, paragraph 6, pp. 2-3. 
680 Idem, PS1, paragraphs 7-12, pp. 3-4. 
681 Idem, PS1, paragraphs 13-16, pp. 4-5. 
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Fourth, clients should build on their organisational capacity and competency, by 
establishing, preserving and strengthening an organisational structure, and defining 
roles, responsibilities and authority to implement the ESMS, with the possibility of 
involving external experts.682 
Fifth, clients should focus on emergency preparedness and response, by establishing 
and maintaining a periodically reviewed system that allows for prompt response to 
accidental and emergency situations, whilst ensuring the prevention and mitigation of 
any harm to people and/or the environment.683 
Sixth, clients need to ensure stakeholder engagement through an on-going process, 
involving stakeholder analysis and planning, disclosure and dissemination of 
information, consultation and participation, grievance mechanisms, and reporting to 
stakeholders, with a view to building strong, constructive, and responsive 
relationships. IFC clients will have to establish a Stakeholder Engagement Plan, 
which allows for the inclusion of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups, and, if 
representation of groups is required, the proper representative should be identified. 
Where project location is still undetermined, clients need to set up a Stakeholder 
Engagement Framework, containing a strategy to identify and engage with the 
relevant stakeholders. Disclosure of relevant information is also mandatory, as well 
as Informed Consultation and Participation of affected communities. In some projects 
involving indigenous peoples, FPIC will be required, in accordance with PS7. 
Furthermore, clients are required to implement and maintain a procedure for external 
communications, as well as grievance mechanisms to address concerns and 
grievances brought by stakeholders in relation to the project’s environmental and 
social impacts.684 The latter should consist of an ‘understandable and transparent 
consultative process that is culturally appropriate and readily accessible, and at no 
cost and without retribution to the party that originated the issue or concern.’685 
Finally, with regard to monitoring and review, IFC clients are expected to set up 
mechanisms that allow for the monitoring and management of the effectiveness of 
the ESMS, as well as with legal, contractual and regulatory requirements. In certain 
circumstances, the client is required to ensure the participation of governments, 
affected communities and third parties and, if necessary, the company should resort 																																																								
682 Idem, PS1, paragraphs 17-19, pp. 5-6. 
683 Idem, PS1, paragraphs 20-21, p. 6. 
684 Idem, PS1, paragraphs 25-33, pp. 7-9. 
685 Idem, PS1, paragraph 35, p. 9. 
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to external experts. The client is furthermore expected to establish dynamic 
mechanisms to verify compliance (such as inspections and audits) and to implement 
corrective and preventive actions.686 Periodic performance reviews should be 
presented to senior management, who ‘will take the necessary and appropriate steps 
to ensure the intent of the client’s policy is met, that procedures, practices, and plans 
are being implemented, and are seen to be effective.’687 
In conclusion, the objectives of PS1 are to identify and assess risks and impacts; to 
provide a mitigation framework that allows for the avoidance (or, if that is not possible, 
for the minimisation) of such risks and impacts; to incentivise clients to have a better 
social and environmental performance; to ensure that grievances and 
communications from stakeholders are addressed; to promote adequate engagement 
with stakeholders throughout the entire cycle of projects, as well as to ensure 
transparency and disclosure of relevant environmental and social information.688 
 
b) Performance Standard 5 
PS5 acknowledges that IFC financed projects may entail land acquisition, restrictions 
on land use and involuntary resettlement, which may cause serious adverse effects 
on affected communities. Involuntary resettlement is understood as comprising 
physical displacement (whenever communities are relocated or lose shelter) and 
economic displacement (whenever communities lose assets or access to them, 
leading to loss of income sources or other means of livelihood), and it is deemed to 
be involuntary whenever the affected groups are unable to refuse land acquisition or 
restrictions on land use.689 It is stated that involuntary resettlement should be avoided 
in principle; however, in cases where avoidance is impossible, resettlement should 
be minimised and clients are required to plan and implement mitigation measures.690 
PS5 further affirms that ‘[t]o help avoid expropriation and eliminate the need to use 
governmental authority to enforce relocation, clients are encouraged to use 
negotiated settlements meeting the requirements of this Performance Standard, even 
if they have the legal means to acquire land without the seller’s consent.’691 																																																								
686 Idem, PS1, paragraphs 22-24, pp. 6-7. 
687 Idem, PS1, paragraph 24, p. 7. 
688 Idem, PS1, pp. 1-2. 
689 Idem, PS5, paragraph 1, p. 1. 
690 Idem, PS5, paragraph 2, p. 1. 
691 Idem, PS5, paragraph 3, p. 1. 
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The objectives of PS5 are: to avoid (and if that is impossible, minimise) displacement; 
to avoid forced eviction; to anticipate and avoid (and if that is impossible, minimise) 
adverse social and economic impacts from land acquisition or restrictions on land use 
(offering compensation for loss of assets at replacement cost and guaranteeing that 
resettlement activities are accompanied with appropriate disclosure of information, 
consultation, and the informed participation of relevant stakeholders); to advance or 
restore the livelihoods and standards of living of displaced communities; to improve 
living conditions among physically displaced communities through the provision of 
suitable housing with security of tenure (i.e., to lands which they can legally occupy 
and where they are protected from eviction) at resettlement sites.692 
The applicability of PS5 should be assessed at the time of the due diligence process 
established in PS1, and its implementation should be managed through the ESMS. It 
does not apply to situations where resettlement results from voluntary land 
transactions or where impacts on the livelihood of stakeholders do not come as a 
consequence of changes to land use – these situations might, however, be covered 
by PS1. If, nevertheless, the impact on land, assets or access to assets becomes 
significantly severe, IFC clients are invited to apply the requirements of PS5.693 
PS5 starts by stating that clients are expected to consider alternatives for project 
design so as to avoid or minimise physical and/or economic displacement, ‘while 
balancing environmental, social, and financial costs and benefits, paying particular 
attention to impacts on the poor and vulnerable.’694 However, if displacement is 
unavoidable, clients should offer the displaced groups or individuals compensation 
for loss of assets at full replacement cost, as well as help them restore or improve 
their standards of living or livelihood. The standards for compensation should be 
transparent and apply equally to all communities and persons affected by the 
displacement, and the client is expected to offer such compensation before he takes 
possession of the land and/or assets. The process of stakeholder engagement 
provided in PS1 applies in these situations, and affected communities should have 
access to all relevant information and be able to participate at all stages of the project. 
Equally, grievance mechanisms should be established so as to allow affected 
communities and individuals to have their concerns addressed.695 																																																								
692 Idem, PS5, pp. 1-2. 
693 Idem, PS5, paragraphs 4-7, pp. 2-3. 
694 Idem, Performance Standard 5, paragraph 8, p. 3. 
695 Idem, Performance Standard 5, paragraphs 8-11, pp. 3-4. 
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In cases where involuntary resettlement is unavoidable, the client should carry out a 
census, in order to determine who will be displaced, as well as who is entitled to 
compensation and assistance. If the affected individuals reject compensation 
calculated on the basis of PS5, the client is invited to collaborate with the relevant 
government agency so as to play an active role in resettlement planning, 
implementation, and monitoring. Moreover, the client is required to establish 
procedures to monitor and evaluate the implementation of a Resettlement Action Plan 
or Livelihood Restoration Plan. This implementation will be deemed complete as soon 
as the adverse impacts of involuntary resettlement are addressed in accordance with 
PS5, which may require external audits.696 
If it is impossible to determine the exact nature or magnitude of the land acquisition 
or restrictions on land use for a given project, clients are required to formulate a 
Resettlement and/or Livelihood Restoration Framework in line with PS5. As soon as 
it becomes possible to determine the adverse impacts, said Framework should be 
expanded into a Resettlement Action Plan or Livelihood Restoration Plan.697 
A Resettlement Action Plan consists of a plan to be applied in case of physical 
displacement, and it should include compensation at full replacement cost. The 
purpose of this plan is to ‘mitigate the negative impacts of displacement; identify 
development opportunities; develop a resettlement budget and schedule; and 
establish the entitlements of all categories of affected persons (including host 
communities)’.698 On the other hand, a Livelihood Restoration Plan is to be 
implemented in case of economic displacement, and it is meant to compensate 
affected communities and individuals, as well as assisting them in accordance with 
the principles of PS5. This plan aims at identifying the entitlements of affected 
communities and individuals, and ensure that they are provided in a transparent, 
consistent, and equitable way.699 
In cases of physical displacement, clients are further required to allow affected 
communities and individuals to have a choice amongst the possible resettlement 
options, and provide assistance throughout the resettlement process. If a new site is 
built for resettled communities and individuals, it should be of a sufficiently high 
standard to guarantee the improvement of their living conditions. The resettlement 																																																								
696 Idem, Performance Standard 5, paragraphs 12-15, p. 4. 
697 Idem, Performance Standard 5, paragraph 16, p. 5. 
698 Idem, Performance Standard 5, paragraph 19, p. 5. 
699 Idem, PS5, paragraph 25, p. 6. 
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process is also required to take into account existing social and cultural institutions of 
the displaced communities and individuals. Finally, forced evictions are prohibited, 
unless they are undertaken with due respect for the applicable law and the principles 
of PS5.700 
In cases of economic displacement, PS5 clearly indicates that IFC clients should 
compensate the loss of assets, or loss of access to assets, at full replacement cost. 
In addition, economically displaced individuals and communities (whose livelihoods 
or income levels are adversely affected) are not only entitled to the abovementioned 
compensation, but also to ‘opportunities to improve, or at least restore, their means 
of income-earning capacity, production levels, and standards of living’.701  
Finally, whenever the host government is responsible for land acquisition and 
resettlement, IFC clients are expected to collaborate and, if necessary, supplement 
the action of the relevant government agency through the implementation of a 
Supplemental Resettlement Plan (in case of physical displacement) or an 
Environmental and Social Action Plan (in case of economic displacement), so as to 
ensure that the process is aligned with PS5.702 
 
c) Performance Standard 7 
PS7 addresses the situation of indigenous peoples who are adversely affected by 
IFC-financed projects. It starts by acknowledging some very important points: that 
indigenous peoples, ‘as social groups with identities that are distinct from mainstream 
groups in national societies, are often among the most marginalized and vulnerable 
segments of the population’, especially ‘if their lands and resources are transformed, 
encroached upon, or significantly degraded’. It also acknowledges that ‘[t]heir 
languages, cultures, religions, spiritual beliefs, and institutions may also come under 
threat and that their ‘vulnerability may include loss of identity, culture, and natural 
resource-based livelihoods, as well as exposure to impoverishment and diseases.’703 
Furthermore, PS7 recognises the importance of indigenous peoples for the 
attainment of sustainable development. 
																																																								
700 Idem, PS5, paragraphs 19-24, pp. 5-6. 
701 Idem, PS5, paragraphs 25-28, pp. 6-7. 
702 Idem, PS5, paragraphs 30-32, pp. 7-8. 
703 Idem, PS7, paragraph 1, p. 1. 
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In line with these considerations, the objectives of this PS are set with explicit 
reference to human rights, which is a very positive feature,704 and include the 
following: ensuring full respect for the human rights, dignity, aspirations, culture, and 
natural resource-based livelihoods of indigenous peoples; anticipating and avoiding 
adverse impacts or, if that is impossible, minimising and/or compensating such 
impacts; promoting sustainable development opportunities and benefits for 
indigenous peoples, in a culturally appropriate way; setting up and maintaining an 
enduring relationship based on Informed Consultation and Participation (ICP) with 
affected indigenous peoples, throughout all stages of the project; ensuring the FPIC 
of indigenous peoples when applicable; and, finally, respecting and preserving the 
culture, knowledge, and practices of indigenous peoples.705 
Similarly to what occurs with PS5, the applicability of PS7 should be determined 
during the due diligence process established in PS1. Necessary actions should be 
implemented through the client’s ESMS.706 
PS7 acknowledges that there is no overarching and universal definition of what 
constitutes an ‘indigenous people’, but it does provide a number of indicators that 
should be taken into account when establishing the applicability of this PS: (1) self-
identification as indigenous, and external recognition of this identity; (2) collective 
attachment to habitats, ancestral territories and their natural resources; (3) presence 
of separate and distinct customary cultural, economic, social, or political institutions; 
and, finally, (4) use of a distinct language or dialect. In addition, PS7 can also apply 
to communities that have lost the collective attachment to their ancestral territories 
due to ‘forced severance, conflict, government resettlement programs, dispossession 
of their lands, natural disasters, or incorporation of such territories into an urban 
area.’707 
The assessment of risks during the due diligence process should serve to identify 
indigenous peoples that may be adversely affected by an IFC-funded project, as well 
as the nature and degree of direct and indirect impacts on their culture (including 
cultural heritage, which is covered in more detail by PS8), and on economic, social 																																																								
704 Very interestingly, the IFC had already included express reference to human rights in their 
performance standards regarding indigenous peoples in previous versions: the 2006 version is one such 
example, but it is important to note that the WB’s Operational Directive 4.20, of September 1991, which 
was applied by the IFC, also referred explicitly to human rights. 
705 Cf. IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability’ (2012), PS7, p. 1. 
706 Idem, PS7, paragraph 3, p. 1. 
707 Idem, PS7, paragraphs 4-7, p. 2. 
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and environmental conditions of the affected communities. Once again, the IFC 
prioritises avoidance of adverse impacts, but, whenever that is impossible, PS7 
requires clients to minimise, restore and/or compensate for these adverse impacts in 
a culturally appropriate way, adequate to the nature and scale of the impacts and the 
vulnerability of the affected communities. ICP is required for proposed actions 
directed at tackling the risks identified through the due diligence process, and it should 
be integrated into an Indigenous Peoples Plan, or a broader community development 
plan with separate components for Indigenous Peoples.708 
In terms of participation and consent, PS7 provides for specific forms of stakeholder 
engagement, which go beyond the requirements of PS1 for disclosure of information, 
consultation and participation, and specifically require the involvement of traditional 
representative bodies and institutions, as well as timeframes that take into account 
traditional decision-making processes. In particular, there are several situations 
considered by the IFC to require the FPIC of indigenous communities, covering 
project design, implementation, and expected outcomes related to identified and 
predicted impacts (which should be assessed with the participation of external 
experts).709 In absence of a universally accepted definition of FPIC, its meaning is 
described as follows: 
FPIC builds on and expands the process of ICP described in Performance 
Standard 1 and will be established through good faith negotiation between the 
client and the Affected Communities of Indigenous Peoples. The client will 
document: (i) the mutually accepted process between the client and Affected 
Communities of Indigenous Peoples, and (ii) evidence of agreement between 
the parties as the outcome of the negotiations. FPIC does not necessarily 
require unanimity and may be achieved even when individuals or groups 
within the community explicitly disagree.710 
FPIC is required in three circumstances under PS7: when the client identifies impacts 
on lands and natural resources subject to traditional ownership or under customary 
use (even in cases where there is no legal title to these lands); if it is necessary to 
undertake relocation of indigenous peoples from lands and natural resources subject 
to traditional ownership or under customary use; and whenever there is the risk of 																																																								
708 Idem, PS7, paragraphs 8-9, p. 2. 
709 Idem, PS7, paragraphs 10-11, p. 3. 
710 Idem, PS7, paragraph 12, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
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significant adverse impacts on critical cultural heritage that is essential to the identity 
and/or cultural, ceremonial, or spiritual aspects of indigenous peoples’ lives (including 
when cultural heritage, comprising traditional knowledge, is to be used 
commercially).711 
In these cases that require FPIC, IFC clients are expected to adopt the following 
actions: (1) documenting efforts to avoid and otherwise minimise the area of land 
proposed for the project; (2) documenting efforts to avoid and otherwise minimise 
impacts on natural resources and natural areas of importance to indigenous peoples; 
(3) identifying and reviewing all property interests and traditional resource uses prior 
to purchasing or leasing land; (4) assessing and documenting resource use without 
prejudicing any indigenous peoples’ land claim, in a gender-inclusive manner; (5) 
ensuring that the affected communities are informed of their land rights under national 
laws, including those recognising customary use rights; and (6) offering affected 
communities compensation and due process in the case of commercial development 
of their land and natural resources, together with culturally appropriate sustainable 
development opportunities.712 
The last requirement, regarding compensation and due process, includes: (1) if 
possible, providing land-based compensation or compensation-in-kind in lieu of cash 
compensation; (2) ensuring continued access to natural resources, identifying the 
equivalent replacement resources, or, as a last option, providing compensation and 
identifying alternative livelihoods; (3) ensuring fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
associated with project usage of the resources that are essential for the identity and 
livelihood of the affected communities; and (4) providing them with access, usage, 
and transit on developed land, subject to overriding health, safety, and security 
considerations.713 
PS7 further requires IFC clients to identify mitigation measures in accordance with 
PS1, as well as ‘opportunities for culturally appropriate and sustainable development 
benefits.’714 Moreover, compensation should be determined, delivered and distributed 
with due regard to indigenous peoples’ traditional institutions and customs, and it can 
occur individually or collectively (or as a combination of both).715 																																																								
711 Idem, PS7, paragraphs 13-17, pp. 3-5. 
712 Idem, PS7, paragraph 14, p. 4. 
713 Ibidem. 
714 Idem, PS7, paragraph 18, p. 5. 
715 Idem, PS7, paragraph 19, p. 5. 
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The last point covered in PS7 refers to situations where the host government is 
responsible for managing issues associated with indigenous peoples. Similarly to 
what occurs with PS5, IFC clients are expected to collaborate and, if necessary, 
supplement the action of the relevant government agency. In such situations, clients 
are required to prepare a plan addressing the requirements of PS7.716  
In light of the above, it is important to highlight the progress achieved in the 
formulation of PS7. The requirement of FPIC for projects that adversely affect 
indigenous peoples, even if restricted to the situations noted above, is a very positive 
development in the IFC PSs. In fact, the 2006 version of PS7 only required ‘free, prior, 
and informed consultation’, which provides for a much lower level of protection than 
FPIC. At the time of the 2006 version of PS7, commentators criticised this option, 
which was considered to be a serious failure of the PSs: 
The choice to refer to "consultations and participation" rather than to the need 
to obtain the prior informed consent of these communities, particularly when 
they include indigenous peoples, does not reflect established international 
environmental standards.717 
Another aspect of PS7 that denotes positive development, in light of international best 
practices and in accordance with HRL, was the new reference to gender inclusion, 
through which the role of women is not only taken into account but also protected on 
a number of occasions.718  
 
d) Performance Standard 8 
PS8 acknowledges the importance of cultural heritage for current and future 
generations, and makes reference to international law instruments such as the WHC 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity.719 The goals of PS8 are to protect cultural 
heritage from adverse impacts caused by IFC-funded projects, as well as to support 
its preservation and promote the equitable sharing of benefits associated with the use 
of cultural heritage.720 Similarly to what occurs with PS5 and PS7, the applicability of 
																																																								
716 Idem, PS7, paragraphs 21-22, p. 6. 
717 Elisa Morgera (2007), p. 166. 
718 In this sense, Adebola Adeyemi (2014), p. 99. 
719 Cf. IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability’ (2012), PS8, paragraph 
1, p. 1. 
720 Idem, PS8, p. 1. 
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PS8 should be determined during the due diligence process established in PS1. 
Necessary actions should be implemented through the client’s ESMS.721 
PS8 defines cultural heritage as: 
(i) tangible forms of cultural heritage, such as tangible moveable or immovable 
objects, property, sites, structures, or groups of structures, having 
archaeological (prehistoric), paleontological, historical, cultural, artistic, and 
religious values; (ii) unique natural features or tangible objects that embody 
cultural values, such as sacred groves, rocks, lakes, and waterfalls; and (iii) 
certain instances of intangible forms of culture that are proposed to be used 
for commercial purposes, such as cultural knowledge, innovations, and 
practices of communities embodying traditional lifestyles.722 
Even though this definition is quite comprehensive, it is important to note that 
intangible cultural heritage is only protected by PS8 in the event of a project’s use of 
knowledge, innovations, or practices of local communities for commercial purposes. 
In such situations, IFC clients are required to inform the affected communities of their 
rights under national law; the scope and nature of the proposed commercial 
development; and the potential consequences of such development. In addition, 
commercial use of intangible cultural heritage is only allowed if the client enters into 
a process of ICP, in good faith, as determined in PS1, and if fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits is sought.723 
Still in terms of scope of application, PS8 applies to cultural heritage independently 
of whether or not it has been legally protected or previously disturbed. In addition, 
PS8 does not apply to the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples.724 Commentators 
have criticised this exclusion, as PS7 and PS8 appear to present contradictory 
language. In fact, in PS7 there is a footnote stating that ‘[a]dditional requirements on 
protection of cultural heritage are set out in Performance Standard 8’, even though 
the latter explicitly excludes the cultural heritage of indigenous peoples. As a result, 
if tangible manifestations of indigenous peoples’ cultural heritage are found in a 
project area, PS8 does not apply and refers to PS7, which in turn circularly 
acknowledges the requirements of PS8. According to Mason, 																																																								
721 Idem, PS8, paragraph 2, p. 1. 
722 Idem, PS8, paragraph 3, p. 1. 
723 Idem, PS8, paragraph 16, p. 4. 
724 Idem, PS8, paragraph 5, p. 1. 
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(…) the underlying logic of these requirements does not withstand scrutiny 
and leaves one to draw his or her own conclusions on how to manage tangible 
manifestations of indigenous cultural heritage. Subject matter experts will 
need to follow the spirit of the Performance Standards and internationally 
recognized good practice until such time that the text of Performance 
Standards 7 and 8 can be amended to correct this incongruence. It is likely 
that the authors of the Performance Standards expect PS8 to apply to most 
manifestations of cultural heritage (both tangible and intangible), whereas 
PS7 is meant to apply to intangible manifestations of culture associated with 
living groups of Indigenous Peoples.725 
PS8 starts by stating that, in addition to complying with the relevant national law 
(namely regarding the implementation of the WHC), the client is required to identify 
and protect cultural heritage by guaranteeing the implementation of internationally 
recognised practices for the protection, field-based study, and documentation of 
cultural heritage, which should be done with resort to experts.726 
With regard to chance finds (i.e., tangible cultural heritage that is found unexpectedly 
during project construction and operation), PS8 requires clients’ ESMS to provide a 
chance find procedure that allows them to address situations where cultural heritage 
is found after the due diligence process takes place. If such cultural heritage is indeed 
found, IFC clients should not disturb it until a professional assessment is made and 
an appropriate course of action is taken in accordance with this PS.727 
Engagement with stakeholders is also required under PS8. In fact, whenever a project 
risks adversely impacting cultural heritage, clients should undertake consultations 
with the affected communities, as well as local or national authorities, in order to 
identify cultural heritage of importance and thus incorporate their views into decision-
making processes.728 
In cases where a project area contains cultural heritage or somehow prevents 
communities from accessing such heritage, clients should allow continued access to 
the cultural site or will provide an alternative access route, in accordance with the 																																																								
725 Andrew Mason, ‘International Project Financing and Cultural Heritage Protection’, 19 International 
Journal of Cultural Property 556 (2012), p. 559. 
726 IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability’ (2012), PS8, paragraphs 
6-7, pp. 1-2. 
727 Idem, PS8, paragraph 8, p. 2. 
728 Idem, PS8, paragraph 9, p. 2. 
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consultations mentioned above and subject to overriding health, safety, and security 
considerations.729 
PS8 defines replicable cultural heritage as:  
tangible forms of cultural heritage that can themselves be moved to another 
location or that can be replaced by a similar structure or natural features to 
which the cultural values can be transferred by appropriate measures. 
Archeological or historical sites may be considered replicable where the 
particular eras and cultural values they represent are well represented by 
other sites and/or structures.730 
If a client finds cultural heritage that is replicable and not critical, he should apply 
mitigation measures directed at avoidance of negative impacts. However, if that is not 
feasible, he should apply the following mitigation hierarchy: (1) minimising adverse 
impacts and implement restoration measures in situ, ensuring the maintenance of 
value and functionality of the cultural heritage; (2) if restoration in situ is not possible, 
restoring the functionality of the cultural heritage in a different location; (3) if 
permanent removal is necessary, the client should take into account the principles of 
PS8; (4) if neither of these options are feasible and where affected communities use 
the cultural heritage, clients should compensate them for loss of cultural heritage.731 
Permanent removal of non-replicable cultural heritage is prohibited unless the 
following is verified: (1) there are no technically or financially feasible alternatives to 
removal; (2) the overall benefits of the project decisively outweigh the anticipated 
cultural heritage loss from removal; and (3) any removal is conducted using the best 
available techniques.732 
Critical cultural heritage is defined in the PSs as: 
(i) the internationally recognized heritage of communities who use, or have 
used within living memory the cultural heritage for long-standing cultural 
purposes; or (ii) legally protected cultural heritage areas, including those 
proposed by host governments for such designation. 
																																																								
729 Idem, PS8, paragraph 10, p. 2. 
730 Idem, Performance Standard 8, footnote to paragraph 11, p. 2. 
731 Idem, Performance Standard 8, paragraph 11, p. 2-3. 
732 Idem, Performance Standard 8, paragraph 12, p. 3. 
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In principle, IFC clients should not remove, significantly alter, or damage critical 
cultural heritage. Exceptionally, if this is not possible, clients should resort to a 
process of ICP, in good faith, and resorting to external experts. If a project is located 
in a legally protected cultural heritage area, such as world heritage sites and 
nationally protected areas, clients are required to respect the conditions for 
permanent removal of non-replicable cultural heritage. In addition, clients should: (1) 
comply with defined national or local cultural heritage regulations or the protected 
area management plans; (2) consult the protected area sponsors and managers, 
local communities and other key stakeholders on the proposed project; and, finally, 
(3) implement additional programs, as appropriate, to promote and enhance the 
conservation aims of the protected area.733 
To finalise the assessment of the relevant IFC PSs, it is important to note that there 
has been considerable progress from the 2006 to the 2012 version, in particular, and 
as mentioned above, in terms of requiring the FPIC of indigenous peoples in certain 
situations, as well as including gender considerations. Although the IFC’s primary 
concern is, of course, the financial viability of projects, it has been progressively more 
and more concerned with the adverse impacts these projects can cause. Not only is 
this significant because of the very high volume of projects financed by the IFC, but 
also because of the influence it can exert on other financial institutions, as will be 
seen in the next section. 
 
3. Private Sector Banks and Human Rights 
The UN Guiding Principles, analysed in the previous chapter and above in Section 1, 
establish a responsibility to respect human rights that applies to all businesses, 
including banks. Perhaps not surprisingly, there has been a tendency in recent years 
for commercial banks to incorporate such responsibility in their activities through a 
number of mechanisms, as a response to increasing external and internal pressure. 
In the words of Forster et al., ‘[o]ne of the most striking phenomena of recent years 
has been the emergence, in a depressed international market, of a willingness, even 
in some cases an eagerness, among commercial organisations to have regard to the 
social and environmental impact of their activities.’734 Banks are not an exception to 
																																																								
733 Idem, Performance Standard 8, paragraph 15, p. 3. 
734 Malcolm Forster et al. (2005), p. 217. 
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this willingness, as will be seen through the analysis of two particularly relevant 
voluntary initiatives: the Equator Principles and the Thun Group of Banks. 
 
3.1. The Equator Principles 
The impact that financial institutions can have on the environment and human rights 
is evident, and so is the idea that banks have the capacity to influence the global 
economy, the environment and social structures through their investment decisions 
and risk management solutions.735 This is particularly acute in cases where 
commercial banks fund large projects in sectors such as infrastructure, mining and oil 
and gas, which is usually done through project finance. The particularity of project 
finance resides in the fact that the repayment of the project finance loan essentially 
relies on the cash flow of the Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and on the value of its 
assets, rather than on the assets of the project sponsors. Project finance is ‘mainly 
used to finance capital-intensive assets and facilitate risk dispersion with complex 
projects.’736 On the other hand, as Adeyemi highlights, [o]wing to the limited recourse 
nature of the project finance loan, banks have a stake in the SPE’s financial 
performance [which] provides financial and reputational incentive to the bank to 
ensure that social and environmental risk of the proposed project is considered and 
lessened where appropriate’.737 
Project finance has been resorted to for centuries and was especially important, for 
instance, in the British industrialisation process, during the late 18th century. However, 
the development of the modern project finance model occurred in the 1930s, with the 
‘New Deal’ in the US, for the financing of infrastructure and resource projects. The 
involvement of private sector banks in this type of lending grew exponentially since 
the early 1990s, when many State-owned companies were privatised.738 This growth 
																																																								
735 Christopher Wright, ‘Global banks, the environment, and human rights: The impact of the Equator 
Principles on lending policies and practices’, 12 Global Environmental Politics 56 (2012), p. 57. 
736 Michael Regan et al., ‘Project finance for public private partnerships: Evidence from Australia’ (2015) 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships, Austin, Texas, USA, 
available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Love2/publication/281075559_Project_Finance_for_Public
_Private_Partnerships_Evidence_from_Australia/links/55d3e68f08ae7fb244f590b9.pdf, p. 2. 
737 Adebola Adeyemi (2014), p. 99. 
738 Michael Regan et al. (2015), pp. 1-2. 
Financial institutions and cultural rights 
	 189 
is also attributed to deregulation and globalisation, which contributed to the increasing 
use of project finance both in developed and developing countries.739 
In project finance, banks may provide loans singularly or in conjunction with other 
commercial banks or MDBs such as the IFC. The most prominent advantage of the 
involvement of MDBs in project finance lies in the fact that political risk can be more 
effectively mitigated,740 but also in the fact that sustainability efforts advanced at MDB 
level permeate and influence private sector banks. 
Project finance entails a number of risks, which may be commercial (such as currency 
fluctuations or changes in demand) or non-commercial (political, fiscal and 
regulatory). One of the most prominent problems associated with project finance lies 
in the fact that it may compromise host States’ ability to regulate on non-economic 
matters, such as the protection of human rights. This danger is particularly severe 
when the agreements entered into to comply with lenders’ requirements contain 
stabilisation clauses, which are meant to ensure that host States do not change the 
regulatory framework in a way that alters the economic equilibrium of the project and 
is detrimental to the foreign investor.741 Because project finance ‘heavily relies on 
projected cash flows, sponsors and lenders typically seek higher levels of stability 
than those provided by general international law.’742 
In light of the above, it is important to understand how the negative impacts of project 
finance can be tackled, and to analyse one of the most important private sector 
initiatives in this regard: the Equator Principles (EP). 
 
a) Origins, concept and scope of the Equator Principles 
The EP were born out of continued pressure, both external and internal, on private 
sector financial institutions to effectively act in accordance with their CSR 
																																																								
739 Annie Dufey and Maryanne Grieg-Gran, ‘The linkages between project finance and sustainable 
development’ in Sheldon Leader and David Ong (eds), Global project finance, human rights and 
sustainable development (Cambridge University Press 2011), p. 17. 
740 Adebola Adeyemi (2014), p. 100. 
741 Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Freezing the balancing act? Project finance, legal tools to manage regulatory risk, 
and sustainable development’ in Sheldon Leader and David Ong (eds), Global project finance, human 
rights and sustainable development (Cambridge University Press 2011), pp. 142-143. 
742 Idem, p. 147. 
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commitments.743 In October 2002, ABN AMRO and the IFC called a meeting in 
London with a small number of prominent commercial banks, with the purpose of 
discussing the social and environmental impacts of project finance.744 During the 
following year, the participants decided to address such impacts through the 
development of a risk management framework, and began drafting a set of principles 
and standards. Concomitantly, at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 
2003, 102 NGOs drafted, signed and released the Collevecchio Declaration,745 which 
‘demanded that financial institutions formulate clear sustainability objectives, 
introduce and enforce environmental and social compliance requirements, support 
debt-relief for highly-indebted developing countries, refrain from financing projects 
without local community consent, disclose policies and lending portfolios, and lobby 
in favor of stronger financial regulation.’746 
In June 2003, the group of banks announced in Washington DC that they were 
launching the first version of the EP, based on standards adopted by the WB and the 
IFC. The EP were subsequently revised in 2006 and again in 2013, so as to bring its 
provisions in line with the revised standards of the WB and the IFC. These revisions 
extended the Principles in number and scope, and reflected proposals presented by 
NGOs and civil society as to how they could be made more effective; this resulted in 
increased control over project activity by the EP financial institutions (EPFIs).747 
Today, the EP count with the adherence of 89 financial institutions in 37 countries, 
which amounts to ‘over 70 percent of international Project Finance debt in emerging 
markets.’748 Its main commitments are expressed as follows: 
We, the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs), have adopted the 
Equator Principles in order to ensure that the Projects we finance and advise 
on are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflects sound 
environmental management practices. We recognise the importance of 
climate change, biodiversity, and human rights, and believe negative impacts 
																																																								
743 Ryan Christopher Hansen, ‘The Impact of the Equator Principles on Lender Liability: Risks of 
Responsible Lending’ (2006), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=948228, 
p. 4. 
744 Malcolm Forster et al. (2005), p. 218. 
745 Available at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/download/collevechio_declaration/030401_collevecchio_declaration_with_sig
natories.pdf. 
746 Christopher Wright (2012), p. 59. 
747 Ryan Christopher Hansen (2006), p. 5. 
748 See the ‘About the Equator Principles’ section in the EP website, at: http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about. 
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on project-affected ecosystems, communities, and the climate should be 
avoided where possible. If these impacts are unavoidable they should be 
minimised, mitigated, and/or offset. (…) 
We will not provide Project Finance or Project-Related Corporate Loans to 
Projects where the client will not, or is unable to, comply with the Equator 
Principles.749 
As Adeyemi points out, the EPFIs willingness to decrease potential profits, expressed 
through the pledge not to provide services to clients who do not respect the EP, 
reveals the ‘depth of financier commitment’ of the EPFIs.750 Even though the adoption 
of the EP is voluntary and allows for considerable flexibility, it is crucial to observe 
that the majority of signatories ‘are now able to show a significant level of adoption of 
the EPs within their lending criteria and practice.’751 Dowell-Jones further affirms that 
the EPFIs have been assuming the function of watchdogs, since they monitor 
borrowers’ safeguard strategies so as to ensure that they cover social and 
environmental impacts in a satisfactory way.752  
Another important point made in the Preamble to the EP is the fact that they constitute 
a ‘common baseline and framework’, to be implemented by each of the EPFIs through 
their internal environmental and social policies, procedures and standards.753 
Consequently, EPFIs have substantial room to choose how to implement the EPs: 
This flexible approach has helped speed adoption of the Principles because 
each EPFI retains the discretion to fashion policies and procedures tailored to 
their organization and the particular project under review, including whether 
deviations from IFC or World Bank guidelines are warranted. Instead of 
resisting a rigid external system, EPFIs invest ownership in “their” social and 
environmental standards, integrating sustainable development practices in 
line with the Principles at a level and pace that best fits their organizational 
profile.754 
In terms of scope, the EP were considerably expanded in the 2013 revision process. 
Before this revision, the Principles only applied to project financings over US$10 																																																								
749 Equator Principles (June 2013), Preamble, p. 2 (emphasis added). 
750 Adebola Adeyemi (2014), p. 101. 
751 Idem, p. 102. 
752 Mary Dowell-Jones (2013), p. 438-439. 
753 Adebola Adeyemi (2014), p. 102. 
754 Ryan Christopher Hansen (2006), pp. 5-6. 
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million; the established threshold was a cause for concern, as NGOs quickly pointed 
out, since it was believed that projects causing severe adverse social and 
environmental impacts were being disguised as corporate loans, so as to avoid the 
application of the EP.755 As a result of the latest revision, the EP now apply to a larger 
number of projects and advisory services. The EP apply ‘globally and to all industry 
sectors’, and to the following financial products: (1) project finance advisory services 
where total project capital costs are US$10 million or more; (2) project finance with 
total Project capital costs of US$10 million or more; (3) project-related corporate loans 
(including export finance in the form of buyer credit), if conditions are met (the majority 
of the loan relates to a single project over which clients have effective direct or indirect 
operational control, the total aggregate loan amount is at least US$100 million, the 
EPFI’s individual commitment is at least US$50 million, and the loan tenor is at least 
two years); and (4) bridge loans with a tenor of less than two years that are intended 
to be refinanced by project finance or a project-related corporate loan that is 
anticipated to meet the four conditions established in number (3).756 
Furthermore, the EP will apply to the expansion or upgrade of existing projects where 
changes in scale or scope have the potential to create significant adverse risks and 
impacts, or significantly change the nature or degree of an existing impact.757 
It should be noted that, although the EP apply in both developed and developing 
countries, the former most commonly have laws and regulations that make 
compliance with most elements of the risk management framework mandatory. Very 
differently, most developing countries do not have a strong legal and regulatory 
framework and, therefore, the EP ‘call on EPFIs to “over-comply” by following 
stringent standards despite the absence of a legal requirement to do so.’758 
 
b) The content of the Equator Principles 
The EP contain ten principles, covering: review and categorisation; environmental 
and social assessment; applicable environmental and social standards; 
environmental and social management systems and EP action plan; stakeholder 
																																																								
755 Michael Torrance, ‘Equator Principles III: new sustainability rules requiring legal strategy rethink’, 8 
Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 503 (2013), p. 503. 
756 Equator Principles (June 2013), Scope, p. 3. 
757 Ibidem. 
758 Christopher Wright (2012), p. 59. 
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engagement; grievance mechanisms; independent review; covenants; independent 
monitoring and reporting; and reporting and transparency. 
One of the main aspects of the EP is the categorisation of project proposals, in 
accordance with the degree and nature of the environmental and social risks and 
impacts they are likely to entail. This categorisation is to be done in line with the IFC’s 
environmental and social categorisation process, which was described in section 2 
above. Principle 1 of the EP, regarding review and categorisation, requires banks to 
screen projects as a part of the internal environmental and social review and due 
diligence process, taking into account the nature, scale and stage of the project, as 
well as the level of environmental and social risks and impacts. Projects are thus 
categorised as ‘category A’ if they are high-risk, ‘category B’ if they are medium-risk, 
and ‘category C’ if they are low-risk.759 In the words of Torrance, ‘[c]ategorisation of 
projects is a highly discretionary and inexact process (…) [and it] will typically be 
reviewed at least annually or whenever changes to the project occur that could affect 
the level of environmental and social risk of a project’.760 Because categorisation 
occurs at a very early stage, as soon as a project is proposed, there is still the 
possibility of correcting courses of action and ensuring that issues regarding the 
sustainability of a project are identified and addressed before financing actually takes 
place.761 
The categorisation process is essential, since placing a project under a specific 
category determines which actions should be taken by both the EPFIs and their 
clients. In very general terms, category A projects require extensive due diligence to 
be conducted by both the EPFI and the borrower, whilst categories B and C entail 
decreasingly stringent obligations. Obviously, the more stringent the due diligence 
requirements, the more expensive it will be for both the EPFIs and their clients; 
therefore, NGOs have consistently expressed concerns as to the possibility that 
EPFIs will categorise projects as B when they should be placed in category A, or as 
C when they belong to category B, so as to reduce due diligence costs.762  
Principles 2 and 3 constitute an effort to minimise reputational and financial risks by 
‘designating the form and substance of the sustainability enquiry’.763 Starting with 																																																								
759 Equator Principles (June 2013), Statement of Principles, p. 5. 
760 Michael Torrance (2013), p. 503. 
761 Ryan Christopher Hansen (2006), p. 9. 
762 Ibidem; see also Malcolm Forster et al. (2005), p. 254. 
763 Idem, p. 11. 
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form, Principle 2 states that borrowers are required to conduct an Environmental and 
Social Assessment for all category A and B projects. The assessment of project 
proposals may include a number of issues, such as, inter alia, human rights, land 
acquisition and involuntary resettlement, impacts on indigenous peoples and their 
unique cultural systems and values, and protection of cultural property and 
heritage.764 The assessment documentation should include measures to minimise, 
mitigate, and offset adverse impacts, and it should contain an adequate, accurate and 
objective evaluation and presentation of all identified risks and impacts. More 
importantly, for category A projects, and, as appropriate, for category B projects, 
borrowers are required to undertake an ESIA; in addition, in some high-risk situations, 
borrowers are expected to add a human rights due diligence process, or other 
focused assessment, to their documentation.765 
Regarding the substance of the sustainability inquiry, Principle 3 emphasises the 
need for borrowers to comply with all relevant host State laws, regulations and permits 
regarding environmental and social issues. For that purpose, this Principle further 
makes a distinction between ‘designated countries’ (i.e., countries which are ‘deemed 
to have robust environmental and social governance, legislation systems and 
institutional capacity designed to protect their people and the natural environment’,766 
such as several EU member States, Australia, the US and others)767 and ‘non-
designated countries’ (all others). For projects located in designated countries, the 
assessment process will evaluate compliance with host State laws and regulations, 
whereas for projects located in non-designated countries, the assessment process 
will evaluate compliance with the applicable IFC PSs and the World Bank Group EHS 
Guidelines. Importantly the relevant standards (either host State laws and 
regulations, or IFC PSs/WB EHS Guidelines) constitute a minimum threshold, and 
EPFIs may, at their sole discretion, apply additional requirements.768 
Principle 4 establishes the need for borrowers to develop or maintain an ESMS, in 
line with the IFC PSs. In order to comply with this Principle, clients are required to 
prepare an Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) in order to address 
the issues raised in the assessment phase, incorporating actions that are necessary 																																																								
764 Equator Principles (June 2013), Exhibit II, p. 20. 
765 Equator Principles (June 2013), Statement of Principles, pp. 5-6. 
766 Idem, Exhibit I, p. 15. 
767 A complete list of designated countries is available at: 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3/designated-countries. 
768 Equator Principles (June 2013), Statement of Principles, p. 6. 
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to ensure compliance with the relevant standards. If these are not fully complied with, 
EPFIs should agree with their clients an Equator Principles Action Plan (AP), which 
has the purpose of bringing the project back in line with the relevant standards.769 
Principle 5 outlines consultation and disclosure measures to be implemented by 
borrowers. For all category A and B projects, clients are required to engage with the 
relevant stakeholders ‘in a structured and culturally appropriate manner’. Where 
severe adverse impacts are anticipated, clients should furthermore conduct a free 
ICP process, tailored to ‘the risks and impacts of the Project; the Project’s phase of 
development; the language preferences of the Affected Communities; their decision-
making processes; and the needs of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.’ In 
addition, clients are required to make available to the relevant stakeholders all 
pertinent assessment documentation, preferably in the local language and in a 
culturally appropriate manner, continuously and starting before construction begins. 
The results from the stakeholder engagement process, as well as any actions 
determined through it, should be adequately documented. It is interesting to note that 
Principle 5 addresses the specificity of the situation of indigenous peoples; in fact, 
this Principle requires both ICP and FPIC, in accordance with the criteria established 
in the IFC PS7.770 
Principle 6, on the other hand, states that EPFIs will require their clients to establish 
grievance mechanisms, as a part of the ESMS, for all category A and, as appropriate, 
category B projects. The grievance mechanism has the purpose of receiving and 
facilitating resolution of concerns and grievances about the project’s environmental 
and social performance. Additionally, it should be scaled in accordance with the risks 
and impacts of each project, and have the relevant stakeholders (who will be informed 
of this mechanism during the stakeholder engagement process) as its primary user. 
The grievance mechanism will ‘seek to resolve concerns promptly, using an 
understandable and transparent consultative process that is culturally appropriate, 
readily accessible, at no cost, and without retribution to the party that originated the 
issue or concern (…) [and it] should not impede access to judicial or administrative 
remedies.771 
As Hansen correctly observes, 																																																								
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770 Ibidem. 
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Principles 7, 8 and 9 aim to secure objectivity and accountability throughout 
the life of the project. Principles 7 and 9 bring objectivity to the due diligence, 
project monitoring and reporting processes by requiring independent expert 
review, while 8 makes the borrower accountable by tying various loan 
covenants to Principles compliance. Because the three Principles collectively 
place EPFI’s in position to “sign-off” on a project’s conformity with the 
applicable social and environmental standards or to exercise remedies when 
they are breached, they are likely to be the key conduits for holding EPFI’s 
liable for a project’s social or environmental harms. How they are implemented 
is thus of central importance to assessing EPFI liability risk.772 
Principle 7 distinguishes between project finance and project-related corporate loans. 
In the first case, an independent environmental and social consultant will carry out an 
independent review of the assessment documentation including the ESMPs, the 
ESMS, and the stakeholder engagement process documentation. The independent 
consultant will furthermore propose an adequate AP to bring the project into 
compliance with the EP or advise when compliance is not possible. This will assist 
EPFIs in the due diligence process and establish compliance before the approval of 
financing. Independent expert reviews are also important because they ‘should help 
alleviate NGO concerns that EPFIs will be inclined to rubber stamp a lax borrower 
due diligence effort in order to maintain a profitable business relationship’. 773  
In the case of project-related corporate loans, and for projects with potential high-risk 
impacts, the independent consultant will conduct a review on issues such as adverse 
impacts on indigenous peoples, critical habitat impacts, significant cultural heritage 
impacts and large-scale resettlement. For all other category A, and as appropriate 
category B, project-related corporate loans, the EPFI may be satisfied with an internal 
review, which may take into account due diligence efforts undertaken by a MDB.774 
Principle 8 is extremely important, in that it allows EPFIs to exercise a higher level of 
control over clients’ compliance with the EP. This Principle establishes that, for all 
projects, borrowers should covenant to comply with all relevant host country 
environmental and social laws, regulations and permits in all material respects. In 
addition, for category A and category B projects, clients will covenant to: (1) comply 																																																								
772 Ryan Christopher Hansen (2006), pp. 14-15 (emphasis added). 
773 Idem, p. 15. 
774 Equator Principles (June 2013), Statement of Principles, pp. 8-9. 
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with the ESMPs and AP (where applicable) during the construction and operation of 
the project in all material respects; (2) periodically report on compliance with the 
ESMPs and AP (where applicable), as well as on compliance with relevant local, state 
and host country environmental and social laws, regulations and permits; and (3) 
decommission the facilities in accordance with an agreed decommissioning plan, 
where appropriate. The most important part of this Principle lies in the possibility for 
EPFIs to work with the borrower on remedial actions to bring the project back into 
compliance, as well as to exercise remedies in case the borrower fails to re-establish 
compliance within a given grace period.775 
Principle 9 contributes to the determination of whether borrowers have complied with 
their commitments. In cases of project finance within category A and, as appropriate, 
category B, the EPFIs will require the appointment of an independent environmental 
and social consultant, or require that the client retain qualified and experienced 
external experts to verify its monitoring information. In the case of project-related 
corporate loans, and if an independent review is required under Principle 7, borrowers 
are required to appoint an independent environmental and social consultant after 
financial close (i.e., whenever all conditions precedent to initial drawing of the debt 
have been satisfied or waived)776 or require that the client retain qualified and 
experienced external experts to verify its monitoring information.777 
Lastly, Principle 10 represents an effort to increase transparency and enhance 
reporting. In addition to the disclosure requirements established in Principle 5, clients 
are required to disclose (for projects in category A and, as appropriate, category B) a 
summary of the ESIA and publicly report greenhouse gas emission levels in some 
cases. EPFIs are required to disclose, at least annually, which transactions have 
reached financial close, as well as its EP implementation processes and experience, 
taking into account appropriate confidentiality considerations. Annex B provides more 
detailed minimum reporting requirements.778 
To finalise this overview of the EP, it is crucial to mention that, in spite of the fast 
growth of the initiative, there are still several important financial institutions (including 
public ones) that have significant involvement in project finance, but have not adopted 
																																																								
775 Equator Principles (June 2013), Statement of Principles, p. 9. 
776 Idem, Exhibit I, p. 17. 
777 Idem, Statement of Principles, p. 10. 
778 Idem, Statement of Principles, pp. 10-11; see also Annex B, pp. 13-14. 
Financial institutions and cultural rights 
	 198 
the EP.779 Nevertheless, there is a ‘growing belief among the Equator Banks that a 
virtuous circle is beginning to develop whereby sponsors, aware of the stringent 
requirements of the Principles, are bringing more robustly assessed projects to the 
Equator Banks.’780 
One of the most prevalent criticisms to the EP resides in its lack of accountability and 
transparency, resulting from the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism such as 
the IFC CAO. In fact, if EPFIs fail to implement the standards contained in the EP, 
affected communities do not have access to monitoring mechanisms.781 In addition, 
because EPFIs have confidentiality obligations in relation to their clients, there are 
many aspects of projects which are never disclosed. Whilst in some States there is 
legislation prohibiting disclosure of confidential information, it is worth noting that the 
EPFIs have been making an effort to increase transparency.782 According to Wright, 
‘[a]ssessing the impact of the Equator Principles on the selection, preparation and 
substantive outcomes of projects is made difficult by the virtual absence of public 
information about the terms and conditions of individual project finance 
transactions.’783 In addition,  
The EPs, in their current state, cover only a small portion of banking services 
relating to project finance (indeed some banks are not involved in project 
finance at all so operate outside the scope of the EPs). Therefore, banks who 
consider that implementing the EPs alone will address their human rights 
impacts are likely to overlook significant impacts to which they are linked 
through their other products and services.784 
In July 2010, a ‘de-listing’ mechanism was introduced into the EP for cases where 
EPFIs do not pay the annual fee to the Secretariat or fail to comply with reporting 
																																																								
779 Christopher Wright (2012), p. 62. 
780 Malcolm Forster et al. (2005), p. 9. 
781 Malcolm Forster et al., ‘The Equator Principles - Making a Difference? Part 2’, 7 Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law 253 (2005), p. 4. 
782 Idem, p. 5. 
783 Christopher Wright (2012), p. 64. 
784 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), p. 50. 
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requirements;785 it is very unfortunate that the ‘de-listing’ mechanism does not apply 
to implementation failures.786 
Finally, it should be noted that, even though human rights have been an important 
part of the EP since inception, the 2013 version ‘make[s] an explicit commitment to a 
broader scope of rights’ and requires EPFIs to conduct due diligence processes in 
line with the UN Guiding Principles and the IFC PSs, as well as additional human 
rights due diligence in high-risk areas.787  
 
3.2. The Thun Group of Banks 
In 2011, four European Banks (Barclays, Credit Suisse, UBS and UniCredit) launched 
the Thun Group, an informal group named after the Swiss town where the group met 
for the two initial workshops. The goal of this group was to discuss the meaning and 
implications of the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ and the Guiding 
Principles for the activities of banks. The group does not constitute a formal entity, 
but gathers banks that have a genuine interest in the relationship between human 
rights and financial institutions.788 The Thun Group recognises in their initial statement 
that: 
The “Guiding Principles” bring a welcome profile and degree of clarity to the 
human rights and business agenda. They provide a blueprint for companies 
to show that they respect human rights, and reduce the risk of causing or 
contributing to human rights abuses. At the same time, they do not – nor do 
they intend to – provide specific guidance for each industrial sector. Further 
interpretation work is required to understand how the “Guiding Principles” 
																																																								
785 The Equator Principles Association, ‘Governance Rules’ (2016), available at: http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/governance_rules.pdf, pp. 10 and 23. The EP Association ‘is the 
unincorporated association of member [EPFIs] whose object is the management, administration and 
development of the EPs’; the Secretariat ‘manages the day to day running of the EP Association and 




786 Christopher Wright (2012), p. 68. 
787 UNEP Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), pp. 49-50. 
788 The Thun Group of Banks, ‘Statement by the Thun Group of banks on the “Guiding principles for the 
implementation of the United Nations ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework” on human rights’ (2011), 
available at: https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/thun-group-of-banks-
statement-guiding-principles-19-oct-2011.pdf, p. 3. 
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should be implemented within specific industries, including the banking 
sector.789 
With the above in mind, the group decided to develop ‘a practical application guide’ 
comprising the challenges and best practice examples of implementing the Guiding 
Principles in bank activity.790 According to the 2013 Discussion Paper, which was 
signed by seven banks,791 the work of the Thun Group is motivated by three drivers: 
(1) acting responsibly (respecting human rights as ‘the right thing to do’ and an 
integral part of responsible business conduct); (2) acting instead of waiting for legal 
requirements (accepting business responsibility for human rights even in jurisdictions 
that have not adopted legislation to tackle the issue); and (3) acting jointly (taking the 
opportunity to combine efforts in the process of operationalising the Guiding 
Principles).792 
One of the main ideas behind the work of the Thun Group is the recognition of the 
Guiding Principles as ‘law in the making’, i.e., as ‘a good example of “hardening” soft 
law in the sense that they act as a catalyst to spark new policy requirements or binding 
regulation and are being multiplied by other international organisations and national 
legislators.’793 
For the purposes of this chapter, it is important to briefly consider the most relevant 
points addressed in the 2013 Discussion Paper. Firstly, the Thun Group suggests that 
banks should develop ‘a risk management model that goes beyond traditional 
parameters, to address (identify, manage and mitigate) human rights risks to external 
stakeholders, i.e., which identifies and assesses potential adverse impacts on rights 
holders as well as risks to the bank itself.’ This risk management model should ensure 
‘awareness of human rights issues and responsibilities within the bank at all levels 
and across all disciplines.’794 
																																																								
789 The Thun Group of Banks (2011). 
790 Banktrack, ‘On the Thun Group Paper on Banks and Human Rights’ (2013), available at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/download/banktrack_on_the_thun_group_paper_on_banks_and_human_righ
ts/banktrack_thun_group_paper_131119_0.pdf, p.1. 
791 Barclays, BBVA, Credit Suisse AG, ING Bank N.V., RBS Group, UBS AG and UniCredit; see The 
Thun Group of Banks, ‘Statement by the Thun Group of Banks - “The Guiding Principles: an 
interpretation for banks”, A Discussion Paper for banks on Principles 16 – 21 of the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights’ (2013) (hereinafter, the ‘2013 Discussion Paper’, available at: 
https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/thun_group_statement_final_2_oct_2013.pdf. 
792 The Thun Group of Banks, ‘2013 Discussion Paper’, p. 3. 
793 Idem, p. 4. 
794 The Thun Group of Banks, ‘2013 Discussion Paper’, p. 5. 
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The 2013 Discussion Paper recognises that ‘[a] “one-size fits all” approach to due 
diligence will not be feasible across the many relationships, transactions and activities 
of a multi-national bank’, and also that ‘[i]t is not practical to undertake a full human 
rights assessment of every business arrangement. An initial assessment should 
identify whether there is a potential for low, medium or high risk of human rights 
impacts, and further due diligence should be tailored to mitigate those risks.’795 
Amongst the factors that trigger the requirement of an enhanced due diligence 
process, the Discussion Paper mentions the examples of financing projects in conflict 
zones, providing financial services to a sector with strong human rights sensitivities 
and developing financial products associated with vulnerable client segments.796 The 
2013 Discussion Paper further states that ‘[t]he need for a heightened level of due 
diligence will increase in the presence of international sanctions, high levels of 
corruption, political instability, violent repression of minority groups or dissidents, 
armed conflict, undemocratic government, poverty, discrimination, or weak 
governance.’797 
The document also recognises that due diligence efforts will be more effective in 
situations where the bank has a high level of leverage, and that ‘[w]here a transaction 
entails little leverage and no ongoing relationship, the capacity for engagement with 
the client is likely to be very limited. In such cases, it may be that an in principle 
decision to approve or decline the relationship is taken as there is little or no 
opportunity to address any impacts and risks identified. Leverage is therefore a 
material factor in considering the potential for human rights impact and risk 
mitigation.’798 
The 2013 Discussion Paper was praised by commentators and NGOs as 
representing ‘a critical juncture on the way to delineate the human rights 
responsibilities of the financial sector’.799 Nevertheless, Banktrack pointed out a 
number of weaknesses, namely: (1) lack of engagement with civil society and other 
stakeholders; (2) the ‘context’ section is weak and underplays banks’ influence; (3) 
the Discussion Paper only partially covers the Guiding Principles; (4) it does not 
																																																								
795 Idem, p. 9. 
796 Ibidem. 
797 Idem, p. 10. 
798 Ibidem. 
799 Damiano De Felice, ‘Banks and human rights due diligence: A critical analysis of the Thun Group's 
discussion paper on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, 19 The International 
Journal of Human Rights 319 (2015), p. 321. 
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address bank responsibility to ensure Access to Remedy; and (5) the human rights 
due diligence in general corporate loans is almost exclusively based on information 
provided by the client and loses the focus on rights-holders.800 
In addition, authors criticised the fact that the approach of the Thun Group in 2013 
expressed a ‘subsidiary approach’, i.e., the idea that banks can only commit human 
rights violations indirectly, through the actions of their clients, and not directly through 
their activities,801 even though it is commonly understood that ‘the global financial 
system and financial institutions are in practice a separate system that is much bigger 
than the underlying world economy that has profound and far reaching human rights 
impacts of its own’.802 This issue was addressed in the beginning of 2017, when the 
Thun Group issued another Discussion Paper, this time focusing on Guiding 
Principles 13 and 17.803 This new document explicitly acknowledges that ‘banks can 
be directly linked to adverse human rights impacts through the provision of their 
financial products and services’804 and provides guidance on the degree of proximity 
between the bank and the human rights impact.805 
After the 2013 Discussion Paper, the Thun Group was further criticised for not 
devoting much attention to the mitigation of human rights impacts, since the 
document only mentioned that ‘[t]he mitigation measures that a bank can put in place 
will depend on the type of financial products or services as well as on the nature of 
the business relationship with the client.’806 This concern was also addressed in the 
2017 Discussion Paper, which now devotes an entire section to due diligence and 
mitigation measures.807 As it stands today, the guidance provided by the Thun Group 
of Banks is of great importance, since it ‘lays the foundations for the adoption of the 
																																																								
800 Banktrack (2013), pp. 2-5. 
801 Damiano De Felice (2015), p. 325. 
802 Mary Dowell-Jones (2013), p. 436. 
803 The Thun Group of Banks, Discussion Paper on the Implications of UN Guiding Principles 13 & 17 in 
a Corporate and Investment Banking Context (2017) (hereinafter, ‘2017 Discussion Paper’). 
804 Idem, p. 6. 
805 Idem, pp. 7-9. 
806 The Thun Group of Banks, ‘2013 Discussion Paper’, p. 14. 
807 The Thun Group of Banks, ‘2017 Discussion Paper’, pp. 10-12 and p. 14. This document was highly 
criticised for not accurately reflecting the content of the Guiding Principles – see John Ruggie, Comments 
on Thun Group of Banks Discussion Paper on the Implications of UN Guiding Principles 13 & 17 In a 
Corporate and Investment Banking Context (2017), available at: https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Thun%20Final.pdf. The group’s response is available at: 
https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/2017_02_28_Thun%20Group_response_John%20Ruggie.pdf. 
Financial institutions and cultural rights 
	 203 
first ever comprehensive guide on how universal banks should operationalise their 
responsibility to respect human rights.’808  
 
4. Conclusions 
Over the past decades, interest on the relationship between banks and human rights 
has grown exponentially, giving rise to heightened pressure over financial institutions 
and, consequently, the adoption of a number of instruments and solutions meant to 
allow for the identification, management and mitigation of human rights impacts. 
Research on the issue has started to proliferate, and international organisations 
reflected this tendency by taking initiatives such as the UNEP FI Human Rights 
Guidance Tool for the Financial Sector809 and panel discussions focusing on the 
banking and financial sectors under the auspices of the UN Global Compact.810 
Although the instruments assessed in this chapter are not legally binding and thus 
constitute soft law, there has been an increasing tendency for the principles that they 
express to ‘harden’. In the case of the World Bank Group, commentators have made 
suggestions along the lines of Bradlow et al., who affirm: 
The three processes surrounding the operational policies of the World Bank 
and the IFC (…) — rule-making, rule-application and rule-enforcement — are 
becoming more ‘law-like’ (with ‘law’ being conceptualized within the broader 
theoretical parameters of global administrative law, functionalist international 
constitutionalism and legal constructivism) and have been instrumental in 
changing the World Bank and IFC into ‘lawmaking’ and ‘law-governed’ 
institutions.811 
In fact, there are already several examples of States adopting binding legislation on 
the issue of banks and human rights and, in the EU, the Commission has urged 
																																																								
808 Damiano De Felice (2015), p. 330. 
809 See http://www.unepfi.org/humanrightstoolkit/. 
810 See https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/events/231-promoting-integrity-and-transparency-
in-the-banking-and-financial-sectors. 
811 Daniel D Bradlow and Andria Naudé Fourie, ‘The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation’, 10 International Organizations Law Review 3 (2013), p. 59. 
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Member States to develop National Action Plans812 to implement the UN Guiding 
Principles.813 
In light of the analysis undertaken above, it is now time to reflect on the question 
posed by this chapter: can banks make a difference in the way culture is respected 
within the context of foreign investment? It appears clear that they can. Firstly, there 
are several soft law instruments (progressively ‘hardening’) that explicitly declare that 
financial institutions have a human rights responsibility. Secondly, the human rights 
requirements of the most influential instruments (e.g., the IFC PSs, which provide the 
basis for the EP) provide for special protection of indigenous peoples (including their 
particular cultural life) and cultural heritage. Thirdly, it is evident that banks (including 
both MDBs and private banks) can and should use the leverage they hold over their 
clients in order to improve the sustainability of their performance. 
In 2016, in the context of the protests at Standing Rock regarding the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, there was clear evidence that these mechanisms are not just theoretical 
possibilities or mere wishful thinking. In fact, the Norwegian bank DNB has 
announced that it has sold its assets in the project and is further considering pulling 
the loans it provided for the Dakota Access Pipeline.814 In addition, several banks 
that, in spite of the pressure from civil society, are still funding the project, are 
allegedly ‘losing thousands of customers a week as a result’ of their involvement.815 
There is still much to be done in this respect, namely in terms of accountability – more 
initiatives should provide mechanisms through which affected stakeholders can raise 
concerns and affect the outcome of projects.816 In addition, there should be more 
																																																								
812 See European Commission, Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
- State of Play: Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2015)144 final) (2015). 
813 United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative and Foley Hoag LLP (December 2015), 
p. 53. This document also enumerates several legislative initiatives aimed at the implementation of soft 
law instruments on the subject of banks and human rights – see pp. 53-55. 
814 See, inter alia, Greenpeace (2016), Largest Bank in Norway Sells Its Assets in Dakota Access 
Pipeline, available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/largest-bank-norway-sells-assets-dakota-
access-pipeline/. 
815 See BankTrack (13 January 2017), 10 Banks financing Dakota Access Pipeline decline meeting with 
tribal leaders, available at: 
http://www.banktrack.org/show/article/10_banks_financing_dakota_access_pipeline_decline_meeting_
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816 Several suggestions have already been made in this regard – see IISD Investment and Sustainable 
Development Program, ‘Investment-related Dispute Settlement - Towards an inclusive multilateral 
approach (Results from an IISD expert meeting held in Montreux, Switzerland, May 23–24, 2016)’ 
(2016), available at: https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/investment-related-dispute-
settlement-montreux-expert-meeting.pdf. 
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specific and detailed instructions for due diligence processes, so as to clearly include 
cultural rights. Overall, it appears that the international community is on the right track, 
calling for more accountability and supporting risk management frameworks that 
include human rights and cultural heritage. More needs to be done – but the 




Chapter 6 – Investor-State dispute settlement and Cultural Rights 
 
The last two chapters have discussed the (‘hardening’) soft law mechanisms that can 
be resorted to in order to ensure the protection of cultural rights. These mechanisms 
were found to be incredibly important developments, but imperfect solutions 
nonetheless. If the cultural rights of the stakeholders affected by a project cannot be 
protected ex ante and through the responsible behaviour of investors and lenders, 
there is (or there could be) one other tool to be harnessed: ISDS. Similarly to what 
was done in the previous chapters, the focus will be placed on the human rights 
impacts of international investment, with emphasis on the behaviour of the investor. 
Ultimately, this chapter will explore how cultural rights can be (and have been) taken 
into account by investment tribunals, whilst discussing to what extent the affected 
communities are allowed to participate in the settlement of an investment dispute. It 
will attempt to demonstrate that the integration of HRL and investment through ISDS 
is possible and that it is occurring increasingly often, even if ISDS is not the ideal 
forum to deal with human rights issues. 
In the introduction, I will build on the contents of Chapter 3, which discussed the 
interaction between IIL and cultural rights. Here, the approach will be more specific, 
clarifying the problematic relationship between ISDS and international HRL. Section 
2 will identify the main entry points for HRL in ISDS, with a focus on denial of treaty 
protections, treaty interpretation, substantive standards, determination of the 
quantum of compensation and the possibility of counterclaims. Section 3 will explore 
the four main avenues for the consideration of human rights arguments in arbitral 
proceedings, namely the invocation of human rights arguments by the investor, the 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between human rights and international investment has been hotly 
debated in literature and frequently addressed by civil society in recent years, in 
particular regarding ISDS. The growing popularity of investment arbitration as 
possibly the most effective way of resolving investment disputes (coupled with 
increasing recourse to the system by foreign investors),817 has been accompanied by 
the emergence of new challenges, such as the interaction between IIL and non-
economic goals, for example, the environment and sustainable development, which 
frequently have to be balanced in ISDS. Human rights issues can present in 
investment situations in several different ways, ranging from the interpretation of the 
actual rights and obligations of the investor, to States’ exercise of regulatory power in 
order to comply with international obligations. However, there is a significant contrast 
between the importance given to the topic of investment and human rights by 
academics and activists and the actual treatment of the matter by arbitral tribunals818 
– so far, ‘references to human rights in the domain of investment arbitration (…) 
remain sparse and infrequent’ and ‘the present role of human rights in the context of 
investment arbitration is peripheral at best.’819 
In this context, one might wonder if the problematic relationship between investment 
arbitration and human rights has been ‘manufactured by legal academics and human 
rights activists’.820 As Karamanian rightly points out, there is no straightforward 
answer to this question, but it appears evident that, in many cases that do have 
human rights implications, the question is simply not raised in arbitral proceedings. 
According to this author, ‘whether due to ignorance of the human rights arguments or 
in fear of the consequences if they are argued, the investors or states opt not to 
mention them.’821 In addition, the atmosphere of confidentiality surrounding many 
investment disputes does not allow for an accurate account of human rights 
arguments raised in the proceedings, since many disputes remain completely 																																																								
817 See, inter alia, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The 
Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human 
Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 46. 
818 In this sense, see Susan L Karamanian, ‘The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration’, 
17 Lewis & Clark L Rev 423 (2013), p. 426; see also UNCTAD, Selected Recent Developments in IIA 
Arbitration and Human Rights (UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/7) (2009), p. 3. 
819 Clara Reiner and Christoph Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration’ in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009), pp. 82-83. 
820 Susan L Karamanian (2013), p. 426. 
821 Idem, p. 427. 
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unknown to the public – therefore, it is impossible to accurately say how many 
disputes involved human rights issues and how these were treated.822  
Recent developments in IIA drafting techniques, which include specific mention to 
human rights in the treaty text and/or transparency and third-party participation 
requirements,823 coupled with a rising number of third-party involvement in investment 
disputes,824 have allowed for an increasingly relevant role for human rights in the 
context of foreign investment. The close relationship between these two areas is 
further demonstrated by the fact that regional human rights bodies, such as the 
ECtHR and the IACtHR, seem to be dealing with a mounting number of human rights 
disputes that are related to investment.825 
The above notwithstanding, investment arbitration and international HRL appear to 
be worryingly disconnected, and one of the reasons that have been advanced for this 
lack of integration lies in the fact that IIAs are, in general, inherently imbalanced: 
investors are given a large number of rights, but mostly no obligations,826 and 
stakeholders are typically not even mentioned in either IIAs or investment 
contracts.827 The rights that foreign investors hold under IIAs are considered by many 
to be excessive, and potentially detrimental to a State’s ability to regulate in the public 
interest.828 In this vein, some authors argue that MNEs have become more powerful 
than many States, which creates power imbalances that can have very negative 
impacts on the regulatory freedom of host States.829 However, whilst the imbalance 
between the power of investors and the power of States is a captivating subject, I am 
more interested in exploring the imbalance between the power of investors and the 
																																																								
822 Ibidem. 
823 See, for instance, references to the importance of human rights in the Preamble to the CETA; see 
also Articles 28 and 29 of the 2012 US Model BIT, which expressly establish transparency requirements 
and allow tribunals to accept amicus curiae submissions – available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf. 
824 In this sense, see Lucas Bastin, ‘Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends’, 30 
Arbitration International 125 (2014). 
825 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human rights law in international investment arbitration’, 
11 Asian J WTO & Int'l Health L & Pol'y 65 (2016), p. 67. 
826 Patrick Dumberry and Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, ‘When and How Allegations of Human Rights 
Violations can be Raised in Investor-State Arbitration’, 13 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 349 
(2012), p. 349. 
827 See Jan Wouters and Nicolas Hachez, ‘When Rules and Values Collide: How Can a Balanced 
Application of Investor Protection Provisions and Human Rights Be Ensured’, 3 Hum Rts & Int'l Legal 
Discourse 301 (2009), p. 302; see also UNCTAD (2009), p. 3. 
828 George K Foster, ‘Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International 
Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment Treaties’, 17 Lewis & Clark Law Review (2013), 
p. 366. 
829 See Tai-Heng Cheng, ‘Power, Authority and International Investment Law’, 20 American University 
International Law Review 465 (2005), pp. 492-493. 
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power of stakeholders within the specific area of investment arbitration. Foster rightly 
points out that there is a worrying ‘(…) asymmetry between local stakeholders, on the 
one hand, and an effective alliance that sometimes exists between the investor and 
the host state, on the other’,830 and this asymmetry must be addressed with care. 
In this chapter, I will focus on ISDS, rather than on the more general issue of IIL and 
human rights, which would necessarily entail an in-depth analysis of IIAs – an analysis 
that, for reasons of space, will not be undertaken. It is therefore important to clarify 
certain fundamental aspects of investment arbitration before assessing how human 
rights issues have been dealt with by arbitrators. 
Over the years, investment arbitration has consistently been seen as the preferred 
method of dispute resolution for reasons such as confidentiality, speed and cost-
effectiveness, virtues which, however, ‘have eroded with the expansion in the number 
of parties using arbitration, the increasingly adjudicative nature of the process and 
the shift in the group serving as arbitrators, which has grown beyond the "grand old 
men" to a younger generation of arbitration technocrats.’831 This means that 
arbitration is often as expensive and lengthy as proceedings before national courts, 
which leads to the question of why investment arbitration should be chosen as a 
dispute settlement mechanism that has virtually lost its most prominent advantages. 
The answer, according to Franck, is neutrality: 
First, there is neutrality of forum, where the place of dispute resolution does 
not unfairly benefit either party or create a "home court" advantage. One might 
call this international arbitration's function as a geographical half-way house. 
Second, there is the neutrality of the decision-making process. In other words, 
having arbitrators who are bound to and selected by the parties, but are 
nevertheless required to render decisions in an "independent" or "impartial" 
manner, offers adjudicative neutrality.832 
Arbitrators are, first and foremost, international adjudicators who ‘owe their powers to 
the consent of the litigant[s]’833 and ISDS ‘is an adjudicatory process involving 
independent fact-finding and legal analysis according to rules of national and 
																																																								
830 George K Foster (2013), p. 368. 
831 Susan Franck, ‘The Role of International Arbitrators’, 12 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 499 (2005), p. 500. 
832 Idem, p. 501 (references omitted, emphasis added). 
833 Lon L Fuller and Kenneth I Winston, ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’, 92 Harvard Law Review 
353 (1978), p. 354. 
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international law by neutral, independent, and impartial decision-makers.’834 Because 
arbitral tribunals are not standing adjudicative bodies, their mandate is, in principle, 
case-specific;835 however, as affirmed by the tribunal in Glamis Gold, ‘[a] case-
specific mandate is not license to ignore systemic implications. To the contrary, it 
arguably makes it all the more important that each tribunal renders its case-specific 
decision with sensitivity to the position of future tribunals and an awareness of other 
systemic implications.’836 
A connected issue is that of the difference between law-applying and law-making 
functions. Whilst, in principle, arbitrators have the primary function of applying the law 
to the facts, it is also arguably their role to creatively contribute to the development of 
IIL, with impacts beyond the specific case.837 In this regard, it should be noted that, 
even though tribunals ‘may not rule on questions that are not submitted to it or grant 
a remedy that is not requested of it (the non ultra petita principle), there is 
considerable support for the view that, in deciding on claims before it, a tribunal is not 
bound by the legal grounds and arguments advanced by the parties (the jura novit 
curia principle).’838 
However, the above does not mean that investment arbitrators have the power to 
adjudicate matters that go beyond investment – and this issue is intimately linked with 
jurisdictional issues. The jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals depends on the consent of 
the parties, and it is limited by the scope of such consent. The clause establishing 
jurisdiction plays a key role in this regard, as it may be drafted in more restrictive or 
broader terms, either in IIAs or in investment contracts. Accordingly, in Biloune v. 
Ghana, the tribunal considered, based on the formulation of the jurisdictional clause 
contained in the contract, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a claim of human rights 
violations as an ‘independent cause of action’.839 In this case, the clause limited the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes ‘in respect of an approved enterprise’.840 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that ‘[i]f and to the extent that the human rights 																																																								
834 Stephan W Schill, ‘System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking’ in Armin Von 
Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke (eds), International Judicial Lawmaking (Springer 2012), p. 135. 
835 In this sense, see, inter alia, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (8 June 
2009), paragraph 3. 
836 Idem, paragraph 6. 
837 Stephan W Schill (2012), p. 139. 
838 Ole Spiermann, ‘Applicable Law’ in Peter Muchlinski et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 90. 
839 See Biloune & Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of 
Ghana, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (Oct. 27, 1989), 19 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 11 (1994), 
paragraph 203. 
840 Idem, paragraph 188. 
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violation affects the investment, it will become a dispute ‘in respect of’ the investment 
and must hence be arbitrable.’841 It is unclear what defines a dispute ‘in respect of’ 
the investment, and much depends on the interpretation made by each investment 
tribunal.842 
The mere affirmation of jurisdiction over an investment-related HRL issue is not in 
itself sufficient, as tribunals will still have to the determine which substantive 
standards apply to the dispute. This depends on the applicable law clause which, in 
many IIAs, explicitly includes international law (covering treaties, customary 
international law and general principles of law) and host-State domestic law, which 
may lead the tribunal to apply relevant human rights norms to the facts of the 
dispute.843 Once again, much depends on interpretation – for instance, in von Pezold 
v. Zimbabwe, the tribunal affirmed that ‘reference to “such rules of general 
international law as may be applicable” in the BITs does not incorporate the universe 
of international law into the BITs or into disputes arising under the BITs’.844 
In addition to jurisdiction and applicable law clauses, there are other areas which may 
constitute entry points for human rights arguments – these will be analysed in the 
following section. 
 
2. Entry points for human rights law in ISDS 
There are a number of mechanisms that may be used in order to introduce HRL into 
ISDS. These include ways of denying treaty protection to the investor based on the 
illegality of the investor’s conduct, such as the ‘clean hands’ doctrine; the 
interpretation of the relevant IIA in conformity with HRL; application and interpretation 
of substantive standards; the determination of the quantum of compensation; and, 




841 Clara Reiner and Christoph Schreuer (2009), p. 84. 
842 In this sense, see Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 95. 
843 In this sense, see Clara Reiner and Christoph Schreuer (2009), pp. 84-85. 
844 Bernhard von Pezold & Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe and Border Timbers Limited & Others v. 
Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15 and ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25 (joined), Procedural Order No. 
2 (26 June 2012), paragraph 57. 
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2.1. Denial of treaty protections – the ‘clean hands’ doctrine 
There are several cases in which host States, faced with ISDS, challenged the legality 
of the investment, either for purposes of exclusion of jurisdiction or for the actual 
denial of treaty protections. The most important doctrine in this regard is the ‘clean 
hands’ doctrine (‘he who comes into equity must come with clean hands’). It stems 
from Roman law principles such as ex delicto non orituractio (‘an unlawful act cannot 
serve as the basis of an action at law’) and ex turpicausa non oritur (‘an action cannot 
arise from a dishonourable cause’)845 and it means that ‘[i]f some form of illegal or 
improper conduct is found on the part of the investor, his or her hands will be 
“unclean”, his claims will be barred and any loss suffered will lie where it falls.’846 This 
doctrine is present in both civil and common law systems and has historically been 
used at the international level by a number of early international claims 
commissions.847 The usefulness of this principle, at least in theory, resides in the 
possibility of denying investment protection to investors who acted illegally, for 
instance, by violating the cultural rights of stakeholders. However, there is still a high 
level of uncertainty regarding the existence and implications of this doctrine in 
international law.848 
There has been increasing support for the application of the ‘clean hands’ doctrine in 
IIL by a number of scholars.849 Even though most IIAs do not specifically provide for 
investor obligations, several of them have included a requirement that investments 
be made ‘in accordance with the law’ – and, even when this provision is not present, 
there is arguably an implicit legality requirement that can be derived from general 
principles of law.850 Whilst the explicit presence of such requirement may impact ISDS 
at the level of jurisdiction, the implicit legality requirement may affect the admissibility 
of a claim.851 
																																																								
845 Patrick Dumberry, ‘State of Confusion: The Doctrine of ‘Clean Hands’ in Investment Arbitration After 
the Yukos Award’, 17 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 229 (2016), p. 230. 
846 Aloysius Llamzon, ‘The State of the “Unclean Hands” Doctrine in International Investment Law: Yukos 
as both Omega and Alpha’, 30 ICSID Review 315 (2015), p. 316. 
847 Idem, pp. 316-317. 
848 Andrew Newcombe and Jean-Michel Marcoux, ‘Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v Republic of Indonesia 
- Imposing International Obligations on Foreign Investors’, 30 ICSID Review 525 (2015), p. 530. 
849 Patrick Dumberry (2016), p. 232. 
850 Rahim Moloo and Alex Khachaturian, ‘The Compliance with the Law Requirement in International 
Investment Law’, 34 Fordham International Law Journal 1473 (2011), p. 1475. 
851 Ibidem; see also R Moloo et al., ‘Fraud and Corruption in International Arbitration’, 10 Transnational 
Dispute Management (TDM) (2013), p. 720. 
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In cases where the IIA contains a legality requirement, only investments made in 
accordance with the law will be protected. Consequently, ‘if evidence that the 
investment at issue was not made legally comes to light, a tribunal will not have 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute pertaining to that investment.’852 Several tribunals 
have adopted this position in the past, such as in Inceysa v. EI Salvador, in which it 
was found that ‘without any doubt, (…) the will of the parties to the BIT was to exclude 
from the scope of application and protection of the Agreement disputes originating 
from investments which were not made in accordance with the laws of the host 
State.’853 The tribunal declined jurisdiction over the case, affirming that ‘Inceysa 
cannot benefit from the rights granted in the BIT, including access to the jurisdiction 
of the Centre, because its investment does not meet the conditions of legality 
necessary to be included within the scope of that investment protection’ and that ‘the 
Centre does not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute brought before it, arising from 
the Contract executed between EI Salvador and Inceysa, and the Arbitral Tribunal 
does not have competence to resolve these disputes.’854 Along the same lines, in 
Fraport v. the Philippines, ‘the BIT explicitly and reiteratedly required that an 
investment, in order to qualify for BIT protection, had to be in accordance with the 
host state's law’,855 and, consequently, ‘[b]ecause there is no "investment in 
accordance with law", the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction ratione materiae.’856 
In cases where the relevant IIA does not contain a legality requirement, there is still 
the possibility of inferring that condition from general principles of law and thus 
excluding an investor claim as inadmissible. In fact, in Plama v. Bulgaria, the relevant 
IIA was the ECT, which does not contain an ‘in accordance with law’ provision; 
nevertheless, the tribunal still found that ‘[t]his does not mean, however, that the 
protections provided for by the ECT cover all kinds of investments, including those 
contrary to domestic or international law.’857 It went on to affirm that: 
In accordance with the introductory note to the ECT "[t]he fundamental aim of 
the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues 
																																																								
852 R Moloo et al. (2013), p. 722. 
853 Cf. Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award (2 
August 2006), paragraph 195. 
854 Idem, paragraphs 335-337. 
855 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03I2S, Award (16 August 2007), paragraph 398. 
856 Idem, paragraph 401. 
857 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 
2008), paragraph 138. 
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[...]". Consequently, the ECT should be interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the aim of encouraging respect for the rule of law. The Arbitral Tribunal 
concludes that the substantive protections of the ECT cannot apply to 
investments that are made contrary to law.858 
Very interestingly, the tribunal included in the concept of ‘contrary to law’ actions that 
go against both domestic law and international law.859 In the determination of which 
general principles of law had been violated by the investor, the tribunal relied in 
previous arbitral decisions referring to the principles of good faith, the ‘principle of 
nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans - that nobody can benefit from his own 
wrong’ and the fact that ‘recognizing the existence of rights arising from illegal acts 
would violate the "respect for the law" which is a principle of international public 
policy’.860 It decided that the fact that the investment was obtained by deceitful 
conduct rendered protecting the investor under the ECT ‘contrary to the principle 
nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans’, contrary to ‘the basic notion of 
international public policy’ and contrary to the principle of good faith.861 Consequently, 
the tribunal affirmed that it could not ‘lend its support to Claimant's request and (…) 
therefore, grant the substantive protections of the ECT.’862 
This approach was confirmed by several other cases, namely in Phoenix Action, Ltd. 
v. The Czech Republic, in which the tribunal affirmed: 
States cannot be deemed to offer access to the ICSID dispute settlement 
mechanism to investments made in violation of their laws. (…) These are 
illegal investments according to the national law of the host State and cannot 
be protected through an ICSID arbitral process. And it is the Tribunal’s view 
that this condition – the conformity of the establishment of the investment with 
the national laws – is implicit even when not expressly stated in the relevant 
BIT.863 
Similarly, in Hamester v Ghana, the tribunal stated as follows: 
																																																								
858 Idem, paragraph 139 (references omitted). 
859 Idem, paragraph 140. 
860 Idem, paragraphs 141-142. 
861 Idem, paragraphs 143-144. 
862 Idem, paragraph 146. 
863 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009), 
paragraph 101. 
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An investment will not be protected if it has been created in violation of 
national or international principles of good faith; by way of corruption, fraud, 
or deceitful conduct; or if its creation itself constitutes a misuse of the system 
of international investment protection under the ICSID Convention. It will also 
not be protected if it is made in violation of the host State’s law. These are 
general principles that exist independently of specific language to this effect 
in the Treaty.864 
These cases, although not specifically mentioning the ‘clean hands’ doctrine, appear 
nevertheless to apply the principle by considering that illegal conduct by the investor 
may render his claim inadmissible. In that sense, the application of the legality 
requirement has been understood as a ‘manifestation of the doctrine of clean 
hands’.865 
Recent cases have, however, raised doubts about the application of the doctrine to 
ISDS: I refer specifically to the Yukos awards866 and to the case of Hesham Talaat M. 
Al-Warraq v. Indonesia. 
The relevance of the Yukos awards lies not only in its treatment of the ‘clean hands’ 
doctrine and its enquiry into the characterization of the doctrine as a general principle 
of law, but also in the fact that it addressed ‘the temporal scope of the legality 
requirement and the question as to whether or not it applies to violations committed 
by an investor during the post-establishment phase of its investment.’867 In February 
2005, three controlling shareholders of OAO Yukos Oil Company (Hulley Enterprises 
Limited, a company organized under the laws of Cyprus; Yukos Universal Limited, a 
company organized under the laws of the Isle of Man; and Veteran Petroleum Limited, 
a company organized under the laws of Cyprus) initiated arbitrations against Russia 
under the ECT. 
In these cases, Russia listed ‘28 instances of alleged “illegal and bad faith conduct” 
by Claimants or “attributable to” Claimants involving a variety of actors and spanning 
over ten years, from the privatization of Yukos in the mid-1990s to its liquidation in 																																																								
864 Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award (18 
June 2010), paragraphs 123-124. 
865 Patrick Dumberry (2016), pp. 234-237. 
866 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 226, 
Final Award (18 July 2014); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award (18 July 2014); and Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) 
v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award (18 July 2014). 
867 Patrick Dumberry (2016), p. 231. 
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November 2007.’868 Russia accused the investors of not paying their tax debts when 
they were due nor making reasonable settlement offers, dissipating the assets they 
held, lying to auditors, obstructing the work of bailiffs and sabotaging the auction of 
Yukos’ core production subsidiary.869 Russia thus argued that the ‘Claimants’ 
“unclean hands” deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction, render Claimants’ claims 
inadmissible and/or deprive Claimants of the substantive protections of the ECT’,870 
and further stated that the ‘clean hands’ doctrine constituted a general principle of 
law.871 Conversely, the investors argued that this doctrine should not apply to their 
claims, since: (1) the ECT did not provide for such principle; (2) it did not constitute a 
general principle of law; and (3) ‘the instances of “unclean hands” alleged by 
Respondent are “collateral illegalities” that do not fall within the parameters of any 
“unclean hands” doctrine.’872 
In turn, Russia argued that the absence of a legality requirement or of an explicit 
‘clean hands’ provision in the ECT did not prevent the doctrine from applying, relying 
on a number of previous awards to consubstantiate this position.873 Contrarily, the 
investors argued that the awards cited by Russia constituted mere obiter dicta, since 
the relevant IIAs did contain a legality requirement.874 The tribunal affirmed: 
The Tribunal notes that there is support in the decisions of tribunals in 
investment treaty arbitrations for the notion that, even where the applicable 
investment treaty does not contain an express requirement of compliance with 
host State laws (as is the case with the ECT), an investment that is made in 
breach of the laws of the host State may either: (a) not qualify as an 
investment, thus depriving the tribunal of jurisdiction; or (b) be refused the 
benefit of the substantive protections of the investment treaty.875 
However, whilst Russia held that the legality requirement applied to investors’ 
conduct in the post-establishment phase, the claimants argued that only the making 
																																																								
868 Yukos v. Russia, paragraph 1281. 
869 Idem, paragraph 1310. 
870 Idem, paragraph 1313. 
871 Idem, paragraph 1315. 
872 Idem, paragraph 1326. 
873 Idem, paragraph 1314. 
874 Idem, paragraphs 1328 and 1332. 
875 Idem, paragraph 1349. 
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of an investment should be subject to a legality test.876 The tribunal agreed with the 
investor, stating: 
There is no compelling reason to deny altogether the right to invoke the ECT 
to any investor who has breached the law of the host State in the course of its 
investment. If the investor acts illegally, the host state can request it to correct 
its behavior and impose upon it sanctions available under domestic law, as 
the Russian Federation indeed purports to have done by reassessing taxes 
and imposing fines. However, if the investor believes these sanctions to be 
unjustified (as Claimants do in the present case), it must have the possibility 
of challenging their validity in accordance with the applicable investment 
treaty. It would undermine the purpose and object of the ECT to deny the 
investor the right to make its case before an arbitral tribunal based on the 
same alleged violations the existence of which the investor seeks to dispute 
on the merits.877 
The tribunal thus limited the scope of the legality requirement to the making of the 
investment, denying its applicability to the post-establishment phase. It should, 
however, be noted that the tribunal seemed to make a distinction between the legality 
requirement and the ‘clean hands’ doctrine, since it assessed the two points 
separately.878 As Dumberry correctly points out, this ‘suggests that any allegations of 
post-establishment breaches would have to be dealt with only under the clean hands 
doctrine.’879 Still, the Tribunal rejected the argument that the ‘clean hands’ doctrine 
constituted a general principle of law: 
The Tribunal is not persuaded that there exists a “general principle of law 
recognized by civilized nations” within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the 
ICJ Statute that would bar an investor from making a claim before an arbitral 
tribunal under an investment treaty because it has so-called “unclean hands.” 
General principles of law require a certain level of recognition and consensus. 
However, on the basis of the cases cited by the Parties, the Tribunal has 
formed the view that there is a significant amount of controversy as to the 
existence of an “unclean hands” principle in international law.880 																																																								
876 Idem, paragraphs 1316 and 1334. 
877 Idem, paragraph 1355 (emphasis added). 
878 Idem, paragraph 1357. 
879 Patrick Dumberry (2016), p. 240. 
880 Yukos v. Russia, paragraphs 1358-1359. 
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Nevertheless, it admitted that ‘some of the instances of Claimants’ “illegal and bad 
faith” conduct (…) could have an impact on the Tribunal’s assessment of liability and 
damages’,881 and ended up reducing the amount of compensation by 25 percent.882 
The case of Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia is important and intriguing 
because it departs from the views expressed in the Yukos awards. In this case, the 
investor claimed he had been mistreated during criminal proceedings conducted by 
Indonesian authorities after a bank bailout. It is important to note that, unlike most 
IIAs, the applicable instrument, which was the Agreement on Promotion, Protection 
and Guarantee of Investments among Member States of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC Agreement) contained an investor obligations clause, as 
follows: 
The investor shall be bound by the laws and regulations in force in the host 
state and shall refrain from all acts that may disturb public order or morals or 
that may be prejudicial to the public interest. He is also to refrain from 
exercising restrictive practices and from trying to achieve gains through 
unlawful means.883 
Indonesia emphasised the fact that this clause was different from normal legality 
requirements, for four reasons: first, the obligation to comply with host State law lies 
on the investor, and not on the investment; secondly, this obligation is not limited in 
temporal terms to the making of the investment, but it is rather on-going as long as 
the investor is operating in the host State; thirdly, the investor is not just expected to 
comply with national law, but also to refrain from disturbing public order or morals and 
from acting in a way that is prejudicial to public interest; lastly, the investor is also 
required to refrain from trying to achieve gains through unlawful means.884 
The State further argued that Al-Warraq’s claim should be deemed inadmissible 
because the investor came to the proceedings with ‘unclean hands’.885 The tribunal 
agreed with Indonesia, stating: 
The Tribunal concludes from the above that the Claimant failed to uphold the 
Indonesian laws and regulations. The Tribunal further considers that the 
																																																								
881 Idem, paragraph 1374. 
882 Idem, paragraph 1827. 
883 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, paragraph 155. 
884 Idem, paragraph 157. 
885 Idem, paragraphs 161 and 172. 
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Claimant's action, whether criminal or not, caused a liquidity issue to Bank 
Century, and his actions have been prejudicial to the public interest, in this 
case the Indonesian financial sector. The Claimant having breached the local 
laws and put the public interest at risk, he has deprived himself of the 
protection afforded by the OIC Agreement. In this regard, the Tribunal is of 
the view that the doctrine of "clean hands" renders the Claimant's claim 
inadmissible.886 
The tribunal thus affirmed that, even though the investor had not received FET, his 
violation of Article 9 of the OIC Agreement prevented him from pursuing his claim.887 
Therefore, the tribunal refused to award damages for the FET violation888 and, 
because ‘the Parties [had] argued their positions and filed their submissions diligently 
and in good faith throughout the proceedings’,889 it decided that ‘each party [should] 
bear its own legal expenses and costs, as well as the expenses and costs of the 
arbitration’.890 
This decision clearly demonstrates that the presence of an investor obligations clause 
in the relevant IIA has the potential to dramatically affect the outcomes of ISDS and, 
furthermore, it clearly acknowledges the existence and applicability of the ‘clean 
hands’ doctrine. Although, in this case, the investor came with ‘unclean hands’ 
because of fraud, and not for the violation of human rights, it is possible to imagine 
situations in which the host State argues that the investor breached the investor 
obligations clause because of human rights abuses. However, as Cotula rightly points 
out, this would raise a number of other questions: 
[F]or example, what kind of evidence might a tribunal be prepared to consider 
in assessing alleged human rights abuses? What role, if any, might civil 
society play in providing that evidence, and through what channels? How 
would an investor obligations clause operate in cases where the claimant and 
the State were complicit in violating human rights?891 
																																																								
886 Idem, paragraphs 645-646 (emphasis added). 
887 Idem, paragraph 648. 
888 Idem, paragraph 654. 
889 Idem, paragraph 681. 
890 Idem, paragraph 682. 
891 Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Human Rights and Investor Obligations in Investor-State Arbitration’, 17 The Journal 
of World Investment & Trade 148 (2016), p. 156. 
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The analysis of these cases leads to the conclusion that the relevant case law is 
‘confused and uncertain’:892 The inconsistent approaches to the ‘clean hands’ 
doctrine do not allow for a clear anticipation of how tribunals might respond to similar 
claims in future cases, but it appears that States now have an additional tool to avoid 
liability for treaty breaches in case the investor engaged in human rights violations. It 
remains to be seen if States will have the right incentives to do so, and mostly how 
tribunals will react to this line of argumentation. 
 
2.2. Treaty interpretation 
One further point of entry for HRL is treaty interpretation. Arbitral tribunals have been 
criticised for their ‘disintegrative inclination’, i.e., their ‘tendency towards considering 
international investment law in a vacuum’.893 However, IIL does not exist in isolation; 
‘[i]nternational law is a legal system, and investment treaties are creatures of it and 
governed by it.’894 Although this is not the place to analyse all the intricacies of treaty 
interpretation, some key pointers should be mentioned. 
Usually, the choice of applicable law is made by the parties – therefore, if the parties 
explicitly refer to international HRL, it will be a part of the law applicable to the dispute. 
This possibility is, however, more theoretical than realistic.895 In the same vein, IIAs 
could, in theory, contain HRL provisions – but this ‘would be quite exceptional’.896 
Nevertheless, external rules such as HRL may still be harmonised with IIL by 
arbitrators through treaty interpretation, more specifically, through systemic 
interpretation, as per the VCLT (which is deemed as reflecting customary rules of 
treaty interpretation).897 In this regard, the ILC, whilst dealing with the broader issue 
of fragmentation, affirmed that Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT ‘may be taken to express 
what may be called the principle of “systemic integration”, the process (…) whereby 
																																																								
892 Patrick Dumberry (2016), p. 259. 
893 See Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, ‘Harmonizing investment protection and international human 
rights: First steps towards a methodology’ in Christina Binder et al. (eds), International investment law 
for the 21st century: Essays in honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 679. 
894 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment treaties and general international law’, 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 361 (2008), p. 369. 
895 Idem, p. 680. 
896 Clara Reiner and Christoph Schreuer (2009), p. 84. 
897 In this sense, Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill (2009), p. 691. 
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international obligations are interpreted by reference to their normative environment 
(“system”).’898 It added: 
All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law, and set 
up rights and obligations that exist alongside rights and obligations 
established by other treaty provisions and rules of customary international 
law. None of such rights or obligations has any intrinsic priority against the 
others. The question of their relationship can only be approached through a 
process of reasoning that makes them appear as parts of some coherent and 
meaningful whole.899 
According to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the interpretation of treaties should take 
into account, together with the context, ‘[a]ny relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.’ These ‘relevant rules’ may clearly 
include international HRL, but the fundamental question is how the elements of this 
provision are assessed by arbitral tribunals. In fact, there are basically three elements 
to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT: first of all, the rule must in fact be a rule of international 
law; secondly, it must be ‘relevant’; and thirdly, it must be applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
The first element may be clarified resorting to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, which 
indicates that international law should be understood as comprising general 
customary law, treaties, and general principles.900 The element of relevance depends 
greatly on the interpretation of the term by adjudicators; in fact, ‘relevant’ ‘is a relative 
term that lends itself to extremes of gradation and a substantive lack of clarity’,901 
which means that arbitrators are given a significant amount of flexibility in this regard. 
The third element, demanding applicability in the relations between the parties, may 
be considered as referring to norms that are applicable in the relations between the 
parties, at the time the IIA was celebrated or at the time of interpretation, the latter 
																																																								
898 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission’ (Finalised by Martti 
Koskenniemi) UN Doc A/CN.4/L682, 13 April 2006, paragraph 413 (hereinafter, the ILC Report on 
Fragmentation). 
899 Idem, paragraph 414. 
900 Statute of the International Court of Justice, annexed to the Charter of the United Nations, available 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2. 
901 Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill (2009), p. 695. 
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appearing to be preferred in modern approaches.902 In addition, it is usually 
understood as norms that are binding on the parties, although the term ‘applicable’ 
also allows room for interpretation.903 The concept of ‘parties’ should be understood 
as referring to the States parties to the IIA (as the investor will necessarily never be 
a party to international conventions, such as human rights instruments).904 Arguably, 
because all UN members have human rights obligations, IIAs celebrated by them 
should be interpreted in conformity with the relevant human rights norms.905 
It should also be noted that, according to the ILC, systemic interpretation entails two 
presumptions: first, a positive one, that all matters not specifically resolved in a treaty 
should be governed by general principles of international law; and second, a negative 
one, that ‘in entering into treaty obligations, the parties intend not to act inconsistently 
with generally recognized principles of international law or with previous treaty 
obligations towards third States.’906 The latter is also known as the presumption of 
compliance with international law. 
Recent decisions by investment tribunals have embraced the value of systemic 
interpretation. In Tulip Real Estate v. Turkey, the tribunal started by acknowledging 
that ‘[t]here is a widespread sentiment that the integration of the law of human rights 
into international investment law is an important concern.’907 It then referred to the 
VCLT and to the ILC Report on Fragmentation, as well as to previous decisions of 
arbitral tribunals regarding human rights. It then concluded that ‘resort to authorities 
stemming from the field of human rights (…) is a legitimate method of treaty 
interpretation.’908 In Urbaser SA and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia v. Argentina, 
the tribunal significantly affirmed: 
The BIT cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. The Tribunal must 
certainly be mindful of the BIT’s special purpose as a Treaty promoting foreign 
investments, but it cannot do so without taking the relevant rules of 
																																																								
902 In this sense, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
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international law into account. The BIT has to be construed in harmony with 
other rules of international law of which it forms part, including those relating 
to human rights.909 
It appears that concerns about the unification of international law and about the 
necessity of systemic interpretation are permeating into the world of investment 
arbitration, which is a very welcome tendency. This notwithstanding, systemic 
interpretation is still a source of difficulties; as Ascensio points out, the ‘integration [of 
systemic arguments] into the interpretative process may create more confusion than 
clarity, all the more so because there is no last resort adjudicative authority to 
combine them harmoniously.’910 These difficulties should not, however, distract from 
the great potential of systemic interpretation, not only as an instrument to unify 
international law, but also as an important point of entry for human rights into ISDS. 
Systemic interpretation is not the only interpretative tool that can lead to the 
consideration of HRL in ISDS. It is also crucial to take into account Article 31(1) and 
(2) of the VCLT and how the wording of the preamble may affect the interpretation of 
IIAs. According to these paragraphs, treaties should be interpreted ‘in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.’911 The context is defined primarily 
by reference to the text of the treaty, including its preamble. If the preamble expressly 
refers to HRL, it may not establish binding obligations on the investors, but there is a 
possibility that tribunals interpreting the treaty provisions would take HRL into 
account. By the same token, if the preamble refers to sustainable development, rather 
than simply to development, there is a higher probability of tribunals paying deference 
to non-economic concerns in the context of investment – although this always entails 
significant flexibility for arbitrators.  
 
2.3. Substantive standards 
When tribunals interpret and apply substantive standards of protection contained in 
IIAs, they may do so by reference to HRL, especially in regard to the concepts of 																																																								
909 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016), paragraph 1200. 
910 Hervé Ascensio, ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties and International 
Investment Law’, 31 ICSID Review 366 (2016), p. 386. 
911 Emphasis added. 
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expropriation,912 FET913 and non-discrimination.914 HRL could have a significant 
impact in the interpretation of substantive standards, namely by limiting the protection 
afforded to the investor (e.g., by considering the human rights purpose of an alleged 
expropriatory measure). A particularly relevant example of this possibility relates to 
the much-discussed notion of legitimate expectations, which can play an important 
role regarding virtually all protection standards.915 Legitimate expectations may be 
defined so as to accommodate ‘the specific human rights situation of developing 
countries’,916 and even of developed countries – this is particularly important 
regarding cultural rights, which are subject to progressive realisation. Arguably, 
investors cannot legitimately expect a State not to take measures to protect and 
promote human rights. Some authors further suggest that ‘[t]here can be no legitimate 
expectations that are contrary to human rights law’.917 
Another relevant example relates to the concept of expropriation. Whilst the ‘sole 
effect’ doctrine stipulates that the purpose of the State measure does not affect its 
expropriatory character,918 another line of case-law does not consider a measure 
expropriatory if it is within the scope of the State’s police powers, a concept which 
arguably includes human rights919 and is intimately connected with States’ right to 
regulate.920 
A further possible and extremely relevant approach is that of applying to the matter 
of indirect expropriation a proportionality balancing test, as developed by international 
																																																								
912 See, inter alia, Jeff Waincymer, ‘Balancing Property Rights and Human Rights in Expropriation’ in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 
913 For a more detailed analysis, see, inter alia, Ioana Knoll-Tudor, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard and Human Rights Norms’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2009). 
914 See, inter alia, Federico Ortino, ‘Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes’ in Pierre-
Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009). 
915 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Human Rights of the Population of the Host State in International Investment 
Arbitration’, 10 J World Investment & Trade 653 (2009), p. 669. 
916 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 100. 
917 Ursula Kriebaum (2009), p. 669. 
918 See, inter alia, L Yves Fortier and Stephen L Drymer, ‘Indirect expropriation in the law of international 
investment: I know it when I see it, or caveat investor’, 19 ICSID Review 293 (2004), pp. 308 et seq; see 
also Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 
Award (17 February 2000), paragraphs 71-72. 
919 Ursula Kriebaum (2009), p. 669. 
920 Jasper Krommendijk and John Morijn, ‘‘Proportional’ by What Measure(s)? Balancing Investor 
Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the Proportionality Principle in Investor-State Arbitration’ 
in Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009), p. 433. 
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human rights courts, chiefly the ECtHR.921 For example, in Tecmed v. Mexico, the 
tribunal affirmed that ‘[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to 
be realized by any expropriatory measure’.922 Subsequently, in Azurix v. Argentina, 
the tribunal referred to the Tecmed award and to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on 
proportionality as ‘additional elements [which] provide useful guidance for purposes 
of determining whether regulatory actions would be expropriatory and give rise to 
compensation.’923 
Although there is no agreement as to the adequacy of proportionality for the balancing 
of investor protection and the regulatory interests of the host State,924 some authors 
affirm that the application of these tests to ISDS should be welcomed, particularly 
when considering that ‘[i]t allows for a more nuanced decision than the "sole effects" 
and the radical "police powers" doctrines.’925 Finally, it should be noted that arbitral 
tribunals often fail to clarify their approach to proportionality, or to engage 
meaningfully in a balancing exercise,926 and that the test is usually only applied to 
determine whether there was expropriation or not, rather than extending it to the 
quantification of compensation.927 
 
2.4. Determination of the quantum of compensation 
If a breach of an IIA is found, compensation should be paid to the investor; however, 
several factors may affect the determination of the quantum of such compensation. 
For example, in Yukos v. Russia, as seen above, the tribunal did not consider that 
the illegal conduct of the investor justified the denial of treaty protection; however, it 
did take it into account in the determination of the amount of compensation, which 
																																																								
921 Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Jorge E Viñuales, ‘Human Rights and Investment Disciplines: Integration in 
Progress’ in Marc Bungenberg et al. (eds), International Investment Law (Nomos/Hart 2015), section 
3(a)(4). 
922 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003), paragraph 122. 
923 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006), paragraph 
312. 
924 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 102. 
925 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Regulatory takings: balancing the interests of the investor and the state’, 8 The 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 717 (2007), p. 729. 
926 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 102. 
927 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Regulatory takings: balancing the interests of the investor and the state’ (2007), 
pp. 729 and 743-744; and Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Human Rights of the Population of the Host State in 
International Investment Arbitration’ (2009), p. 670. 
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was reduced by 25%.928 It is therefore important to ask whether a State measure 
adopted to comply with an international obligation (for the purpose of this research, 
either HRL or international cultural law) may have an impact on the determination of 
the amount of compensation or the choice of valuation methods. 
The determination of the quantum of compensation is undoubtedly a stage of ISDS 
at which HRL may have another significant entry point. However, the most expressive 
examples of reduction of the amount of compensation for non-economic reasons are 
found in cases in which the host State raised cultural concerns based on international 
cultural law, rather than cases expressly argued in HRL terms. 
A prominent example is found in SPP v. Egypt, which will be analysed in more detail 
in section 3. In this case, both the tribunal and the parties affirmed the relevance of 
the WHC for the dispute.929 The tribunal considered that the State measures at stake 
constituted a case of a compensable taking,930 but the acknowledgment of the 
international obligations held under the WHC had significant consequences on the 
determination of the amount of compensation. The tribunal affirmed that ‘[t]he cardinal 
point to be borne in mind, then, in determining the appropriate compensation is that, 
while the contracts could no longer be performed [due to the obligations assumed 
under the WHC], the Claimants are entitled to receive fair compensation for what was 
expropriated rather than damages for breach of contract.’931 Although the investors 
argued that the discounted cash flow (‘DCF’) method should be applied, the tribunal 
disagreed and affirmed that this method was ‘not appropriate for determining the fair 
compensation in this case because the project was not in existence for a sufficient 
period of time to generate the data necessary for a meaningful DCF calculation’.932 
In addition, the tribunal decided that the loss of profit (lucrum cessans) could not be 
compensated, stating that ‘the allowance of lucrum cessans may only involve those 
profits which are legitimate’ and that ‘lot sales in the areas registered with the World 
Heritage Committee under the UNESCO Convention would have been illegal under 
both international law and Egyptian law after 1979, when the registration was 
made.’933 It added that, because ‘the project was located in an area where the 																																																								
928 Yukos v. Russia, Final Award (18 July 2014), paragraphs 1633-1637. 
929 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, Award (20 May 1992), paragraph 78. 
930 Idem, paragraph 154. 
931 Idem, paragraph 183. 
932 Idem, paragraph 188. 
933 Idem, paragraph 190. 
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Claimants should have known there was a risk that antiquities would be discovered’, 
it decided ‘not to base compensation on profits that might have been earned after the 
Plateau areas were registered with UNESCO.’934 
In the end, although the investors claimed a total of US$41,000,000, the tribunal 
decided to award only US$27,661,000,935 based on the difference between the 
expenditures undertaken to generate the revenues imputed to the lot sale and the 
portion of imputed revenues corresponding to the investor’s shareholding in the joint 
venture.936 Because the tribunal denied the award of compensation for profits that 
could have been accrued after the emergence of the international cultural law 
obligation, this case is a clear example of ‘how, under the specific circumstances of 
the case, international obligations arising from different subject-matter areas of 
international law can be relevant while adjudicating investment disputes.’937 There is 




Finally, the possibility of tribunals hearing counterclaims by host States constitutes 
an important point of entry for HRL. The possibility of a respondent State to file a 
counterclaim against the claimant investor is a complicated issue (according to 
Asteriti, ‘a Cinderella issue’),938 and this is not the place to discuss the complexities 
associated with the matter. However, a few general observations must be made so 
as to frame the issue. 
First of all, it should be noted that the vast majority of the cases arbitrated so far were 
initiated by the investor,939 and the few counterclaims that have been submitted have 
																																																								
934 Idem, paragraph 251. 
935 Idem, paragraph 257. 
936 Idem, paragraph 217. 
937 Lahra Liberti, ‘The Relevance of Non-Investment Treaty Obligations in Assessing Compensation’ in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. (eds), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press 2009), p. 564. 
938 Alessandra Asteriti, ‘Environmental Law in Investment Arbitration: Procedural Means of 
Incorporation’, 16 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 248 (2015), p. 256. 
939 José Antonio Rivas, ‘ICSID Treaty Counterclaims: Case Law and Treaty Evolution’ in Jean E. Kalicki 
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been unsuccessful in most cases.940 In addition, very few IIAs explicitly refer to 
counterclaims,941 which means that the possibility of submitting a counterclaim highly 
depends on treaty interpretation. The rarity of investor obligations in treaty language 
leads to the fact that, in most cases, ‘states cannot submit counterclaims against 
investors when the substance of the dispute is a violation of an IIA.’942 
In principle, tribunals have jurisdiction over counterclaims, except if this is explicitly 
rejected; the viability of counterclaims depends in practice on the rules governing the 
proceedings and on the wording of the IIA provision establishing jurisdiction.943 Both 
Article 46 of the ICSID Convention and Article 21(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules explicitly provide for counterclaims. However, when assessing the possibility of 
submitting counterclaims, it is necessary, first and foremost, to interpret the 
jurisdictional clause, which, as mentioned before, may be drafted in broader or 
narrower terms, the latter making it more difficult to defend the possibility of a 
counterclaim. The fundamental elements of jurisdiction that need to be assessed are 
the consent of the parties and the connection between the original claim and the 
counterclaim.944 Choice of law provisions may also be relevant, to the extent that they 
refer to the host State’s domestic law – which would allow States to invoke investor 
obligations even in the absence of such obligations in the IIA.945 A detailed analysis 
of the controversies regarding each of these issues will not be undertaken in this 
research, for reasons of space.946 
A recent award, in the case of Urbaser SA and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia v. 
Argentina, is particularly relevant regarding counterclaims based on human rights. In 
this case, the dispute related to a concession for water and sewage services to be 
provided in the Province of Greater Buenos Aires. This concession was granted in 
early 2000 to Aguas Del Gran Buenos Aires S.A. (AGBA), a company established by 
foreign investors and shareholders, including Urbaser and CABB, and was terminated 
in July 2006. The investors claimed that Argentina breached several provisions of the 																																																								
940 Thomas Kendra, ‘State Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration-A New Lease of Life?’, 29 Arbitration 
International 575 (2013), p. 580; see also Ana Vohryzek-Griest, ‘State Counterclaims in Investor-State 
Disputes: A History of 30 Years of Failure’ International Law, Revista Colombiana de Derecho 
Internacional 83 (2009). 
941 Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing Investment Law’, 17 Lewis & Clark 
L Rev 461 (2013), p. 467. 
942 Idem, p. 463. 
943 Alessandra Asteriti (2015), p. 257. 
944 Idem, pp. 257-264. 
945 Thomas Kendra (2013), p. 585. 
946 For a more detailed discussion of the matter, see, inter alia, Andrea K Bjorklund (2013), pp. 473-475; 
see also Thomas Kendra (2013); Ana Vohryzek-Griest (2009); and Alessandra Asteriti (2015). 
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applicable BIT, including FET and expropriation claims. The tribunal dismissed all 
claims, except for finding a small breach of the FET standard in relation to the 
renegotiation of the concession contract between 2003 and 2005. More importantly 
for the purpose of this research, Argentina filed a counterclaim in the dispute, based 
on the damage suffered by the State as a result of the investors’ administration of the 
concession, mainly due to the failure to make the investment they had undertaken to 
make, which constituted a violation of the principles of good faith and pacta sunt 
servanda, with impacts on the human right to water.947 
The tribunal first accepted jurisdiction over Argentina’s counterclaim, based mainly 
on Articles 25 and 46 of the ICSID Convention and on the broad wording of the BIT’s 
dispute resolution clause, which was deemed ‘completely neutral as to the identity of 
the claimant or respondent in an investment dispute arising “between the parties”’.948 
The tribunal also rejected the investor’s argument that its consent had been restricted 
to their involvement in the proceedings as claimants, to the exclusion of any potential 
counterclaim,949 asking: 
(…) when Claimants accept that Article X of the BIT retains a right for the 
Argentine Republic to raise a claim against the investor, how could it be 
possible to also admit that Claimants would be entitled to render this right 
nonexistent merely by restricting their acceptance of arbitration to their own 
claims?950 
The tribunal considered the filing of the counterclaim timely951 and further affirmed 
that the factual link between the original claim and the counterclaim was ‘manifest’,952 
ultimately affirming that it had jurisdiction to deal with the counterclaim and that the 
claim was admissible.953 
Although the tribunal ended up dismissing the counterclaim on its merits,954 several 
of its observations need to be noted. First of all, regarding the investors’ argument 
that the BIT did not impose obligations on the investor, hence not granting any rights 
																																																								
947 Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The Argentine 
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948 Idem, paragraph 1143. 
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to the host State, the tribunal affirmed that ‘(…) there [was] no provision stating that 
the investment’s host State would not have any right under the BIT’955 and that such 
understanding would be contrary to the wording of the BIT.956 In relation to the matter 
of applicable law, after making some comments on the need to preserve the effet utile 
of treaty rules,957 the tribunal affirmed that ‘the BIT does not represent, in the view of 
the Contracting Parties and its clear text, a set of rules defined in isolation without 
consideration given to rules of international law external to its own rules.’958 
When assessing the relationship between the BIT and international and HRL, the 
tribunal stated that it felt ‘reluctant’ to accept the investors’ argument that private 
companies did not have human rights obligations.959 Regarding the principle 
according to which companies are by nature not able to be subjects of international 
law, and therefore not capable of holding obligations, the tribunal considered its 
importance to have been lost. It added that ‘[i]f the BIT (…) is not based on a 
corporation’s incapacity of holding rights under international law, it cannot be admitted 
that it would reject by necessity any idea that a foreign investor company could not 
be subject to international law obligations.’960 
After referring to CSR as ‘a standard of crucial importance’ accepted by international 
law, the tribunal meaningfully affirmed: ‘it can no longer be admitted that companies 
operating internationally are immune from becoming subjects of international law.’961 
It further reviewed a number of human rights instruments, such as the UDHR, the 
ICESCR, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, as well as the Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, arriving at the following statement: 
(…) it is therefore to be admitted that the human right for everyone’s dignity 
and its right for adequate housing and living conditions are complemented by 
an obligation on all parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activity 
aimed at destroying such rights.962 
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Nevertheless, after referring to the principle of systemic interpretation, the tribunal 
determined that the investors’ obligation to make the investment they had undertaken 
to make did not find its ground in international law, but rather on domestic law. The 
contrary could only be possible if an obligation to abstain from violating human rights 
was at stake, but, in this case, that was ‘not a matter for concern’.963 
Even though the counterclaim failed, important progress has been made by this 
tribunal and, if the trend persists, it may contribute to a more regular and effective use 
of counterclaims as a mechanism to integrate HRL and international investment, with 
significant impact both on the equilibrium of ISDS and on the protection and promotion 
of human rights. 
 
3. Avenues for the consideration of human rights in ISDS 
In the previous section, several procedural points of entry for HRL were identified. 
With these possibilities in mind, it is now important to understand which actors may 
raise human rights arguments in arbitral proceedings, and how this has been 
happening in practice. There are essentially four possible avenues for the introduction 
of human rights arguments in ISDS: they may be raised by the investor, by States 
(mainly the host State), by third parties and by the tribunal itself. 
 
3.1. Invocation of human rights and cultural arguments by 
investors 
a) Human rights arguments 
Situations where the investor invokes human rights in order to strengthen his claim 
are the less relevant in terms of the protection of stakeholders, but, perhaps not 
surprisingly, they constitute the area in which investment tribunals have shown the 
least reluctance to consider human rights arguments.964 It is thus important to still 
address these situations, simply because they allow for a deeper understanding of 
how investment tribunals actually deal with HRL. 
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Investors usually invoke human rights arguments either as an independent claim, in 
addition to claims regarding violation of the applicable IIA, or as way of substantiating 
the alleged violation of the applicable IIA.965 At first glance, this might appear 
counterintuitive, mainly for two reasons: first, arbitral tribunals that are constituted 
under an IIA are specialised courts with a limited mandate, restricted to ‘investment 
disputes’ brought by an ‘investor’, which means that HRL only has the chance to 
permeate into these disputes if the jurisdictional and applicable law clauses are broad 
enough to cover human rights issues;966 secondly, investment arbitrators are not 
human rights experts and may thus not be sufficiently competent to decide on this 
sort of issues. 
There are, however, other incentives for investors to bring up human rights issues in 
investment disputes, the most obvious being the fact that a human rights argument 
can help support investment claims, thus strengthening the investor’s position. In 
addition, investors might prefer to raise these issues within the context of an 
investment dispute so as to avoid the adjudication rules of human rights bodies, 
namely the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies.967 Finally, it is important to 
consider the significantly different nature of the enforcement of the final decisions: 
ISDS awards are arguably much more easily enforced than the decisions of human 
rights adjudicating bodies and thus appear as an attractive alternative for investors.968 
There has been a number of investment disputes where investors raised arguments 
that are directly grounded on HRL. The first that should be mentioned is the 
UNCITRAL case of Biloune v. Ghana,969 where a Syrian investor argued, in addition 
to the breach of contractual provisions in the form of expropriation, that there had 
been a violation of his human rights and denial of justice. In this case, the tribunal 
stated that investors are entitled to a minimum standard of treatment and that all 
individuals, regardless of nationality, hold inviolable human rights. Nevertheless, 
considering the wording of the consent clause contained in the agreement, the 
tribunal considered that it did not have jurisdiction to address this type of claim as an 
independent cause of action.970 The actions undertaken by Ghana that formed the 
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base of the human rights claim were, however, considered when deciding on the 
matter of expropriation. In the words of Kube and Petersmann, ‘[t]his may indicate 
that although the tribunal was reluctant to directly adjudicate on human rights, the fact 
that the governmental action had severe consequences for the individual could not 
be ignored (and was thus brought to bear in the determination of expropriation).’971 
Another interesting case in this regard is that of Chevron v. Ecuador I,972 in which the 
investors made an independent claim for denial of justice under customary 
international law. The tribunal considered that it would have jurisdiction to assess 
these claims as long as they were sufficiently related to the investment, which, in this 
case, was considered to be true. The tribunal stated that the language of the IIA 
‘includes all disputes “arising out of or relating to” investment agreements and this 
language is broad enough to allow the Tribunal to hear a denial of justice claim 
relating to the Concession Agreements.’973 It is important to note that, in this case, 
the investors relied both on provisions of Ecuadorian domestic law and the 
international obligations stemming from the ACHR, as well as citing the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice and the IACtHR.974 Stating that the IIA provision on 
denial of justice significantly overlapped with the prohibition of denial of justice under 
customary international law, the Tribunal considered that the relevant IIA provision, 
‘setting out an “effective means” standard, constitutes a lex specialis and not a mere 
restatement of the law on denial of justice.’975 The tribunal further stated that, given 
the common origins of the two standards, the application and interpretation of the 
treaty provision should be informed by the customary international law on denial of 
justice.976 As Kube and Petersmann point out, it is impossible to establish to what 
extent the human rights argument affected the final award, since ‘[t]he tribunal 
avoided explicit reference to international law in the subsequent analysis and to the 
human rights citations of the claimants.’977 
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In Toto v. Lebanon,978 the investor claimed that the ‘abnormally slow pace’ of 
proceedings before national courts constituted a case of denial of justice under 
international law,979 and referred both to the case-law of the ECtHR and to Article 14 
of the ICCPR.980 Because of the way the relevant IIA was drafted, including 
international law both for jurisdiction and applicable law purposes, the tribunal 
decided to engage with the investor’s argumentation and referred to the ICCPR and 
to a decision of the ICCPR Commission.981 In the end, the tribunal stated that it did 
not have jurisdiction under the IIA to decide on the claim due to lack of evidence.982 
The tribunal nevertheless seemed to be open to the idea of considering human rights 
arguments, at least in principle.983 
In Roussalis v. Romania,984 the investor based his claims on several breaches of the 
applicable IIA, but also raised an issue regarding the right to property, under the First 
Additional Protocol to the ECHR.985 The tribunal, however, dismissed the application 
of the European Convention, stating: 
The Tribunal does not exclude the possibility that the international obligations 
of the Contracting States (…) could include obligations deriving from 
multilateral instruments to which those states are parties, including, possibly, 
the European Convention of Human Rights and its Additional Protocol No.1. 
But the issue is moot in the present case and does not require decision by the 
Tribunal, given the higher and more specific level of protection offered by the 
BIT to the investors compared to the more general protections offered to them 
by the human rights instruments referred above.986 
There are also several cases in which the investor raised human rights arguments as 
a way of supporting their treaty breach claims. As Kube and Petersmann highlight, 
however, in these cases ‘the impact of human rights argumentation very often 
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remains unclear since the need for an explicit decision at the jurisdictional stage often 
is unnecessary.’987 
The first case that should be mentioned in this regard is that of Micula v. Romania,988 
a case that is considered to be a successful example of the application of the rules of 
interpretation provided by Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.989 In this case, the tribunal 
considered certain rules of international law as relevant to the arbitral proceedings, 
namely EU law and, more interestingly, Article 15 of the UDHR, by stating that ‘[i]n 
making its determination, the Tribunal will be mindful’ of the latter provision.990 
However, the tribunal did not return to this provision in its reasoning, which makes it 
unclear how HRL affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
Another extremely interesting case is that of Grand River Enterprise v. U.S.,991 in 
which the investors were indigenous peoples, members of the First Nations. In this 
case, the claimants argued that the applicable law went beyond NAFTA, including a 
number of international human rights instruments such as the IACHR, the UDHR, the 
UNDRIP and ILO Convention no. 169.992 The investors also argued that the relevant 
NAFTA provisions should be interpreted taking into account fundamental human 
rights norms.993 In its reasoning, the tribunal mentioned ‘the need to preserve the 
NAFTA Parties' "flexibility to safeguard the public welfare"’,994 as well as the ‘the 
obligation to "take into account" other rules of international law’. It also criticised the 
US authorities for not being ‘at all sensitive to the particular rights and interests of the 
Claimants or the indigenous nations of which they are citizens, including those 
interests in maintaining and developing cross-border trade relations in accordance 
with longstanding traditions in promoting economic development opportunities for 
indigenous communities’.995 The tribunal also assessed the existence of a customary 
international law principle requiring governments to consult indigenous peoples, but 
concluded that, should such duty exist, it would be collectively held by the indigenous 
peoples concerned, and there was no compelling evidence in the case showing that 
																																																								
987 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 75. 
988 loan Micula et al. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
(24 September 2008). 
989 Hervé Ascensio (2016), p. 382. 
990 loan Micula et al. v. Romania, paragraph 88. 
991 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (12 
January 2011). 
992 Idem, paragraph 182. 
993 Idem, paragraph 66. 
994 Idem, paragraph 69. 
995 Idem, paragraph 186. 
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the investor was the rightful representative of the First Nations.996 However, and 
according to Balcerzak, ‘the case shows that the scope of jurisdiction, even if it covers 
exclusively claims based on standards of protection included in a particular 
investment treaty, limits neither the applicable law nor the possible influence of 
human rights on the interpretation of the provisions of investment treaties.’997 
In UPS v. Canada, the investor claimed that the host State allegedly undertook anti-
competitive practices in the postal services market, but also that Canada was 
violating labour rights provided by the ILO, the International Bill of Human Rights and 
customary international law, by denying a right to collective bargaining to postal 
workers in rural areas. According to UPS, this was tantamount to a violation of the 
obligation to ensure minimum standard of treatment to foreign investors in 
accordance with international law, under NAFTA, since it distorted competition and 
lowered wages.998 The tribunal did not, however, respond to the human rights 
arguments raised by the investor or by third parties acting as amicus curiae.999  
It should also be noted that, in the cases of Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. v. Russia1000 
and Veteran Petroleum v. Russia,1001 both the host State and the investors raised 
human rights arguments, namely through the invocation of the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR to support their claims regarding the right to property. In both cases, the 
tribunals stated that said jurisprudence was not binding on them, but considered 
nevertheless that ‘it is natural to examine [these decisions] in the light of many of the 
arguments made’ by the claimants.1002 
A further relevant case is Rompetrol v. Romania, where the investor claimed that the 
arrest, detention, criminal investigations and wire-tapping of its directors constituted 
State-sponsored harassment in breach of the BIT. To support this claim, the investor 
invoked due process rights under international law, namely Article 6 of the ECHR. 
The tribunal affirmed, first of all, that it is not competent to decide issues relating to 
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the application of the ECHR; secondly, that the relevant IIA was the governing law of 
the dispute; more interestingly, it left the door open for HRL, by stating: 
The category of materials for the assessment in particular of fair and equitable 
treatment is not a closed one, and may include, in appropriate circumstances, 
the consideration of common standards under other international regimes 
(including those in the area of human rights), if and to the extent that they 
throw useful light on the content of fair and equitable treatment in particular 
sets of factual circumstances; the examination is however very specific to the 
particular circumstances, and defies definition by any general rule.1003 
Lastly, the case of Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia raises a number of 
interesting questions both regarding the investor’s and the host State’s arguments. In 
this case, the investor claimed he had been mistreated in the course of criminal 
proceedings conducted by Indonesian authorities after a bank bailout. The claimant 
was not present in these proceedings, however, and was convicted in absentia and 
a part of his assets was confiscated. The applicable IIA was the OIC Agreement,1004 
which contained ‘an unusual provision (…) protecting the “basic rights” of 
investors’.1005 The investor substantiated his position with reference to Article 14 of 
the ICCPR, which would apply by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.1006 The 
tribunal stated that the expression ‘basic rights’ as used in the OIC Agreement 
referred to ‘basic property rights’, and not to the investor’s civil and political rights.1007 
However, in a rare display of openness to HRL, the tribunal analysed several 
international instruments such as the General Comments of the HRC,1008 regional 
human rights instruments and case-law,1009 the UDHR1010 and the UN Guidelines on 
the Role of Prosecutors,1011 in addition to the ICCPR.1012 Cotula rightly affirms that 
‘the Tribunal took some important steps forwards in considering human rights in 
[ISDS]’,1013 mainly for three reasons. First, whilst assessing the relevance of the 																																																								
1003 The Rompetrol Group N.V.v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award (6 May 2013), paragraph 
172. 
1004 Available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2399. 
1005 Lorenzo Cotula (2016), p. 149. 
1006 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award (15 December 
2014), paragraphs 177-178 (hereinafter, Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia). 
1007 Idem, paragraphs 518-522. 
1008 Idem, paragraph 572. 
1009 Idem, paragraph 575. 
1010 Idem, paragraph 576. 
1011 Idem, paragraph 577. 
1012 Idem, paragraphs 556 et seq. 
1013 Lorenzo Cotula (2016), p. 152. 
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ICCPR for the alleged breach of FET, the tribunal unmistakably affirmed that 
international HRL imposes obligations on States, and that this is relevant for ISDS.1014 
Secondly, the tribunal acknowledged the fact that the ICCPR is part of general 
international law.1015 Thirdly, not only did the tribunal make an in-depth analysis of the 
relevant human rights instruments, but it also relied heavily on international HRL to 
establish that there was a breach of FET by the host State. It appears that, as stated 
by Cotula, ‘[f]ollowing Al-Warraq, tribunals might feel less reluctant to engage with 
[international HRL] arguments.’1016 
Considering the above, it appears that the investment tribunals’ approach to human 
rights arguments raised by the investor has been inconsistent, ranging ‘from taking 
them into account in determining a breach of investment law obligations, stating to be 
"mindful" or aware of the human rights at stake, to denying the tribunals' competence 
for examining human rights claims as such.’1017 However, recent developments show 
that it is possible to balance human rights and investment protection, and that in many 
cases these two areas of international law are ‘mutually reinforcing’.1018 
 
b) Cultural arguments 
In addition to considering cases involving human rights argumentation, it is important, 
for the purposes of this research, to also mention an important case regarding 
indigenous cultural rights, Grand River v. US, already mentioned above. In this case, 
the investor was a company composed of indigenous peoples, dedicated to the 
manufacture and sale of tobacco products, which they considered ‘a traditional trade 
of the Six Nations peoples in which they have engaged for centuries.’1019 The 
claimants argued that the NAFTA provisions on NT, MFN, minimum standard of 
treatment and expropriation had been breached, negatively impacting on their cultural 
rights. They claimed: 
This arbitration is not about health protection or promotion. It is not about State 
rights to regulate in the interests of the public good. And it is not only about 																																																								
1014 Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. Indonesia, paragraphs 556-562 and 621. 
1015 Idem, paragraph 558. 
1016 Lorenzo Cotula (2016), p. 154. 
1017 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 79. 
1018 Lorenzo Cotula (2016), p. 152. 
1019 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Statement 
of Claimant’s Claims Arising Directly out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share 
Amendments (6 November 2006), p. 1. 
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the anticompetitive measures being imposed at the behest of a few large 
companies in exchange for a share of their profits. This arbitration concerns 
and arises out of the Respondent’s discrimination against a group of 
aboriginal investors, their traditions, businesses and livelihoods, and the 
expropriation of their markets, all in violation of their rights under international 
law.1020 
The investor claimed that the US had a duty to consult with indigenous peoples before 
imposing a measure that is likely to affect them, and that this duty resulted from a 
number of international HRL instruments and customary international law.1021 In this 
respect, the tribunal considered that ‘state legal officers acted less than optimally’ and 
that ‘First Nations or tribal governments (…) should have been included in these 
discussions.’1022 It added that ‘[i]t may well be, as the Claimants urged, that there 
does exist a principle of customary international law requiring governmental 
authorities to consult indigenous peoples on governmental policies or actions 
significantly affecting them’.1023 
The claimant also argued that the US requirement that tobacco companies should 
pay a contribution as compensation for the treatment of tobacco-related illnesses, 
which was contained in the Master Settlement Agreement negotiated between 
several states and tobacco companies, amounted to an indirect expropriation. In this 
agreement, the companies also agreed to ‘extensive restrictions on advertising and 
other marketing practices, and to fund smoking prevention and cessation programs’, 
which increased the price of cigarettes.1024 The investor further claimed that it should 
be immune from state regulation for commercial activities involving cross-border trade 
at a significant scale under the Jay Treaty, which protected cross-border movement 
and trade among indigenous peoples in North America; on this point, the Tribunal 
affirmed that the claimant’s argument relied ‘on an interpretation of the Jay Treaty 
that is not plainly supported by the text or easily and readily derived from application 
of accepted rules of treaty interpretation’. 1025 
																																																								
1020 Ibidem. 
1021 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (12 
January 2011), paragraph 182. 
1022 Idem, paragraph 185. 
1023 Idem, paragraph 210. 
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Even though the tribunal paid consideration to the particular status of indigenous 
peoples, it rejected the expropriation claim because the investor’s business remained 
profitable.1026 It also addressed the issue of legitimate expectations; based on the fact 
that ‘trade in tobacco products has historically been the subject of close and extensive 
regulation by U.S. states’, it stated that the investor ‘could not reasonably have 
developed and relied on an expectation (…) that he could carry on a large-scale 
tobacco distribution business, involving the transportation of large quantities of 
cigarettes across state lines and into many states of the United States, without 
encountering state regulation.’1027 
In Grand River, the tribunal has shown some deference to the particular status of 
indigenous peoples under international law, but it is important to keep in mind that 
arbitral tribunals have limited jurisdiction and cannot thus decide on matters such as 
the violation of indigenous peoples’ rights. As Vadi points out, one of the most 
significant implications of this case lies in the fact that ‘arbitral tribunals are open to 
consider non-investment concerns within international investment law while fully 
respecting their arbitral mandate which requires them to adjudicate only on possible 
breaches of international investment law.’1028 
 
3.2. Invocation of human rights and cultural arguments by the host 
State 
a) Human rights arguments 
Human rights have frequently been invoked by host States as a justification for 
measures that had the potential to be considered breaches of IIAs. As has been noted 
before, States may find themselves in a situation of conflict between observing its 
international obligations (States are subject to international human rights obligations, 
both not to engage in human rights violations and to prevent human rights violations 
undertaken by others) and complying with the commitments assumed through the 
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conclusion of IIAs. This conflict may potentially constrict States’ regulatory space, as 
liability for breaches of IIAs may incentivise a ‘race-to-the-bottom’.1029 
It should be mentioned that there are no known cases to date brought by States 
against investors for violation of human rights.1030 This could be due to procedural 
reasons, since only a small minority of IIAs allow for States to initiate proceedings; in 
addition, usually the investor expresses his consent to arbitration in his request to 
initiate proceedings, which may be limited to the substance of the request.1031 
Furthermore, it is common to find a degree of complicity between the investor and the 
host State when it comes to human rights abuses. To complicate the situation further, 
the human rights obligations of non-State actors are still not defined in international 
law, which renders such claims more difficult.1032 
This section will thus focus on disputes where the host State raised human rights 
arguments as a defence against investor claims – more precisely, as a justification 
for measures taken in furtherance of international human rights obligations which 
adversely affect foreign investors or investments. 
The first cases that should be mentioned are the ones brought against Argentina in 
relation to the right to water, a human right contained in the ICESCR and other human 
rights instruments.1033 Argentina adopted a number of emergency measures as a 
reaction to the 1999 economic and financial crisis, namely to ensure that its 
population had access to affordable water and gas, and several investors contested 
said measures through ISDS. In Azurix v. Argentina, the State argued that ‘a conflict 
between [an IIA] and human rights treaties must be resolved in favor of human rights 
because the consumers’ public interest must prevail over the private interest of 
service provider [sic].’1034 The tribunal stated that the issue of incompatibility between 
the relevant IIA and human rights had not been ‘fully argued’ and that it failed ‘to 
understand the incompatibility’ in the specifics of the case, since the services to 
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consumers kept being provided after the termination notice.1035 Nevertheless, when 
the tribunal analysed the concept of public purpose to assess the existence of 
expropriation, it recognised that ‘[i]n the exercise of their public policy function, 
governments take all sorts of measures that may affect the economic value of 
investments without such measures giving rise to a need to compensate’1036 and 
subsequently referred to the Tecmed award, in which the tribunal sought guidance in 
the case law of the ECtHR.1037 However, there was no discussion of the impact of 
HRL in the determination of expropriation – a fact that some authors blame Argentina 
for.1038 
In Siemens v. Argentina, the reference to HRL by the State was deemed as not 
sufficiently developed, which led the tribunal to affirm that ‘without the benefit of 
further elaboration and substantiation by the parties, [the human rights argument] is 
not an argument that, prima facie, bears any relationship to the merits of this case.’1039 
In Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, the State, in addition to the argument of necessity, 
invoked the human right to water as a justification for its measures.1040 The tribunal 
acknowledged that ‘[t]he provision of water and sewage services to the metropolitan 
area of Buenos Aires certainly was vital to the health and well-being of nearly ten 
million people and was therefore an essential interest of the Argentine State’, but 
stated it was ‘not convinced that the only way that Argentina could satisfy that 
essential interest was by adopting measures that would subsequently violate the 
treaty rights of the Claimants’ investments to fair and equitable treatment’.1041 It 
added: 
Argentina is subject to both international obligations, i.e. human rights and 
treaty obligation, and must respect both of them equally. Under the 
circumstances of these cases, Argentina’s human rights obligations and its 
investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually 
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exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, Argentina could have respected both 
types of obligations.1042 
Kube and Petersmann rightly observe that it is difficult to understand how the tribunal 
reached the above conclusion of compatibility, since there is no in-depth analysis of 
Argentina’s human rights obligations nor did the tribunal discuss the severity of the 
threat to the right to water that the State was trying to avoid and its impact on the 
investment obligations.1043 
In SAUR v. Argentina, the State again argued that its measures had been taken to 
protect the constitutionally grounded human right to water, adding that they could not 
be considered as an expropriation or deemed unfair, but should rather be seen as 
necessary and legitimate measures for the protection of its population and their 
fundamental rights.1044 The tribunal acknowledged that human rights in general, and 
the right to water in particular, constituted one of the several sources that it should 
take into account in its decision, since these rights were a part of Argentine 
constitutional law and, more importantly, of the general principles of international 
law.1045 However, it stated that these rights were not incompatible with the investor’s 
rights under the relevant IIA.1046 
In other cases such as Continental Casualty v. Argentina, the State relied mainly on 
the ‘necessity’ clause contained in the relevant IIAs, which was analysed in light of 
Article XX of the GATT and customary international law.1047 In this case, there was a 
general exception clause in Article XI of the US/Argentina BIT, which stated: ‘[t]his 
Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for 
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its 
own essential security interests.’ The main point in this decision was the fact that the 
tribunal ‘adopted a mature form of proportionality analysis’,1048 even though it did not 
directly engage in a discussion of the conflict between IIA obligations and HRL. 
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Nevertheless, ‘the adoption of balancing methods from right-based constitutional law 
systems could promote convergence of human rights and international investment 
law.’1049 
Another significant case involving Argentina, this time in relation to the gas sector, is 
CMS Gas v Argentina, in which the State argued that ‘as the economic and social 
crisis that affected the country compromised basic human rights, no investment treaty 
could prevail as it would be in violation of such constitutionally recognized rights.’1050 
The tribunal, however, affirmed that ‘there is no question of affecting fundamental 
human rights when considering the issues disputed by the parties’.1051 
It is also important to mention the case of Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, which concerned 
water privatisation. In this case, the tribunal summarised Tanzania’s argument by 
stating that ‘[w]ater and sanitation services are vitally important, and the Republic has 
more than a right to protect such services in case of a crisis: it has a moral and 
perhaps even a legal obligation to do so.’1052 The tribunal decided that Tanzania’s 
measures amounted to an expropriation, but its reasoning did not reflect the human 
rights concerns expressed by the host State, rather focusing on the violation of 
contractual requirements.1053 
This overview of arbitral awards shows that States have had very little success in the 
invocation of HRL as a justification for measures that violate investment protections. 
As Kube and Petersmann note, ‘ISDS tribunals are rather reluctant to accept human 
rights based arguments and have not developed a coherent methodology for 
evaluating the human rights dimensions of investment disputes. Host states [also] 
seem reluctant to justify their measures in terms of their human rights obligations.’1054 
 
b) Cultural arguments 
After analysing several cases in which host States invoked human rights arguments 
as a defence, it is important to also mention some cases in which the protection of 																																																								
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cultural heritage was States’ non-economic motivation for measures that could violate 
IIL. Even though these cases were not specifically framed in human rights terms, this 
research has already made clear that the right to culture includes the protection of 
cultural heritage. Because the interaction between cultural heritage and international 
investment has already been extensively covered in the relevant literature,1055 and for 
reasons of space, only some key cases will be mentioned. 
The first relevant case in this regard is Glamis Gold v. USA, which involved an area 
of the Californian desert considered sacred by the Quechan Indian tribe. The tribe 
vehemently opposed a project that entailed gold mining in the area, since it would 
allegedly ‘destroy the Trail of Dreams’,1056 a sacred path walked by the Quechan in 
ceremonies ‘to celebrate the creation of the world, the spirit world, the natural world, 
and [the Creator] Kukumat’s  cremation.’1057 The investor initiated proceedings with 
the claim that certain measures taken by the federal government and by California 
regarding the backfilling of open-pit mines amounted to expropriation and to the 
violation of the minimum standard of treatment. In this case, the tribunal referred to 
UNESCO instruments regarding the protection of cultural heritage, namely the 
WHC.1058 It found that the investor’s claims were without merit, stating that the 
measure addressed ‘some, if not all, of the harms caused to Native American sacred 
sites by open-pit mining’ and that ‘governments must compromise between the 
interests of competing parties’.1059 It went on to say that ‘there was a reasonable 
connection between the harm and the proposed remedy’ and that the area contained 
‘sight lines, teaching areas and viewsheds that must be protected and would be 
harmed by significant pits and waste piles in the near vicinity’.1060 In the end, the 
tribunal rejected all of the investor’s claims and ordered him to pay two thirds of the 
arbitral costs. 
In Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, the State expropriated the 
property of the investors to extend the Guanacaste Conservation Area, which was 
later entered into the World Heritage List. The tribunal recognised that States are 
allowed by international law to ‘expropriate foreign-owned property within its territory 
for a public purpose and against the prompt payment of adequate and effective 																																																								
1055 A detailed and in-depth analysis of these awards can be found in Valentina Vadi (2014). 
1056 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (8 June 2009), paragraph 107. 
1057 Idem, paragraph 105. 
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compensation’, but affirmed that ‘the purpose of protecting the environment for which 
the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which 
adequate compensation must be paid (…) [and the] international source of the 
obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.’1061 
The case of SPP v. Egypt concerned a tourism development project at the pyramids 
area near Cairo and at Ras El Hekma on the Mediterranean coast.1062 The project 
faced political opposition and became the subject of parliamentary inquiry, since it 
had the potential to threaten undiscovered antiquities.1063 Egypt thus cancelled the 
project and declared the lands as having ‘utilité publique’1064 and, around nine months 
later, nominated ‘the pyramid fields from Giza to Dahshur’ for inclusion in the World 
Heritage List.1065 When determining the applicable law, the tribunal stated that there 
was no doubt that the WHC was relevant.1066 The tribunal went on to find that certain 
acts of the Egyptian authorities ‘created expectations protected by established 
principles of international law’1067 and accepted the investor’s argument that the public 
purpose of the expropriation did not exempt the State from paying compensation, 
affirming that the obligations of the WHC only became binding on Egypt after the 
nomination of the site.1068 This has been the subject of criticism, with scholars arguing 
that ‘the outstanding and universal value depends on the qualities of a site rather than 
on its evaluation either by the [S]tate party or the World Heritage Committee.’1069 It 
should be noted, however, that even though the tribunal arrived at this conclusion, it 
did take into account the obligations arising from the WHC in the determination of the 
quantum of compensation, as seen in Section 2 above. 
It is also important to mention the case of Parkerings v. Lithuania, which regarded the 
construction of parking facilities near the Cathedral in the Old Town of Vilnius, a World 
Heritage Site. In this case, the investor claimed that the State had breached the MFN 
clause when it terminated the agreement with Parkerings and signed a new contract 
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with a Dutch company,1070 even though the latter would not conduct excavations 
under the Old Town.1071 The tribunal rejected this claim, stating that ‘the two investors 
were not in like circumstances’ and that ‘the City of Vilnius did have legitimate grounds 
to distinguish between the two projects’.1072 In this case, the tribunal showed 
deference towards the protection of cultural heritage and acknowledged that ‘[t]he 
historical and archaeological preservation and environmental protection could be and 
in this case were a justification for the refusal of the project.’1073 As Vadi points out, 
‘[w]hile the Tribunal did not mention any hierarchy among different international law 
obligations, it concretely balanced the different norms.’1074 
In Lemire v. Ukraine, a case regarding intangible cultural heritage, the investor was 
the majority shareholder of Gala, a radio station broadcasting in Ukraine, and he 
initiated arbitration against the State on a number of grounds, including the violation 
of FET, minimum standard of treatment and performance requirements. Whilst other 
(domestic) investors managed to secure between 38 and 56 frequencies, Lemire was 
only awarded one, in a small village in rural Ukraine.1075 Lemire argued that the fact 
that a tender for a radio channel required the broadcast to be in Ukrainian only 
amounted to discrimination and placed domestic investors in a position of advantage. 
He claimed that ‘[w]e should allow the audience to determine what it wants and we 
think that since Ukraine is seeking the status of a country with a market economy, it 
should not introduce Ukrainian culture by force’.1076 The tribunal dismissed this claim, 
stating that the fact that the authorities had decided to establish said condition ‘was a 
legitimate decision, based on a public interest choice to extend the use of Ukrainian 
in the media’.1077 
As to the claim that the Ukrainian procedure for the issuance of broadcasting licences 
was in itself unfair, inequitable and discriminatory, the tribunal stated that ‘pluralism 
could arguably be better served if the new channel was awarded to a different 
company’1078 and that ‘[t]he weaknesses in the Ukrainian legal procedure for the 																																																								
1070 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award (11 
September 2007), paragraph 203. 
1071 Idem, paragraph 284. 
1072 Idem, paragraph 396. 
1073 Idem, paragraph 392. 
1074 Valentina Vadi (2014), p. 128. 
1075 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award (28 March 2011), hereinafter 
‘Lemire v. Ukraine, Award’, paragraph 59. 
1076 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability 
(14 January 2010), hereinafter ‘Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability’, paragraph 406. 
1077 Idem, paragraph 407. 
1078 Idem, paragraph 354. 
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issuance of radio frequencies and the lack of transparency in the administrative 
procedures resulted in an arbitrary advantage to local investors with greater political 
clout.’1079 As to the tender, the tribunal stated that ‘the apparently politically motivated 
preference for one competitor represents a discrimination against Claimant’ and that 
‘such decisions violated the FET standard’.1080 
The investor further argued that the norm requiring that at least 50 percent of each 
radio station air time should be dedicated to music produced in Ukraine constituted 
the imposition of performance requirements, prohibited under the relevant IIA.1081 He 
complained that, because Gala was dedicated to hits, of which there were very few 
produced in Ukraine, this meant that it had to continuously replay the same few 
Ukrainian hits.1082 This allegedly led to a loss of advertising revenue.1083 Ukraine, on 
the other hand, affirmed that: 
In all jurisdictions, Radio and TV are special sectors subject to specific 
regulation. There are two reasons for this: first, radio frequencies are by 
technical nature scarce assets, and consequently the law must articulate 
systems for allocating licences to prospective bidders; but there is also a 
second reason: when regulating private activity in the media sector, States 
can, and frequently do, take into consideration a number of legitimate public 
policy issues; thus, media companies can be subject to specific regulation and 
supervision in order to guarantee transparency, political and linguistic 
pluralism, protection of children or minorities and other similar factors.1084 
In this respect, the tribunal acknowledged that the requirement applied to all 
broadcasters in Ukraine, independently of nationality.1085 Very importantly, it added 
that: 
As a sovereign State, Ukraine has the inherent right to regulate its affairs and 
adopt laws in order to protect the common good of its people, as defined by 
its Parliament and Government. The prerogative extends to promulgating 
regulations which define the State’s own cultural policy. The promotion of 
																																																								
1079 Lemire v. Ukraine, Award, paragraph 64. 
1080 Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, paragraphs 356-357. 
1081 Idem, paragraph 218 and 499. 
1082 Idem, paragraph 503. 
1083 Idem, paragraph 499. 
1084 Idem, paragraph 241 (emphasis added). 
1085 Idem, paragraph 501. 
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domestic music may validly reflect a State policy to preserve and strengthen 
cultural inheritance and national identity. The “high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to 
regulate matters within their own borders” is reinforced in cases when the 
purpose of the legislation affects deeply felt cultural or linguistic traits of the 
community.1086 
The tribunal dismissed the investor’s claim, stating that the prohibition of performance 
requirements was ‘trade-related: to avoid that States impose local content 
requirements as a protection of local industries against competing imports’ and that 
‘the underlying reasons [of the rule] were not to protect local industries and restrict 
imports, but rather to promote Ukraine’s cultural inheritance, a purpose which is 
compatible with [the IIA]’.1087 
This brief overview of cases allows for a number of conclusions to be drawn. First of 
all, it appears clear that there is no coherent response by arbitral tribunals to 
arguments connected to human rights or cultural heritage. Whilst tribunals have 
manifested a certain degree of deference for non-economic goals, there is still a high 
level of uncertainty regarding how much these arguments may impact the final 
decision. Vadi argues that ‘[a]rbitrators have increasingly taken cultural concerns into 
consideration in deciding cases brought before them (…) [and] the integration of 
cultural concerns within international investment arbitration is a welcome move 
because it contributes to the harmonious development of international law’.1088 
However, it should also be pointed out that tribunals are biased towards listed World 
Heritage, which ‘leaves much indigenous and rural heritage unprotected’.1089 In my 
view, this bias could be overcome through an effective connection between cultural 
heritage and human rights, which would bridge the gap between listed and unlisted 
heritage, grounding cultural rights on human dignity and ensuring that all communities 




1086 Idem, paragraph 505 (emphasis added). 
1087 Idem, paragraph 510. 
1088 Valentina Vadi (2014), p. 131. 
1089 Idem, p. 132. 
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3.3. Invocation of human rights arguments by third parties 
After assessing the first two avenues for human rights to enter ISDS, namely through 
the invocation of human rights arguments by investors and the host State, it is crucial 
to understand how third parties – specifically, affected stakeholders – may participate 
in ISDS and achieve the protection of their cultural rights. 
One of the most prominent critiques of ISDS is based on the fact that the system does 
not guarantee enough transparency, legitimacy or accountability. This claim is 
grounded on the fact that issues of public policy are being decided through a system 
that is largely built on confidentiality and does not provide the level of public access 
that would ‘ensure public acceptance of the result and the democratic accountability 
of the process’.1090 Furthermore, scholars have argued that ‘international investment 
arbitration has the potential to usurp national decision-making powers and even 
aspects of state sovereignty in areas of considerable public significance’1091 and that 
awards against the State are paid through taxpayers’ money,1092 which reinforces the 
idea that ISDS directly affects civil society in a way that commercial arbitration does 
not. 
For these reasons, authors have begun to affirm that ‘[a]s investor-State disputes 
have evolved from the “traditional” expropriation cases (ie governmental interference 
with the physical assets of the foreign investors) to conflicts arising out of regulatory 
interferences with various aspects of the investment, it is increasingly recognized that 
they should be characterized as “regulatory disputes within the public law sphere”.’1093 
A trend is developing in the sense of opening the ISDS system to the participation 
and information of affected stakeholders. Third party intervention in arbitral 
proceedings is becoming more and more common, even if not universally 
guaranteed. The impetus for this development originated in the case law of the WTO 
dispute settlement bodies, which ‘started the trend and left the door wide open for 
																																																								
1090 J Anthony VanDuzer, ‘Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through 
Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation’, 52 McGill Law Journal 681 (2007), p. 685. 
1091 Eugenia Levine, ‘Amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: the implications of an increase 
in third-party participation’, 29 Berkeley J Int'l L 200 (2011), p. 205. 
1092 Idem, p. 206. 
1093 Tomoko Ishikawa, ‘Third party participation in investment treaty arbitration’, 59 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 373 (2010), p. 376; see also Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and Public Law (Oxford University Press 2008), p. 4. 
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private persons to file amicus curiae briefs in inter-State trade disputes’.1094 Only later 
did it spread to ISDS. 
 
a) The participation of non-disputing parties 
As mentioned above, the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in international law 
began at the WTO level,1095 but, initially, arbitral tribunals did not match the WTO’s 
openness to amicus participation. NAFTA tribunals were the first to accept such 
participation, and the first case in which a tribunal considered amicus curiae 
submissions was Methanex. This UNCITRAL case involved a Canadian company 
who claimed compensation from the US, arguing that its profits had been reduced 
due to California’s ban on the use of a gas additive known as methyl tertiary-butyl 
ether (MTBE). Because environmental matters were at stake, several organisations 
dedicated to the subject petitioned the tribunal to request permission to make oral 
and written amicus curiae submissions, to participate in the arbitration proceedings 
as amici curiae, to attend the hearings, to be given the opportunity to review 
memorials of the parties and any other submissions or orders in the proceedings and 
to have observer status at oral hearings. 
The parties had diverging opinions on the matter; whilst Mexico1096 and the 
claimant1097 opposed the admission of amici curiae, the US1098 and Canada1099 were 
in favour. The tribunal started by stating that ‘there is nothing in either the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules or Chapter 11, Section B, that either expressly confers upon the 
Tribunal the power to accept amicus submissions or expressly provides that the 
Tribunal shall have no such power’.1100 It then went on to affirm that such power 
should be considered against Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,1101 
which stated that ‘the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as 
it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at 																																																								
1094 Brigitte Stern, ‘Civil Society's Voice in the Settlement of International Economic Disputes’, 22 ICSID 
Review 280 (2007), p. 281. 
1095 For an analysis of how the approach to amici curiae evolved in the context of the WTO, see, inter 
alia, Brigitte Stern (2007), pp. 283-290. 
1096 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions 
from Third Persons to Intervene as "amici curiae" (15 January 2001), paragraph 9. 
1097 Idem, paragraphs 11-15. 
1098 Idem, paragraph 16. 
1099 Idem, paragraph 10. 
1100 Idem, paragraph 24. 
1101 Idem, paragraphs 25-26. 
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any stage in the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting its 
case’. The Tribunal interpreted this provision saying that ‘it cannot grant the Tribunal 
any power to add further disputing parties to the arbitration, nor to accord to persons 
who are non-parties the substantive status, rights or privileges of a Disputing 
Party.’1102 However, it stated that receiving ‘written submissions from a person other 
than the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that person as a party to the 
arbitration.’1103 
After referring to the previous practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the 
WTO,1104 the tribunal affirmed that it had ‘the power to accept amicus submissions (in 
writing) from each of the Petitioners’ but that it had ‘no power to accept the Petitioners' 
requests to receive materials generated within the arbitration or to attend oral 
hearings of the arbitration.’1105 The tribunal further admitted that there was 
‘undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration’, arising from its subject-matter, that 
‘[t]he substantive issues extend far beyond those raised by the usual transnational 
arbitration between commercial parties’ and that Chapter 11 Arbitration ‘could benefit 
from being perceived as more open or transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen 
as unduly secretive. In this regard, the Tribunal's willingness to receive amicus 
submissions might support the process in general and this arbitration in particular; 
whereas a blanket refusal could do positive harm.’1106 Finally, the tribunal declared 
that it had the power to accept amicus written submissions, subject to procedural 
limitations to be determined, and deferred the final decision to a later stage of the 
proceedings.1107 
The above notwithstanding, the tribunal declined to allow amici to attend oral 
hearings, since Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules required hearings to 
be held in camera unless both parties consent otherwise, and the claimant did not 
authorise such attendance.1108 As to access to the materials generated in the 
proceedings, the tribunal assessed the meaning of confidentiality in arbitration and 
distinguished it from privacy; however, it ended up rejecting amici access to such 
																																																								
1102 Idem, paragraph 27. 
1103 Idem, paragraph 30. 
1104 Idem, paragraph 31 et seq. 
1105 Idem, paragraph 47. 
1106 Idem, paragraph 49. 
1107 Idem, paragraph 53. 
1108 Idem, paragraphs 41-42. 
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documents on the basis of the parties’ agreement to keep the proceedings 
confidential.1109 
In 2003, when this case was still ongoing, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) 
issued the Statement of the FTC on non-disputing party participation, which 
acknowledged that non-disputing parties had the right to request permission to submit 
amicus curiae briefs, and established a number of procedural guidelines for the 
acceptance of such submissions.1110 In 2004, following this statement, the Methanex 
tribunal decided to accept amicus submissions in accordance with the guidelines 
established therein.1111 The decision in Methanex was later followed by a number of 
decisions, namely in the UPS and Glamis Gold cases.1112 
Similarly to what happened in the context of NAFTA, ICSID tribunals dealing with the 
question of amicus curiae submissions for the first time were faced with the absence 
of specific rules governing the issue.1113 The issue of amicus participation was first 
raised in the context of ICSID arbitration in the case of Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia. 
The tribunal, however, denied such participation stating that it did not, ‘absent the 
agreement of the Parties, have the power to: join a non-party to the proceedings; 
provide access to hearings to non-parties and, a fortiori, to the public generally; or to 
make the documents of the proceedings public.’1114 Because the parties had not given 
such consent, it declined the petitioners’ request. The matter was only clarified in April 
2006, when the ICSID Arbitration Rules were amended so as to elucidate that 
tribunals do have the right to accept non-disputing party submissions.1115 
Whereas, before, tribunals had to decide ‘with the consent of the parties’, after this 
amendment they are only barred from allowing third parties to attend or observe the 
hearings if either party objects. This might be a very subtle change, but it does signal 
a wider openness to amicus participation. The first petition for amicus curiae 																																																								
1109 Idem, paragraphs 43-46. 
1110 Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf. 
1111 Cf. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits (3 August 2005), paragraphs 26 et seq. 
1112 Both cited above; for reasons of space, these cases will not be analysed in this section. 
1113 See Christina Knahr, ‘Transparency, third party participation and access to documents in 
international investment arbitration’, 23 Arbitration International 327 (2007), p. 334. 
1114 Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Letter from President of 
Tribunal Responding to Petition (29 January 2003), available at: 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Aguas-BoliviaResponse.pdf. 
1115 See, in particular, Rules 32 and 37 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, available at: 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/ICSID%20Convention%20English.p
df 
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submission to reach an ICSID tribunal after this amendment was in the context of the 
Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania case, a dispute which arose as a consequence of the 
termination of a contract between Biwater Gauff and Tanzania, regarding the service 
of water supply.1116 Five NGOs filed a petition for amicus status and the tribunal 
applied and interpreted the new rules for the first time, ultimately deciding to accept 
written submissions from the petitioners.1117 In addition, the tribunal decided to deny 
access to the documents filed by the parties, but left the door open for this access to 
be granted at a later stage of the proceedings.1118 
The third request made by the NGOs was that the hearings be open to the public and 
that non-disputing parties or amici be allowed to reply directly to any questions 
directed to them by the tribunal concerning their submissions. Because the claimant 
objected to this request, the tribunal found that it had ‘no power to permit the 
Petitioners' presence or participation at the hearing’ and thus rejected the request. 
However, it reserved the right to ‘ask the Petitioners specific questions in relation to 
their written submission, and to request the filing of further written submissions and/or 
documents or other evidence, which might assist in better understanding the 
Petitioners' position, whether before or after the hearing.’1119 
It is interesting to note that two of the NGOs petitioning in Biwater had already 
participated in Methanex and in one of the Argentinian water cases as amici curiae. 
This fact is all the more important since, as Stern points out, ‘[a] class of NGOs 
specializing in the formulation of amicus curiae briefs seems thus to be emerging.’1120 
In addition, the trend towards greater acceptance of non-disputing party participation 
did not stop at the developments within NAFTA and ICSID disputes, and is rather 
becoming a more common feature of recent IIAs, such as the US FTAs with 
Singapore, Chile and Morocco.1121 
However, this trend does not appear to be irreversible, as evidenced by another case, 
von Pezold v. Zimbabwe, which concerned forestry and agricultural businesses in 
Zimbabwe that were subject to expropriation. In this case, an NGO and several 
																																																								
1116 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, 
Procedural Order No. 5 (2 February 2007). 
1117 Idem, paragraphs 49-50. 
1118 Idem, paragraphs 66-68. 
1119 Idem, paragraphs 69-72. 
1120 Brigitte Stern (2007), p. 327. 
1121 All available at: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements; see, in particular, Article 
15.9(3) of the FTA with Singapore and Article 10.19(3) of the FTAs with Chile and Morocco. 
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indigenous communities requested to participate as amici, filing written submissions, 
accessing case materials, attending the oral hearings and answering questions posed 
by the tribunal. These requests were denied, based, among other reasons, on the 
widely contested1122 belief that the petitioners were not 'independent' from the 
respondent State. The claimants had argued, among others, that the interests of the 
indigenous communities were adverse to their own and aligned with those of the 
State, and that these communities effectively constituted organs of the State and 
therefore could not be independent.1123 In an extremely restrictive interpretation, the 
tribunal affirmed that independence was implicit in Rule 37(2)(a) of the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and decided to deny the application because of ‘[t]he apparent lack 
of independence or neutrality of the Petitioners’.1124 
It is hard to understand such interpretation of Rule 37(2), which appears to conflict 
with the rationale of introducing the paragraph in the first place and also to contradict 
the requirement for a ‘significant interest’ in the proceedings. As Bastin observes, this 
decision ‘constitutes not only a departure from previous case law and, arguably, from 
principle, but also a curtailment of the trend which had been previously evident in the 
investor-State arbitration system.’1125 The decision in von Pezold v. Zimbabwe should 
be seen as a reminder that the participation of amici curiae in ISDS is far from being 
guaranteed. 
 
b) Human rights arguments in amicus curiae submissions 
Several of the cases in which amicus curiae submissions were accepted were 
connected to human rights. As Kube and Petersmann point out, human rights 
argumentation put forth by third parties may have a double impact on ISDS: first, this 
kind of argumentation might weigh in the tribunal’s assessment of whether to accept 
amicus curiae participation, since it is demonstrative of the existence of public 
interest; second, third-party participation may prompt the analysis of HRL within the 
context of investment arbitration.1126 
																																																								
1122 See, inter alia, Lucas Bastin (2014), p. 139. 
1123 Idem, paragraph 50. 
1124 Idem, paragraph 56. 
1125 Idem, p. 140. 
1126 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 87. 
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A number of cases where third parties requested to participate as amici curiae raised 
human rights issues. First of all, in Suez/Vivendi v. Argentina, five NGOs filed a 
petition requesting: access to the hearings; participation as amici curiae and access 
to the case documents.1127 The claimants were of the opinion that such petition should 
be denied, whereas Argentina supported its acceptance.1128 Regarding the access to 
and participation in the hearings, the tribunal analysed the matter against ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 32(2), and, because the claimants had opposed the attendance of 
amici, the tribunal affirmed that ‘[t]he crucial element of consent by both parties to the 
dispute [was] absent in this case’ and thus denied the corresponding part of the 
petition.1129 
Regarding the submission of amicus curiae briefs, the tribunal started by stating that 
‘[n]either the ICSID Convention nor the Arbitration Rules specifically authorize or 
specifically prohibit the submission by nonparties of amicus curiae briefs or other 
documents.’1130 The tribunal thus assessed whether it had the power to do so under 
Article 44 of the ICSID Convention, which provided that ‘[i]f any question of procedure 
arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed 
by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question’. In its view, this sentence 
constituted ‘a grant of residual power to the Tribunal to decide procedural questions 
not treated in the Convention itself or the rules applicable to a given dispute.’1131 The 
tribunal compared this provision to Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, which were 
deemed similar, and referred to the Methanex case, as well as to the practices of 
NAFTA, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the WTO, arriving at the conclusion that it 
did have ‘the power to admit amicus curiae submissions from suitable nonparties in 
appropriate cases.’1132 If further presented three basic criteria for the admission of 
amicus curiae briefs: ‘a) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case; b) the 
suitability of a given nonparty to act as amicus curiae in that case, and c) the 
procedure by which the amicus submission is made and considered.’1133 
																																																								
1127 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (formerly Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic), Order in response to a 
Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005), paragraph 1. 
1128 Idem, paragraph 3. 
1129 Idem, paragraphs 4-7. 
1130 Idem, paragraph 9. 
1131 Idem, paragraph 10. 
1132 Idem, paragraph 16. 
1133 Idem, paragraph 17. 
Investor-State dispute settlement and Cultural Rights  
	 257 
As to the appropriateness of the subject-matter of the case, the tribunal 
acknowledged that it did ‘involve matters of public interest of such a nature that have 
traditionally led courts and other tribunals to receive amicus submissions from 
suitable nonparties.’1134 It also recognised that accepting amicus submissions would 
have ‘the additional desirable consequence of increasing the transparency of 
investor-state arbitration.’1135 The tribunal thus affirmed that this case was appropriate 
for amicus curiae participation.1136 Regarding the suitability of the petitioners to act as 
amici curiae, the tribunal required them to have ‘the expertise, experience, and 
independence to be of assistance in this case’; these requirements were to be 
assessed through the application for leave to make an amicus submission.1137 
Because the tribunal considered that the disputing parties had provided sufficient 
information on jurisdictional issues, it declined to accept amicus participation on that 
matter.1138 In terms of the procedure for amicus briefs, the tribunal considered that it 
did not have to establish such procedure before the actual approval of the amici1139 
and the matter was determined in a subsequent order.1140 
In its decision on liability, the tribunal did not appear to consider the human rights 
argument sufficiently. The observations of the tribunal regarding the amici brief were 
restricted to a plain rejection of the idea that Argentina’s human rights obligations 
regarding the right to water trumped its obligations under the BITs. It affirmed that 
‘Argentina is subject to both international obligations, i.e. human rights and treaty 
obligation, and must respect both of them equally. (…) Argentina’s human rights 
obligations and its investment treaty obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or 
mutually exclusive. Thus (…) Argentina could have respected both types of 
obligations’.1141 Similarly, in UPS v. Canada, the tribunal acknowledged the human 
rights argument raised by the amici when summarising the procedural history1142 but 																																																								
1134 Idem, paragraph 20. 
1135 Idem, paragraph 22. 
1136 Idem, paragraph 23. 
1137 Idem, paragraph 24. 
1138 Idem, paragraph 28. 
1139 Idem, paragraph 29. 
1140 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (formerly Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic), Order in Response to a 
Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to make an amicus curiae Submission 
(12 February 2007). 
1141 Idem, Decision on Liability (30 July 2010), paragraph 262. 
1142 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Decision of the 
Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (17 October 2001), paragraph 
22; and Award on the Merits (24 May 2007), paragraph 3. 
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did not respond to it in the final award, simply dismissing the association of the 
minimum standard of treatment with the violation of workers’ rights.1143 
In Glamis Gold, amicus curiae submissions were filed by the Quechan Indian Nation, 
Friends of the Earth Canada/Friends of the Earth United States (joint submission), 
the National Mining Association and the Sierra Club/Earthworks (joint submission). 
The tribunal ‘decided to accept each submission and consider it, as appropriate, in 
accordance with the principles stated in the FTC Statement’.1144 The most relevant 
submission for the purposes of this research is that of the Quechan Indian Nation, 
whose ancestral lands were being affected by the investment project, which meant 
they were directly implicated in the case. The applicants affirmed that ‘the Tribe has 
proactively tracked all of the legal, administrative and policy initiatives known to it, to 
ensure that the sacred places at Indian Pass would be protected to the maximum 
extent possible and treated with appropriate dignity’ and that ‘the manner in which 
this sacred area and the Tribe's interest in it will be portrayed in this arbitral process 
is of great concern for native peoples worldwide, who are similarly attempting to 
protect their irreplaceable sacred places and ensure religious freedoms.’ It added that 
it wanted ‘to ensure that the sensitive and serious nature of indigenous sacred areas 
[would be] properly taken in account in this, and in all future, international 
proceedings’.1145 
Amongst the Tribe’s arguments, it was claimed that ‘[t]he Tribunal should accept the 
Tribe's submission because it will assist (…) in the determination of factual and legal 
issues by bringing the perspective, particular knowledge and insight that is unique to 
American tribal sovereign governments. Neither of the parties to these proceedings 
can make this kind of contribution’ – namely, because ‘as a sovereign nation, the 
Tribe cannot be said to be adequately represented by another sovereign: the United 
States Government’.1146 In addition, the Tribe stated that ‘no party can speak with 
expertise or authority to the cultural, social or religious value of the Indian Pass area 
to the Tribe or the severity of impacts to the area and the Tribe, except for qualified 
members of the Tribe. The Tribe is thus uniquely positioned to comment on the 
impacts of the proposed mine to cultural resources, cultural landscape or context.’1147 																																																								
1143 Idem, paragraphs 185-187. 
1144 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (8 June 2009), paragraph 286. 
1145 Glamis Gold, Quechan Indian Nation Application for Leave to File a Non-Party Submission (19 
August 2005), available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf. 
1146 Ibidem. 
1147 Ibidem. 
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In 2005, the Tribunal accepted the Tribe’s submission, without detailing any 
reasons.1148 The other petitioners were also granted amici status, as the tribunal held 
that ‘it should apply strictly the requirements specified in the FTC Statement, for 
example restrictions as to length or limitations as to the matters to be addressed, but 
that, given the public and remedial purposes of non-disputing submissions, leave to 
file and acceptance of submissions should be granted liberally.’1149 In addition, ‘the 
public was invited to view the proceedings in a separate room via closed circuit 
television. The Quechan were invited to view the proceedings from a different location 
with a separate video feed to allow their viewing of otherwise restricted discussion of 
cultural locations; tribal identification would be required for admission to this 
location.’1150 
The Tribunal, however, emphasised the fact that, under the FTC Statement, 
‘acceptance of a non-disputing submission does not require the Tribunal to consider 
that submission at any point in the arbitration’1151 and that 
inasmuch as the State Parties to the NAFTA have agreed to allow amicus 
filings in certain circumstances, it is the Tribunal’s view that it should address 
those filings explicitly in its Award to the degree that they bear on decisions 
that must be taken. In this case, the Tribunal appreciates the thoughtful 
submissions made by a varied group of interested non-parties (…). Given the 
Tribunal’s holdings, however, the Tribunal does not reach the particular issues 
addressed by these submissions.1152 
It should be noted that, in their submission, the Quechan Tribe invoked both human 
rights and cultural arguments, referring to Article 27 of the ICCPR and to several 
UNESCO documents.1153 However, the tribunal did not address such arguments 
specifically, or HRL in general, in its final award. It appears that, even though the 
Tribe was allowed a certain level of participation in the proceedings, their arguments 
were nonetheless largely ignored. For this reason, authors have suggested that 
																																																								
1148 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision on Application and Submission 
by Quechan Indian Nation (16 September 2005). 
1149 Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (8 June 2009), paragraph 286. 
1150 Idem, paragraph 290. 
1151 Idem, paragraph 286. 
1152 Idem, paragraph 8. 
1153 Glamis Gold, Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation (19 August 2005), p. 8, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf. 
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indigenous peoples should be granted the right to intervene in ISDS, rather than the 
mere right to file amicus curiae submissions.1154 
In Aguas del Tunari v. Argentina, the petition requesting the participation as amicus 
curiae was rejected.1155 Both in Suez/InterAguas v. Argentina and Biwater Gauff v. 
Tanzania, the tribunal accepted the petition for participation as amici, based on the 
fact that the provision of water and sanitary systems could affect human rights.1156 
However, in Biwater, the final award contains no reference whatsoever to human 
rights, except in the summary of the amici’s arguments; and, in Suez/InterAguas, the 
only reference to HRL is identical to the one in Suez/Vivendi. 
In Grand River v. USA, the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations submitted 
a letter supporting the claimants’ position, raising human rights arguments.1157 This 
letter was later on included in the claimant’s reply and the tribunal stated that it had 
been ‘read and considered’, with no further comments on its content.1158 In von Pezold 
v. Zimbabwe, the amici raised a number of human rights arguments, namely in 
relation to the rights of indigenous peoples, but, as mentioned above, their requests 
were denied.1159 
It thus appears clear that, even though amici frequently raise human rights arguments 
in their submissions, the tribunals do not generally address those arguments 
sufficiently, and it remains unclear how they affect final decisions. However, it is also 
possible to observe that ‘the review of the content of the amicus submission filed by 
NGOs, civil society organizations and human rights experts shows that third party 
intervention is a promising avenue for raising human rights concerns, especially for 
those which were otherwise not represented in the proceedings but nevertheless 
considerably affected by the investment dispute.’1160 Although ‘a consistent and 
																																																								
1154 In this sense, see Patrick Wieland, ‘Why the Amicus Curia Institution is Ill-Suited to Address 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights before Investor-State Arbitration Tribunals: Glamis Gold and the Right of 
Intervention’, 3 Trade, Law and Development 334 (2011). 
1155 Cf. section 3.3(A). 
1156 Suez/InterAguas v. Argentina, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae 
(17 March 2006), paragraph 18; and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, Procedural Order No. 5 (2 February 
2007), paragraphs 52 and 55. 
1157 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Amicus 
Curiae Submission of the Office of the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations (19 January 2009). 
1158 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award (12 
January 2011), paragraph 60. 
1159 See section 3.3(A). 
1160 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 91. 
Investor-State dispute settlement and Cultural Rights  
	 261 
transparent methodology’1161 is still lacking, this avenue appears to be a promising 
one regarding the protection of the rights of stakeholders. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that the benefits of amicus 
curiae participation have already been widely analysed by many scholars, namely in 
terms of protection of the public interest, improvement of the quality of awards, 
enhanced transparency, facilitation of public scrutiny, increased legitimacy and 
mitigation of the public-private divide in ISDS.1162 A number of negative impacts have 
also been identified, from the ‘imposition’ of the institution of amicus curiae on States 
that do not recognise it to an ‘attack’ on the consensual nature of arbitration. In 
addition, amicus participation has been characterised as an additional hurdle to the 
disputing parties, affecting their autonomy and strategies, compromising 
confidentiality, imposing costs and delays, and allegedly favouring States in detriment 
of the investors.1163 
In addition, there are essentially four aspects in which amicus curiae participation 
shows considerable limitations, as identified by Obadia: first, an amicus is not an 
actual party to the dispute; second, the possibility of submitting amicus briefs is 
subject to approval based on the fulfilment of a number of requirements, rather than 
being automatic; third, the general rule of confidentiality blocks amicus access to case 
documentation; fourth, in the majority of cases, tribunals do not allow access to the 
hearings.1164 
In light of the above, it is possible to conclude that, even though amicus curiae 
participation ‘might contribute to the procedural legitimacy of the arbitral process, as 
well as to the substantive quality of the awards’,1165 its role in practice has been 
relatively unsuccessful. Pessimists will affirm that amicus participation does not 
appear to have actually influenced the tribunals and their decisions, and that 
participation rights are far from being guaranteed.1166 A more nuanced view should 
be preferred, as expressed by Ortino: in spite of the seemingly tenuous link between 
amici briefs and the tribunals’ decisions, ‘the impact of civil society on international 
																																																								
1161 Ibidem. 
1162 Tomoko Ishikawa (2010), p. 411. 
1163 See Katia Fach Gómez, ‘Rethinking the role of amicus curiae in international investment arbitration: 
how to draw the line favorably for the public interest’, 35 Fordham Int'l LJ 510 (2011), pp. 543-554. 
1164 Eloise Obadia, ‘Extension of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: Non-Disputing Party 
Participation in Investment Arbitration’, 22 ICSID Review 349 (2007), pp. 366 et seq. 
1165 Eugenia Levine (2011), p. 217. 
1166 In this sense, see Eloise Obadia (2007), p. 378 and Eugenia Levine (2011), p. 217. 
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economic law should be appreciated in a broader context’; the participation of amici 
effectively symbolizes ‘the existence of apparently unrepresented stakeholders with 
a key interest in the outcome of the balancing exercise inherent in the application of 
international economic law’; and the acceptance of amici opens the door ‘to a much 
broader, non-economic perspective’ that cannot be ignored.1167 
 
3.4. Invocation of human rights arguments by the Tribunal 
After considering the invocation of human rights arguments by the investor, the State 
and by third parties, the missing piece of the puzzle is the introduction of such 
arguments by the Tribunal itself. There are several cases in which arbitral tribunals 
raised human rights issues without them being raised by any of the parties or by the 
amici curiae. One example can be found in Azurix v. Argentina, in which the tribunal 
relied on the case-law of the ECtHR in order to assess the expropriation claim.1168 In 
Tecmed v. Mexico, the tribunal equally referred to decisions of the ECtHR and of the 
IACtHR both in relation to the expropriation claim and to the relevance of the 
distinction between nationals and non-nationals.1169 In Mondev v. USA, the tribunal 
addressed the issue of the retrospective application of new rules by referring to the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR;1170 when assessing the international jurisprudence 
regarding immunities of public authorities, it stated that the decisions of the ECtHR 
regarding the right to a court could provide guidance by analogy as to the possible 
scope of NAFTA’s guarantee of ‘treatment in accordance with international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security’.1171 More 
interestingly, in Phoenix v. Czech Republic, the tribunal distinctively affirmed: 
the ICSID Convention’s jurisdictional requirements – as well as those of the 
BIT – cannot be read and interpreted in isolation from public international law, 
and its general principles. To take an extreme example, nobody would 
suggest that ICSID protection should be granted to investments made in 																																																								
1167 Federico Ortino, ‘The Impact of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Settlement of Trade and Investment 
Disputes: An Analysis of the Shrimp/Turtle and Methanex Decisions’ (2009), available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656844, p. 316. 
1168 Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (14 July 2006), 
paragraph 311. 
1169 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003), paragraphs 116 and 122. 
1170 Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)99/02, Award (11 
October 2002), paragraph 138. 
1171 Idem, paragraph 144. 
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violation of the most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like 
investments made in pursuance of torture or genocide or in support of slavery 
or trafficking of human organs.1172 
These references, however, appear to be sporadic, with no clear methodology and 
usually only used for interpretative guidance. As a result, ‘[i]n light of the numerous 
dismissals of human rights arguments brought forward by amici and host states, this 
practice of sporadically referencing HRL and jurisprudence runs the risk of being 
perceived as selective, if not biased.’1173 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have attempted to assess if and how the cultural rights of affected 
stakeholders could be protected at the level of ISDS. The starting point of this analysis 
was the recognition of the perceived lack of legitimacy and bias of ISDS, largely 
resulting from the lack of transparency of the proceedings. However, it should be 
noted that there have been several efforts in the sense of increasing the levels of 
transparency and, consequently, the legitimacy of investment arbitration, namely 
through the formulation of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based 
Investor-State Arbitration and the conclusion of the UN Convention on Transparency 
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.1174 
The first step of the analysis undertaken in this Chapter was to identify the procedural 
entry points for HRL in ISDS. Besides the obvious relevance of jurisdictional and 
applicable law issues, the most important mechanisms were identified and assessed, 
namely the denial of treaty protections based on the illegality of the investor’s conduct 
and the ‘clean hands’ doctrine; the use of systemic interpretation of IIAs and the 
relevance of the wording of the preamble; the application and interpretation of 
substantive protection standards in conformity with HRL; the relevance of HRL in the 
determination of the quantum of compensation; and, finally, the possibility of host 
States filing counterclaims. This analysis demonstrated that progress is occurring on 																																																								
1172 Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award (15 April 2009), 
paragraph 78. 
1173 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2016), p. 93. 
1174 In this regard, see, inter alia, Claudia Reith, ‘The New UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 2014 - 
Significant Breakthrough or a Regime Full of Empty Formula’, 4 YB on Int'l Arb 121 (2015); and Esmé 
Shirlow, ‘Dawn of a new era? The UNCITRAL Rules and UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration’, 31 ICSID Review 622 (2016). 
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many fronts and that the integration of international investment and HRL is happening 
more and more frequently. 
The permeation of (cultural) human rights arguments into ISDS may occur via four 
different avenues, namely the invocation of such arguments by the investor himself, 
the host State, third parties or the tribunals ex officio. After analysing the relevant 
decisions, several conclusions stand out. First, there is a significant disconnection 
between human rights arguments and cultural heritage arguments, which 
compromises their strength. Cultural heritage arguments appear to have been 
increasingly well received by tribunals (perhaps more so than human rights 
arguments) but this has still been happening in an incoherent, disorganised and 
unpredictable way. In addition, the consideration of cultural concerns by tribunals has 
been biased towards listed World Heritage, which risks jeopardising much indigenous 
and rural heritage. As mentioned above, in my view, this bias could be overcome 
through an effective connection between cultural heritage and human rights, which 
would bridge the gap between listed and unlisted heritage, grounding cultural rights 
on human dignity and ensuring that all communities have access to the same level of 
protection. 
Second, tribunals have shown more willingness to address human rights concerns 
when it comes to the assessment and enforcement of investor rights (even if quite 
inconsistently), as opposed to the rights of stakeholders, raised either by the host 
State or amici curiae. Third, tribunals appear to be much more open to the acceptance 
of human rights arguments in relation to procedural issues, methodology and as 
elements of procedural history. Both States and amici curiae have had very little 
success in the invocation of HRL as a justification for measures that violate 
investment protections, which confirms to a certain extent the perceived bias of ISDS 
in favour of investors. 
In light of the above, it is possible to conclude that the integration of investment and 
human rights in ISDS is possible, is occurring and will likely keep taking place – even 
if, at least for now, ISDS is still not the most appropriate forum to ensure the protection 
and promotion of cultural rights. This is not only due to the empirical tendencies 
observed in this chapter, but also to the fact that arbitrators are not human rights 
experts and have a limited mandate – which, when exceeded, might result in the 
annulment of a decision. It is still crucial that tribunals develop a coherent and 
transparent methodology in this regard – simply because human rights issues are 
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bound to arise in investment disputes, and the ex ante mechanisms addressed in the 
previous chapters might not be sufficiently effective to guarantee the protection of 
cultural rights before a dispute has a chance to occur. It is thus possible to conclude, 
with Reiner and Schreuer, that ‘[t]he current trend seems to indicate that the role of 
human rights in investment arbitration will continue to increase. Whether the arbitral 
system is the best suited for dealing with breaches of human rights remains a 
controversial issue. Lack of transparency and legitimacy are perhaps inevitable 
reproaches and it remains to be seen whether these issues can be resolved.’1175 	
																																																								






There are so many implications to the imbalance between IIL (and all the rights it 
grants to investors – in particular, to large and powerful MNEs) and the human rights 
of affected stakeholders (namely their cultural rights, which are underdeveloped and 
under-protected) that any effort to provide a clear picture of a fragment of that 
imbalance will necessarily spark thoughts and discussions connected to many 
adjacent issues. Cultural rights are already a kaleidoscope in and of itself, as I 
attempted to demonstrate in the first chapter of this thesis, and their interaction with 
other areas of international law, namely international economic law, may appear 
blurry at times, veiled by mentalities that still need to be changed. Proposals for more 
effective solutions to this imbalance have already appeared in many spheres, but still 
lack the political support (and perhaps level of human development) needed for 
implementation. Studying this discrepancy between the levels of protection of 
investors and stakeholders from the point of view of cultural rights is as much about 
correcting historical wrongs as it is about turning globalisation into a positive force, 
which is urgently needed. 
International HRL, as it stands today, does not yet provide the clarity and 
accountability that are necessary to ensure sustainability and fairness. The need for 
a legally binding and comprehensive mechanism to impose obligations on MNEs is 
widely recognised, but still a long way from becoming a reality. There are already 
laudable efforts being made to achieve this, as can be seen from the activity of the 
HRC, which, through Resolution 26/9 of 14 July 2014, established ‘an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights; whose mandate [is] to elaborate an 
international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, 
the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises’.1176 The 
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viability of this legally binding instrument may however be questioned just by looking 
at the breakdown of the voting for this Resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 20 
to 14, with 13 abstentions. The countries that opposed the adoption of the Resolution 
include the UK, the US and several other western countries (who, in my opinion, 
should be the first ones to push for its success). It makes us wonder whether this 
instrument will follow the route of the ill-fated ‘Draft Norms’.1177 In addition, the process 
is slow – so far, the intergovernmental working group has met once a year, with the 
next session scheduled for October 2017. 
Because of the lack of a legally binding instrument on the human rights 
responsibilities of MNEs, one has to consider other options. These can be soft law 
mechanisms imposing CSR on companies and financial institutions (as analysed in 
chapters 4 and 5) or different approaches to related hard law mechanisms (such as 
ISDS, as addressed in chapter 6). None of these options is fully satisfactory, but they 
do have the potential to effect change whilst a more effective solution is not in place. 
The downsides of these mechanisms have been assessed throughout Part II of this 
dissertation; in very broad terms, CSR alone is not sufficiently effective because of 
the lack of accountability and ISDS is arguably not the right forum to discuss human 
rights concerns, both for reasons of limited mandate and lack of transparency, as well 
as limited scope for the participation of stakeholders. But the possibilities that they 
provide are not negligible – on the contrary, they should be harnessed and put to 
good service. 
It is crucial to ask, then: what can be done until a legally binding instrument comes to 
exist? How can the available tools be applied to the development of a fairer solution 
to the imbalance between the protection of investors and the protection of the cultural 
rights of stakeholders? There are essentially two possible paths: first, making the 
most of the instruments that are currently available; and, second, suggesting new 





1177 In this respect, see chapter 4. 
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1. Making the most of existing instruments 
Using whatever tools are currently available to tackle the imbalance between the level 
of protection afforded to investors under IIL and the protection of individuals or 
communities affected by an investment has to be a priority, given the slow pace at 
which changes in international law usually occur. The first point that has to be made 
is connected with the importance of civil society, NGOs and activists in general. As 
demonstrated by the case of Standing Rock and the Dakota Access Pipeline, the 
more resistance there is to a project, the more likely it is that governments will pay 
heed to the concerns of stakeholders and that MNEs and banks will take measures 
to comply with CSR initiatives.1178 In addition, the involvement of civil society and 
NGOs is not restricted to pressure, but also plays an important role in ISDS, namely 
through the participation as amici curiae. This sounds like a completely evident 
observation, but civil society resistance to investment projects does not come without 
a price: it is sufficient to read the news about the Standing Rock protests to 
understand that protesters were met with use of excessive force, unlawful arrests, 
mistreatment in prisons and other difficulties.1179 As a result, communities trying to 
defend themselves from human rights abuses often end up encountering further 
human rights abuses. As unfair as this sounds, it is a reality that should not be ignored 
– it may very well reduce the incentives for resistance. Stakeholders should be legally 
empowered to voice their concerns without this kind of negative consequences. 
The second important point regarding the available mechanisms is that CSR may not 
be sufficiently effective in and of itself, but it is a very important step forward and it 
constitutes a trend that civil society should reinforce. More importantly, it provides 
guidelines and plans of action that have the potential to inspire and frame future hard 
law instruments. In addition, it also appears clear that resolving conflicts with 
stakeholders through CSR mechanisms may be more effective than through ISDS, 
since it provides an opportunity to defend culture ex ante, i.e., before the damage is 
done. In this respect, both human rights impact assessments (with specific focus on 
																																																								
1178 However, it should be noted that the future of this project is still uncertain, mostly as a result of 
President Trump’s recent decision to push the pipeline forward. In this regard, see, inter alia, The 
Guardian (26 January 2017), Standing Rock Sioux tribe says Trump is breaking law with Dakota Access 
order, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/26/standing-rock-sioux-tribe-trump-
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1179 See, inter alia, The Guardian (31 October 2016), Dakota Access pipeline protests: UN group 




cultural rights) and FPIC play a crucial role. Companies and banks should comply 
with voluntary codes of conduct and commit to respecting and protecting cultural 
rights, and stakeholders should hold them accountable. One of the greatest difficulties 
regarding CSR is the lack of monitoring and accountability, and trusting the good 
intentions of powerful MNEs is probably naïve. Therefore, an effort should be made 
to expose non-compliant companies more effectively. And here we come back to the 
first point: the more information is held by the public, the more likely it is that 
companies and banks will feel compelled to make responsible investments. 
The third point relates to how fragmented the cultural rights regime is at present. HRL 
and cultural law interact a lot less than they should, which compromises the strength 
of legal arguments. In the absence of a more integrated regime, stakeholders should 
make an effort to present a more inclusive line of argumentation, linking cultural rights 
to human dignity, cultural diversity and identity, tangible and intangible cultural 
heritage, the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, self-determination and 
sustainable development. There are several international instruments devoted to 
each of these concepts, but only a holistic view of culture and cultural rights may 
provide a strong legal basis to face the protection of investors and investments that 
adversely affect individuals and communities. 
Connected to this idea is the role of cultural rights in ISDS. Even though investment 
tribunals are arguably not the right forum to discuss human rights, for all the reasons 
put forth in chapter 6, it is inevitable to accept that human rights concerns in general, 
and cultural rights concerns in particular, may need to be brought to light by States 
and stakeholders acting as amici curiae, in order to protect States’ sovereign 
prerogative to regulate in the public interest. For this to be possible, not only do 
tribunals need to pay more deference to international law in general as applicable law 
(thus reducing the ‘isolationism’ of IIL), but they also should consider that investors 
have certain obligations under national and international law, even if not explicitly 
provided by the relevant IIAs. This could either affect the quantum of compensation 
for regulatory takings or even deny treaty protection to investors who violate 
international law (specifically, cultural rights). In addition, both treaty interpretation in 
general and the application of protection standards in particular should be compatible 
with HRL. Another promising aspect of ISDS is the possibility of States filing 
counterclaims, in which they could arguably raise human rights arguments – tribunals 
need to be more flexible and more open to this possibility. 
Conclusions  
	 270 
Because the consideration of human rights arguments by investment tribunals has 
been very limited, it appears clear again that, as mentioned above, stakeholders 
would benefit from substantiating their arguments with both HRL and cultural law 
considerations. In addition, the efforts being undertaken at the international level to 
increase the transparency of ISDS should be continued – not just to increase the 
chances for participation by civil society, but also to add legitimacy to investment 
arbitration. 
 
2. Changing the landscape 
There is much that can be done to change the landscape for stakeholders who are 
adversely affected by foreign investment. The most obvious and important one has 
already been mentioned: it would be ideal to clarify and ‘harden’ the law on the human 
rights responsibilities of MNEs. As previously observed, there have been attempts to 
do this in the past, but they have been largely unsuccessful; and there are 
praiseworthy initiatives taking place at the time of writing, even though their success 
is hard to predict. In a perfect world, both HRL and IIL would acknowledge that MNEs 
currently have as much (or indeed, more) power than some States and that their 
activities need to be regulated so as to avoid violations of human rights. 
Unquestionably, it is time for the law to address the impunity with which so many 
MNEs have been acting all around the world, for so many years. 
Several strategies may also be adopted regarding drafting techniques for IIAs and 
investment contracts. These comprise the inclusion of investor obligations clauses, 
cultural and human rights exceptions and impact assessment requirements.1180 Much 
of what is wrong with IIL derives from the absence of investor obligations in IIAs – 
investors should be required to comply with both international and national law, and 
there should be consequences for situations where this compliance is lacking. Arbitral 
tribunals would have a much easier task should this type of clauses be inserted into 
IIAs more often; they also have the potential to foster an investment culture that 
emphasises prevention rather than remediation. In addition, a cultural human rights 
exception would allow States to preserve their regulatory space more effectively 																																																								
1180 For several proposals for change, including the ones identified, see UNCTAD, Investment Policy 





without the fear of retaliation by investors. Impact assessments focusing not just on 
environmental concerns, but also on human rights and cultural aspects, would allow 
for a generally more responsible investment culture and, again, for a much deeper 
focus on prevention, rather than remediation. Even though several modern IIAs 
already contain provisions of this kind, they should become standard practice and 
they should be drafted in a clear way, so as to dissipate interpretative difficulties. 
A further suggestion that needs to be made relates to the democratisation of both 
HRL and IIL. It is urgent to fight the tendency to focus on the culture of the majority, 
forgetting the delicate and vulnerable position of ethnic and racial minorities and 
indigenous peoples. Cultural diversity needs to be preserved, which means there 
should be a stronger effort to combat assimilation and homogenisation. This type of 
effort may come from the international community, but it has to be embraced by both 
home and host States alike. 
Finally, I believe that the fragmentation of international law is a strong factor that 
facilitates the impunity of MNEs, their ability to forum shop and to circumvent HRL. 
Legal arguments become much stronger when they have a solid, uniform basis and 
when there are monitoring and accountability mechanisms at the international level. 
It is undeniable that many issues regarding the interaction of non-economic values 
and international economic law lead to the same type of concerns and solutions – I 
am thinking specifically about environmental concerns, which have arguably become 
much more developed in the context of both CSR and dispute settlement 
mechanisms. There are so many points of contact between human rights, cultural 
heritage, environmental protection and similar issues that one has to wonder if these 
could all be united under an overarching area of international law, possibly an 
‘international sustainability law’. I believe that the more we compartmentalise non-
economic values under international law, the weaker each of them becomes when 
considered in isolation. This type of comprehensiveness is clearly not an easy 
proposal, especially because of how hard and slow the process of change can be at 
the international level. Further research is also required in this regard, but it does 





3. Final Remarks 
Defending the sacred is hard, especially when what is sacred to a community is 
unknown to the ‘official’ national culture or disregarded by States. It is also hard 
because of the imbalance between the power of affected stakeholders and the power 
of investors, who sometimes collude with States in actions that have the potential to 
harm cultural rights. In a world driven by economic and materialistic concerns, the 
first change that needs to happen is one of mentalities. 
So much harm has already been inflicted on our planet and on the most sustainable 
communities that have lived in it for thousands of years that it is urgent to push for a 
change. This is already happening to a certain degree: NGOs and civil society are 
becoming more and more involved, more and more vocal, more and more 
demanding; ISDS is becoming more open to third party participation, more 
transparent and more legitimate; in addition, the international community is fighting 
for both hard and soft law mechanisms to impose human rights responsibilities on 
MNEs. 
Alas, being on the right track does not mean that all is well, nor does it exempt 
academics and activists from questioning the status quo and pushing for more 
responsible investment. This research attempted to not only clarify the (confusing) 
conceptual framework surrounding cultural rights, but also to analyse their interaction 
with IIL. The starting point has been the wish to prevent harm rather than remediating 
it, even though it is unavoidable to address the situations in which harm has already 
been done. The focus on prevention had the logical consequence of assessing CSR 
as a tool before analysing the possibilities offered by ISDS; the focus on culture was 
the natural result of the realisation that cultural rights, although largely ignored and 
underdeveloped, are crucial to sustainable development, to the preservation of the 
identity of communities and to the promotion of peace amongst and within nations. 
This research asked if, in order to integrate international investment and cultural 
rights, it was preferable to harness hard or soft law mechanisms, or a combination of 
both, and what could be done to improve the status quo. Throughout the assessment 
of the relevant instruments, I concluded that none of them individually was able to 
sufficiently guarantee such integration when taken in isolation. Consequently, I 
argued that it is essential to make an intelligent and effective use of both hard and 
soft law mechanisms in combination. Both sets of instruments should be pursued, but 
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they also need to be improved, as suggested above. Therefore, I conclude that the 
answer lies not in the strict choice between binding legislation and private orderings, 
but rather in their coexistence, mutual reinforcement and improvement. 
International economic law is becoming more and more open to non-economic 
concerns, but this research demonstrated that current efforts only have limited 
success. The available mechanisms need to be ‘hardened’, deepened, considered 
with more seriousness. Globalisation is an unavoidable reality and foreign investment 
will not slow down, which means that it is urgent to develop solutions for the problems 
they may cause. It is everyone’s responsibility to fight for change. Building on the 
foundations that have already been laid is essential, not just for the protection of 
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